Global Policy Forum

Haiti: On the Verge of Conflict and Instability

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By Erich Marquardt

Power and Interest News Report
February 2, 2005

Since the removal of Haiti's President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, Port-au-Prince has yet to eliminate the instability brought with the rebel takeover that started in the town of Gonaives and eventually led to a coup that forced Aristide into exile to South Africa. The rebel takeover, tacitly supported by the United States and France, has now created a fragile security situation where opposing armed factions face each other in urban violence that, while not large in scale, is still too problematic for U.N. peacekeepers to resolve.


Haiti suffers from an interim government that is not popular and owes its continued existence to the presence of U.N. peacekeepers, rebel militias that refuse to disarm and who cannot be controlled by the interim government or the peacekeepers, and the supporters and detractors of the dethroned majority political party, Family Lavalas, who launch guerrilla attacks on the country's new authorities and each other.

Background of a Crisis

Aristide, winning democratic elections in 1990, took power only to be quickly overthrown in a military coup eight months later. The violence that resulted after his departure brought about a wave of refugees fleeing the country, many to the United States. To stem the tide of refugees, and to stabilize the situation in Haiti, the Clinton administration restored Aristide to power in 1994.

In 1995, shortly after taking power again, Aristide disbanded the Haitian army due to the institution's existence as a power bloc capable of removing the country's civilian leadership. The Haitian military, long a force that exercised its power to influence successive governments in Port-au-Prince, reacted with obvious negativity to the decision. Aristide's action riled the country's soldiers, as their livelihoods and sources of income were destroyed. Some military leaders fled into exile in surrounding states, while others drifted back into civilian life. While former soldiers remained quiet for years, once Aristide's popular support began to dwindle -- largely as a result of his administration's inability to alter the country's dismal social conditions dramatically -- this former power force began to plan a resurgence.

Marked with the 2001 commando-style assault on the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince, paramilitaries launched small scale raids on various Haitian towns, attacking and raiding police stations and other targets. By 2004, civilian opposition to Aristide's rule had grown, led by an umbrella group of opposition parties known as the Democratic Platform. The Platform, primarily consisting of Haiti's middle class and skilled workers, stands in stark contrast to Aristide's Family Lavalas political party, which is supported by the country's vast underclass.

Early in the year, the Platform launched successful work strikes that weakened Aristide's hold on power. Furthermore, the international community had placed an economic embargo on Haiti over concerns on the Aristide administration's management of state finances. Using the 2000 elections as a justification -- an election that raised serious questions of electoral fraud by the ruling Family Lavalas party -- the United States had placed a near total embargo on the country.

Supported by the Democratic Platform, and tacitly supported by the United States and France, members of the former military managed to launch a massive revolt against the Aristide regime and successfully took over Port-au-Prince in February 2004. In the words of Aristide, who commented on the final part of the invasion,

During the night of the 28th of February 2004, there was a coup d'etat. One could say that it was a geo-political kidnapping. ... The 28th of February, at night, suddenly, American military personnel who were already all over Port-au-Prince descended on my house in Tabarre to tell me … the foreigners and Haitian terrorists alike, loaded with heavy weapons, were already in position to open fire on Port-au-Prince. And right then, the Americans precisely stated that [the rebels] will kill thousands of people and it will be a bloodbath. That the attack is ready to start, and when the first bullet is fired nothing will stop them and nothing will make them wait until they take over, therefore the mission is to take me dead or alive.

In March, after Aristide's departure, a U.S.-backed advisory council selected interim Prime Minister Gerard Latortue to help stabilize the country and plan for democratic elections, scheduled for November 13, 2005. It was at this point that all the components were in place for a classic power struggle.

Power Blocs Contend for Control

The Democratic Platform rode to power on the backs of Haiti's rebel fighters due to the two groups' converging interests. The rebels were the only force capable of taking control of the country, and the opposition movement was the only group capable of providing international legitimacy to the rebels' actions. Now, with opposition figures in power, the rebel forces do not plan on losing their negotiating chips any time soon, explaining why they have failed to disarm despite government requests to do so.

The rebels demand that the Haitian military be reconstituted, securing them their historical role of being in a position to influence the decisions of Port-au-Prince. The government demands that the rebels disarm now that Aristide has been removed from power. These clashing interests have resulted in some rebels turning against the interim government.

The international community does not desire a return of a corrupt military bureaucracy responsible for so much of Haiti's past instability. That being said, however, the international community is not willing to allocate the resources necessary to disband the rebels forcefully. The U.N. peacekeeping force is made up of some 6,500 soldiers, a force too small to risk engaging paramilitary fighters in shantytown streets.

Paramilitary leaders control certain parts of the country, especially the more rural areas. In some parts of the country, they man roadblocks, patrol streets, and arrest alleged criminals. For instance, one influential rebel leader who helped lead the February coup is Remissainthe Ravix. Ravix now commands a group of rebels who engage in regular street patrols outside Port-au-Prince. According to Ravix, "We are mobilizing throughout Haiti to take matters into our own hands." Ravix has also brandished Latortue a traitor on radio and television, saying, "It is not us who are illegal, it is the government of Latortue that is illegal."

Another leader, Butteur Metayer, patrols Gonaives and leads crackdowns on Aristide supporters. Metayer led a militia known as the Cannibal Army, which once supported Aristide but fell out of grace with him in 2003 when Metayer's brother was assassinated in a plot allegedly designed by Aristide. Metayer's militia assisted in the rebel insurrection that led to Aristide's ouster.

Metayer's militia, now known as the Front for National Resistance, has vowed not to disarm, saying in a recent Radio Provincale interview, "Now I'm back and we'll provide security for Gonaives to get rid of the thieves. We're not going to take up arms [to fight], but we're not going to set them aside either."

On top of this component are the supporters and detractors of Aristide and his Lavalas Family party. Many of Aristide's supporters are launching their own guerrilla attacks against government and rebel positions, demanding the return of their exiled president. While weak in power, they make up a faction large enough to create significant instability in some areas of Haiti. In some cities, they have managed to keep rebels and peacekeepers out, such as in the hillsides of the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Bel Air, which was only recently stormed by peacekeepers. Hundreds have been killed in clashes between gangs of pro-Aristide fighters and the rebels.

Now, all of these groups are contending for power. The present government and the rebels are exploring ways to share power, while Aristide supporters are using violent tactics to create tension throughout the country, hoping for a return of their exiled leader.

Conclusion

The present situation in Haiti is tumultuous, but still controllable. Until elections take place in November 2005, the interim government and the U.N. will work to placate the demands of the rebels. While the desired option for the interim government would be to disarm the rebels, it is unlikely that the international community will be willing to alter their mission in a manner that would result in increased casualties and urban-style warfare with paramilitary fighters. Indeed, Latortue has been handing out financial checks to the rebels, with the intent of covering their back pay since the disbanding of the army in 1995.

Nevertheless, at some point, the rebels will have to be dealt with since they will not disarm until they are certain that their interests have been served. Unless the new government agrees to reconstitute the Haitian military, the rebels will not relinquish their present position of power and will continue to pressure the Haitian government and threaten them with the violent consequence of not meeting their demands. Until the international community is willing to amplify the peacekeeping operation and forcefully crack down on the rebels, Haiti will remain on the verge of conflict and instability.


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FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.