Global Policy Forum

President Bill Clinton on 16 December launched the United States' latest bombardment of the Iraqi people. Disregarding overwhelming worldwide opposition, Washington and London launched a massive four-night air attack that killed at least 62 Iraqi soldiers and more than 80 civilians. Knowning that the brazen assault would be vetoed by the United Nations Security Council if it were given the opportunity, Clinton and British Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair gave the final thumbs-up for the attack even as the council was in session. The council was discussing the report by the head of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, Richard Butler, about Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM weapons inspectors. Clinton and Blair used the flimsy evidence and exaggerated claims in Butler's report as justification for the bloodbath.

If there ever were any doubts that Butler has been serving the interests of the US, the events surrounding the latest outrage against Iraq put them to rest. Former senior UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter told the 17 December New York Post that US officials prodded inspection teams to provoke a crisis tojustify bombing. 'What Richard Butler did last week with the inspections was a set-up,' Ritter said.

Ritter is hardly a friend of Iraq. He was a US military intelligence officer based in Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War and was at the centre of a crisis in January 1998, when Iraq acused Ritter of being a US spy. Ritter resigned from UNSCOM because he claimed it and the US were 'too soft' on Saddam Hussein.

US influence

Butler was supposed to deliver his report to the Security Council on 14 December, at the same time as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA report found that Iraq 'provided the necessary' level of cooperation' to allow nuclear inspections to be carried out 'efficiently and effectively'. At the request of the US, Butler delayed the formal presentation of his report until the evening of 15 December. 'With Clinton in Israel through the weekend and the Muslim holy month of Ramadan beginning on Saturday, the window for American and British military action was very narrow, officials said,' reported the New York Times on 18 December. 'The administration did not want to offend Arab allies, or put the president's safety in jeopardy, by ordering an attack while Clinton was still in Israel, a senior American official said.' The Washington Post on 18 December, quoting a 'high-ranking (US) administration official', reported that Butler communicated his conclusions to the US on 13 December, two days before they were made known to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Security Council, which supposedly employs him.

'According to accounts from several participants... Butler had briefed American officials as early as last Friday (I I December) on his most recent conclusions,' the New York Times reported on the same day. On 16 December, the Washington Post reported: 'Butler's conclusions were welcomed in Washington, which helped orchestrate the terms of the Australian diplomat's report. Sources in New York and Washington said Clinton administration officials played a direct role in shaping Butler's text during multiple conversations with him (on 14 December) at secure facilities in the US mission to the United Nations.' On 18 December, the paper added, 'Administration officials acknowledge they had advance knowledge of the language he would use and sought to influence it, as one official said, "at the margins".'

Butler withdrew UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq on 14 December on the advice of the US and without the authorisation of the Security Council. According to the 18 December New York Times, 'the president issued a highly classified order to the Pentagon on Sunday morning (13 December) that began a 72-hour countdown to the air assault".

Dishonesty

An examination of Butler's report reveals its dishonesty. Since 17 Novenmer, when Iraq allowed UNSCOM inspections to resume after briefly halying cooperation, there had been at least 427 inspections. The report identified problems with five. In one case, inspectors were made to wait 45 minuets before they were given access to a guest house that had previously been an office of a security organisation. In a second incident, UNSCOM inspectors were not allowed to interview undergraduate students at Bagdad University' science department about their research. In the most widely cited incident, inspectors were refused admittance to the Bagada headquarters of the ruling Baath Party. Thirty inspectors, headed by Austrailian Roger Hill, arrived without warning and demanded entry - too many under the terms of an agreement between UNSCOM and the Iraqi government. Four inspectors were eventually admitted.

