Global Policy Forum

By Yayha Effendi

The state of Afghanistan did not exist as a separate political entity before the 18th century, but it was through a process of political and religious evolution, arising out of the conflict of interests between Mughal India, the Safavid Empire of Persia and the Uzbek Khanates of Trans-Oxiana that made the Afghans emerge as a political force.

The mystery shrouding the obscure Afghan socio-political fabric could not be deciphered unless insight into its ethnic and demographic complexities, which as well holds a key to the success of Loya Jirga, now considered as the last prescription of enduring peace and political stability in Afghanistan. Afghans rank top in population with 47 per cent majority, Pushto as their language and Sunni being their sect.

They are concentrated in the oases of eastern Afghanistan and the Helmand, and the Arghandab valleys. The major tribes are the Ghiljai and the Durrani. The Ghiljais are a formidable tribe and are both feared and respected by their neighbours, and those who come into contact with them.

The British during the First Anglo-Afghan war had to pay a heavy price when they thought that they could buy the Ghiljai loyalty with subsidies. It only ended for them with the loss of Ghazni and the terrible massacre in the Khurd Kabul Pass in 1842. Subsequent British relations with the Ghiljai tribe ceased after this experience.

The British, thereafter, preferred interaction with the Durranis who despite their martial qualities are more inclined to exercise moderation. With the result that they were able to forge a precarious cohesion among the diverse Pushto speaking tribes and the non-Pakhtun races through tactful and diplomatic handling rather than exercising coercion, undue force or intrusive manoeuvres something which is always outrightly rejected by the tribal Afghan society.

Tajik, another important segment with 26 per cent of the total Afghan population are predominantly Sunni with Dari (Farsi) as their language. A sedentary race, living in the highlands along the southern slopes of the Hindukush range subsisting on agriculture. They are excellent horticulturists, artisans and farmers, they tend to form the urban elite of all the major population centres in Afghanistan.

Basically they are a mild-tempered but a courageous people, who have an ancient tradition of culture and education extending to pre-Islamic times. They have always looked down on Afghans as boors, and consider themselves the custodians of the ancient Aryan civilization of the region. Majority of the literate and intellectuals in Afghanistan are from the Tajik community.

Hazaras constitutes 12 per cent of the population with Dari (Farsi) as their language and Shiaism as their sect. By origin, the Hazaras are Mongols. They claim to be the descendants of the trapped Mongol "Tuman" or formations who had garrisoned Afghanistan during the period of the Ilkhans. However, the complexity of the Hazaras is their division in the two major sects of Shias and Sunnis and call themselves Aimaqs while the tribes in the central massif of the Afghan highlands are orthodox Shias.

Uzbeks and the Turcomans together form 8 per cent of the population are the major race living between the river Oxus and the Hindukush. The Uzbeks tend to predominate in the region. The Turcomans are mainly refugees who fled before the Czarist armies until the 19th century and later during the war after October Revolution of 1917. They are a very steady and disciplined people unlike the volatile Afghans. But since their population was comparatively less, as the bulk of the Turkic races live across the Oxus in the Russian Turkistan, the Uzbeks and the Turcomans were never able to play a major role in Afghan politics except in the recent past owing to increasing trans-frontier support lent to the Uzbeks forces under their warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum.

Historically, the Uzbeks were confined to their provinces in the north, living a life of their own in splendid isolation. The recent high profile role by the Uzbeks is likely to have its own ramifications with its trans-frontier cultural and political affinities. Much would depend on how, their political existence is stabilized with military aid and the time span for such a life support measures from across the border is another serious threat to the already volatile situation well in advance of the Loya Jirga. Such dissension if backed from across the border will pose a serious threat and is capable of endangering the geographic stability of Afghanistan in particular and the South East Asian general.

