Global Policy Forum

A United Nations vote on statehood for Palestine will not determine whether and how a Palestinian state is established and recognized. That will be determined predominantly by the political realities dividing and linking Israel and Palestine. However, regional and global factors may influence the timing and shape of the forthcoming Palestinian state, the extent to which its prospects for peace and prosperity are enhanced and the basis on which its relations with surrounding states are put in place. Since one important area in which exogenous factors may be as important as internal factors in Palestine and Israel is refugee return, it is worth exploring what those factors are, how they can be altered to foster successful reintegration of the returning refugees and how that process will influence an eventual Palestinian state's relationships with other states.

Right of Return

This essay will not rehash the well-worn path of the right of return or negotiations over that right. The historical patterns of refugee return in general are far more important in helping to understand the anticipated problems of return in the Palestinian case. Nevertheless, since the evolution of that doctrine and, more importantly, its perception will also have an impact, the issue has to be briefly revisited, especially from the perspective of perceptions.

Palestinians perceive themselves as victims of a long colonial process that began at least in 1917 and continued with the establishment of Israel in 1947-49. For Palestinians, colonization denied them a national existence. Al-Nakba (the catastrophe), the defeat of the Arab invasion of the nascent Israel and the exodus of about 700,000 Arab residents from what became Israel are the most important experiences defining the Palestinian identity. These experiences were exacerbated by the dominant view among Palestinians that their trauma ushered in the widely celebrated Jewish return to national self-determination after a two-millennium exile. Palestinians did not experience the influx of Jews into mandatory Palestine as the salvation from extermination of another people, one rejected by the other nations of the world, but rather as Palestinian victimization through the foisting of the European Jewish problem on them. 

In Elias Khoury's 1998 novel, "Gate of the Sun" ("Bab al-Shams"), the Palestinian exodus defined Palestinians as the Jews of the Jews, the new wandering people whose collective national identity is characterized by dispossession, refugee status, impoverishment, longing for a vanished past and resistance. Return to homes and a homeland became a metaphorical existence in the face of the deprivation and occupation of that homeland by an alien people. 

In the parallel Israeli narrative of the Palestinian exodus, the Palestinian people voluntarily left their homeland. That narrative was exposed to be myth by the publication of Benny Morris' "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited." Based on Israeli and British archival research, Morris' work documented that although most refugees fled to escape from the violent conflict, forced expulsions by local commanders were widespread. Yet for Israeli Jews, responsibility for the violence of 1948 rested -- and still rests -- exclusively on the Arab states and the Palestinian leadership for their rejection of the partition plan and the invasion of Israel by five Arab armies.

Against this background, the right of return of Palestinian refugees evolved as a belief with mythical and moral force rather than a principle with any legal status. For the Jews of Israel, return, except for token humanitarian and family reunification, was a nonstarter and a perceived threat to the security of their own self-determination project. Count Folke Bernadotte's June 1948 proposal that Palestine refugees, both Jewish and Arab, should have the "right to return home without restriction and to regain possession of their property" -- or, as subsequently amended, the right of compensation if the refugees did not opt for repatriation -- became an abstract principle, given the absence of homes to return to following widespread destruction of those properties; the political, social and economic difficulties of return; and the failure of both sides to instigate any implementable compensation program.

As a result, the international community initially pursued regional resettlement. When that effort failed, return -- initially by the use of armed struggle as the sole means of liberating Palestine -- gradually morphed into a right for the Palestinians over the course of the next 30 years. Paragraph 11 of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948, which recommended that the refugees be permitted to return under certain conditions, was transformed into a central tenet in the collective belief system of the Palestinians. Years after the passage of the famous resolution, Palestinian return was interpreted and endorsed by the U.N. as a right held by all of those who fled or were forced to flee and became "a conditio sine qua non for the exercise of Palestinian rights to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty." Following Khalidi, many recent Palestinian statements on return omit any mention or reference to destination. 

