Global Policy Forum

By Daniel Epstein

Côte d'Ivoire's recent history is far different than those of other African states. Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Sudan saw contingents of United Nations peacekeepers safeguarding civilian populations, with limited success. Unlike the DRC or the Sudan, Sierra Leone may be the closest parallel to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. In both cases former colonial powers, the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone and France in Côte d'Ivoire, entered the states to put an end to the fighting and force some kind of reconciliation. The true reasons for France's involvement ranged from being Côte d'Ivoire's largest importer of goods, the fear of a possible repeat of genocide similar to Rwanda, or perhaps a feeling of responsibility to the stability of a former colony (Background). Regardless of their intentions, the French maintained a 4,000 member force to monitor the ceasefire line established in October 2002. In addition, a force of 1,500 troops arrived and was stationed along with the French peacekeepers through the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS).

International Mediation: UN Efforts

In light of the ongoing clashes in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UN understood that another West African state falling into a state of failure was unacceptable. The combat in the DRC had drawn in as many as eleven African states, numerous rebel militias, and former members of the government (Congo 4-25). As stated earlier in France's possible motives for deploying troops, the UN could not ignore another possible genocidal event occurring in Africa. As stated in United Nations Operation in Cí´te d'Ivoire's Mandate, "having determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, decided to establish the UNOCI for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004 (Cí´te)." This operation succeeded the original political mission instituted in May 2003, in conjunction with the ECOWAS, the United Nations Missions in Cí´te d'Ivoire.

The Security Council authorized the peacekeeping force to use any means necessary to quell the fighting between the two sides. In 2003 and 2004, this facet of the mission came to fruition as the Côte d'Ivoire government continued to expel those they considered to be "non-Ivorite" and allowed militias to kill those seen as less than loyal to President Gbagbo. November 2004 saw a new government offensive against rebel positions throughout the state including, "bomb[ing] northern cities, killing dozens of civilians, and attack[ing] the Abidjan hotel that housed the rebel delegates to the powerless coalition government set up at Marcoussis (Chirot 72)." French, UN, African Union, and ECOWAS forces, both under the direction of the UN, coordinated to halt the government's advance into Bouaké and UN guards protected the rebel delegates being housed in the Abidjan hotel. After a surprise attack by the government's air force on French positions, followed by a French retaliatory strike, the government and those living in the south turned against the UN. It now became a necessity for the UN to not only remain in the state, but to act as a buffer between the mounting tensions of the French, the Ivorian government, and the general population.

At this point, the UN may have made a crucial mistake that actually caused the conflict to continue. Another primary component of the UNs force's mandate was the DDR, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the Côte d'Ivoire army and the rebel Forces Nouvelles (Cí´te b). With this objective falling by the wayside with the high level of mistrust between the government and the rebels, South African President Thabo Mbeki interceded on behalf of the African Union and attempted to rekindle another aspect of the UNOCIs mandate, elections. Again, President Gbagbo proved that he was either unwilling or incapable of finding a solution to the state's split and feared that he may not be victorious in a free election. Not to defend Gbagbo's anti-democratic stance, but he had reason to believe that the outcome of the elections would not be favorable. A key southern political ally of the President, the Akan voting bloc, was offended by his actions and backed the northern section of the country against the administration (Chirot 73). This was the point when the UN decided on 14 October 2005 to back President Gbagbo for another year in hopes that he would install a coalition government. Those hopes were soon dashed by the relatively ineffective and powerless Cabinet created to balance power with the remainder of the executive branch.

