Global Policy Forum

By Simon Tisdall

The Bush administration's battle to secure a tough new UN security council resolution on Iraq is approaching a climax. The word from the White House is that after over a month of discussions, it's time to wrap it up.

Having been presented with the "final" US draft, the council is expected to meet again this weekend. US diplomats are adamant that their government, having toned down some of the draft's provisions, is unwilling to make further concessions to critics led by France and Russia.

One of three outcomes is possible in this high-stakes game of diplomatic poker; all are potentially hugely damaging on a wide range of fronts. That consideration prompts a more basic question about the wisdom of President George Bush's approach.

One possible outcome is that the UN will pass the resolution. On this scenario, permanent members such as France, Russia and China, despite their deep-seated misgivings, will reluctantly abstain rather than use their veto powers. But the US will still gain the required nine or more votes in favour from the council's total 15 members.

In theory, such a victory would satisfy the administration. It would certainly come as a great relief to the British government, which has backed Washington and helped frame the draft. Prime minister Tony Blair urged Bush to take the Iraq issue to the UN and seek its backing for any future action.

On the other hand, hardliners within the administration may view such success with mixed feelings. They do not believe for a minute that resumed weapons inspections (which will follow a UN agreement) will eradicate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.

The hawks fear that inspections will simply allow Saddam to gain time and that, as in the past, he will find ways to thwart the inspectors and bamboozle the international community. An inspection and report-back period lasting up to 135 days, as envisaged in the resolution, could seriously disrupt the Pentagon's timetable and regional preparations for military action.

A second possible outcome is that the draft resolution is put to a vote and is vetoed by either France or Russia, or both, or otherwise fails to attract the crucial nine votes in favour.

The third possibility is that, realising that it lacks sufficient support, the US decides not to force a vote at all and ends the discussion.

Bush and his officials have already made crystal clear what will happen if either of the above outcomes result. The US, they say, is prepared to go it alone and take all necessary measures, including military action, in pursuit of its national security interest. They will try to assemble a "coalition of the willing". And they will condemn the UN for its inability to stand up for itself and enforce its own, previous Iraq resolutions. This, they will say, indicates a fundamental lack of backbone.

It can thus plainly be seen why any of these three possible conclusions to the current UN debate are potentially damaging.

If the resolution as drafted is passed, and an inspection process resumes, parties to all three sides of the dispute may immediately begin to undermine it. France and Russia will continue to express the opinion that the resolution amounts to a "green light" for war and that its terms make it almost certain that Iraq will be unable to comply.

They will continue to argue that the UN should have been able to consider and vote on the issue again, if and when Iraq's non-compliance is asserted. As permanent council members, they may even try to ensure that that the UN does get a second bite. They will not support Bush's coalition and their example may lead others to follow suit. This may be particularly true of Arab countries that supported the Paris-Moscow stance. Iraq will try to exploit these divisions.

The administration hawks meanwhile will be looking for any chance to halt the inspection process and declare Saddam to be formally in "material breach" of his obligations, in defiance of the international community.

Since Iraq has to accept the resolution unconditionally within seven days of its passage, and declare a full inventory of the weapons it says it does not possess within 30 days, the hardliners may not have to wait long.

The inspection conditions, meanwhile, are so onerous and inflexible that even if the inspections recommence, it may be only be a matter of time before the process breaks down. For example, US and British warplanes continue to engage in almost daily exchanges with the Iraqi military in the northern and southern no-fly zones, where inspections are to take place. Such incidents, which may become entangled with efforts to provide security for the UN, have explosive potential.

Lastly, the Iraqis - who have consistently insisted that there was no need at all for a new UN resolution - may decide to reject it outright. Or, more likely, they will ostensibly go along with the new inspection regime while trying to ensure that it does not succeed and appealing for solidarity against US "imperialism".

This may all be thought bad enough. But the damage caused by the possible vetoing of the US resolution, or its withdrawal, will be even greater.

A US decision to go ahead anyway means that war may be considered a certainty. That in turn will face people like Blair with an agonising decision. It is no exaggeration to say that, given the state of British public and Labour party opinion, his support for US unilateral action could bring down his government. And much worse, in the longer term, the UN will have been perhaps fatally weakened.

A precedent will have been set, to all intents and purposes, that suggests that a member state, if it feels strongly enough about a given issue, can go ahead with pre-emptive military action without UN authority. That undermines the UN charter and international law and the system of collective responsibility and collective self-defence that has been in place (and fully supported by previous US administrations) since 1945. It is a recipe for chaos in international affairs. Perhaps there is yet a way out of this impasse but it is hard to see where it lies. And thus do these uniformly gloomy alternative outcomes raise a basic question about Bush's approach.

It is too late now, apparently, but Bush would surely have been better advised to put forward a resolution that could have commanded broad, positive international support. It may have taken a little longer. But the US would almost certainly have got what it wanted in the end, backed by firm international support.

Instead - by its aggressive and hasty approach and because of its previous, well-documented disdain for collective international policy-making, international treaties and consensual political action - the administration has divided its friends, alienated and undermined traditional allies, and now finds that its policies and motives (however well justified they seem to be) are widely distrusted.

This only strengthens America's enemies, the foremost among whom is not Saddam but the many-headed terrorists of al-Qaida and their global followers.

It may be safely assumed that these thugs are observing the ructions at the UN with enormous pleasure.

FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.