Global Policy Forum

By Saban Kardas

The ISAF, charged with assisting 'the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas,' stands as a unique example of its kind -- the so-called peacebuilding operations. According to a recent U.N. study, this wide range of activities can be defined 'as activities undertaken to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations, something that is more than just the absence of war'

The main problem with peace operations is somewhat generic and ontological. There is a situation of, what I call, the dilemma of accountability. The supposed beneficiaries of the operation are the people of the target country. Yet, the human and material contributions are coming from other states whose governments are expected to advance national interests. Therefore, notwithstanding slogans of universal solidarity, the governments are accountable, above all, to their citizenry.

The mood prevalent among Turkish decisions-makers and analysts in the debate around Turkish command of the ISAF is far from grasping the conceptual and theoretical aspects of the issue. Particularly the confusion between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which can also be observed in international discussions, is noteworthy. The following is an attempt to briefly examine the qualitative changes experienced in international peace operations throughout the 1990s and to discuss some of the problems involved, with an aim to provide an analytical framework to the debate.

From peacekeeping to peacebuilding

The ISAF, charged with assisting "the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas," stands as a unique example of its kind -- the so-called peacebuilding operations. According to a recent U.N. study, this wide range of activities can be defined "as activities undertaken to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations, something that is more than just the absence of war." International peace-building operations, which constitute one important aspect of peace operations, is a term of more recent origin. It was not before the 1990s that these operations mushroomed. Previously, U.N. crisis management activities in armed conflicts were limited to peacekeeping, whose main characteristics, which at the same time distinguish it from most of the operations undertaken in the 1990s, were: peacekeeping forces were deployed upon the consent of the belligerents; they were adhered to impartiality and lightly armed to the extend of self-protection.

Yet, the crises in the 1990s resulting in any sort of international involvement were different in character. With the disappearance of the minimum order provided by the bipolarity, violence was unleashed and various forms of intrastate conflicts proliferated. The growing activities of intrastate groupings created an urgent need for the protection of basic human rights and the restoration of security and order. The process further introduced a new concept, failed states, associated with the collapse of government and the anarchy that stems from it, leading to civil conflicts and producing situations of human deprivation.

The growing belief in the U.N.'s primacy in the maintenance of international security provided the U.N. bureaucracy with an added impetus to be more assertive in dealing with the crises of the new era. This was accompanied by the readiness of some Western democracies to accompany the United Nations in this new crusade. While such concepts as international society, human rights, democracy, and universal citizenship provided necessary moral legitimacy for the new enterprise, the supposed linkage between human rights and international security added a security justification, as well. As a result, a variety of different operations, ranging from peacekeeping to peace building and humanitarian intervention, made up the inventory of international community in dealing with problems as such.

Some common points to these operations can be discerned as follows. In most cases, the operations were undertaken in the absence of consent by the target government, or by one or more of the different parties to a civil war; or else, there was simply no government in effective control. Consequently, multilateral forces were deployed in a hostile setting, thus by default were partial. Moreover, they were heavily armed and as in the case of interventions, they were preceded by large-scale use of aerial power. Furthermore, such operations no longer exclusively belonged to the United Nations, rather became an area of interest also for the regional organizations, or coalitions of willing. Particularly, the implementation of U.N. decisions increasingly depended on the active participation of states or other organizations, due mainly to the lack of military forces available to the United Nations.

As to tackling with the problem of failed states, the establishment of a political structure has emerged as one of the goals to prevent the recurrence of the situation triggering the international action. To this end, addressing underlying root causes of the conflicts and undertaking long-term political missions such as achieving national reconciliation, disarmament, establishing democratic processes, revitalizing collapsed economies, as well as halting immediate threats were seen as an indispensable part of the new strategy. Shortly, what is required is a process of nation building undertaken by international actors. To provide a secure environment for the operations of the international political and civilian presence, a multilateral security force became the indispensable component of these initiatives.

Approaching ISAF

Discussing the ISAF against this background would be of use and give us some insights for a better comprehension. As stated, it has some unique features. Military activities around Afghanistan can be divided into three categories. Aerial bombardments and missile attacks against Taliban/Al-Qaida forces by the Allies constitute the first step. Secondly, Allied forces were deployed on the ground to conduct operations to eliminate the remaining Taliban units. The collapse of Taliban rule also made it possible to deploy an international security force for assisting the interim Afghan government, and the UN SC authorized for the establishment for six months of ISAF.

It is hard to categorize U.S. operations against the Taliban as an instance of a peace operation. It is rather a full-scale use of force in a situation resembling traditional warfare. International law scholars may discuss them within the context of intervention into civil wars, or as an instance of self-defense. On the other hand, although the ISAF itself can easily be qualified as another example of the peacebuilding missions that emerged in the 1990s, its relations to Allied military operations make it unique and put it a delicate situation.

