Global Policy Forum

By David M. Malone and Kirsti Samuels *

On Tuesday the United Nations begins a peacekeeping operation in Haiti, replacing a multinational force authorized by the UN Security Council three months ago after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fled into exile. Unfortunately this UN effort begins in less than ideal circumstances, with the United Nations distracted by many other crises.

Until a rebellion in Haiti in February, French and U.S. policy consisted of complaining about Aristide. Having taken the initiative internationally to rid the impoverished nation of this democratically elected leader, these countries might have been expected to take the lead in a bold strategy to address the country's ills.

The task of improving governance in Haiti will be a long-term, risky and expensive one. With Afghanistan, Iraq, the Ivory Coast and several other countries already requiring extensive life support, countries with a historical interest in Haiti seem to have resigned from the challenge there, hoping the United Nations can pick up the pieces without much evident commitment on their own part. There are shades of Iraq in this story: for missions impossible, it seems, one should dial the United Nations.

Haiti is a failed state, now governed by a weak interim administration. More than 70 percent of its population lives on less than $1 a day. The floods last week that caused hundreds of deaths would have killed no one in more developed countries with functioning state institutions. The multinational force has restored a measure of calm. But ambitious objectives to disarm rebels came to nothing. Washington's most striking idea recently was a threat to prosecute Aristide for corruption or other misdeeds. It is not clear how that would help Haitians.

The interim prime minister, Gerard Latortue, has announced plans for elections next year, but elections in Haiti have, in recent years, served mainly to polarize political life. A willingness to compromise, to break a "winner takes all" political culture, is more important and more urgent than electoral rituals, as we have learned in Bosnia and other post-conflict societies, where repeated elections have done little to promote prosperity or political responsibility.

There will, of course, be multilateral financial and development assistance on offer, but this proved remarkably ineffective from 1994 to 1997, when $2 billion was spent - and wasted because of poor local absorptive capacity and corruption. Some cash held up in the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank should now become available, and, to its credit, the United States has pledged $160 million.

But how will jobs be created in Haiti? From 1994 to 1996, "quick impact" projects benefited few. International economic sanctions against Haiti, instituted to restore Aristide to power after he was overthrown in a coup in 1991, cost thousands of jobs in the light industrial assembly sector that have never been regained. Haiti's largely unskilled labor force is highly militant compared to that of, say, Honduras, which today turns out in large numbers the clothes and other consumer goods that Haiti used to produce.

How serious are the key capitals about staying the course in Haiti? Washington is signaling that it wishes to withdraw its troops from Haiti as soon as possible, hardly a come-on to the countries invited to pick up the slack. France will withdraw its troops by July 15. Chile and Canada will leave theirs longer. In one hopeful sign, many Latin American countries have offered troops for the UN peacekeeping operations, which will be commanded by a Brazilian. The 6,700-strong force has been authorized - laughably - for only six months. The UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, had recommended two years.

From 1994 to 2000, the United Nations and the Organization of American States, in an unusually productive partnership, worked hard to train a respectable Haitian police force, to improve the climate of respect for human rights, and to provide some basis for economic recovery. That the United Nations and the OAS failed says less about the effectiveness of these organizations than about the difficulty of the tasks.

For international actors, dropping the ball - again - in Haiti would put paid to any pretensions of seriousness on democratization, human rights and economic renaissance, which are the themes of America's rhetoric on the Middle East and of French rhetoric on its global priorities.

*About the Authors: David Malone, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, is president of the International Peace Academy in New York. Kirsti Samuels is an associate at the academy.