The UNs backing of Gbagbo was a pivotal point in the reunification of the state and it is understandable why the UN would follow such a plan. Following the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis and the Mbeki-mentored Pretoria Agreements, these confidence and security building measures (CSBM) were hoped to bring an end to post- civil war tensions. The creation of a Cabinet and more powerful interim- Prime Minister Post were two critical aspects of the agreements negotiated between both sides, but Gbagbo had still refused to give up power. Instead he allowed a government-backed militia, known as the Young Patriots, to run rampant and attack various UN offices and personnel because there were no longer any French positions to attack that wouldn't bring some form of retribution from their military (Chirot 76). The UN needed to take action against Gbagbo directly, but permitted him to serve out the remainder of his year. The process of imposing sanctions had already been in place against the state before the UN mobilized any troops; targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his allies may have proven to be more effective in limiting their lifestyles while the populace suffered. In addition, it would have behooved the UN to introduce sanctions against Forces Nouvelles considering that they were receiving refuge from a foreign power, namely Côte d'Ivoire's northern neighbor Burkina Faso. It should be pointed out that the UN did impose travel and financial sanctions on one rebel leader, Fofié Kouakou, who was the commander of a group that was loyal to now Prime Minister Guillaume Soro. Mr. Kouakou received the sanctions from the UN due to, "involvement of his troops in the recruitment of child soldiers, abductions, imposition of forced labor' and sexual abuse (Balint-Kurti 17)."

Gbagbo's continued actions to preserve his own power base and work against the efforts of the international and West African community led many observers to conclude that intervention would inevitably be a failure. Serwer and Thomson point out that any international peacekeeping mission, "will initially find itself dealing primarily with the former warring parties, whose cooperation is needed in the early stages (Crocker 385)." In the case of Cí´te d'Ivoire, the lack of maintaining any treaty between the government and the rebels had held back any chance of reinstituting a stable infrastructure. The UN was unable to hold the government or the rebels accountable for their actions in defiance of either the original Linas-Marcoussis or the later Pretoria agreements. The lack of initial disarmament at the onset of the deployment coupled with the peacekeeping forces' forced defensive stance crippled the operation. The French have experienced a similar dilemma, but have gone about their operation in a different manner.

International Mediation: French Efforts

The original mandate for UNOCI included, "by other provisions of resolution 1739, the Security Council authorized from the date of adoption of that resolution the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support the UNOCI in accordance with the agreement reached between UNOCI and the French authorities (Cí´te)." When the civil war began in September 2002, over 10,000 people were killed within a few months including former coup leader General Robert Guéï and his family (Chirot 68). Mixed in with the death toll was the displacement of nearly one million people throughout Côte d'Ivoire and neighboring states. When reports were received that Guéï had been killed and Gbagbo's government was about to fall, France mobilized an initial force of 3,000 troops to evacuate French residents and protect the endangered government, again France's true intentions are not entirely clear. France continues to monitor the ceasefire line, along with UN troops, and has bolstered their force by additional 1,000 soldiers.

France's hard-line approach towards their former colony was always seen as insult to Ivorian sovereignty. Gbagbo understood that asking for French assistance would be unpopular even amongst his southern strongholds, but he also knew that without them he may not be able to withstand another rebel attack, especially after Abidjan was nearly lost. After the fighting broke out, "Côte d'Ivoire began to publicly insist that France should activate a 1961 bilateral defense accord" known as the accords spéciaux (Balint-Kurti 20). This document is publicly available to read, but the specifics regarding French military involvement are rather vague. What little is known about the accord requires that Côte d'Ivoire is threatened by another state, as always they pointed out Burkina Faso as the culprit.

As much as the French were willing to send troops into their troubled former colony, they also made an effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. From January 15th to the 23rd of 2003, "a Round Table of Ivorian political forces met in Linas- Marcoussis (Peace)." All sides of the war were represented at the conference, including designated members of the ECOWAS. The central points of the agreement focused on CSBMs such as establishing a Government of National Reconciliation to ensure an immediate end of hostilities, a timetable for free elections, and the release of military hostages being held by both sides (Peace). In addition, the agreement called for the monitoring of compliance by all sides to be reported to international, regional, and national authorities. Again, it was Gbagbo who stood in the way of progress by allowing only local elections which were for positions of little power and an affront to the Linas-Marcoussis agreement's original intent of a legitimate Presidential vote. Without the commitment from the government to the very basic measures laid out by the agreement, the Forces Nouvelles were not compelled to follow the agreement themselves.