Other races in Afghanistan include Nuristanis and the Balochs who together form 7 per cent of the population. The Nuristanis are the descendants of some forgotten Aryan people cut off from the world, in their inaccessible valleys in the eastern arm of the Hindukush. Amir Abdur Rehman Khan forced their conversion to Islam in the later part of the 9th century.

He pre-empted the British, who were thinking of sending Christian missionaries to proselytize among these fair skinned Eurasian people. The Baloch are confined to the desert zone, south of the Helmand River, and are a spill over of the race from Balochistan. They are more in number than the Nuristanis but they have never played any important role in Afghan politics.

Amir Dost Mohammed Khan is remembered as the Amir-i-Kabir (The Great Amir). He consolidated his power by establishing familial links with all the major Pakhtun tribes and the other races in Afghanistan. He was a very broad-minded man who had no class or racial prejudices. His policy continued after him, with the result the ruling family of Afghanistan, the Mohammadzais, were linked to all the foremost Tajik, Hazara, Nuristani, and the Uzbek families other than their relationships with the major Pakhtun tribes of the country.

In other words almost everyone could claim a relationship, or at least close ties, with the Muhammadzais. It was a vast and complex exercise of establishing blood links, which probably had never been done before in the region lying between the Sulaiman Range and the River Oxus.

The Muhammadzais of Kabul even lost their language, Pushto, because a majority of them had non-Afghan mothers. By the turn of the century the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and the Nuristanis all began to call themselves "Afghans" and became the part of a "nation". The later Muhammadzai ruler, Zahir Shah, even went to the extent of discouraging the royalty, and the noble Barakzai families from attaining influential positions in the Government. This had its own unfortunate backlash for the royal family.

By opening the door to the corridors of power to commoners on a basis of some crude form of meritocracy, those deserving Barakzais who could have strengthened the hands of the king were excluded by this rather liberal and idealistic attitude had there been no external influence at work in the social and political fabric of Afghanistan, instituted by no one less than the father of the nation, Ahmed Shah Durrani would have evolved from a tribal democracy of traditional respect and understanding between the chieftain families into a true national democracy. But this was unfortunately not to be in the Afghan case because of the aggressive and intrusive foreign manoeuvring which has not ceased till date.

The Durranis are divided into two main branches, the Zirak and the Panjpia. The Zirak branch of the Durranis was dominated by the Popalzai of which origin is the Prime Minister Hamid Karzai, who has an uphill task to prove his mantle in the wake of the surrender by Pakhtun dominated Taliban forces in Kandahar. Much would depend on Hamid Karzai's policy of reconciliation and appeasement than vindictive measures which might be expected from him by his behind the stage benefactors. Ahmed Shah was a scion of the chieftain family (Sadozaa) of that clan.

'Piryan' in Pushto with English translation of ghost is the current code word used in Pushtu speaking parts of Afghanistan for foreign intelligence operatives. Ghosts are found in horror stories and so goes the Afghan history. The invisibility and destructive nature of this evil influence could be a logic behind the usage of this terminology.

The recent death of a CIA agent in Mazar-i-Sharif attaches much significance to this terminology of the foreign power dependence on clandestine methods to influence Afghan affairs which in fact has been so far the recipe of disaster for Afghanistan.

After the Kingdom of Afghanistan emerged in 1747 under Ahmed Shah Durrani, the ghost of foreign spirits seems to haunt the Afghans till this day. The history of this unfortunate state seems replete with foreign imposed conflicts, tragedies and wars. The First Afghan war, the second Afghan war, the third Afghan war and now the fourth Afghan war.

The Afghan story at the CIA closed on the eve of Soviet withdrawal. No rehabilitation of handicapped war victims or haven for orphans, destitutes and widows. No war heroes or solemn ceremony in honour of the unknown soldiers who died for an unknown cause at least not for their own. Humanity seems to have gone into slumber. Chaos, internal conflicts and anarchy began to reign Afghanistan. Thousands more were to die while the world walked away leaving the innocent and hapless Afghans in the lurch.

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