Although the right of return occupies a central place in the Palestinian national identity and belief system, Khalil Shikaki, the noted Palestinian pollster, has documented that most Palestinian refugees do not anticipate or want to return. In a 2003 poll, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research showed that only 10 percent of respondents questioned in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon wanted to rebuild their homes under Israeli rule. Further, even against the background of the May 2011 refugee riots, recent Palestinian polls show that only 26 percent continue to endorse the right of Palestinian return to their 1948 homes as their top goal. Nevertheless, a March 2011 survey of Israelis by the Truman Institute at Hebrew University showed that 40 percent believed that the Palestinians' foremost objective is to recapture the territory occupied by the Jews. This background of conflicting myths, mantras, perspectives on history and adaptations partially shapes the prospects and impact of Palestinian refugee integration. 

The Protracted Palestinian Refugee Population

Though myths, mantras and deep-seated beliefs have an impact on refugee return and reintegration, facts are even more important. The most important of these facts is the number of Palestinian refugees expected to return to a Palestinian state. The numbers are far more modest than references to the total number of Palestinian refugees suggest. One reason for this is that half of the Palestinian refugees did not cross a pre-existing recognized border into another state. Rather, they fled within Palestine and became internally displaced persons (IDPs). These and their progeny constitute the current number of more than 1.1 million "refugees" in Gaza and the more than 1.6 million in the West Bank. Further, another 1.8 million Palestinians became citizens of Jordan, where they make up a majority of the country's population. Few of them are expected to repatriate. Thus, 4.5 million of the "refugees" registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) still live in what was mandatory Palestine. This means there are at most roughly 800,000 Palestinian refugees in the ordinary sense of the term potentially requiring repatriation and reintegration, with up to 400,000 in each of Lebanon and Syria.

In Syria, only half those refugees live in camps, with the others well-integrated into the Syrian economy. The more acute problem historically has been Lebanon, which has rejected integrating the refugees even into the local economy, though half the refugees have managed to integrate on their own. Assuming the repatriation of the refugees still registered and residing in camps in Syria and Lebanon, one is realistically faced with the repatriation and reintegration of possibly 300,000 people, a number that could rise to as many as 500,000 depending on the conditions of repatriation.

Assuming a figure of 400,000 returning to a country with a population of roughly 4 million, a new state of Palestine would have to absorb 10 percent of its existing population. That is a difficult but far from insurmountable challenge, especially if there were to be a transfer of territory from Israel to balance territory to be annexed by Israel. Transferring the housing in the more outlying Jewish settlements to the new state of Palestine would also alleviate the burden.

Several factors complicate such an optimistic assessment, however. First, 45 percent of the Palestinian IDPs in Gaza and one-third of the Palestinian IDPs in the West Bank still live in camps and have not been fully integrated over the past 60 years. Second, a key element in any effort at full reintegration of all the Palestinians who wish to return to a Palestinian state will be the amount of compensation available to the refugees for lost property. Arab states could divert compensation for Jewish refugees who were forced to flee Arab lands to the Palestinians to offset deficiencies in the Israeli compensation package, however blatantly unjust that would be to the former.

Not only is economy assistance directly important in assisting in the process of integration, but it is also very important in minimizing stigmatization, which creates lingering differentiation between returnees and residents in all repatriation efforts. Thus, the availability of money has a double impact in the process of integration.

In the case of the Palestinians, there is a third complicating factor: the presence and role of UNRWA. Set up in 1949 to provide "temporary direct relief and works" as an interim measure until a permanent solution to the Palestinian refugee crisis could be found, UNRWA went on to become the largest U.N. agency, with more than 28,000 employees. After its initial unsuccessful focus on development and settlement in other Arab states was abandoned, UNRWA morphed into a Ministry of Health, Education and Welfare for the Palestinian refugees, with a distinct emphasis on education. Its legacy is a well-educated Palestinian refugee population, but also a divided jurisdiction within Palestine and a dependence on massive outside assistance. Thus, the problem becomes one of not only integrating the refugees and IDPs still in camps, but also of integrating service-providing organizations into the new government. Such a step has so far been avoided, not only for ideological reasons but for economic motives as well, lest there be a decline in foreign aid now directed through UNRWA. 

