By J. Sri Raman*
truthoutOctober 10, 2004
September 24 must have been a day of new hope for Kashmir, the Himalayan territory of legendary beauty and long-suffering people. The common Kashmiris, however, won't associate the date with a destiny of peace. On that day, India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in New York and came out with a joint statement, which both of them hailed as "historic." Mandarins and officially briefed media analysts of both countries employed the epithet to emphasize a "breakthrough" on the Kashmir issue.
The acclaimed advance consisted of an explicit mention in the statement of the "Jammu and Kashmir" issue, and of proposed India-Pakistan efforts to find a "peaceful" and "negotiated" solution to it. These analysts made a recurring reference to the resolve of both countries to return to attempts at a "bilateral" settlement of the dispute.
Six days after the statement, police arrested Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) chairman Mohammmed Yasin Malik in Srinagar, capital of the India-administered State of Jammu and Kashmir, under violent public protests. Malik had been officially considered a moderate among militants. There has hardly been a day since the statement, either, without reports of killings - of militants and security personnel, besides helpless civilians - from different parts of the disputed territory. The continuing unrest alone does not disprove the claims made for the summit and the statement in New York. It does, when combined with the conspicuous omission of the Kashmiri people from the purview of the discussions and the document.
A leading publicist of Pakistan's peace movement, M. B. Naqvi, notes: "The only qualifications given to the desired settlement of the issue are that it should be peaceful and bilaterally negotiated; there is not a word about the people of Kashmir or their rights or desires. The purpose of this possible settlement extends no farther than the satisfaction of India as well as Pakistan, with no reference to anyone else or anything. However historic this breakthrough may be, there can be doubts about its substance." Both New Delhi and Islamabad have done their bit to deepen the doubts.
General Musharraf has repeatedly argued against "sticking" to traditional stands on the issue, and assured India and the international community that his government won't do so. An officially uncontested interpretation of this assurance has been that Pakistan may not insist on a plebiscite in Kashmir any more. A plebiscite, in recognition of the Kashmiri's right of self-determination, may not have been practical in unsettled conditions and amidst unceasing strife. Pakistan, however, cannot abandon the demand without suggesting an alternative, or it will appear unconcerned about the political right of the people.
A section of Kashmiris have been pressing their case against a plebiscite whose only options would be to decide Kashmir's accession to either India or Pakistan. The JKLF, for one example, has been talking of a "third option" of "independence" for Kashmir. It launched a public protest in 2001 also in Pakistan-administered Azad (Free) Kashmir against an order of the Pakistan government, requiring contestants in the assembly elections there to declare their support for the accession of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. Neither India nor Pakistan, however, has taken cognizance of the "third option."
The Manmohan Singh government, for its part, has not raised hopes of a Kashmiri role in the process of a Kashmir settlement by alienating the All-Party Hurriyat (Freedom) Conference (APHC), a coalition of the militant groups in the State. The government, which had invited the APHC for "unconditional" talks, now harps on parleys "strictly within the parameters set by the Constitution." Even the moderates among the militants say this makes nonsense of the talks, as the condition denotes denial of recognition to the Kashmir dispute.
Malik initiated a signature campaign last year to demonstrate support in the State for the demand for Kashmiris' participation in the dialogue process. Over a million Kashmiris have reportedly signed the petition, and Malik expects signatures to exceed the two-million mark. It is the demand of more than the Muslim majority of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits, in popular parlance) and Buddhists endorse the demand. The Pandits in particular, refugees from the Kashmir conflict who languish in camps in and around Delhi and dream of returning to their "homeland," want a place in the dialogue.
The summit and the statement have drawn ire also from uncompromising Indian and Pakistani opponents of peace in and over Kashmir. The Indian hawks are counseling the government against giving credence to Pakistan's gestures which, they say, are aimed only at pleasing the USA and the European Union. Their Pakistani counterparts are warning Islamabad against what they see purely as India's ploy to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The need to defend the dialogue process from these sworn enemies of South Asian peace is beyond debate. So, however, is the case for giving the Kashmiris a say in the Kashmir solution.
About the Author: J. Sri Raman, a freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to truthout.
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