Global Policy Forum

By Simon Tisdall

Within the cabinet, the Labour party and in the country at large, a touching faith is increasingly placed in the ability of the UN to extricate us from the Iraq mess. This sentiment, broadly shared across western Europe, was summed up last week by a British minister: "Stick to the UN and there will be infinitely less trouble and even no trouble at all."

Some people, including leftish MPs and bishops, seem to hope that, in effect, the UN will save us not from our avowed enemy, Iraq, but from our main ally, America. Many others, motivated by a wide range of different concerns, also focus on demands for a second UN security council debate and/or resolution that, unlike last autumn's resolution 1441, would specifically authorise, or block, military action.

Such hopes of salvation or absolution are woefully misplaced from almost every point of view. Those opposed to war have little reason to believe that the security council, having voted unanimously for 1441, will thwart the US now. Although the council's composition has changed since then, political considerations, rather than considerations of justice, remain uppermost for the four other permanent members.

None can ultimately afford to alienate the Bush administration on so definitive an issue. The most they may do is try for delay. The casting of a veto would be seen by Washington as tantamount to a hostile act. All four also have a considerable economic stake in a post-Saddam Iraq. Russia, for example, will want to recover sizeable Soviet-era debts; France, like the US, has strategically vital energy interests to pursue.

If it comes to a vote, it is almost inconceivable that an already severely chastened Germany, Spain's pro-American government, a compromised, indebted Pakistan or other equally impotent or impoverished non-permanent members will conclusively stand in the way of the US juggernaut. Thus, for those opposed to war, the UN process offers very little encouragement.

For those who have doubts but remain undecided, a second UN resolution has also assumed a key importance. UN authorisation of force would go a long way towards salving many consciences troubled by the prospect of yet more western violence aimed at the Iraqi people. "The UN's voted for it, so that's all right then" would be the comforting, responsibility-shifting refrain.

The Blair government understands this dynamic very well. Like the US, it initially opposed the French idea of a second resolution. Now Jack Straw and others say it is their preference. They know a vote in favour, or some form of UN consensus, would help calm party members, persuading them that the government (and also they themselves) had done all they could - and now had a primary duty to "support the UN". Concord would be restored, even as deathly discord loomed over Iraq.

What ministers also know, but are far less willing to say, is that a second UN vote will make no difference whatsoever to US intentions. In the unlikely event (see above) that the council tried to delay or block its invasion plans by more than a few weeks, the US can be expected to walk away. It will claim (as before) that it already has all the authority it needs. It will invite others to join with it. And then it will attack. On the other hand, if the council accepts its case and endorses action, then - in Washington's view - all well and good.

In other words, the current fixation with a second UN resolution is delusional. It enables the government to offer its supporters false reassurance. It allows the unpersuaded among the public a figleaf behind which to banish well-justified doubts. It is all smoke and mirrors, under whose cover we cower.

A second resolution will not somehow make war more just. It will not make it more moral. It will not make it less dangerous or any less of a "defeat for humanity", as the Pope puts it. It does not make it right. The push for a second resolution, whether or not it actually comes to pass, provides a get-out clause for all those who, for manifold different reasons, cannot or will not stand up to Washington's warmongers - including our own half-deaf, tag-along leadership - or are just plain confused, frightened or apathetic. It is no substitute for taking individual and collective responsibility.

Two other main props sustain the UN illusion. One is that somehow a second resolution will make a US-led invasion more legal, more above board. In fact, the opposite is the case and article 51, chapter VII of the UN charter is quite specific on this point. UN members, it states, have "an inherent right of individual or collective self-defence". But it goes on to make clear that such a right applies "if an armed attack occurs against a UN member".

In other words, the UN charter provides no legal basis for pre-emptive or offensive military action in Iraq of the kind envisaged by the US and Britain. It specifically warns members against spreading the "scourge of war" or otherwise undermining its central tenet of peaceful co-existence. Tony Blair's recent claim to be acting in self-defence against a "direct threat" from Iraq is highly contentious. In contrast, under the charter at least, all UN members would be legally enjoined to assist Iraq in repelling US-British aggression.

The inherent proposition here - that politically expedient, ad hoc UN resolutions can contradict or even override basic principles enshrined in the UN's founding charter - is surely both unacceptable and unsafe in law. Reform of council membership and procedures, supported in the past by Britain, is now a matter of urgency.

The other, crucial prop is evidential. Washington has already claimed a "material breach" (entailing "serious consequences") of 1441 following last month's reputedly false or incomplete Iraqi weapons declaration. US complaints also include a lack of "active cooperation". But the fact remains that proof of serious, serial deception is so far lacking; that there has been none of the predicted Iraqi obstruction; and that the inspectors, backed by Kofi Annan, want much more time to do their job properly. And even if a "smoking gun" were found in some Basra bunker, so what? This would be a success, meaning the investigations are working.

Which brings us, finally, to the one UN process that, in this context, is above politics, entirely legal and deserving of strong backing, to the one way the UN can extract us from this mess of our own making: the inspections. They should continue indefinitely under their present mandate, leading perhaps to a permanent monitoring and verification regime as long as Saddam remains in power. The UN need take no new action; no second resolution is required. The inspectors must be allowed to do their work free from false political pressures and military timetables. This is the "UN route" that all can and should support.

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