Challenges of Integration and Return to the Prospective Palestinian State 

Based on the estimated 100,000 Palestinians who have already returned, lessons are not readily available on how to handle a return population of 300,000-400,000. This is because most of those who have returned so far can be characterized as a political elite, in the case of the "Tunisians" following the signing of the Oslo Accords, and an economic elite, comprised mostly of well-off American Palestinians returning to establish successful businesses and build substantial homes. Neither group of returnees comprised of refugees from the camps.

Further, as outlined above, the very notion of return is identified in the Palestinian conceptual world with return to homes, not to homeland. But those homes were located in what is now Israel, and refugees are highly unlikely to return to them given Israeli policy for more than 60 years; historical patterns from ethnic and confessional displacements throughout the world in the past century; and the reality that the vast majority of those homes no longer exist. So it is perhaps best to turn first to the issue of the IDPs -- that is, those already living within what will almost certainly become a Palestinian state -- before dealing with the return of Palestinian refugees not currently living within Palestine.

For a reference point, it helps to refer to another case of reintegration of IDPs in the region, that of Lebanon. In Lebanon, one-third of the population was internally displaced by the civil war, resulting in "confessional divisions" and "the imposition of quasi-religious homogeneity in different areas of the country." In spite of strenuous efforts by many agencies, Lebanese IDPs largely did not return to their homes if doing so meant they would have to live as a minority.

In contrast, Palestinians are not deeply divided by confessional or ethnic divisions, making integration primarily a matter of economic and social support. Further, in the West Bank, there has not been widespread destruction of infrastructure. On the contrary, enormous efforts have recently been put into developing governmental and physical infrastructure. (On the other hand, though roadblocks and checkpoints are gradually coming down in the West Bank, many areas are still partially occupied, and many roadblocks and checkpoints remain, seriously impeding transportation and communications.) Further, given both the Palestinian governmental and the UNRWA systems, schools are bountiful compared to almost all other situations of refugee and IDP return, though Palestinians face the task of integrating the two systems. The political division between Gaza and the West Bank means that there is a potential internal spoiler to sabotage programs that might successfully integrate the refugees, especially if they were to contribute to positive relations with Israel. But if the current peace is further reinforced by a peace agreement, the issue of physical insecurity will also be alleviated. 

The only real problem will then be budgetary constraints. However, if past patterns of financial support are available, infusions of significant capital will continue. If this is reinforced by payment of compensation claims either directly from Israel or as offsets by Arab states, Palestine could enjoy a period of rapid growth and prosperity that could even outpace the high economic growth rate of the West Bank over the past several years. Comparison with virtually any other IDP situation suggests the prospects for Palestine are by far the best, reinforced by the fact that its largest trading partner -- even if they are still formally at war -- is Israel, a country that is now part of the First World and a leading high-tech innovator. 

Do the international norms for IDPs provide any insight into what to expect? First, as already suggested, Palestinian IDPs do not face the same special-assistance and protection needs of virtually all other IDPs. They already enjoy virtually the same degree of human rights protections -- as well as human rights infringements from their own government and the Israelis -- as others living in Palestine. Further, a number of very active civil society organizations, at least in the West Bank, have emerged to strengthen those protections. In principle the Palestinian Authority already carries the primary responsibility for the IDPs, though in practice, UNRWA has assumed that responsibility. It needs only to be legally transferred to the government, albeit the latter is not eager to assume that burden unless the financial and logistical support via UNRWA continues at least for a few years. Nevertheless, there is no absence of will or capacity on the part of the state or national authorities. Thus, though IDP norms offer little guidance applicable to Palestinian IDPs, they do suggest a very optimistic outlook in dealing with their integration.

