Global Policy Forum

By Zvi Bar'el

The foreign minister of Turkey, Yasar Yakis, could not have been more forthright when he explained the principles that are guiding his country in negotiations with the U.S. administration.

Turkey wants a representative of its own in the Iraqi government that will be established after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Yakis explained, "because we know the people involved better than anyone and we can stop the Americans from making mistakes."

This week, following the conclusion of the protracted talks between the two countries, the government of Turkey asked Parliament to approve the stationing of American forces on Turkish soil. Yakis' remarks were construed as a declaration of war: not necessarily a war against Iraq, but war between the Kurds and the Turks, between the Kurds and the Americans and between the Turkmen and the Kurds.

"History is about to record another Kurdish disaster," wrote Bakhtiar Zahedi, a member of Jalal Talabani's Kurdish faction, one of the two major factions that control northern Iraq. "The new plan is intended to betray the Kurds yet again," Zahedi continued. "The Kissinger school - of fraud and deception - is alive and well. President George Bush is invoking the victims of Halabja [referring to a chemical weapons attack on the village of Halabja, in northern Iraq, in 1988] in order to win the support of public opinion. But he is not committing himself to protect the citizens of Kurdistan - as though the Kurdish people and Iraqi people did not suffer enough in the episode of the first George Bush."

Other Kurdish representatives, including those who belong to the faction led by Massoud Barzani, are threatening that if the details of the Turkish- American agreement are implemented, a war will be fomented between the Kurds and the Turks, which will be highly counterproductive to the campaign in Iraq.

Two cardinal issues were at the center of the discussions between Ankara and Washington: compensation for the damage the war will cause Turkey, and prevention of the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, which would take control of the oil resources in northern Iraq. It was agreed that Turkey will receive a grant of $6 billion, of which $1 billion will be forthcoming in cash and serve as a guarantee for Turkey to take out convenient loans. Another $10 billion will be made available in the form of loans over a three-year period. Turkey initially demanded a grant of $10 billion and another $20 billion in loans and guarantees. Ankara also asked for its $5-billion debt to the U.S. to be erased in return for its purchase of military equipment.

There is considerable doubt in Turkey about the prospects of actualizing the agreement that was signed. With the costs of the war likely to spiral to $50 billion - and this ahead of additional expenses earmarked for the postwar stage - it is thought highly unlikely that the U.S. Congress will hurry to approve $15 billion in aid for Turkey.

The political section of the agreement was spelled out in considerable detail, but neither side, neither the Americans nor the Turks, is certain it will be carried out. Under the terms of the agreement, Turkish forces will be able to enter Iraq up to a distance of 60 kilometers; they will not enter the oil cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. Their declared goal will be to prevent the entry of Kurdish or Iraqi refugees into Turkey. The size of the Turkish expeditionary force is not specified in the agreement. Turkey intends to dispatch about 40,000 troops in addition to the 12,000 Turkish soldiers who are already stationed in northern Iraq.

The U.S. administration wants to reduce the size of the force. Washington's demand that the Turkish force be subordinate to American command was rejected out of hand; the Turks agreed only to coordinate their military activity with the Americans. The hardest article to implement relates to the Turkish demand that the Kurds be disarmed after the offensive concludes.

A new Cyprus?

Another possible scenario threatens the written agreements and the Turkish demands that have not yet been met. "We will oppose any Turkish military intervention," Hushyar Zibari - spokesman of the Kurdish Democratic Party, the faction headed by Barzani - warned this week. "Anyone who thinks we are bluffing should think again. This is a most serious matter. Any intervention, for any reason whatsoever, will produce clashes. The image of the U.S., Britain and the other countries that want to assist Iraq will be harmed when their allies - the Turks and the Kurds - seize one another by the throat."

The Kurds are fearful that Turkey will establish a new Cyprus in northern Iraq, and they point out that the allies of the Turks, the Turkmen in Iraq, have long been preparing to act as a vanguard force that will enter ahead of the Turkish army. The two million or so Turkmen in Iraq constitute another pretext for Turkey's expected incursion there. The purpose of the move will be to protect "the persecuted minority that is facing the danger of extinction," the Turks explain.

The Turkmen Front, a militant organization that represents the Turkmen minority in Iraq, has laid claim to "ownership" of Kirkuk. Its spokesmen show ostensibly historical proof according to which it was the Turkmen and not the Kurds who administered the city for generations. They also maintain that there is a Turkmen majority in the Kirkuk district. Turkmen serve in the Turkish separation force that has patrolled the areas between the Kurdish districts since the cease-fire was achieved in the civil war between the Talabani and Barzani factions. The inspection force is financed in part by the U.S. and also trains a force of armed guards. The concern is that over the years, a Turkmen army has effectively been formed, which will fight against the Kurds on the side of the Turks if war breaks out and gives rise to a violent confrontation between the Kurds and the Turks.

