Global Policy Forum

By Farid El Khazen *

In the war years, whenever a car bomb exploded in Beirut, fighting escalated and the internal divide among Lebanese groups deepened. On February 14, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in a massive explosion that ripped through the hotel district in Beirut ignited the spark of unprecedented national unity. Lebanese, drawn from all communities openly expressed their desire to see Syrian troops and security services withdraw from Lebanon. The taboo of Syrian control over Lebanon was broken in word and deed.

Lebanon's 15-year war ended in 1990. But the quest for the country's second independence (the first was in 1943) has now taken off and can no longer be reversed. It all began in early September 2004, when President Emile Lahoud's six-year term was extended after a constitutional amendment and in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559. A former army commander, Lahoud was Syrian President Bashar Assad's choice for the presidency at a time when Assad could have opted for other pro-Syrian candidates. The passing of Resolution 1559 meant that developments in Lebanon were being closely monitored by the international community, and particularly the United States and France, who co-sponsored the resolution.

Only a few weeks after the passing of Resolution 1559, parliamentarian Marwan Hamade escaped an assassination attempt by a car bomb. A veteran politician known for his moderation, he was an effective go-between between Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and the Christian opposition. The investigation of Hamade's assassination attempt led nowhere, not unlike other investigations of political assassinations in pre- and post-war Lebanon. The Hamade attempt carried an unambiguous message: that political assassination to preserve the status quo of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon was still part and parcel of the "political process," in defiance of the renewed international focus on Lebanon.

If the passing of Resolution 1559 hastened the decision to target Hamade, the beginning of its implementation paved the way for the assassination of Hariri. UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen's meetings with officials in Beirut and Damascus only a few days prior to Hariri's assassination signaled that the international community was serious about implementing Resolution 1559.

Just as no one expected the targeting of a Lebanese figure of the stature of Rafik Hariri, no one expected the chain reaction of events that the assassination instigated and that paved the way for ending Syria's 30-year domination of Lebanon. The rapid deterioration in U.S.-Syrian relations, particularly following the Iraq war and Syria's backing of Iraqi terrorist groups, revived Washington's interest - first to exert pressure on Syria in Lebanon and then, following the passing of Resolution 1559, to call for complete Syrian troop withdrawal from the country. For Washington, Syria's Lebanese role became a destabilizing factor and ended American support for a Pax Syriana in the country that dated back to the mid-1970s. It took, in other words, three decades for Lebanon to become a country worthy of international support, independently of regional politics.

Lebanon's second independence is on a much more solid ground than its first in 1943. The expression of national unity is far more genuine today. People power was the main vehicle for change in 2005, while independence in 1943 involved little popular participation. Whereas in the early 1940s the Arab-Israel conflict was in its early phases and inter-Arab feuds in the name of Arabism were deeply divisive issues, today Arabism is a spent force and the battlefield for the Arab-Israel conflict is Palestine, not Lebanon.

Independence in 1943 was based on an unwritten compromise, known as the National Pact, on power-sharing and Lebanon's "Arab face." Today, independence is wedded to the 1989 Taif Accord, which defines the distribution of political power and proclaims Lebanon's Arab identity. In the absence of Taif, Lebanon's future, following a Syrian withdrawal, would have been problematic. What will also facilitate the transition is the presence of a Lebanese Army capable of filling the security vacuum in the aftermath of a Syrian pullout.

Although Shiite leaders have supported Taif, the Shiite community's two main parties, Hizbullah and Amal, are the most closely linked to Syria. Both parties have expressed support for Syrian troop withdrawal in accordance with Taif, but have opposed Resolution 1559. The issue at stake here is Hizbullah, which refuses to disarm until after the ending of the Arab-Israel conflict. But Hizbullah's stand has little support and the party's popularity outside its Shiite base has continued to decline since the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000.

On the positive side, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah has been committed to preserving internal stability and has opted for the state. The party has been actively involved in the political process since the early 1990s and its decision to disarm is, in the end, a function of a settlement that involves Syria, Iran and the United States.

The factors, both internal and external, that led to war in 1975 are not around anymore. Gone are the days when Lebanon served as a battleground for the Arab-Israel conflict and for inter-Arab feuds. The Lebanese are also far more immune to internal divisions than at any time in the past. Equally important is Washington's rediscovery of Lebanon as a model for democracy and confessional coexistence between Christians and Muslims, Sunnis and Shiites, in an Arab world that is yet to become democratic and to tolerate communal diversity.

Needless to say, Lebanon has to make a difficult transition toward independence while preserving national unity and attending to monumental economic problems. But developments are moving on a path that indicates that Lebanon's future is far more promising than its past.

About the Author: Farid el-Khazen is chair of the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut, and a member of the Qornet Shehwan opposition group He is the author of "The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976" (Harvard University Press, 2000). This commentary first appeared in bitterlemons-international, an online newsletter.

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