April 23, 1996
Statement by Ambassador Tono Eitel Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council at the United Nations: Composition and Size of the Security Council
Mr. Chairman,
When we discuss the issue of permanent membership and principles governing the possible extension of permanent membership we are really at the centre of our reform effort, at the heart of our debate. It takes us back to the question: What led to this powerful drive to reform the Security Council, what led to the creation of this open-ended working group?
It was and it is a deep-seated malaise, a feeling of dissatisfaction with the Security Council, and with regard to permanent membership.
It is now a well-established fact - well-established also through the thorough debate in this group - that the overwhelming majority of the members of our now universal organisation share the view that the current composition of the Security Council, in particular with regard to permanent members, needs improvement.
More than 50 years after the creation of the United Nations and the Security Council, there is still not yet a single permanent member from the South in the Security Council. Since the first day of this working group, we have stated our view that in particular the nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America must be better and more equitably represented in the Council. Also, it strikes the eye that all the current permanent members are nuclear powers, whereas the views and interests of the non-nuclear world are not represented.
If we look back, there were two occasions in which decisions were taken on permanent membership in the Security Council:
- In 1945, the United Nations were created and with them the Security Council. At that time, all those countries and nations were not taken into account, which were at this time not independent, be it for one reason or another. Decisions were taken by 50 states. This means for today's debate that the current permanent membership does not take into account the existence of 135 out of 185 members of the United Nations and their interests and expectations.
- In 1963, at the occasion of the second decision on the composition of the Security Council, only a limited reform measure was taken. The number of non-permanent seats was increased by four, while the permanent membership decided upon in 1945 was not changed. Since 1963, more than 70 new members have joined the United Nations. Again, for today this means that more than the majority of the 135 states which joined the United Nations since 1945 never had a say in this second decision neither. Let me mention that among those countries is Germany.
This is the stark reality with which our reform effort has to cope when it comes to the question of, in particular, permanent membership.
What does this mean for the questions that we discuss today, i. e. the question which principles should govern the extension of permanent membership? In our view, the situation which I tried to summarize makes a compelling case that the following principles should be applied with regard to permanent membership:
1) It is a must that the South gets permanent membership. Germany supports permanent membership for Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Carribean, three seats altogether.
2) At the same time latecomers or newcomers to the United Nations like Japan and Germany with their contributions to international peace and security and international development are eligible for permanent membership in the Security Council.
In our view, there is already a good measure of agreement in the working group for such an approach. The flat denial of new permanent membership is damaging to the South, who would continue having no permanent seats much more than to the North, who is already represented. That, it seems to me, is the reason why the no-permanent-seat-position continues to be a tiny minority of roughly 3% of the whole membership of our organisation.
What would a reform of the Security Council based on these principles with regard to permanent membership achieve? The answer is:
- Permanent membership would for the first time include the South and its interests and aspirations by the selection of countries from the three regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.
- By the inclusion of countries such as Japan and Germany with their potential to make contributions on a global scale, for example also the views and aspirations of the non-nuclear membership of the United Nations would have a strong voice.
- Most important, such a reform would bring the Security Council again in line with the vision of the Charter of a Council based on equitable representation, effectiveness, legitimacy and credibility.
It is obvious that such a reformed permanent membership is an essential element of a new and modern Security Council, supported and sustained by broad agreement among the members of the United Nations.
Mr. Chairman,
Let me add a few remarks on the ratio between permanent membership and non-permanent membership.
The first observation is that there have always been - for good reasons - more non- permanent than permanent members. This principle should, in our view, be upheld. As we are for five new permanent members, we favour also, for the reason of this principle, an adequate increase in non-permanent seats. This would bring the total membership of the Security Council to the mid-twenties. Let us have a quick look at the numbers and ratio involved:
- From 1945 to 1963 the ratio between permanent and non-permanent members was 1 : 1,2.
- From 1965 to today the ratio is 1 : 2.
- The new Security Council as proposed by us would have a ratio of 1 : 1,4 (24) or 1 : 1,5 (25).
With such a ratio we would again be closer to the ratio existing when the United Nations were created.
Mr. Chairman,
The ratio of permanent membership to non-permanent membership is in our view also closely related to the question of the necessary quorum for decisions. We believe that non- permanent members should have the possibility to bring about out of their own strength decisions of the Security Council on substance even when - theoretically - not a single permanent member casts an affirmative vote. In the same manner, we believe non- permanent members should have the possibility to block a decision of the Security Council on substance even when - again theoretically - all the permanent members cast a positive vote.
With regard to criteria for new permanent members, this is obviously a very important aspect of the reform effort. As the compendium shows, an enormous amount of thoughts and work has already been invested in this question. Many criteria for permanent membership have been put forward, some more, some less convincing.
