Global Policy Forum

By David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar, and Linda Gerber

The recent 97-0 vote of the U.S. Senate calling on the White House to seek NATO and UN support for the postwar transition in Iraq highlights growing public concerns about the Bush administration's go-it-alone occupation policy.

After winning the war impressively, the U.S. is in danger of losing the peace in Iraq. American troops are facing a debilitating series of small skirmishes that sap the morale of the armed forces. In a recent interview, President Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, acknowledged that U.S. troops in Iraq are now engaged in 'police operations.' Unstated in that interview was the growing recognition by many that U.S. troops are ill suited to urban warfare and are not properly trained or equipped to play the civilian policing roles that current conditions in Iraq demand.

Unfortunately, the president has chosen to portray the security dilemmas facing the U.S. in Iraq as a simple contest of wills and force between Saddam sympathizers and U.S. liberators. His recent "bring 'em on" remark reflected a singular insensitivity to the challenges U.S. forces are now experiencing. While the bulk of the current resistance appears to be coming from Baath Party loyalists, U.S. military responses to attack tend to cause the further radicalization of Iraqis who had no taste for Saddam, but who now blame Americans for the loss of loved ones and the destruction of their homeland. The absence of internal security, electricity, medical care, and jobs only adds to the disillusionment and bitterness of many Iraqis. As more U.S. troops die, their killers become more diverse.

Analysts and military officials worry aloud about the impact of a prolonged and difficult occupation on members of the armed forces and their families. Concerns have been raised about troop rotations, which are increasingly delayed, and the hardships this is causing for the families of active duty and reserve soldiers. Soon commanders will be holding their breath regarding the psychological state of troops who have been in the field too long and whose sense of purpose has become confused in the fog of policing.

These challenges do not need to exist. A large portion of the U.S. armed forces in Iraq could be home within weeks if the Bush administration would weigh more seriously the utility of turning over the major responsibility for internal security and political transition in Iraq to the United Nations and an international protection force. As recommended in the recent amendment adopted by the Senate, the United States should request NATO participation in an international protection force in Iraq. The involvement of NATO and other regional bodies will depend on placing the postwar transition in Iraq under the authority of the UN Security Council. This could follow and improve upon previous UN resolutions including Resolution 1244, which outlined responsibilities for an international protection force in Kosovo in 1999.

Following the model of successful international transitions in East Timor and other countries, the U.S. should stimulate and then support the creation of a UN administered transitional authority in Iraq. This UN authority, with support from the Arab League and other regional organizations, would be tasked with both matters of internal policing and security, and the political transition to a democratic Iraq.

Briefly stated, the actions to achieve these goals can be summarized as follows:

1. Create a new UN Transitional Authority, authorized by and reporting to the Security Council. Its task, as Secretary General Kofi Annan said on April 17, would be to assure "the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine their own system of government and political leadership, as well as to control their own natural resources." 2. Expand the role of the current UN Special Representative to be head of the Transitional Authority, establishing that position as UN Administrator responsible for 1) setting the priorities on internal security to be enforced by a newly established UN Protection Force, 2) managing the political transition process within Iraq, and 3) administering the Development Fund of Iraq. Invite the Arab League and other relevant regional organizations to assist the UN Transitional Authority in managing Iraq's political transition and economic reconstruction. 3. Accelerate the creation of an indigenous Iraqi police force. Invite the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, the Arab League, and other regional organizations to participate in a training and equipment program, under UN authority, to establish a credible Iraqi police force as soon as possible. 4. Create a UN Protection Force to provide military security during the political transition process. Invite NATO to contribute forces, logistical support, and command experience to the UN Protection Force. Confirm the current U.S./UK command as that UN protection force for an initial three months, until a substantial international force is assembled and readied for deployment. By the end of the three-month period, the U.S.-led command would substantially reduce its forces, and a UN commander (hopefully an Arab general) would take charge of the protection force, working in conjunction with the UN Administrator. 5. Adopt the "Iraqi Principles for a Future Government," as approved by a meeting of nearly 100 Iraqis, convened by the U.S., near Nasiriyah on April 15, as conditions to guide the UN political transition process and the subsequent Iraqi government. These principles include the following points:

· Iraq must be democratic
· The future government should not be based on communal identity
· The future government should be organized as a democratic federal system, on the basis of a countrywide consultation
· The rule of law must be paramount
· Iraq must be built on respect for diversity, including respect for the role of women
· Iraqis must choose their own leaders, not have them imposed from outside
· Political violence must be rejected
6. Establish a political transition office, staffed with experienced international specialists, with a fixed timeline (12-18 months) for achieving Iraqi self rule, to carry out the following tasks:

· Sponsor a national dialogue on democracy and the political transition
· Register political parties and voters
· Hold elections for local and provincial leadership
· Hold elections to a constitutional convention
· Hold elections to approve a constitution and choose national political leaders
7. Transform the current Interim Governing Council in Iraq into a "transitional government" representing all political factions and major ethnic, geographic and religious elements of Iraqi society, with substantial representation of women, to cooperate with the UN Transitional Authority and the UN Administrator in performing the following tasks:

· Assume responsibility for various ministries of government, including finance, economic development, health, education, oil production and marketing, and agriculture
· Establish priorities for reconstruction and economic development
· Assist the UN Administrator in training and equipping an indigenous Iraqi police force and Iraqi armed forces
· Assist the UN Transitional Authority in the political transition process, including the drafting of a constitution that would be presented to the constitutional convention and Iraqi voters, and managing local and provincial elections
· Participate with the UN Administrator in managing disbursements from the Development Fund of Iraq
· Assist the UN Administrator in rehabilitating the Iraqi oil industry and redeveloping infrastructure
8. Place responsibility for managing the Development Fund of Iraq with the UN Transitional Authority and the UN Administrator, with clearly specified requirements for transparent accounting and reporting to the Security Council. Make arrangements for the "transitional government" to cooperate in managing disbursement decisions and prioritizing the rehabilitation of Iraq's oil industry and civilian infrastructure. After the 12-18 month transition process, control over the Development Fund of Iraq would be transferred to the new Iraqi government. All foreign military forces would leave Iraq.

Nothing in such a plan either smacks of defeatism or requires the U.S. to abandon its goals in Iraq. Rather, it is a smart and timely policy that chooses to accomplish national objectives via international means. It recognizes that a number of nations stand ready to join a force that is multinational in authority and composition but are skeptical of an Anglo-American imperium. The current effort to cobble together an international force under U.S. command has produced a meager force of approximately 15,000 troops, mostly from eastern European nations, with no involvement of Arab countries. A UN-authorized force would have much greater legitimacy and wider participation and support. Once there is a fixed timeline for Iraqi self-governance and U.S. forces begin to withdraw, armed resistance to foreign troops will likely diminish.

The internationalization of responsibility for Iraq would free the president and the nation to think in a more long term and clear-headed way than is now possible about other national security policy objectives that may necessitate U.S. troop commitments. The unilateralism of our Iraq policy should not prevent the nation from responding to peacekeeping challenges in Africa, or meeting other international security obligations in the Middle East or the Korean peninsula. The U.S. can avoid these trade-offs and withdraw forces from Iraq by harnessing the expertise and political will of the UN.

Produced by the Fourth Freedom Forum and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame

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