This lack of dedication angered the French and only grew worse with the military actions carried out by the government in November 2004. In response to the French aiding the UN in protecting the rebel delegates housed at the hotel in Abidjan, the Ivorian Air Force attacked a French outpost in Bouaké killing nine French peacekeepers and an American missionary (Chirot 73). France's military responded by destroying all of Côte d'Ivoire's aircraft and a pro- government militia, the Young Patriots, launched attacks on remaining French citizens throughout the south. Although the French peacekeeping force remained in the state, France's willingness to organize another Linas- Marcoussis conference quickly eroded. With the failure of Linas- Marcoussis and Pretoria, the possible final chapter of this conflict was surprising.

The Ouagadougou Political Accord and a Possible End

To the shock of many international mediators, President Gbagbo directly contacted rebel leader Guillaume Soro to bring an end to the state's division. The two worked together to create a timetable and agree to various concessions by both sides. On 4 March 2007, Gbagbo and Soro signed the accord, "under the aegis of President Blaise Campaore of neighboring Burkina Faso (Lewis 86)." The main aspects of the agreement included the disarmament of both government and rebel militias along with their integration into civil service; greater powers given to the Prime Minister post; actual progress towards establishing Presidential elections; and finally trials regarding the validity of the referendum questioning a northerner's true Ivorite heritage (Lewis 88).

Not all have been pleased with the sudden reconciliation, this includes an assassination attempt on PM Soro's life by members of his former rebel force, but disarmament on both sides has started. The rebels began to turn in their weapons this May and will have completed the act within the next five months (James). In addition to disarming, individual rebel members have been paid a monthly stipend for adhering to the accord. Government forces have also shown a sign of good faith by withdrawing to their barracks in the south. These acts coupled with the set elections on 30 November may signal an end to a conflict that a year before would have seemed improbable.

Thoughts on Peacekeeping

One last note, it has been debated whether international efforts to mediate conflicts in various areas of the world are effective. The international community has a long track record of unproductive peacekeeping missions, but some successful campaigns that make peacekeeping a "hit-or-miss" prospect. That being said, if the UN, in conjunction with the African Union and the ECOWAS, and the French had not intervened the death toll would have reached into the hundreds of thousands. Considering the number of West African states that were failing, a regional war could have costs the lives of millions and caused the collapse of the ECOWAS. The peacekeeping mission in Côte d'Ivoire taught international observers one thing, they must always enforce negotiated treaties on all sides involved in a conflict or the consequences will be ongoing civilian deaths and an increased divide.

SOURCES

"Background Note: Côte d'Ivoire." state.gov. July 2008. Bureau of African Affairs. .

Balint-Kurti, Daniel. "Côte d'Ivoire's Forces Nouvelles." Chatham House. (September 2007): 17, 20. .

Chirot, Daniel. "The Debacle in Côte d'Ivoire." Journal of Democracy. Vol. 17, Issue 2. (April 2006): 68, 72, 73, 76. ProQuest. EBSCOhost. Norwich University Library. Northfield, VT. 24 June 2008.

"Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflcit." International Crisis Group. November 1998. 14-25.

"Côte d'Ivoire- UNOCI- Mandate." un.org. 2007. .

Crocker, Chester A., et al. Leashing The Dogs of War- Conflict Management In A Divided World. Washington, DC: 385.

James, John. "Ivorian ex-rebels begin to disarm." bbc.com. 3 May 2008. .

Lewis, Chloe. "Cí´te d'Ivoire: a nation reunited: the star of west Africa returns." Foreign Policy. Issue 164. (Jan-Feb 2008): 86, 88. General One File. EBSCOhost. Norwich University Library. Northfield, VT. 21 July 2008.

"Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Côte d'Ivoire." usip.org. 14 Feb 2003. .