At first glance, the ISAF bears a resemblance to some of the earlier operations in the sense that two different international forces operated simultaneously, or consequently: the relation between Operation Allied Force and the subsequent deployment of KFOR; NATO air strikes and UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces in Bosnia; and U.N. peacekeeping in Somalia UNOSOM I and U.S.-led UNITAF. Nevertheless, the ISAF with a strong mandate, acting parallel to but separately from an actual combat mission differs from these comparable cases and stands in a unique position. This coexistence might be seen as an asset in terms of cross-supporting in the form of logistical, intelligent and protection support provided by the Allies. Yet, the argument here is that this unique state of affairs is rather rendering the ISAF vulnerable and multiplying the already high risks inherent in such peace operations.

Needless to discuss here, is the operational aspects of engaging in multinational military operation of any kind: the high level of uncertainty and risk of loses, problems of interoperability, the unevenness of the quality of force contingents, lack of thorough intelligence available in real-time situations, operating in an unknown terrain, and so on.

Dilemma of accountability

The main problem with peace operations is somewhat generic and ontological. There is a situation of, what I call, the dilemma of accountability. The supposed beneficiaries of the operation are the people of the target country. Yet, the human and material contributions are coming from other states whose governments are expected to advance national interests. Therefore, notwithstanding slogans of universal solidarity, the governments are accountable, above all, to their citizenry. This is especially evident in Western democracies, where the power of public opinion is acting like a sword cutting both directions. Whereas Western public opinion has mobilized their governments toward active engagement in humanitarian crises, it did so easily change when the forces suffered casualties and images of dead soldiers appeared on televisions. For this reason, the commitment of outsiders and the expectations of locals are at odds with each other. While the local authorities, also the U.N. bureaucracy, pursue maximalist involvement, the contributing countries are rather sticking to a minimalist approach based on a zero-casualty expectancy. Consequently, there is a capability-expectation gap, which is hard to bridge.

It is not surprising to observe a similar debate in the context of the ISAF. The interim government, supported by U.N. staff, has been asking in Western capitals for an expansion in the number and coverage of the ISAF. For the time being, this demand is refused and the ISAF is patrolling Kabul. This minimalist approach is posing some problems. Although it is definitely good news for the troop contributors, this approach is of limited use and leaves open the questions about the security in the rest of this divided country. Much of the countryside is under the control of local warlords, or no man's land. Remembering that Kabul often changed hands in the last decade once a strong power emerged in the periphery, it is hard to be optimistic about the future, especially a post-American one. Ironically, many of the various groups are now allied with the United States, but are at war with each other. In a country where the stability increasingly depends on the international forces, the departure of foreigners and the declining interest of the international community is the nightmare scenario no one wants to imagine. This concern forces the interim government to persistently emphasize their hope that this time the international community will not leave the Afghan people alone. For the international community, this uncertainty and possible failure may diminish the belief in the ability of international institutions to solve the problems of failed states, and may result in a reluctance to become involved in the future. As can be remembered, the main reason why the international community stood idle during massacres in Rwanda was the earlier debacle in Somalia.

If a maximalist approach is preferred and the operation is expanded, the dangers to the international force, mission creep, are more probable and immediate. For addressing the main challenge of failed states, the lack of a monopoly on the use of force, the restoration of order is a sine qua non which may involve on the one hand disarming different factions, arresting uncooperative leaders, and brokering reconciliation; and creating a national army, police and judiciary on the other. Until now, the ISAF has not endeavored to achieve these challenging tasks, rather its main activity in this regard remained confined to training and equipping the core of a future Afghan military and police. But recent reports conclude that it will take many months to train even a modest force. Therefore, a possible expansion of the mandate toward nation building will, for the time being, have to include the ISAF and is bound to reduce the support among -- even the previously co-operative -- warlords and increase the risk of potential domestic backlash, the next issue we will focus on.

Domestic backlash

As stated, most peace operations were undertaken in situations where at least one local party was opposed to the deployment; thus they risked conflict. Even when there is no such initial opposition, the presence of international forces restructuring a state might be easily perceived as something short of an occupation force. Moreover, rebuilding politics involves changing patterns of power sharing, reallocation of resources, reshaping the traditional hierarchies, etc.. Like every political process, this too creates losers as well as winners. In the long run, therefore, domestic backlash is highly possible to surface.

Looking at Afghanistan from this perspective some more lessons can be drawn. The ISAF is deployed following a full-scale war, implying against the will of the remnants of the Taliban. Even after the deployment of the ISAF, the war is continuing. Whether the war has really come to an end and the Taliban is rooted out militarily, are open questions. Yet, many former Taliban fighters are now disarmed and returning home. Their reintegration into the devastated Afghan society, where almost no functioning economy or social infrastructure is available, has a long way to go.