As part of the agreement with the U.S., Turkey wants to ensure that the Kurds will not remain armed after the war in Iraq. Ankara has warned that a situation in which materiel and weapons remain in Kurdish hands is liable to turn the region into a perpetual battleground. Officials in Turkey reminded the Americans what the consequences were of leaving weapons in the hands of the mujahideen, the Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan. But even if the Americans show understanding for the Turkish demand, both sides appear to be aware that it will be all but impossible to actually collect the Kurds' weapons.

The Kurds, for their part, view the agreement as a Turkish-American plot that is liable to result in the establishment of a Turkish regime in northern Iraq and put an end to their plan to create a federative Iraqi state to be headed by a Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish leadership.

The Kurdish intellectual, Dr. Kamal Mirawdelli - a poet, writer and publicist who lives in England - this week issued a call to the Kurdish leadership to unite its ranks and actively oppose the "plot":

"Is it not a disgrace that our leaders intend to deceive our people?" he asked. "Is it right that we should tell the Kurds to forget about a federation in Iraq, not to attack Kirkuk and Mosul, and that they must accept the invasion by the Turkish army and prevent the refugees of Kirkuk from returning home?"

Mirawdelli called for Kurdish unity and for rallies, strikes and processions to be held around the world. He urged a declaration that the Kurds will fight the Turks if the latter invade northern Iraq. His call joins the reports of growing bitterness among all the Kurdish factions and the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees who are planning their return to the Iraqi cities from which they were expelled.

That is a nightmare scenario for the Turks, who fear the return of masses of refugees to the oil cities, thus making it impossible for them to seize control there and possibly giving rise to a situation in which the Kurds become partners of the Americans in exploiting the oil resources.

Twice abandoned

"No one trusts promises and agreements anymore," stated an electronic message from a representative of the Barzani faction. "Tension is high and people are ready to fight against anyone who is liable to undermine the rights of the Kurds, whether it is the Americans or the Turks. We welcome the Americans and are waiting for them to liberate Iraq, but if they end up bringing a Turkish occupation instead of Saddam Hussein, we may be forced to fight. Many of us still remember the previous American betrayal."

The Kurds remember two betrayals. The summer of 1996 marked the collapse of the alliance between the two Kurdish factions. The deep rift between the leadership of the factions, their inability to agree over areas of control, and in particular the dispute over the revenues from the collection of passage fees from oil tankers, had the effect of forging an alliance between Massoud Barzani and Saddam Hussein. Barzani invited the Iraqi army to help him remove the Talabani faction from the city of Irbil. The Iraqis took the opportunity to attack the city of Sulaymaniya, which was the center of activity of the Iraqi National Congress, the umbrella organization of the Iraqi opposition. Some 200 activists were executed and thousands were arrested. The Iraqis also seized computer diskettes containing operational plans and lists of names of the organization's activists, as well as of the agents and collaborators within the Iraqi army. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had to evacuate its agents and see to the rehabilitation of hundreds of collaborators in the U.S.

The alliance between Barzani and Iraq thwarted any possibility of creating a concrete opposition against the Baghdad regime. Many of Barzani's followers viewed the alliance as revenge for the wrong done them by the Americans, who abandoned them twice. The first time was during the signing of the agreement between Iran and Iraq, in Algiers, in 1975. In this agreement, Iran undertook to continue to assist the Kurds in return for the division of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The Americans did not bother to inform the Kurds about the agreement that was worked out, and the Kurds also viewed this as a betrayal by Israel. They believed that Israel knew about the agreement and kept the information to itself, or that it was unable to persuade the Americans not to go ahead with the accord.

The second betrayal came in 1991. A great deal of time passed then, before the Americans, under the pressure of public opinion, came to the aid of the Kurdish refugees. The American ambassador in Ankara pressured the secretary of state, James Baker, to visit the refugees in Kurdistan. Baker, who arrived by helicopter, remained in the region for 12 minutes and was deeply moved by the suffering of the Kurds. In the wake of those historic 12 minutes, humanitarian aid to the Kurds began.

Now the Kurds fear a replay of that scenario. Their spokesmen understand that the Americans are planning to introduce an American military government in Iraq and that the Iraqi opposition will not be allowed to take power. The Kurds have no role in this scenario; the aspiration for an Iraqi federation is liable to be shattered, and the oil revenues the Kurds have enjoyed for the past 12 years might fall into foreign hands. The benefactor will be Turkey or international companies, especially of the American and British variety.

Developments along these lines could serve as a good pretext for a Kurdish war against anyone who tries to deprive them of their source of livelihood.

"In place of a northern front of the Afghanistan type, a front that will help the Americans seize control of the country, the U.S. is liable to encounter a Kurdish northern front that will make its life hell," says a Turkish commentator. "Instead of liberating Baghdad, the Americans will be forced to act as a separation force between Turkey and Kurdistan."

FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.