By Joseph Fitchett

In Sri Lanka, Eritrea and Sierra Leone, War Rolls On

The crisis in Sierra Leone, and Western passivity as it unfolds, has caused anger and embarrassment in European capitals, where the political paralysis is seen as proof of the limits on the international community's readiness to back its rhetoric about humanitarian intervention and UN attempts to police peace settlements.

Publicly, governments have been reluctant to accuse each other. Privately, however, reproaches are rife about political fumbles in European capitals, in Washington and at United Nations headquarters. European policymakers, smarting at their own limitations in dealing with the plight of Sierra Leone, in private blame the Clinton administration for failing to provide a U.S. core for multinational military action.

Without significant outside intervention in Sierra Leone, Western officials said Monday, the outlook is bleak. British paratroops can protect Freetown, the capital, long enough for an international evacuation. In the longer run, however, there seems scant likelihood that an international force will impose the peace plan, which was signed by all sides. The British holding action, officials said in Europe, was likely to provide only a delay before a resumption of the rebellion, launched with such carnage by Foday Sankoh.

European officials, normally prompt in their praise of UN authority, voiced stinging criticism of Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his top peacekeeping staff for jeopardizing the UN's prestige in an increasingly hopeless-looking operation. A Clinton administration official went even further: ''What may be on the point of eclipse is not just the credibility of the UN but also any prospect of humanitarian causes being a justification for international intervention.''

European officials have been reluctant to draw attention publicly to the European Union's divisions and inability to act alone, but they privately complained that an international response has been curbed by the Clinton administration's embrace of a military doctrine of no casualties. That means that U.S. infantrymen can only deploy with massive protecting firepower, a military requirement that turns any expedition into an expensive and politically risky venture.

Ironically, a British policymaker said, ''you actually wouldn't need a huge force to take down Sankoh.'' But, he added angrily, ''Nobody is even thinking about that anymore because the Clinton people damn well refuse to involve any boys.''

Capturing Mr. Sankoh and disarming his forces seem to be required under the strong language of the Security Council resolution on Sierra Leone, which used the phrase about ''all necessary measures,'' which means military force in diplomatic jargon.

But in Washington, the turn of events in Sierra Leone has ominous overtones of the fiasco in Somalia in 1993. President Bill Clinton was scarred when UN forces, spearheaded by U.S. troops, were mauled in the course of trying to capture a warlord in Mogadishu. Mr. Clinton and the Pentagon agreed on quick U.S. withdrawal and a policy of never again running such political risks.

The European Union, aware of this U.S. reluctance, has pledged to acquire more muscle itself. The EU has said that it will have a 50,000-man force by 2003. But even if those troops were available today, officials said it was doubtful that Europe could agree to send a major expedition.

Britain is dogged by dubious relations with its old colony. The Blair government has drawn fierce press criticism for alleged mistakes in brokering a peace deal in Sierra Leone at any price last year. In addition, British newspapers reported, the Blair government forced the Sierra Leone authorities to dismiss mercenary armies - Executive Outcomes from South Africa and Sandline from Britain - that provided the government's only effective defense against the rebels.

France's forces are overstretched and must stay ready to act in Lebanon, Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said to reporters last week. Mr. Vedrine sounded skeptical about Mr. Annan's chances of getting reinforcements. ''If he can get the forces he needs for the mission, more power to him; but if he can't, then the only alternative is to renegotiate the terms of the deal'' in Sierra Leone.

Mr. Annan is widely criticized privately in Europe for encouraging the UN to begin an operation in Sierra Leone for which it lacked the military clout and with no prospect of getting a surge of support in a crisis. ''He had considerable experience with peacekeeping in his old UN jobs and he should have realized that the Security Council was risking its political credibility,'' according to a French diplomat.