Although the actual warfare is taking place between the Taliban and Allied forces, one should note some incidents in which the ISAF forces came under fire. Thanks to the end of Taliban repression and provision of international humanitarian aid, international attempts are welcome by many Afghanis. Yet, in the eyes of the ordinary Afghan people the distinction between the ISAF forces and the U.S. combat forces is hard to draw. Here, it might be helpful to remember the debate among the humanitarian aid agencies throughout the 1990s. Even these organizations working for the delivery of aid had been arguing against military solutions, since they risk the life of humanitarian workers. Then, one may ask "would not the active engagement of U.S. operations put the ISAF forces at higher risk?" At the moment, the focus is on actual warfare, and the ISAF is confined to Kabul; but once the U.S. forces are gone, the ISAF will be the focus. Considering the low literacy rates, highly fragmented society, local anxieties, unhappy memories of foreign invasion, and the culture of resistance the ISAF is, indeed, operating on a slippery slope. The risk of domestic backlash is there which we must beware of.

Building failed states

A third major problem inherent in engaging failed states is whether the international community is at all capable of helping construct political structures and providing order in failed states. Such policies are the most necessary, albeit the most difficult, ones to address the problem. Until now there has been no clear-cut concept, nor any agreed-upon instruments developed. Peace operations are already costly and disputed ventures, and adding such long-term tasks onto the agenda would multiply this. Practically, besides the need for tremendous international reconstruction aid, such an extended operation would require the deployment of military forces for a longer time implying higher material -- and possibly -- human costs. This enlarged conceptualizations of international missions, initially, discourages international actors from actively participating. If an operation is undertaken at all, in the long run, it may lessen local and international support and generate a stronger opposition coming from the local parties in the target country. This will in turn multiply the possible dangers discussed so far.

Following other examples, a U.N. civil and political mission has also been set up in Afghanistan; now the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is also in place. UNAMA, set up for an initial 12 months, would fulfil all tasks that were entrusted to the United Nations in Bonn. The mission will be comprised of two "pillars" -- one for political affairs, and the other for relief, recovery and reconstruction. We can assume that the conduct of these missions will need the ISAF for fostering of a secure environment to civilian actors, implying an extension in the duration.

Yet, there is also a parallel process, interesting to observe: the establishment of the Loya Jirga. Moreover, though there are no plans to restore the monarchy, the former king is also expected to return. Whether these developments would bring about a unifying political process or be divisive, is an open question. Yet, they will definitely affect the ISAF forces, which are even responsible for security during the arrival of king. This process also indicates an ironic situation at the beginning of the 21st century: the sole aim of establishing democracies as a remedy to failed states seemed to be abandoned; rather a collaboration with traditional institutions is forced upon.

Approaching Turkish debate

Based on foregoing, we can briefly comment on Turkey's position on taking over the ISAF command. Turkey has actively participated in most recent NATO and U.N. missions. Based on the experiences derived, the Turkish military elite seemed to be well informed about operational dilemmas and followed, indeed, a successful bargaining strategy. As a result, besides insisting on compensation for financial costs, Turkish position, not surprisingly, followed a minimalist approach: asking for a clear mandate, requesting continued contribution from NATO partners; and so on. Yet it is hard to see a corresponding careful approach -- especially among Turkish political elite and intellectuals -- on the problems discussed here. They are rather under the illusion of Turkey's growing prestige, Turkey's being a role model with its modern democracy, historical ties with Afghanistan, etc.

As to the first problem discussed here, the accountability dilemma, in the case of Turkey the dilemma becomes trilateral and makes things more complicated. U.S. and Western expectations on Turkey enter into play as another limiting factor affecting Turkish decision-makers. The perception that Turkey is financially supported for this service creates important implications for state-society relations -- which is missing in the debate -- as well as Turkey's multilateral conduct, and how Turkey's role is seen within Afghanistan.

As regards to the second problem, domestic backlash, there is a shared implicit belief that Turkey's Muslim identity and historical ties with Afghanistan will help prevent such a backlash. Given that Islam as a denominator was not enough to be a unifying factor even among Afghans themselves, relying on these assumptions becomes highly problematic. On the other hand, how Turkey's special affinities with Uzbeks is perceived there is not that clear. Moreover, practical experience in the field speaks against these expectations: Pakistani peacekeeping forces which suffered death casualties in Somalia, and African peacekeeping initiatives becoming part of the local conflicts show that having affinities is in itself not enough to avoid this problem. Furthermore, the Turkish side seems to be pleased with Karzai's assurance for the security of Turkish personnel. A small note of caution: the ISAF is there to protect the interim government, not vice versa.

The third factor, building failed states, also attracts the attention of Turks. Turkish experience with democracy and a secular regime, coupled with parallel development projects to be offered, is presented as a solution to this law-torn and highly fragmented country. Turkish ambitions in this direction are not new and we have enough evidence to judge how they are perceived in other parts of the Islamic world. Considering that these ideas could not penetrate into relatively more developed and orderly Muslim societies, one should be critical of how far they can be welcome by Afghani people.

In short, the dilemmas inherent in peacebuilding are generic. Although Turkey's particularities may help reduce the negative repercussions, they will not eliminate the potential problems which may resurface at any time. Therefore, there is a need for a more realistic assessment on the issue within a relevant theoretical context. Let's hope that everything goes fine. But, let's also beware of the slippery slope.

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