Global Policy Forum

By Dipali Mukhopadhyay

We have compiled major statements by senior Bush Administration officials on Iraq's capabilities to manufacture and hide chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and delivery systems. We have bolded statements of note.

Vice President Cheney
Veterans of Foreign Wars 103 rd National Convention
August 26, 2002

"But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other sources, we've gotten this from the firsthand testimony of defectors --including Saddam's own son-in-law, who was subsequently murdered at Saddam's direction. Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.

"Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and seated atop ten percent of the world's oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.

"Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction."

Secretary Powell
FOX News Sunday Interview with Tony Snow
September 8, 2002

"There is no doubt that he has chemical weapons stocks… With respect to biological weapons, we are confident that he has some stocks of those weapons and he is probably continuing to try to develop more… With respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite confident that he continues to try to pursue the technology that would allow him to develop a nuclear weapon… So there's no question that he has these weapons, but even more importantly, he is striving to do even more, to get even more."

Vice President Cheney
NBC Meet the Press with Tim Russert
September 8, 2002

"What we have seen recently that has raised our level of concern to the current state of unrest, if you will, if I can put it in those terms, is that he now is trying through his illicit procurement network to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium.

"Specifically aluminum tubes. There's a story in the New York Times this morning --this is --and I want to attribute it to the Times. I don't want to talk about obviously specific intelligence sources. But it is now public that in fact he has been seeking to acquire, and we have been able to intercept and prevent him from acquiring through this particular channel, the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge. And the centrifuge is required to take low-grade uranium and enhance it into highly-enriched uranium, which is what you have to have in order to build a bomb. This is a technology he was working on back say before the Gulf War.

"And one of the reasons it's of concern to him is we know about a particular shipment --we have intercepted that --we don't know what else, what other avenues he may be taking out there, what he may have already acquired… So we have to deal with these bits and pieces and try to put them together into a mosaic to understand what's going on. But we do know with absolute certainty that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon."

National Security Advisor Rice
The New Republic (June 19, 2003)
September 8, 2002

"There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly [Saddam] can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." Secretary Rumsfeld The New Republic (June 19, 2003) September 8, 2002 "Imagine a September eleventh with weapons of mass destruction. It's not three thousand – it's tens of thousands of innocent men, women and children."

President Bush United Nations General Assembly, New York September 12, 2002

"U. N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.

"United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

"And in 1995, after four years of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. We know now, were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993.

"Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program --weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.

"Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U. N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region…

"We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left?" White House

A Decade of Deception and Defiance, Fact Sheet
September 12, 2002

Biological Weapons

-2001 Iraqi defector said, "he had visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons."

-"UNSCOM experts concluded… that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, than it had declared."

-Failure to account for 3 tons of growth material for biological agents.

-Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility is one of two known biocontainment level 3 facilities.

-Continued attempts to procure mobile biological weapons laboratories "that could be used for further research and development." Chemical Weapons

-"Saddam Hussein continues his efforts to develop chemical weapons."

-"Gaps identified by UNSCOM… strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard."

-Hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions remain unaccounted for.

-15,000 artillery rockets remain unaccounted for.

-550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent remain unaccounted for.

-Continued rebuilding and expansion of dual-use infrastructure that could rapidly be diverted to chemical weapons production (eg: chlorine and phenol plants)

-"Seeking to purchase chemical weapons agent precursors and applicable production equipment."

-Attempting to hide activities at the Fallujah plant -Chlorine production capacity far higher than required for civilian water treatment needs at Fallujah and three other plants. "Evidence indicates that some of its chlorine imports are being diverted for military purposes."

Nuclear Weapons

-Capability to build a nuclear bomb within months if Iraq acquired fissile material.

-"Embarked on worldwide hunt for materials to make atomic bomb."

-Sought to purchase thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes "which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium."-Withheld documentation on past nuclear program.

-"Still has the technical expertise and some of the infrastructure needed to pursue goal of building a nuclear weapon." -"Saddam Hussein has repeatedly met with his nuclear scientists over the past two years."

Ballistic Missiles

-"Believed to be developing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km."

-"Discrepancies identified by UNSCOM… suggest that Iraq retains small force of SCUD-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads."

-"Continues work on the al-Samoud liquid propellant short-range missile (which can fly beyond the allowed 150 kilometers)."

-"The al-Samoud and Ababil-100 appeared in a military parade in Baghdad on December 31, 2000, suggesting that both systems are nearing operational deployment."

-"The Al-Rafah-North facility is Iraq's principal site for testing liquid propellant missile engines… has been building a new, larger test stand there that is clearly intended for testing prohibited longer-range missile engines."

-Al-Mamoun facility, rebuilt structures for Badr-2000 missile program that had been dismantled by UNSCOM.

Other Means of Delivery

-Continued conversion of L-29 jet trainer aircraft for potential vehicles to deliver chemical or biological weapons.

Government of Great Britain

Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government
September 24, 2002

General Conclusions

-Iraq has military plans to use chemical and biological weapons, including against Iraq's Shia population. "Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them."

-Iraq has command and control arrangements to employ chemical and biological weapons in place. "Special Security Organization and Special Republic Guard units would be involved in the movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some multiple Launcher Rocket Systems."

Biological Weapons

-"We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents… Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent… and is judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons. The experience personnel who were active in the program have largely remained in the country."

-Facilities of concern include: Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah, al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute, Amariyah Serum and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib

-"There was intelligence that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production facilities."

-"Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities." Chemical Weapons

-"In mid-2001, the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months."

-"Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent." The chlorine and phenol plants at Fallujah are of particular concern, as is the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'.

-Those of concern include: Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah, al Qa'qa' chemical complex Nuclear Weapons

-"The present Iraqi program is almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon."

