United Nations After Annan

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By Shashi Tharoor

Namibian
April 28, 2006


"The most impossible job on earth" was how the first United Nations secretary-general (SG), Trygve Lie, described the post to his successor, Dag Hammarskjold, in 1953. Time has not made the job any easier.

Framers of the UN Charter gave the SG two distinct functions: "Chief administrative officer of the organisation" and also an independent official whom the General Assembly and Security Council can entrust with certain unspecified (but implicitly political) tasks. Each holder of the office must demonstrate whether he is more Secretary than General.

Paradoxes abound. The SG is expected to enjoy the backing of governments, especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, but be above partiality to any of them. He establishes his credentials by bureaucratic or diplomatic service, but, once elected, must transcend his past and serve as a voice of the world, even a 'secular Pope'.

The SG is entrusted with assisting member states to make sound and well-informed decisions, which he is then obliged to execute, but he is also authorised to influence their work and even to propose actions that they should undertake. He administers a complex organisation and serves as head of the UN agencies, but must exercise this role within budgetary and regulatory constraints imposed by the member governments.

True, the SG has an unparalleled agenda-shaping authority. But he does not have the power to execute all his ideas, and he articulates a vision that only governments can fulfil. He moves the world, but he cannot direct it. It was Hammarskjold who, at the height of the Cold War, first argued that an impartial civil servant could be "politically celibate" without being "politically virgin".

The SG could play a political role without losing his impartiality, provided he hewed faithfully to the Charter and to international law. With the Cold War's end, Kofi Annan has gone further than his predecessors in using the bully pulpit of his office. He boldly raised the question of the morality of intervention and the duty of the individual to follow his conscience, and he challenged member states to resolve the tensions between state sovereignty and their responsibility to protect ordinary people.

Often, an SG can raise an awkward question but not dictate the appropriate answer; Annan's historic speech to the General Assembly in 1999 on intervention set a thousand flowers blooming at think tanks and among op-ed columnists, but it has not led to a single military intervention to protect the oppressed.

The UN is often seen embodying international legitimacy, yet the SG's pronouncements often have less impact on the conduct of member states than the Pope's strictures on birth control. The SG knows that he can accomplish little without support of members whose inaction on one issue or another he might otherwise want to denounce. He cannot afford to allow frustration on any one issue to affect his ability to elicit cooperation from governments on a range of others. Annan once made the point by citing an old Ghanaian proverb: "Never hit a man on the head when you have your fingers between his teeth".

Today's single-superpower world also means that the SG must manage a relationship that is vital to the UN's survival without mortgaging his own integrity and independence. The insistent demands of some in the US that the UN prove its utility to America - demands that could not have been made in the same terms during the Cold War - oblige an SG to walk a tightrope between heeding US priorities and the preferences of the membership as a whole. Paradoxically, he can be most useful to the US when he demonstrates his independence from it.

Member states' increasing micro-management of budgets has also weakened the SG's authority. Both Annan and his predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, embarked on ambitious administrative reforms, but were unable to address the far greater levels of procedural and regulatory inertia in areas under the authority of the member states.

No SG has enjoyed real independence from governments: The UN operates without embassies or intelligence services, and member states resist any attempt to acquire such capabilities. Indeed, today the SG commands great diplomatic legitimacy, and even greater media visibility, but less political power than the language of the UN Charter suggests.

To be effective, he must be skilled at managing staff and budgets, gifted at public diplomacy, and able to engage the loyalties of a wide array of external actors, including non-governmental organisations, business groups, and journalists. He also must convince the nations of the poor and conflict-ridden South that their interests are uppermost in his mind while ensuring that he can work effectively with the wealthy and powerful North.

He must recognise the powers and the prerogatives of the Security Council, especially its five permanent members, while staying attentive to the priorities and passions of the General Assembly. And he must present member states with politically achievable proposals and implement his mandates within the means they provide him. Above all, he must conceive and project a vision of the UN as it should be, while administering and defending the organisation as it is. Truly an impossible job.


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