Editorial from The Economist

In itself, East Timor does not amount to much: it is a tiny territory of some 800,000 people coveted by Indonesia, a country of 200m. That is why the rest of the world has never been much bothered by what happened there. But even tiny places can become significant. If the world fails the East Timorese again, the consequences will be felt far beyond the fringes of South-East Asia.

The body most immediately concerned is the United Nations. It could hardly have prevented Indonesia from invading East Timor in 1975, after Portugal, the colonial power, had bolted—though America, which knew the invasion was coming and did nothing to stop it, is far less blameless. Nor could the UN have stopped Indonesia from then annexing the territory and embarking on a campaign of repression that was to claim, directly or indirectly, some 200,000 lives.

To its credit, moreover, the UN never recognised Indonesian rule and when, last January, President B.J. Habibie surprisingly offered the East Timorese a referendum, the UN organised it with admirable efficiency: 98.6% of the eligible voters cast their ballots on August 30th, and 78.5% of them opted for independence. But now the territory is engulfed by violence, most of it carried out by militias determined to frustrate the voters' clear desire. Foremost responsibility for this, as for East Timor's earlier suffering, is Indonesia's. But the UN, having agreed to hold the vote, and on Mr Habibie's timetable, is now so involved that it too will be guilty of a most terrible breach of trust if the East Timorese are denied their independence, or gain it only after another bloodbath.

Unfortunately, however, the UN is not an autonomous organisation whose boss has at his beck and call the troops needed to impose law and order in unruly parts of the world. It is the servant of its members, especially the five countries with permanent seats on the Security Council. Two of these, China and Russia, generally stand up for oppressed peoples only when it suits their ideological or other interests. But the three others, America, Britain and France, nowadays proclaim nobler principles and, over Kosovo at least, have been prepared to rain down bombs and rockets for them. In terms of persecution, the East Timorese have surely suffered more than the Kosovars, and arguably the UN's obligation to them is more explicit. So where are the West's principles now?

On hold, is the answer. Some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, are ready to provide peacekeepers. Australia well might since it has a particularly guilty conscience about the East Timorese: though they fought in the second world war to help prevent a Japanese invasion of Australia, the Australians ever nervous of their big neighbour shamefully broke western ranks to recognise Indonesia's rule of the annexed territory. But even Australia will not send in its forces without permission from the Indonesian government.

That is what must now be extracted. No one wants to take on the Indonesian army, which is widely accused of orchestrating the militias. And no one wants to destabilise the world's fourth-biggest country, especially as it is struggling to restore its economy and establish democracy. On the contrary, outsiders are anxious to help. But they should do so only if the Indonesian government is sincere in what it says it is doing and, to judge by its actions this week, it is not.

Mr Habibie may well have miscalculated in allowing the referendum: he may have reckoned that the vote would go Indonesia's way. Neither he nor anyone in the army should miscalculate again. They should be left in no doubt now that the world will not allow Indonesia to hang on to East Timor, as it did in 1975. The current mess is, after all, a direct consequence of that piece of misguided realpolitik.

Where are you, ASEAN?

Conceivably, diplomatic pressure alone could still work. It will have a better chance of doing so if it does not all come from the West. Indonesia's Asian neighbours have a powerful interest in regional peace. Some of them also say they resent the West's predominance on the world stage. Why then don't they help to bring a little order to their own neck of the woods by leaning on the powers-that-be in Indonesia? The West, however, must also weigh in, making it plain that, regardless of Indonesia's parlous economy, it will not lend money to a country in which militias, with the connivance of the army, make a bloodstained mockery of elections.

But diplomacy may not be enough. In that case, the UN, meaning the Security Council, will have to threaten, and be ready to use, force, even without Indonesia's permission. If it does not, it is hard to see it being taken seriously in such circumstances again. Rather it will be treated as an outfit that merely organises votes and then scuttles, leaving the local thugs to seize control (as in Cambodia). That would hearten despots the world over, and dash the hopes of millions in countries where the big powers have no direct interest.

Yet the big powers too would suffer. China, Russia and the West all stand to gain from an orderly world. If the UN collapses in disrepute, like the League of Nations, the prospects of finding international solutions for international problems, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction, will simply vanish. Perhaps then those western countries that could not tolerate mass murder in Kosovo will wonder why they could so readily tolerate it in insignificant East Timor.