-"Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and materials with nuclear applications."

-"Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

-Attempt to purchase vacuum pumps, magnet production line, Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride, a large filament winding machine, and a large balancing machine for uranium enrichment purposes.

-Repeated attempts to purchase 60,000 or more specialized aluminum tubes. "The specialized aluminum in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear program."

-"While sanctions remain effect Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon."

-"If they were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least 5 years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously."

-Weapon within 1 to 2 years with acquired fissile material.

Ballistic Missiles

-Retained up to 20 Al-Hussein ballistic missiles with range of 650km. "They could be used with conventional, chemical, or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel."

-Began development of missiles with range of over 1000 km that could have been produced, under sanctions, by 2007.

-"Iraq wants to extend the range of its missile systems to over 1000km," and "satellite imagery has shown a new engine test stand being constructed… capable of testing engines for medium range ballistic missiles with ranges over 1000km."

-At least 50 Al Samoud missiles have been produced and Iraq has "used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending the range to at least 200km."

-Production of Ababil-100 underway and "Iraq has worked on extending its range to at least 200 km."

-Iraq has the "technical expertise" to develop chemical and biological warheads for the al-Samoud/ Ababil-100 ballistic missiles.

-Attempted and some successful procurement of prohibited technology and materials (eg: aluminum powder, ammonium perchlorate, and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene, liquid propellant chemicals).

Other Means of Delivery

-"In the last six months, the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons."

-"Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for chemical and biological agents."

-Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for, according to UNSCOM.

-"It is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over a large area."

-"Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an UAV which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area."

National Security Advisor Rice
The New Republic (June 19, 2003)
September 26, 2002

"There clearly are contacts between Al Qaeda and Iraq… There clearly is testimony that some of the contacts have been important contacts and that there's a relationship there."

Secretary Rumsfeld
The New Republic (June 19, 2003)
September 26, 2002

In Washington on September 26, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed he had "bulletproof" evidence of ties between Saddam and Al Qaeda.

Central Intelligence Agency
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
October 2002

General Conclusions

"Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade." "Iraq has preserved and in some cases enhanced the infrastructure and expertise necessary for WMD production and has used that capability to maintain a stockpile of WMD and to increase its size and sophistication in some areas."

"In the absence of inspectors, Baghdad's already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of discovery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited programs."

Biological Weapons

-"Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability, which includes mobile facilities; these facilities can evade detection, are highly survivable, and can exceed the production rates Iraq had prior to the Gulf war."

-"Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland."

-"Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare production and already may have done so."

-"Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad's declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that is acknowledged producing, including Bacillus anthracis."

-"The improvement or expansion of a number of nominally 'civilian' facilities that were directly associated with biological weapons indicates that key aspects of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements more advanced and larger than before the 1990-1991 Gulf War." Facilities of concern include: al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, and the Fallujah III Castor Oil Production Plant Chemical Weapons

-"Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX."

-"Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare agents within its chemical industry, although it probably depends on external sources for some precursors."

-"Baghdad is expanding its infrastructure, under cover of civilian industries, that it could use to advance its CW agent production capability."

-"Gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin, and mustard."

-"Iraq probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents."

-"Iraq probably has concealed precursors, production equipment, documentation and other items necessary for continuing its CW effort."

-"Thousands of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions… remain unaccounted for."

-Overstated use of chemical bombs in Iran-Iraq war by at least 6,000.

-15,000 artillery rockets not accounted for.

-550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent not accounted for.

-"Baghdad continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could divert quickly to CW production… Iraq is seeking to purchase CW agent precursors and applicable production equipment and is trying to hide the activities of the Fallujah plant." Nuclear Weapons

-"In the absence of inspections, however, most analysts assess that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear program

-"unraveling the IAEA's hard-earned accomplishments."

-No weapon before the last half of the decade if fissile material produced indigenously.

-Weapon within a year with acquired fissile material.

-"Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs."

-"Iraq has withheld important details relevant to its nuclear program."

-Retains cadre of nuclear scientists, program documentation, sufficient dual-use capabilities "to support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program."

-"An increase in dual-use procurement activity in recent years may be supporting a reconstituted nuclear weapons program."

-Numerous meetings between Saddam and scientists over the past two years.

-"Baghdad may have acquired uranium enrichment capabilities that could shorten substantially the amount of time necessary to make a nuclear weapon."

Ballistic Missiles

-"Iraq has developed a ballistic missile capability that exceeds the 150km range limitation established under UNSCR 687."

-"Discrepancies in Baghdad's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of extended-range Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads."

-"Iraq never explained the disposition of advanced missile components, such as guidance and control systems, that it could not produce on its own and that would be critical to developmental programs."

-"The al-Samoud liquid propellant SRBM and the Ababil-100 solid propellant SRBM, however, are capable of flying beyond the allowed 150km range. Both missiles have been tested aggressively and are in early deployment."

-"Other evidence strongly suggests Iraq is modifying missile testing and production facilities to produce even longer-range missiles."

-"The Al-Rafah-North Liquid Propellant Engine Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation Facility is Iraq's principal site for the static testing of liquid propellant missile engines… Baghdad has begun building a new test stand there that is larger… The only possible explanation for this test facility is that Iraq intends to test engines for longer-range missiles."

-"The Al Mutasim Solid Rocket Motor and Test Facility, previously associated with Iraq's Badr-2000 solid propellant missile program, has been rebuilt and expanded... the size of certain facilities there… suggests that Baghdad is preparing to develop systems that are prohibited by the UN."