Butler wrote in his report that UNSCOM had 'solid evidence' of 'proscribed materials' hidden there, including 'ballistic missle components'. The London Times on 17 December revealed that this 'solid' evidence was only the say-so of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)- backed Iraqi 'dissidents' seeking to overthrow the Baath Party. UNSCOM inspectors also demanded the right to inspect two establishments on Fridays - the Muslim holy day - and insisted that no Iraqis accompany then. This breached an agreement that government officials accompany inspectors on Frodays if nobody is working at the site. Despite writing, 'In statistical terms, the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation', Butler concluded, 'the Commission is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council.' Russia and China called for Butler's dismissal. China's UN representative said, 'The leader of UNSCOM has played a dishonorable role in the crisis. The reports submitted by UNSCOM to the secretary general were unfounded and evasive of the facts.'

Spying

Whatever remaining credibility Butler had was shattered on 8 January, when UN officials, angry at Washington's manipulation of UNSCOM, leaked details of how the US and other countries spied on Iraq using UNSCOM as cover. The Washington Post revealed that from 1996, UNSCOM provided information to the US that could pinpoint the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and reveal his security precautions. Until 1998, this was done using Israel-supplied hand-held devices capable of monitoring and recording radio communications. The recordings were analysed in Israel, Britain and the US. In 1998, the 'US took control of the operation,' the Post reported, and installed a sophisticated 'black box' able to automatically send intercepted messages via a satellite relay in a nearby country to the National Security agency at Fort Meade (Maryland, USA).'

The 8 January London Times reported, 'US officials said that some of the intelligence was used in last month's four-day bombing campaign'. While Butler immediately denied that UNSCOM passed information to the US, the Washington Post reported that US officials confirmed the leaked details. Butler approved the installation of the 'black box', the newspaper reported. After the US took charge of the operation, 'Washington specified that only Butler and his deputy, Charles Duelfer, be given access to the intercepted material'.

Ritter, whom the Washington Post identified as the UNSCOM official who initiated the operation in 1996 with the approval of former UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus, told the French newspaper Liberation on 8 January that UNSCOM had a 'special relationship' involving the sharing of intelligence with the spy agencies of five countries, including the US and Israel. Ritter told the 10 January Chicago Tribune that Butler gave him the order to install the black box last July, and that Washington had complete control of the device.

Labor man

Butler has always been a loyal servant to his political masters. He rose through the Australian diplomatic corps under the patronage of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). A former private secretary to several federal Labor opposition leaders, he was appointed Australia's representative on disarmament to the UN when the Hawke Labor government was elected in 1983. His role was to try to confuse and coopt the mass antinuclear weapons movement developing in Australia. In the 1980s, as ambassador to Thailand, Butler campaigned for Labor foreign minister Gareth Evans' 'peace plan' for Cambodia, which championed a formula to allow the genocidal Khmer Rouge to participate in a coalition government and downplayed the atrocities of Pol Pot. Later, Butler was appointed Australia's ambassador to the UN.

A Times of India editorial last November gave this account of Butler's progress after-arriving in New York: 'After the Liberals won the 1996 elections, they made it clear (Butler's) days were numbered. Butler, however, had a plan: he convinced foreign minister Alexander Downer that he would ensure US support for an Australian seat on the Security Council. But the US backed Portugal... One of the reasons for the humiliating defeat was that many Asian and Pacific ambassadors had been alienated by Butler's arrogance in dealing with them. 'By the time Downer moved to sack him, however, Butler had hitched himself to the skirts of Madeleine Albright, then Washington's UN representative. Albright wanted someone to push the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) through the UN General Assembly after the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had deadlocked due to the intransigence of the five nuclear weapon states.... 'In 1997, Butler was rewarded by the US with the UNSCOM job. Albright got Downer to agree to Butler's appointment. According to Aus'tralian diplomatic sources, Downer agreed"in the fond belief that he would not only be rid of an insufferable and arrogant upstart but also that he would not have to pay him anything. So you can imagine the surprise here when we were told that the government had to pay Butler some $250,000 a year! ".' More than ever, Butler relies on the US to keep his job. Washington's veto on the Security Council is all that prevents Butler being sacked.