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Excerpts From Iraqi Letter: 'Not Out of Fear' but 'Responsibility'

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The New York Times
November 14, 1998
Following are excerpts from the letter and its annex regarding inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iraq sent today to Secretary General Kofi Annan, in a translation by the United Nations:

The goal sought by Iraq from its decisions of Aug. 5 and Oct. 31 was not to sever the relationship with Unscom and the l.A.E.A. and to cease the implementation of its obligations. ... The objective of Iraq is to end the suffering of its embargoed people ... Iraq has dealt with your initiative regarding the comprehensive review. But unfortunately, the deliberations of the Council on the procedures for carrying our the review did not result in a clear picture which ensures fairness and objectivity.... It is well known that the main reason for that was the American position, which does not represent the prevailing opinion of the Council ...

On the basis of what was stated in your letter, and in appreciation of the content of the letter of President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, and the positive positions expressed and conveyed to us by China, France, Brazil and other states, and in order to give a further chance to achieve justice by lifting sanctions.... Iraq decided to resume working with the Special Commission and the I.A.E.A. and to allow them to perform their normal duties in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and on the basis of the principles which were agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanaing signed with you on Feb. 23, 1998.

We offer this chance not out of fear of the aggressive American campaign and the threat to commit a new aggression against Iraq, but as an expression of our feeling of responsibility, and in response to your appeal and those of our friends. We affirm that the people of Iraq would not relinquish their legitimate right in having the iniquitous embargo lifted and to live normally like other nations of the world. We will be looking forward to seeing the outcome of your efforts and the review.

Excellency, we rightly believe that if the comprehensive review were not to be a mere formality and to be free from the influences of the tremendous purposes, the adoption of the points we conveyed yesterday, November 13, 1998, to the Ambassadors of Russia, France and China, a copy of which I enclose herewith, will render the review serious, fair and fruitful.

Annex

... IT]he Position of Iraq on the comprehensive review is:

The comprehensive review be carried out within a very short time (seven days, for example) after the resumption of Unscom and the I.A.E.A. of their normal duties. This is to be without conditions (like those mentioned formerly in regard to what is called the confirmation of Iraq's cooperation).

The comprehensive review ... emphasizes the question of evidence. . .

If the Council sees, througft an objective study, that there are Matters which need to be done, a short period should be determined for their completion. Until that corn reached, the Council implements Pletion is for lifting or reducing sanctions i measures tion to what has been fulfilled of th n propore requirements....

The Council assures that none of its members should impose additional conditions or restrictions...

[Tjhe second phase of the review commences after completing the conclusions of the first phase.

Sixth, the second phase of the review only encompasses the obligations determined by clear provisions of the resolutions and no matters be raised contrary to the legal interpretation of the resolutions.

Seventh, the members of the Council and specially the permanent members abide by international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council in respect of all matters pertaining to Iraq.

Eighth, the question of Butler and the structure of Unscom and its practices are important matters. The Council is to consider them seriously in order to insure a good relationship in the future. We hope that this will be done as soon as possible.

Ninth, it is necessary that these assurances be communicated directly to the leadership in Baghdad either by the Secretary General or by a delegation from the Council.



 

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