-"At the Al Mamoun Solid Rocket Motor Production Plant and RDT& E Facility, the Iraqis, since the December 1998 departure of inspectors, have rebuilt structures damaged during the Gulf War and dismantled by UNSCOM that originally were built to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 program. They also have built a new building and are reconstructing other buildings originally designed to fill large Badr-2000 motor casings with solid propellant. Also at al-Mamoun, the Iraqis have rebuilt two structures used to 'mix' solid propellant for the Badr-2000 missile… the only logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings is that Iraq intends to develop longer-range prohibited missiles."

-"The Iraqis have completed a new ammonium perchlorate production plant at Mamoun that supports Iraq's solid propellant missile program." Other Means of Delivery

-"Iraq is continuing to develop other platforms which most analysts believe probably are intended for delivering biological warfare agents."

-"Baghdad's UAVs – especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare agents – could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland." -"Iraq already has produced modified drop-tanks that can disperse biological or chemical weapons effectively" (aircraft and helicopter-mounted).

President Bush
Rose Garden
October 2, 2002

"In defiance of pledges to the UN it has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons. It is rebuilding the facilities used to make those weapons. UN inspectors believe that Iraq could have produced enough biological and chemical agent to kill millions of people. The regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons and is seeking the materials needed to do so."

Director Tenet
Letter to Senator Graham
The New Republic (June 19, 2003)
October 7, 2002

The CIA had "solid reporting of senior-level contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda going back a decade."

President Bush
Cincinnati, Ohio
October 7, 2002

"In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and is capable of killing millions.

"We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, and VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on Iran, and on more than forty villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September 11. "And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it has used to produce chemical and biological weapons…

"We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical and biological weapons across broad areas. We are concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using UAVs for missions targeting the United States. "And, of course, sophisticated delivery systems are not required for a chemical or biological attack --all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it. "And that is the source of our urgent concern about Saddam Hussein's links to international terrorist groups.

"Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon. We don't know exactly, and that is the problem. Before the Gulf War, the best intelligence indicated that Iraq was eight to 10 years away from developing a nuclear weapon; after the war, international inspectors learned that the regime had been much closer. The regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993. "The inspectors discovered that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a workable nuclear weapon, and was pursuing several different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.

"Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium-enrichment sites. "That same year, information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer who had defected, revealed that despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered his nuclear program to continue. The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. "Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his "nuclear mujahedeen" --his nuclear holy warriors. "Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past.

"Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly-enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year."

US Department of State
Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman
December 19, 2002

Biological Weapons

"The UN Special Commission concluded that Iraq did not verifiably account for, at a minimum, 2160kg of growth media. This is enough to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax— 3 times the amount Iraq declared; 1200 liters of botulinum toxin; and 5500 liters of clostridium perfrigens– 16 times the amount Iraq declared."

-"In January 1999, UNSCOM reported that Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that… 400 biological weapon-capable aerial bombs had been lost or destroyed."

-"The Iraqi declaration provides no information about its mobile biological weapon agent facilities. Instead it insists that these are 'refrigeration vehicles and food testing laboratories. '"

Chemical Weapons

-"In 1999, UNSCOM and international experts concluded that Iraq needed to provide additional, credible information about VX production."

-"The Iraqi regime has never adequately accounted for hundreds, possibly thousands, of tons of chemical precursors."

-"In January 1999, UNSCOM reported that Iraq failed to provide credible evidence that 550 mustard gas-filled artillery shells… had been lost or destroyed."

-"There is no adequate accounting for nearly 30,000 empty munitions that could be filled with chemical agents."

Means of Delivery "Iraq admitted in 1995 that a MIG-21 remote-piloted vehicle tested in 1991 was to carry a biological weapon spray system."

"Iraq already knows how to put these biological agents into bombs and how to disperse biological agent using aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles."

Nuclear Weapons

"The Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger."

Ballistic Missiles

"Iraq has disclosed manufacturing new energetic fuels suited only to a class of missile to which it does not admit."

-"Iraq claims that flight-testing of a larger diameter missile falls within the 150km limit. This claim is not credible."

President Bush
Crawford, Texas
December 31, 2002

"Well, first of all, I think it's important to remember that Saddam Hussein was close to having a nuclear weapon. We don't know whether or not he has a nuclear weapon."

Dr. Rice
"Why We Know Iraq is Lying"
New York Times
January 23, 2003

"For example, the declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq's efforts to get uranium from abroad, its manufacture of specific fuel for ballistic missiles it claims not to have, and the gaps previously identified by the United Nations in Iraq's accounting for more than two tons of the raw materials needed to produce thousands of gallons of anthrax and other biological weapons."

Secretary Wolfowitz
Council on Foreign Relations
January 23, 2003

"And, of course, there is every reason to believe that things are being moved constantly and hidden. The whole purpose, if you think about it, for Iraq constructing mobile units to produce biological weapons could only have been to be able to hide them. We know about that capability from defectors and other sources, but unless Iraq comes clean about what it has, we cannot expect the inspectors to find them…

"There are also gaps in accounting for such deadly items as 1.5 tons of the nerve gas VX, 550 mustard-filled artillery shells, and 400 biological weapons-capable aerial bombs that the U. N. Special Commission concluded in 1999— and this is the U. N. 's conclusion— Iraq had failed to account for. There is no mention of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from abroad. Iraq fails to explain why it's producing missile fuel that seems designed for ballistic missiles it claims it does not have. There is no information on 13 recent Iraqi missile tests cited by [chief U. N. inspector] Dr. Blix that exceeded the 150-kilometer limit. There is no explanation of the connection between Iraq's extensive unmanned aerial vehicle program and chemical or biological agent dispersal. There is no information about Iraq's mobile biological weapons production facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq has not accounted for some two tons of anthrax growth media…

"Already, we have multiple reports and other evidence of intensified efforts to hide documents in places where they are unlikely to be found, such as private homes of low-level officials and universities. We have reports and other evidence of prohibited material and documents being relocated to agricultural areas and private homes or hidden beneath mosques and hospitals. Furthermore, according to these reports, the material is moved constantly, making it difficult to trace or find without absolutely fresh intelligence. It is a shell game played on a grand scale with deadly serious weapons. Those efforts at concealment are assisted by active surveillance and penetration of the inspectors…

"I think the short answer, Michael, really is there is a lot of evidence; as the evidence accumulates, our ability to talk about it undoubtedly will grow. But we don't have a lot of time; time is running out, and I repeat: What has clearly not happened is any change of attitude by the Iraqi regime.

