Global Policy Forum

The debate in Britain about a possible war is becoming too narrowly defined. Listen to the most prominent opponents of war against Iraq, and some of them make a significant qualification: their opposition would turn to support if the UN authorised an attack on Iraq by agreeing a new resolution. Across the political spectrum this is the common cry that links Clare Short, the Secretary of State for International Development, scores of dissenting Labour and Conservative MPs, the Liberal Democrats and many of the bishops who have expressed public concern about the possible conflict: no war without the explicit backing of the UN.

These dissenters make a powerful case. They are right to be alarmed at the prospect of a unilateral attack by the US, backed by Britain alone. With good cause they seek a way in which a precarious conflict can be made a little less dangerous by uniting the international community against Baghdad. But there are limits to their case. They elevate the UN almost to the point of deification; this distorts the arguments in the build-up to war.

The UN resolution, agreed at the end of last year, stated that false statements by Iraq about its armoury and failure to co-operate with the weapons inspectors would constitute a "material breach" of the country's obligations. The resolution is not clear about whether a further resolution is required to trigger war. This has led to a debate about whether that second resolution is desirable or essential. What the original UN resolution fails to address is whether Saddam plans to use his weapons in an act of aggression, even if he fails to co-operate with the inspectors. With possibly weeks to go before a war, the central question should not be the essentially tactical one of whether the US and the UK can persuade the likes of China and Russia to back a new UN resolution. It should be this: what is the evidence that Saddam is planning to use any of his apparently lethal weapons? Of course, intent is hard to prove, and impossible to prove conclusively. But if international law is being rewritten to justify pre-emptive strikes, the burden of proof for the US, Britain and the UN as a whole must be wider than mere possession of weapons.

It is quite possible that Saddam has acquired weapons for defensive purposes. This would not be entirely surprising given the array of powerful enemies ranged against him. In many ways it would be equally surprising if he did plan to use them, given the reprisals that would inevitably follow. Perhaps the tyrant is getting reckless, and is planning to risk conflagration including his own certain destruction by attacking a neighbouring country. But where is the evidence for this? Hawks in the US and British governments will argue that such a question is for liberals on a Saturday evening at a comfortable dinner party. They insist that after 11 September there is no space for such considerations. But let us briefly rehearse again the risks of a pre-emptive attack on Iraq. If Saddam possesses weapons of mass destruction he could use them in a final destructive act, most probably against Israel. There is the wider possibility that however successful the war against Saddam, the region becomes dangerously destabilised, fuelling anger against the West, at a time when the terrorist threat already seems more potent and immediate than any dangers posed by Saddam.

Mr Blair argues that the war against terrorism makes a strike against Saddam more urgent because the terrorists will soon acquire weapons of mass destruction from rogue states. In which case why attack Iraq alone, given the threat posed by North Korea and, arguably, other countries with a known nuclear capability? The Prime Minister's response to this question at his press conference last week was to say that "Iraq is the focus now", as if this almost happened by chance. Quite simply, Iraq is the focus because President Bush and Mr Blair have decided to make it the focus.

The calls for a second UN resolution have become a substitute for thought. They are the answer to the wrong question. We repeat that it would be better to have the backing of the UN for war than no backing at all. But the more fundamental question remains unanswered: what is the evidence that such a risky war is justified, with or without the backing of the UN? We shall keep asking this question and, until a satisfactory answer is forthcoming, we remain opposed to war.