We believe that the reform should be inspired in the first place by the Charter of the United Nations itself. Indeed, we are convinced that not only relevant but the most important criteria are contained in the Charter. They should guide our decisions when we decide on new permanent members:
- Article 4 of the Charter stipulates that members of the United Nations should be "peace-loving". The language may be a little bit idealistic, but the concept is in our view as valid and convincing as ever. We believe that the electorate of new permanent members will consequently careful examine, whether the candidate for a new permanent seat demonstrated in word and deed its commitment to peace and international security.
- Article 23 of the Charter stipulates that with respect to non-permanent members of the Security Council, regard shall be specially paid in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation. In our view, it is only natural that this is even more valid for permanent members. We, therefore, believe that the members of the United Nations will carefully examine the record and the overall performance of a candidate for a permanent seat with regard to the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organisation. At the same time, it is also clear that the notion "contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security" is very wide and comprehensive.
- The notion of equitable geographical distribution also contained in Article 23 is obviously not a criterion for a member state as such, but a rule for the selection of non-permanent members. As the German side stressed, we regard the current state of permanent membership as being not equitable, especially with regard to the member states of the South.
This must be redressed.
Mr. Chairman,
The Charter of the United Nations contains provisions which point to the most important criterion, indeed the criterion which overrides all other criteria: This is a criterion which was stressed at our last session, in particular by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Pakistan, my friend Ambassador Kamal. He very rightly underlined that when all the chips are down, the decisive criterion according to the Charter is and will be whether a candidate for a permanent seat will enjoy the trust and support of two thirds of the membership of this organisation, including the permanent members.
This is a wisdom which the fathers of the Charter have bestowed upon us. The Charter itself assures that we cannot, that we will not neglect it.
This decisive criterion, in our view, takes care of many concerns. It has the effect that even very strong ellbows and the readiness to use them are not a criterion for permanent membership.
Mr. Chairman,
As far as the number of new permanent members is concerned, I believe that the German position is already well-known. But for the sake of clarity and also because of the fact that this has a bearing on the future size and composition of the Security Council, let me restate it: We believe that there should be three new permanent members from the South. In addition, we would have Japan and Germany as permanent members. This would amount to ten permanent members.
With regard to the issue of modalities for the selection of new permanent members, I believe that I can refer myself to what I said on the issue of criteria for new members. Whatever modalities we agree upon, in the end they must meet the requirements of Article 108 of the Charter, that is to say, that two thirds of the members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council must support them.
Rotational arrangements for new permanent members are a concept which gradually, through the efforts of this working group and in particular its African members has found a considerable measure of interest in this body. A number of speakers have underlined that they think it is worthwhile to study such a concept further. The basic idea of this approach seems to be to devise a pragmatic, subsidiary solution for a situation, in which there is agreement that a region should have a new permanent member in the Security Council and where at the same time there is no clear agreement among the countries of that region or even the general membership as a whole that a certain country is the natural candidate for the permanent seat in question.
On the German side, we do not rule out such an approach. It may offer a way out where the electorate so decides, in particular, as broad agreement among the electorate is anyhow required for decisions on new permanent members.
Mr Chairman, The programme also mentions the so-called "cascade-effect" in the context of the question of new permanent members. It is the merit of Argentina of having called the attention of Member States to this phenomenum in the Compendium of 18 September 1995.
While I may come back to this aspect at a later stage, for now I want to sum up very briefly our own position: We do not want to profit from the so-called "cascade-effect" and we are ready to bear the consequences of such an attitude.
Mr. Chairman,
As to the extension of the veto right to new permanent members, let me again sum up the German position:
In the first place, we understand the misgivings that many countries obviously have with regard to the right to veto. Interesting proposals to limit the right to veto have been put forward. They should lead to a dialogue between the general membership and the permanent members. Germany, for its part, can accept any reasonable procedure with regard to decision-making in the Security Council. The right to veto is per se not an objective for us.
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, why is it that if the old permanent members keep their veto - I think, a reasonable assumption - we favour a veto for the new permanent members, too?
It is, because we want the new permanent members to carry weight. If they are not on equal terms with the old permanent members, if they can give only their advise, and their individual consent is not required - then they are permanent members in the sense, that they are longer in the Council than a couple of years, but they are not capable of bringing to bear their opinion. This may all be right, if we send them into the Council out of devotion only - an attitude, against which the Italian President quite rightly warned us. If however, we want the new permanent members to perform and to carry their point, then we have to equip them with the same armour the other permanent members have. The question of the veto for the new members is a question of the degree of their effectiveness. That is, Mr. Chairman, why we are for equal status of all permanent members, old and new.
With regard to the issue of amendments to the Charter, we believe that it is very appropriate that we seriously begin to discuss this aspect. I would like to encourage in particular the authors of those proposals that have found a broad measure of agreement in this group to move forward to the study of the question which amendments to the Charter would be necessary in connection with their proposals. On the other side, it is quite obvious that the amendments to the Charter will depend to a very large extent on the decisions on substance. The necessary amendments to the Charter will then have to be decided upon accordingly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