"Yeah, it's possible that we have been misinformed on some things. The only way to verify that you've been misinformed is with the kind of openness the South Africans or the Ukrainians or the Kazakhs demonstrated. If you can go into places and talk freely to people and look at all the records, you might be convinced. But in a country that has a history of constructing Potemkin villages, there's absolutely no way to know whether what the inspectors were shown were indeed those aluminum tubes that we're concerned about or whether it was a whole facade constructed to substantiate a certain story."

Secretary Powell
Washington, DC
January 27, 2003

"Iraq continues to conceal quantities, vast quantities, of highly lethal material and weapons to deliver it. They could kill thousands upon thousands of men, women and children if Saddam Hussein decides to use these against those men, women and children, or, just as frightening, to provide them to others who might use such weapons."

President Bush
State of the Union Address, Washington, DC
January 28, 2003

"Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation.

"For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons…

"The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax – enough doses to kill several million people. He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.

"The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin – enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hadn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.

"Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He's not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

"U. S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them – despite Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

"From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

"The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb. The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide."

Secretary Powell
"We Will Not Shrink From War"
Wall Street Journal
February 3, 2003

"Indeed the Iraqi regime is going to great lengths to conceal its weapons of mass destruction. It has removed material from sites it knew were likely to be inspected. The regime also has an active program of coaching scientists before they talk to inspectors and only permits interviews when minders are present. On top of that, thousands of pages of sensitive weapons-related documents have been found in private homes…

"Iraq also continues to acquire banned equipment, with proscribed imports arriving as recently as last month."

Secretary Powell
United Nations Security Council, New York
February 5, 2003

"It should come as no shock then that since Saddam Hussein forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these [biological] weapons. One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents… We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails… He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, the biological weapons agent production always began… The units could not be broken down in the middle of a production run… As these drawings, based on their description show, we know what the fermenters look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like. We know they fit together, we know how they work, and we know a great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted… We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological agents factories."

"Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas-gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, campelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox."

"We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry."

"For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tariq State Establishment. Tariq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq's chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs."

"Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent." "He is so determined that has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium.

"By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U. S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.

"Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use.

"Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but this is an old army trooper. I can tell you a couple things.

"First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U. S. requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so.

"Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including in the latest batch an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces.

"Why would they continue refining the specifications? Why would they continuing refining the specification, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off?

"The high-tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines. Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium.

"In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War.

"This incident, linked with the tubes, is another indicator of Iraq's attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.

"Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq.

"People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material.

"Numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missile with a range of 650 to 900 km.

"What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles. As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had.

"Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade… Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes but on developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this… There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs.

"We detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 km nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here."

President Bush
Radio Address to the Nation
February 8, 2003

"The Iraqi regime has actively and secretly attempted to obtain equipment needed to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Firsthand witnesses have informed us that Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of biological agents – equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade discovery.

"Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks. Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda have met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document forgery experts to work with al Qaeda. Iraq has also provided al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training. And an al Qaeda operative was sent to Iraq several times in the late 1990s for help in acquiring poisons and gases. We also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network headed by a senior al Qaeda terrorist planner. This network runs a poison and explosive training camp in northeast Iraq, and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad."

Director Tenet
Testimony before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee
February 11, 2003

"Iraq has in place an active effort to deceive U. N. inspectors and deny them access. The effort is directed at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given clear directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials in their possession. Iraq's BW program includes mobile research and production facilities that will be difficult, if not impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began this program in the mid '90s, during a time when U. N. inspectors were in the country. "Iraq has established a pattern of clandestine procurement designed to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. These procurements include but go well beyond the aluminum tubes that you have heard so much about. Iraq has recently flight-tested missiles that violate the U. S. range limit of 150 kilometers. They have tested unmanned aerial vehicles to ranges that far exceed both what it declared to the United Nations and what it is permitted under U. N. resolutions. "Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of al Qaeda. We know Zarqawi's network was behind the poison plots in Europe, and we discussed earlier as well --Secretary Powell the assassination of a U. S. State Department employee in Jordan. "Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful. "Mr. Chairman, this information is based on a solid foundation of intelligence. It comes to us from credible and reliable sources. Much of it is corroborated by multiple sources. And it is consistent with the pattern of denial and deception exhibited by Saddam Hussein over the past 12 years…

"Sir, I think we will find caches of weapons of mass destruction, absolutely…

"Senator, if the inspections regime continues on its current course, with the non-cooperation and non-compliance of the Iraqis, essentially their continued effort to deceive, to make it possible for these inspectors to work --and there's not much of a record to indicate that that's going to change --that's something you have to factor into your calculations.

"But one thing you have to remember is Saddam Hussein built the WMD program with inspectors living in his country for years.

"He understood how to acquire chemical and biological capabilities. He understood how to establish a clandestine procurement network. He understands how to cross borders. Now, the policy decision you make or others make is not my purview. He will continue to strengthen himself over time, and the greatest concern is how fast he gets to a nuclear capability, which then magnifies the impact of his already large chemical and biological program. So, from a professional perspective, it never gets any better with this fellow, and he's never been a status quo guy."

