Global Policy Forum

By Barnett Rubin*

"Everyone is failing us." I heard these words recently from a senior adviser to Hamid Karzai, the Afghan leader, at a private dinner in Kabul. His was just the most blunt expression of a spreading concern. United Nations officials, who had relied on assurances of American support, also wondered if the United States would soon turn its attention elsewhere. Washington's refusal to support expansion of the British-led International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul has signaled, to many, the start of disengagement.

Just past the halfway mark of its six-month tenure, the interim authority in Afghanistan is preparing for a transition through the assembly of leaders called a loya jirga, which is scheduled for June 10 to 16. The loya jirga, to be opened by the former king, Zahir Shah, is supposed to elect a new, more representative government. The prospect of the loya jirga process shaking up an already shaky structure — before reconstruction or disarmament has even begun — further complicates the security crisis.

Reconstruction aid is trapped in an incomprehensible bureaucracy as visiting dignitaries pose for photo-ops with schoolgirls; meanwhile, legions of consultants (myself included) traipse from ministry to ministry conducting "needs assessments." Officials scrape by without furniture, equipment or even paper, while warlords armed and financed by the United States and Britain to fight terrorism rule over most of the country.

Men and women throughout Afghanistan welcome the opportunity the loya jirga represents to be consulted, however imperfectly, on how they will be governed. Yet they also fear they will not be able to vote or debate freely. Armed commanders dominate the localities where several stages of indirect elections will be held to choose delegates to the loya jirga. The defense ministry — controlled by followers of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, all from the Panjshir Valley — still has thousands of troops in Kabul. In the first major violation of the United Nations-sponsored Bonn agreement that formed the current government, the defense minister refused to withdraw these troops from Kabul when international security forces were deployed there. The troops are supposed to be confined to barracks.

For many Afghans, the test of the loya jirga's legitimacy will be whether it can provide a political role for the former king and reduce the power of this small group. But the Panjshiris believe that only the organized force left them by Massoud can assure the stability needed for the transition and that both their persistence in fighting the Soviets and the Taliban and their willingness to participate in a broader coalition government, even with groups lacking military power, entitle them to this role. The presence of their troops in Kabul reinforces the message. The resulting tensions could erupt in a battle over the center, dissidence in the provinces, or both.

Twenty-four years of war have left the country in a state of destitution and brutalization almost impossible to fathom. Nearly every victimizer has served his turn as victim, though Afghanistan's women have experienced only change from one form of oppression to another. Even once brutal commanders say they have learned from the past and wish to move from war to politics. But they need help, they need to be pressured, and all are keeping their options open.

Afghanistan's leaders have clearly stated what they need: expansion of the International Security Assistance Force from Kabul to the major provincial centers and quick disbursement of aid to resuscitate the administration and provide alternative livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of armed men. In discussions I had in the Ministry for Women's Affairs and with professionals and activists from nongovernmental organizations, women emphasized that security was the prerequisite for their broader participation in public life.

The position of the United States and its coalition partners — that they will train Afghan national forces rather than use international forces to maintain security — is disingenuous. An expanded international force is needed precisely to provide security during the reorganization of irregulars into a smaller, more disciplined force that will maintain security.

A recent Security Council resolution tried to replace expansion of the international force with economic incentives by promising that reconstruction aid will be provided only to local leaders who protect human rights and ensure security. But substituting offers of assistance for police and military action will fail here as elsewhere. Incentives work best when combined with sanctions. For now, local commanders still feel they can protect their interests best with guns.

Whatever explanations Washington offers, both Afghans and international officials see the refusal to expand the international force as the start of American disengagement, repeating the mistake of the 1990's despite promises to learn from that experience. Providing security for rebuilding Afghanistan is now the front line in the war against terrorism. Failure here will undermine all other commitments. Many fear that failure has already started. There is still time to prove them wrong.

*Barnett R. Rubin, director of studies at New York University's Center on International Cooperation, is the author of "The Fragmentation of Afghanistan."

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