Is the same true of the Palestinian refugees likely to return from Lebanon and Syria? Palestine will offer a breath of relative freedom compared with conditions in Syria under President Bashar Assad. If offered economic assistance in the way of compensation for lost properties, the refugees will have to decide whether their prospects are better in a post-Assad Syria or in a nascent Palestinian state, with all the uncertainties that both imply. In most of the Middle East countries where Palestinians found refuge, the dictators for a multitude of reasons served as their protector. Whether that history will have any repercussions for Palestinians who remain in a post-Assad Syria remains to be seen.

By contrast, large-scale repatriation from Lebanon can be expected. Lebanon was the country most resistant to integrating Palestinians -- lest the delicate balance between Christians, Muslims and Druze be upset -- and the Palestinians have historically contributed to both instigating and exacerbating violent conflict within Lebanon and between Lebanon and Israel. With the rise in power of Lebanon's Shiites, the formation of a Hezbollah-dominated government allied with Iran and an overt and explicit policy of rejecting any Israeli state in the Middle East, Lebanon will not likely be supportive of a Palestinian state that provides such recognition.

Nor will there be support among Lebanese for any surrender of the principle of a right of return. Would Lebanon then impede a likely large return to Palestine of Palestinian refugees? The prospect is unlikely, but as long as Hezbollah remains the predominant power in Lebanon with its own armed militia, Lebanon will most assuredly become the home for those Palestinians who reject any deal with Israel on compensation and refugee return to Palestine.

Though Lebanese attitudes, as well as those of Syria, will have an impact on the success of refugee return, the exodus of Palestinians from Syria and Lebanon is unlikely to have a detrimental social and political effect on those countries, though each will lose an important source of educated professionals and a positive contribution to the domestic economies.

Exogenous Policy Approaches and Issues

Given this realistic scenario, what role can external actors play in fostering an outcome that ensures the greatest stability for Palestine and an environment that successfully integrates both IDPs and refugees? First, Countries from outside the Middle East can foster the shift in redefining the issue of return to mean return to a national homeland. Second, those states can also foster the integration of UNRWA with the Palestinian Authority and its successor government, while continuing aid for several years, a process that need not wait for a formal peace deal between Israel and Palestine. Third, plans for compensation, including offsets for the property lost by Jews forced to flee Arab lands, should be underway to ensure that action is taken as soon as the process of integration and reintegration begins and that the infusion of capital is readily available to enhance the success of that process. Given past experience, this is unlikely to take place in a timely manner, but the longer the delay, the less likelihood there is that compensation will play a positive role in fostering return and integration. Without that infusion of capital, prospects of successful return and integration still remain very positive, but countries should do their best to ensure the process has the best possible start.   

Endogenous Policy Approaches and Challenges

Whatever the responsibilities and roles of external actors, the prime responsibility for integrating IDPs and refugees will rest on the Palestinian government. The new state will have to deal with amending and reinterpreting the myth of a right of return, shifting it from a right of return to homes to a celebration of a return to a homeland, hopefully using the reality of nonreturn for all other refugees and IDPs from ethnic conflict in the rest of the world as a point of reference. Palestine will finally have to face the task of integrating those who live in camps with those who live outside, those labeled as refugees and those who trace their roots to the West Bank and Gaza. Palestine will have the onerous task of working out a satisfactory compensation package with Israel and the international community -- including other Arab states, which, because of their role in the flight of Arab Jews, are destined to play an important role. Palestine will also be tasked with the challenge of integrating two different institutional structures for taking care of the education, health and welfare of Palestinians.

All of these efforts will in part depend on Palestinians reinventing themselves as winners focused on a dynamic and creative future, eschewing both a narrative that depicts them as victims whose lives have been scarred by international events that many believe they had no part in bringing about, and a nostalgic but unrealizable desire to return to their lost homes. Given the proven intellectual and creative capacities of Palestinians and the educational and technical skills they possess, all of these challenges can be met. Hopefully, education and skill reinforced by financial aid and the pressures of reality will overcome the powerful gravitational pull of myth and nostalgia.