Director Tenet
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 12, 2003

"But in any event, the other thing that you have to --the other thing, and it's a choice you have to think about, he is going to get a nuclear weapon sooner or later. Our estimate is that with fissile material, he could have it in a year or two. He will enhance his ballistic missile capability with that kind of capability.

"And his biological-weapons capability is far bigger than it was at the time of the Gulf War, and he has a chemical-weapons capability that he hasn't declared. And so you put that in the context of a region --it's actually a little bit different than what you look at in North Korea, because you've got a South Korea with a large American presence and a Japanese, a Russian, a Chinese and a South Korean ally that are a bit different in terms of their strength and overall stature than the countries he faces in this region."

Secretary Powell
Center for Strategic and International Studies
March 5, 2003

For example, we know that in late January, the Iraqi intelligence service transported chemical and biological agents to areas far away from Baghdad, near the Syrian and Turkish borders, in order to conceal them, and they have concealed them, from the prying eyes of inspectors.

In early February, fearing that UNMOVIC had precise intelligence about storage locations, the Iraqis were moving prohibited materials every 12 to 24 hours. And in mid-February, concerned about the surveillance capabilities of the U-2 overflights that they finally were going to permit, Iraq was transferring banned materials in old vehicles and placing them in poor, working-class neighborhoods outside the capital. If Baghdad really were cooperating, if they really wanted to comply, if it really was disarmament that they were interested in, they would be bringing all these materials out, not scattering them for protection.

President Bush
East Room, White House
March 6, 2003

"Iraq's dictator has made a public show of producing and destroying a few missiles, missiles that violate the restrictions set out more than 10 years ago. Yet our intelligence shows that even as he is destroying these few missiles, he has ordered the continued production of the very same type of missiles.

"Iraqi operatives continue to hide biological and chemical agents to avoid detection by inspectors. In some cases these materials have been moved to different locations every 12 to 24 hours, or placed in vehicles that are in residential neighborhoods. We know from multiple intelligence sources that Iraqi weapons scientists continue to be threatened with harm should they cooperate with U. N. inspectors."

Scientists are required by Iraqi intelligence to wear concealed recording devices during interviews, and hotels where interviews take place are bugged by the regime.

Secretary Powell
United Nations Security Council, New York
March 7, 2003

"Dr. El Baradei talked about the aluminum tubes that Iraq has tried to acquire over the years, but we also know that, notwithstanding the report today, that there is new information that is available to us and, I believe, available to the IAEA about a European country where Iraq was found shopping for these kinds of tubes; and that country has provided information to us, to IAEA, that the material properties and manufacturing tolerances required by Iraq are more exact by a factor of 50 percent or more than those usually specified for rocket motor casings. Its experts concluded that the tolerances and specifications Iraq was seeking cannot be justified for unguided rockets. "And I'm very pleased that we will keep this issue open. "The point is that this document conclusively shows that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture these kinds of weapons; that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture not only chemical but biological weapons, and that Iraq had and still has literally tens of thousands of delivery systems, including increasingly capable and dangerous unmanned aerial vehicles."

US Official
New York Times
March 10, 2003

"The distinctive appearance of the rockets' cluster munitions, heavy metal balls with holes in them, suggested their use as a way to disperse chemical of biological weapons, said the official."

"If you take the kinds of fuses we know they have, and you screw them in there, when these things come out from the main frame and they explode inward, chemical agents come out. These can be used for biological weapons, too."

State Department Spokesman Boucher
Washington Times
March 11, 2003

"Here are the inspectors now finding a whole new system of pilotless vehicles that Iraq could be developing for dispersal of chemical and biological weapons, another indication they're still working on that."

Vice President Cheney
NBC Meet the Press
March 16, 2003

"And I think that would be the fear here, that even if he were tomorrow to give everything up, if he stays in power we have to assume that as soon as the world is looking the other way and preoccupied with other issues he'll be back again rebuilding his BW and CW capabilities, and once again reconstituting his nuclear program. "We know he has reconstituted these programs since the Gulf War. We know he's out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons, and we know he has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the al Qaeda organization.

"We know that based on intelligence that he has been very, very good at hiding these kinds of efforts. He has had years to get good at it, and we know he's been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons, and we believe he has in fact reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this kind of issue, especially where Iraq is concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing.

President Bush
Address to the Nation March 17, 2003 "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."

"The danger is clear: using chemical, biological, or one day nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their state ambition and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other."

US Military Officials
CNN
March 18, 2003

Iraqi Republican Guard military units south of Baghdad may now have chemical munitions filled with a form of VX nerve agent as well as mustard gas, US military officials Tuesday told CNN. Officials base the possibility on intelligence reports that include the monitoring of Iraqi military communications.

General Franks
Washington Post
March 23, 2003

"There is no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. As this operation continues, those weapons will be identified, found, along with the people who have produced them and who guard them."

Press Secretary Fleischer
Washington Post
March 23, 2003

White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said Friday there is "no question" that weapons of mass destruction will be found, and said documenting the discoveries "is one of the reasons that there are so many reporters present with the military."

Kenneth Adelman, member of Defense Policy Board
Washington Post
March 23, 2003

"I have no doubt we're going to find big stores of weapons of mass destruction. One thing we may find is Saddam Hussein ordered them to be used and soldiers didn't follow the orders. The threat of use goes down every day because adherence to orders goes down."

President Bush
Washington Post
March 27, 2003

In his speech yesterday at McDill Air Force Base in Tampa, home of the US Central Command, Bush sought again to frame the Iraqi campaign as a bid to "prevent the Iraqi regime from using its hidden weapons of mass destruction."

Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz
Washington Post
March 30, 2003

"The president has made very clear that the reason why we are in Iraq is to find weapons of mass destruction. The fact that we haven't found them in seven or eight days doesn't faze me one little bit. Very clearly, we need to find this stuff or people are going to be asking questions."

