May 1996
1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
It is generally agreed that the present membership of the Security Council is in need of expansion, if only to reflect the steady rise in membership of the United Nations. General membership has grown from 51 members in 1945, to 113 in 1965 (date of the Council's only enlargement, from eleven to fifteen seats), to 185 today.
The five permanent members all belong to the Northern Hemisphere, and four of them are economically developed Countries, while one is rapidly approaching industrialized status. To add new permanent seats only for two developed Countries, which also belong to the Northern Hemisphere, would not be equitable or democratic. Rather than correct the existing imbalance, such a solution would aggravate it.
Moreover, the establishment of new permanent seats would extend a situation of eternal privilege to other Countries. Such a development would be anachronistic and incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality of States, which lies at the foundations of the United Nations. Fifty years after the establishment of the Organization, an imaginative effort is needed to search for new formulas, rather than merely extending old privileges to other Countries.
The reform must move in a democratic, not an elitist direction.
A more equitable solution for all would be to increase non-permanent seats only, as was the case with the reform of 1965. Among other things, this would prevent the difficulties connected with the proliferation of veto power and its dangers.
The numbers speak clearly: 77 Countries have never been members of the Security Council, while 47 others have been able to serve only once (see annex I). The problem stems mainly from the fact that, within each geographic group, several large Countries tend to compete for a Security Council seat much more frequently, thus elbowing out the smaller Countries. A formula must be found to redress this chronic situation and provide for a greater and more regular involvement of the many, not of the few, in the Security Council.
2) THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Italy first presented its proposal on June 30, 1993, in response to the Secretary-General's questionnaire. The proposal was later illustrated by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs before the General Assembly on September 30, 1993, and gradually modified in light of observations and proposals made by other Countries in the course of the meetings of the "Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council." The present document is the latest revision of the Italian proposal, which can now be summarized as follows:
-- The two categories of permanent and non-permanent members should be kept, and the current permanent membership of five should remain the same;
-- Ten new non-permanent seats should be added. For each of these seats, 3 States would be rotating, making a total of 30 States. Consequently, each of them would remain two years on and four consecutive years off the Council. These 30 States, which therefore would rotate more frequently and regularly than others, should be selected on the basis of objective criteria to be determined by the General Assembly.
-- All 30 Countries, due to rotate more frequently and regularly, would be subject to regular elections. They would need to obtain two-thirds of the votes of the General Assembly, by secret ballot, in a manner similar to the present clean-slate mechanism, everytime it is their turn. Should the candidates not obtain a majority by the third ballot, the second Country from the same sub-group of three States could then run, according to the same procedure. If this second Country also fails to obtain the required majority, this seat would become open to election to all members of the same geographic group, according to current practices.
-- Obviously this model presupposes maintaining the Charter provision that bans immediate reelection for a member who has just completed a two-year term. In fact, if the ban were to be abolished, the number of spaces available for other Countries would automatically be reduced, limiting the right of all to equitable representation. We should not forget that in the League of Nations, the possibility of immediate reelection to a seat on the Council was one of its key problems.
-- The list of the above-mentioned 30 Countries to rotate with greater frequency and regularity would be subject to periodic revisions (every 10, 12 or 15 years), thus avoiding the risk of creating new situations of "eternal" privilege. The assessment should depend essentially on the degree to which a Country has managed to honor the commitment and meet the increased responsibilities stemming from its more frequent rotation. If it has not, it should by replaced, by Resolution of the General Assembly, with another Country.
-- The geographic distribution of these additional non-permanent seats should be such as to privilege the continents that are currently under-represented. So if 10 new seats were to be added, 5 of them should go to the African and Asian groups, two to the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), two to the Western European and Others Group (WEOG, which by itself continues to shoulder 65.13 % of the U.N. regular budget and 73.675 % of the peace-keeping budget), and one to the Eastern European Group. In this way 70 % of the additional non-permanent seats would be reserved for developing Countries.
