Global Policy Forum

By Simon Chesterman and David M. Malone *

The United States seeks to use the UN Security Council to contain Saddam Hussein before ousting him, probably by force. Other members, including Russia, China and France, are trying to use the council to contain the United States. The stakes are high, not least for the future of the Security Council itself.

It will consider the next step in the Iraq crisis after getting a report from the UN weapons inspectors this Monday. The council's decisions will have an impact far beyond the Middle East.

NATO's Kosovo campaign in 1999 bypassed the Security Council. A U.S.-led military operation against Iraq without the council's blessing would confirm the view that the United Nations can now be regarded as an optional extra in global security.

The fundamental divide is a trans-Atlantic one. The United States, in the words of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, holds that the mission should determine the coalition. In other words, U.S. policy will be implemented multilaterally where possible, unilaterally where necessary. This is the opposite of European decision-making, where coalitions largely determine policies and unilateralism is a four-letter word.

Tony Blair has strongly supported George W. Bush. Nevertheless, recent statements suggest that even Blair thinks that Washington may be pushing the Security Council too hard on Iraq. It is inconceivable that Blair would now abandon America, but France and Germany are in a stronger position to challenge the United States. This encourages Russian and Chinese reservations about early use of force against Iraq.

Washington and London have asserted repeatedly that they have evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. They have produced none, however, and will soon have to put up or shut up, unless UN inspectors make a significant weapons find.

France, Russia and China derive a significant part of their status as major powers from their permanent seats and vetoes in the Security Council. If pushed to a vote, it is unlikely that any of these countries would actually veto a U.S. resolution that had majority support. (The last French veto against a U.S. resolution was cast in 1956 over the Suez crisis.) But it is quite possible that some would abstain.

The dilemma for the council is how far it can go to accommodate the United States without being seen as impotent, and how far it can oppose the United States without condemning itself to irrelevance.

Legally, a resolution with nine of the 15 votes is as valid as one that is unanimous. But international law is being used here as a political tool. The question for the Bush camp is whether a slim majority vote and some delay is worse than no vote at all. It took two months to negotiate the unanimous resolution that got inspectors into Iraq. There appears to be little appetite in Washington for a similar process to authorize military action.

The United States and Europe have fundamentally different conceptions of the role of international institutions. Europeans and many others see stability and order in such structures. The Bush administration regards them tactically, as either supporting or constraining U.S. policy.

The American public wants to support Bush on Iraq and will rally around the flag if he decides on military action. But a secondary message in recent polls makes clear that American public opinion values company in overseas military ventures, and most foreign company will come only with a Security Council mandate.

Agreement on a mandate will certainly take time and cause heartburn within some Washington constituencies. If the United States chooses the military path without a mandate, the council's authority will be weakened. But the economic, military and political risks for the United States (and Britain) will increase.

If the Security Council can agree on a strategy for using force, however, these risks will be mitigated and American leadership will be enhanced. Does the Bush administration have the patience to face such a challenge? The future course of international relations hinges on the answer.

* Chesterman is a senior associate at the International Peace Academy in New York. Malone, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, is the academy's president.

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