Secretary Rumsfeld
ABC "This Week with George Stephanapolous"
March 30, 2003

"If you think – let me take that, both pieces – the area in the south and the west and the north that coalition forces control is substantial. It happens not to be the area where weapons of mass destruction were dispersed. We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.

Kenneth Adelman, member of Defense Policy Board
Washington Post
April 10, 2003

"With fear of Hussein almost gone, 'people will step forward pretty fast' and identify Iraq's weapons stores, said former Reagan arms official Kenneth Adelman, who serves on the Defense Policy Board. 'It should be pretty soon, in the next five days. '"

Secretary Rumsfeld
Washington Post
April 10, 2003

"The thought that as part of this process, some of those materials could leave the country and [get] in the hands of terrorist networks would be a very unhappy prospect… to the extent they haven't been moved out of the country – it obviously is important to find them."

Secretary Rumsfeld
Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer
April 13, 2003

Q: "Are you still convinced we will find weapons of mass destruction?"

A: "Oh my goodness, there's been so much intelligence, CIA material about what's been going on in that country that if we can find the right people who will tell us where they've located them then that's the way we're going to find them. Inspectors didn't find them and certainly we're not going to find them. It's not like a treasure hunt when you run around and dig down and see if there's a tunnel some place. You've got to find the people who dug the tunnels, the people who've worked in those operations."

Q: "And you think we will?"

A: "I do."

Press Secretary Fleischer
New York Times
April 14, 2003

"We have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. This is what this war was about and is about. And we have high confidence it will be found."

Press Secretary Fleischer
Dallas Morning News
April 23, 2003

"We know they exist. And we're confident they will be found."

President Bush
New York Times
April 25, 2003

"I think there's going to be skepticism until people find out there was, in fact, a weapons of mass destruction program. We are learning more as we interrogate or we have discussions with Iraqi scientists and people within the Iraqi structure, that perhaps he destroyed some, perhaps he dispersed some. And so we will find them. But it's going to take time to find them. And the best way to find them is to continue to collect information from the humans, Iraqis who were involved in hiding them." (From interview with Tom Brokaw, Air Force One)

Senior Administration Official
New York Times
April 25, 2003

"It's possible that they had the precursors, the raw stuff, but they did not weaponize it. We just don't know yet." (From an interview one week earlier)

Press Secretary Fleischer
Washington Times
April 26, 2003

"The president says that we have evidence now that we are gathering that shows that they may have destroyed some of them on the eve of the war. And just because it happened on the eve of the war, that proves what the president is saying about in the months leading up to the war, that the real cause of insecurity and the threat the Iraq presented was that they had weapons of mass destruction. We can't explain why they may have destroyed them. Perhaps over time we will find out what drove them to do that. Perhaps it was the fear of actually being discovered, caught red-handed with the very weapons we said they had. "It actually proves the case, when you think about it, that if Iraq did, indeed, destroy some of them on the eve of war, they had them, they lied to the United Nations about them, they lied to the world about them, they lied to the United States about them, and they fooled the inspectors when it came to having them. How could they have destroyed them if they didn't have them?

It "may be the successful military campaign that was carried out that prevented them from doing many of the worse-case scenarios that we feared they'd do. We're fortunate if they destroyed it, because that means they didn't use it. They certainly could have made a very different decision because they did have it. It could have been used. Mercifully, it was not."

Secretary Powell
CBS "Face the Nation"
May 4, 2003

"Their [the Syrians] position is they think it unlikely Saddam Hussein would have trusted them with such weapons."

Undersecretary Stephen Cambone
US Department of Defense Press Briefing
May 7, 2003

"So, while some of the equipment on the trailer could have been used for purposes other than biological weapons agent production, US and UK technical experts have concluded that the unit does not appear to perform any function beyond what the defector said it was for, which was the production of biological agents.

"As time goes by and the more we learn, I'm sure we're going to discover that the WMD programs are as extensive and as varied as the Secretary of State reported in his February address." Q: "On the expectations, is it possible that no specific weapons will be found, and that perhaps precursor chemicals and the documentation of this program is really what is going to be recovered on the ground?" A: "That may be. It may be that we find that in some cases there will be larger and smaller stockpiles of things. In some cases, they'll be larger and smaller parts of, say, the missile and delivery systems." "I think we're going to find that they had a weapons of mass destruction program. Now, how it was configured and how they intended to use it is part of the hard work that they're going through right now."

Vice Admiral Jacoby
U. S. Department of Defense Press Briefing
May 7, 2003

Q: "Is it possible that a lot of the intelligence the US had about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program before the war is going to turn out to be wrong now that you're on the ground able to check it out?"

A: "It's far too early to tell. As Dr. Cambone's been saying, this is piecing together a major jigsaw puzzle, and we're only just beginning to gain insights and to work the puzzle."

Q: "The thing that I think is still confusing is prior – just as the war was unfolding, Defense officials, intelligence officials kept saying that they were convinced there were weapons of mass destruction and there was direct threat to US troops in the theater. We heard about the red line. We heard about all of these potential threats, of actual weaponized chemical and biological weapons directly facing US troops on the battlefield. You were prepared for that and you thought it was there. What happened to it? What happened to all this stuff?"

A: "It's too early to tell. It really is. That will – that will become clear as there's more access to the people that are making the decisions."

White House Official
London Financial Times
May 13, 2003

"You don't necessarily have tons of chemical weapons or biological weapons sitting around (in Iraq)." Instead, he said, Mr Hussein had developed a capacity "to produce banned items just before the time you may need them."

Undersecretary Feith
U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations
May 15, 2003

"As noted, coalition forces have operations underway to identify, secure, exploit and dismantle Iraqi WMD capabilities, facilities and stockpiles. This is a huge undertaking and we are in the early stages of this effort.