-- For financing peace-keeping operations, the present permanent members are required to pay a sum amounting to their contribution to the regular budget, plus a surcharge. The possibility could be envisaged of charging the more frequently and regularly rotating members an additional percentage on their financial contributions to peace-keeping operations, equivalent to half the percentage paid by the permanent members for the same purpose. This would greatly help the U.N. to overcome its present financial crisis, and spread the additional burden to a group of 30 Countries rather than to two or five members alone. The Secretary-General has recently written, "The organization's excessive dependence on the assessments of a single Member State is unhealthy." The same would also be true if the United Nations had to depend only on the assessments of two or three Member States.
-- Finally, the majority required for the adoption of a resolution, provided for by Article 27 of the Charter, should be adjusted to the new size of the Security Council. Consequently, the Council would make decisions by an affirmative vote of 15 members rather than by the present nine.
3) CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES TO ROTATE WITH GREATER FREQUENCY AND REGULARITY
By way of example, one could consider the following criteria:
-- The contribution of Member States to "the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization" (article 23 of the Charter).
-- Equitable geographic distribution (article 23 of the Charter).
-- The capacity and willingness of States to contribute specifically to peace-keeping operations with military personnel, equipment and financial resources.
-- The ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for humanitarian activities, economic development, and the protection of human rights.
Needless to say, additional criteria could be taken into consideration.
4) ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
Following are some of the benefits to the Organization:
-- An enlarged Council more representative of the increased general U.N. membership.
-- Avoidance of new situations of "eternal" privilege, as would occur instead if additional permanent seats were created.
--A greater and more democratic participation of all member States in the activities of the Council, which is a basic premise for more effective decisions.
-- A more equitable geographic distribution of the seats in the Council. It is easier to obtain this result on a basis of 30 Countries than on the more limited basis of two or five additional permanent-member Countries.
-- An important incentive for more frequently and regularly rotating members to keep or increase their commitment to achieving the objectives of the Charter, in particular for the maintenance of international peace and security. Such members might be asked to make an increased contribution to peace-keeping operations: this would be a tangible sign of the greater responsibilities deriving from their more frequent presence in the Council.
-- Lowering the growing contentiousness that seems to characterize elections to the Security Council.
5) ADVANTAGES FOR ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES
The proposal also presents a set of concrete advantages for all member States of the United Nations, namely:
-- Smaller Countries would be given a more fair chance of being elected to a non-permanent seat by removing and shielding them from the unequal competition of the larger ones in each regional group. Even better, rotation agreements could be reached, and respected, within each group, thus ensuring that also for ordinary rotation the "clean slate" formula could be adopted.
-- Countries rotating more frequently and regularly would be given recognition of their more substantial role in support of the United Nations. They could also plan--in a more regular and long-term way--their policy of support for the United Nations and their contribution, financial and otherwise, to the achievement of the goals of the Organization, in particular to those of the Security Council. Furthermore, these Countries could establish among themselves special liaisons, in groups of 3, for rotating the additional non-permanent seats.
-- The permanent members could see their present burden for peace-keeping operations reduced, since it could be shared not with 2 or 5 additional members, but with 30 more frequently and regularly rotating Countries.
6) REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE EXTENSION OF VETO POWER.
Veto power--invoked as an inalienable prerogative of permanent membership by some Countries aspiring to that status--is an institution that may have been justified during the Cold War years. Nowadays, the hope of many is that it may become obsolete through non-use.
While in recent years the permanent members have shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto, it is also true that nothing guarantees that this tendency will continue and become irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat to use the veto can have a strong impact on the Security Council's proceedings and the final outcome of its debates.
This is why Italy is opposed to extending veto power to other Countries. One of the main advantages of the Italian proposal, to increase non-permanent members--is that the issue of such an extension would not arise at all.
Moreover, while it may appear unrealistic to hope that the current holders of the veto be willing to spontaneously renounce it, Italy shares the opinion of those who believe that its use should nevertheless be regulated and contained as much as possible: by trying to limit its area of application, for example, or requiring at least two vetoes to block the adoption of a Resolution.
7) FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
If the Italian proposal were adopted, the General Assembly would maintain its central role and link with the Security Council for the following reasons:
a) it would be up to the General Assembly to determine, by a Resolution and on the basis of objective and agreed upon criteria, the list of 30 Countries rotating more frequently and regularly;
b) the General Assembly would periodically, every 10-15 years, review such a list and make changes in its composition;
c) all non-permanent members of the Council--without exception--would have to submit to elections by secret ballot in the General Assembly, and obtain a two-thirds majority;
An increase in permanent seats would widen the gap between the Security Council and the General Assembly, since the new permanent members would not have to stand for democratic elections, and thus would not in practice be accountable to the General Assembly. The Italian project would instead foster a smoother and more harmonious relationship between the two bodies.
Critics of this formula imply that it ultimately creates a third category of members. This is simply not so. First of all, in their initial selection, review and election for every term, these Countries would be totally subject to the decisions of the General Assembly, like all non-permanent members. Secondly, while members rotating more frequently and regularly would stand for election every six years, the other countries could compete--in theory--every four years. Thirdly, shielded from the competition of larger Countries, mid-sized and small States could in turn establish fair rotation agreements among themselves for "clean slates," with a realistic hope of being elected.
What the Italian proposal aims to do is ease rivalries and foster a climate of greater harmony. Other projects would instead heighten the competition between them. In fact, the major beneficiaries of such a reform would be the smaller and mid-sized States, 79 of which have been kept out of the Council so far.
Last but not least, such a reform would be easy to implement. All that would be needed is to amend two articles in the U.N. Charter: article 23 (composition), to reflect the increase in non-permanent members, and article 27 (voting), to indicate the new majority required for decisions.
TERMS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL Non-Permanent Members JANUARY 1996 MEMBER STATES WHO HAVE NOT SERVED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1 Afghanistan 27 Estonia 53 Palau
2 Albania 28 Fiji 54 Papua New Guinea
3 Andorra 29 Gambia 55 Qatar
4 Angola 30 Georgia 56 Rep. of Moldova
5 Antigua & Barbuda 31 Grenada 57 St. Kitts & Nevis
6 Armenia 32 Guatemala 58 Saint Lucia
7 Azerbaijan 33 Haiti 59 St. Vincent
8 Bahamas 34 Iceland 60 Samoa
9 Bahrain 35 Israel 61 San Marino
10 Barbados 36 Kazakhstan 62 Sao Tome & Principe
11 Belize 37 Kyrgyzstan 63 Saudi Arabia
12 Bhutan 38 Lao People's Dem. Rep. 64 Seychelles
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 Latvia 65 Singapore
14 Brunei Darussalam 40 Lesotho 66 Slovak Rep.
15 Cambodia 41 Liechtenstein 67 Slovenia
16 Central African Rep. 42 Lithuania 68 Solomon Islands
17 Chad 43 Luxembourg 69 South Africa
18 Comoros 44 Malawi 70 Suriname
19 Croatia 45 Maldives 71 Swaziland
20 Cyprus 46 Marshall Islands 72 Tajikistan
21 Dem. People's Rep. Korea 47 Micronesia (Federated States of) 73 The Former Yugoslavia
22 Dominica 48 Monaco 74 Turkmenistan
23 Dominican Republic 49 Mongolia 75 Uzbekistan
24 El Salvador 50 Mozambique 76 Vanuatu
25 Equatorial Guinea 51 Myanmar 77 Vietnam
26 Eritrea 52 Namibia
LIST OF COUNTRIES ELECTED ONLY ONCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
1 Bangladesh 24 Libya
2 Belarus 25 Madagascar
3 Benin 26 Mali
4 Botswana 27 Malta
5 5 Burkina Faso 28 Mauritania
6 Burundi 29 Mauritus
7 Cameroon 30 Nicaragua
8 Cape Verde 31 Niger
9 Congo 32 Oman
10 Costa Rica 33 Paraguay
11 Czech Republic 34 Portugal
12 Djibouti 35 Rep. of Korea
13 Gabon 36 Rwanda
14 Greece 37 Sierra Leone
15 Guinea 38 Somalia
16 Guinea-Bissau 39 Sri Lanka
17 Honduras 40 Sudan
18 Iran 41 Tanzania
19 Jamaica 42 Thailand
20 Kenya 43 Togo
21 Kuwait 44 Trinidad and Tobago
22 Lebanon 45 United Arab Emirates
23 Liberia 46 Uruguay
47 Yemen