We have found evidence of the WMD programs, but we have a long way to go before we can gain a complete understanding of them. As we noted in connection with the UN inspection process, there is no way that we can find WMD materials that have been hidden unless those involved in the program tell us where to look.

"I am confident that we will eventually be able to piece together a fairly complete account of Iraq's WMD programs – but the process will take months and perhaps years.

"It bears stressing: The task of accounting for and eliminating all nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles, facilities and infrastructure will take time."

Secretary Rumsfeld
Council on Foreign Relations
May 27, 2003

"It is also possible that they decided they would destroy them prior to a conflict. I don't suspect we'll learn a lot more as we go on interrogating people."

"My guess is that the kind of things the intelligence community provided Secretary Powell, and Secretary Powell provided the United Nations, will in fact be turned up, to the extent that they're still there."

President Bush
Interview with TVP, Poland
May 29, 2003

"We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories… They're illegal. They're against the United Nations resolutions, and we've so far discovered two. And we'll find more weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them."

Secretary Rumsfeld
Agence France Presse
May 30, 2003

"I can assure you that this war was not waged under any false pretext. We believed then and we belive now that the Iraqis have, had chemical weapons, biological weapons, and that they had a program to develop nuclear weapons but did not have nuclear weapons. This is what the United Kingdom's intelligence suggested as well." (From an interview with Infinity Broadcasting)

Lt. Gen. James Conway, Commander of the 1 st Marine Expeditionary Force
Los Angeles
Times May 31, 2003

"It was a surprise to me then, it remains a surprise to me now, that we have not uncovered weapons. It's not for lack of trying. We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they're simply not there."

Director Tenet
Los Angeles Times
May 31, 2003

"Our role is to call it like we see it – to tell policymakers what we know, what we don't know, what we think, and what we base it on. That is exactly what was done and continues to be done on intelligence issues related to Iraq. The integrity of our process was maintained throughout."

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
US Department of Defense Press Conference
May 31, 2003

"If you think back to 1991, we clearly made massive mistakes in underestimating what the Iraqis had, and before what we discovered after we got into Iraq was that they had a much more advanced nuclear program than we believed. It s interesting too, by the way, we didn't find it right away. Three months after the end of the last Gulf War, the UN inspectors were ready to declare Iraq nuclear free. They held off, and six months later they discovered that Iraq had not one but four different routes to nuclear weapons that they were pursuing with investments that were massive. It s a big country. They ve worked at hiding things very, very deliberately. There is no question in my mind that there was something there. There are just too many pieces of evidence and we'll get to the bottom of it."

Prime Minister Blair
London Daily Telegraph
June 2, 2003

"We are going to assemble that evidence and present it properly to people… a complete picture." (Of a new intelligence dossier with fresh evidence about Iraq's illegal arsenal)

Undersecretary Feith
Special Pentagon Briefing
June 4, 2003

"Now on this issue of intelligence judgements – now to get to my second topic, the intelligence judgements on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Secretary of State Powell talked about our intelligence sources when he gave his presentation on February 5 th to the UN Security Council… And these judgements were based on intelligence that – intelligence reports and intelligence analysis that not only went back years but predated this administration. In February 1998 President Clinton said, 'Iraq continues to conceal chemical and biological weapons and the missiles that can deliver them, and Iraq has the capacity to quickly restart production of these weapons. ' Secretary of Defense Cohen, in – also in 1998, said, 'I believe that Iraq is developing them, because they've used them in the past. The acquisition of these types of weapons does make Saddam Hussein a major player in the region. He's concerned about the power, and the opportunity to have nuclear or biological or chemical weapons gives him the status and the ability to project that power to intimidate the neighbors in the region. ' And there are similar quotations from Vice President Gore and others.

"The – it – from our perspective, it's pretty clear that the intelligence community's judgements concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction did not undergo a major change between the Clinton and Bush administrations."

Q: "The administration, starting in September, painted the picture of an imminent threat from weapons of mass destruction, yet the DIA… said in September, there's no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Just square the circle. You say the intelligence has been consistent, but yet you painted a much more imminent threat than anybody in the Clinton administration did during the '90s."

A: "I think what we – what we have been stressing is that September 11 th highlighted the special dangers that come from the connection of weapons of mass destruction to state sponsors of terrorism… So that caused a reassessment of the nature of the threat and the risk. That's a different issue from the analysis of whether one believes that the Iraqis possessed the capability to use chemical weapons, biological weapons; whether they had a program that was aiming toward the development of nuclear weapons. On the basic question of whether the Iraqis had the capability, I don't think there was any kind of major discontinuity in the analysis over the years from the intelligence community."

"This suggestion that we said to them, 'This is what we're looking for, go find it, ' is precisely the inaccuracy that we are here to rebut."

President Bush
New York Times on the Web
June 5, 2003

"We've made sure Iraq is not going to be used as an arsenal for terrorist groups. We're going to look. We'll reveal the truth. But one thing is certain: no terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime because the Iraqi regime is no more."

Undersecretary Feith
Bloomberg. com
June 6, 2003

"It's pretty clear that the intelligence judgements concerning Iraq weapons of mass destruction did not undergo a major change between the Clinton and Bush administrations." (From Pentagon press conference)

Vice Admiral Jacoby
Press Conference on Defense Intelligence Agency Study
June 7, 2003

"It talks about the fact that at the time, in September 2002, we could not specifically pin down individual facilities operating as part of the weapons of mass destruction programs, specifically, the chemical warfare portion. It is not, in any way, intended to portray the fact that we had doubts that such a program existed… was active, or… was part of the Iraqi WMD infrastructure.

"We did not have doubts about the existence of the program. We could not reliably pin down, for somebody who was doing contingency planning, specific facilities, locations or production that was underway at a specific location at that point in time."

National Security Advisor Rice
ABC "This Week with George Stephanapolous"
June 8, 2003

"So there was plenty of evidence and plenty of assessment that they were there. The assessments also said that these programs were being actively pursued and actively reconstituted. There were multiple sources that talked about, as we got ready for the run-up to war, Iraqi preparations to actually use chemical weapons, leading the president to deliver a very strong measure of deterrence to those who might in fact try and use them.

"If you connected the dots about everything that we knew about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs going back to 1991 and going all the way up until March 2003 when we launched the attack against Iraq, you could come to only one conclusion, and that was that this was an active program, that this was a dangerous program, this was a prorgram that was effectively concealed.

"At the time that the State of the Union address was prepared, there were also other sources that said that they were – the Iraqis were seeking yellow cake uranium oxide from Africa and that was taken out a British report. Clearly, that particular report, we learned subsequently, subsequently was not credible. George, I am telling you that when this was raised with the intelligence community they said what we could say. And there were other attempts to get yellow cake from Africa. But the important thing here is that this case about the nuclear weapons program did not rest on a document that the British cited. This case rested on Saddam Hussein's infrastructure for the development of nuclear weapons, it rested on procurement activities to try and acquire pieces of --centrifuges that might be used...

"Well, and magnets and balancing equipment and all kinds of things. It also rested on the expertise that he kept together. The fact is that there is now a lot of revisionism that says there was disagreement on this data point, or disagreement on that data point. But the overwhelming assessment of the intelligence community, the director of Central Intelligence has a disciplined process which he runs. It's called a "national intelligence estimate," and the overwhelming bulk of the evidence in there, not about a data point here or a data point there, but about what Saddam Hussein was doing, was that he had weapons of mass destruction. That was the judgment. That he was continuing to improve his weapons of mass destruction capabilities; that he was hiding these from the world; that there were large, unaccounted for stockpiles. That was not just U. S. intelligence, that was the U. N. inspectors, and we already knew that this was somebody who had used them in the past and as President Clinton said when he directed an attack on Iraq in December of 1998, there is every reason to believe he would use them again. So we have a long history here leading up to the decision to use force in 2003 and it is a picture in which the intelligence community connected a lot of dots from multiple services, from multiple sources, to come up with the picture on which the president acted.

"But when you look at the picture, and you ask yourself, did people believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction? Yes... He was clearly concealing a program and that's separable from what we will find out about the nature of that program, where these weapons are, what – how he was concealing it. We've always known that the strongest evidence about the Iraqi programs will come from talking to people who were involved in them."

Senior Military Officer
Time
June 9, 2003

"There was a predisposition in this Administration to assume the worst about Saddam. They were inclined to see and interpret evidence a particular war to support a very deeply held conviction. I just think they felt there needed to be some sort of rallying point for the American people. I think they said it sincerely, but I also think that at the end of the day, we'll find out their interpretations of the intelligence were wrong."

Secretary Powell
Time
June 9, 2003

"We didn't just make them up one night. Those were eyewitness accounts of people who had worked in the program and knew it was going on, multiple accounts. 'Oh, it was a hydrogen-making thing for balloons. ' No, There's no question in my mind what it was designed for."

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
Vanity Fair
July 2003

"For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on."

Senior Official
US News and World Report
June 9, 2003

"It was over the top and ran the gamut from al Qaeda to human rights to weapons of mass destruction. They were unsubstantiated assertions, in my view."

President Bush
Washington Post
June 10, 2003

"Iraq had a weapons program. Intelligence throughout the decade showed they had a weapons program. I am absolutely convinced with time we'll find out that they did have a weapons program." (From a Cabinet meeting on June 9)

Press Secretary Fleischer
Washington Post
June 10, 2003

"The president, in saying programs, also applies that to weapons. The president had repeatedly said that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that includes everything knowable up to the opening shots of the war. We still have confidence in that information. You could say Iraq continues to have weapons of mass destruction. We have confidence we're going to find them. They're still there."

National Security
Advisor Rice
Los Angeles Times

"We did not know at the time – maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency – but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery. Of course it was information that was mistaken." (From Sunday interview)

Secretary Rumsfeld
US Department of Defense Press Briefing
June 24, 2003

"I don't know anybody that I can think of who has contended that Iraqis had nuclear weapons. "I don't know anybody in any government or any intelligence agency who suggested that the Iraqis had nuclear weapons. That's fact number one.

"If you go back to my statement, we also know that the Iraqis did have chemical weapons. They confessed to having had all of these weapons over a sustained period of time. I brought something along. In the '90s, Iraq admitted having 8,500 liters of anthrax and several tons of VX. Iraq admitted producing 6,500 chemical bombs containing an estimated 1,000 tons of chemical agents, none of which have ever been accounted for. In 1998, President Clinton said Saddam Hussein possessed 5, 000 gallons of botulin, 2,000 gallons of anthrax, and 177 Scud warheads, and bombs filled with biological agents.

"I have reason, ever reason, to believe that the intelligence that we were operating off was correct and that we will, in fact, find weapons or evidence of weapons programs that are conclusive. But that's just a matter of time.

"It should also be said that as the forces moved north from Kuwait into Iraq – I've forgotten exactly what city it was in – they found stockpiles of Iraqi protective gear that one doesn't go out and purchase for the dickens of it."

General Myers
US Department of Defense Briefing
June 24, 2003

"And the other part of that is that, you know, you act off intelligence. Intelligence doesn't necessarily mean something is true. It's just – it's intelligence. You know, it's your best estimate of the situation. It doesn't mean it's a fact. I mean, that's not what intelligence is. It's not – they're – and so you make judgements."

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