May 20, 1996
Mr. Chairman,
The last round of our meetings addressed the possible increase in permanent seats on the Security Council. We noted that at the end of the day, not very many delegations expressed themselves in favor of such an increase. Certainly there were not enough voices to warrant the conclusion that there is growing support for a solution that is not democratic and not compatible with the UN Charter. We should never forget that in its preamble, the Charter solemnly reaffirms the equal rights of nations large and small.
In the same connection, we have noted a growing interest in the Italian proposal. In the last four rounds of our discussions, 16 delegations have joined those who had already expressed support for or interest in our project, bringing the total to 63 countries. This number is factual. If the bureau has any doubt, we can provide the list of delegations who made statements in favor the Italian proposal. It is true that some of them have indicated their preference for it as a fall-back solution, in case the "Quick Fix proposal" does not pass. And I don't need to repeat here that it is now commonly accepted that the "Quick Fix proposal" is already dead.
Mr. Chairman,
In April I explained at length why Italy is firmly opposed to the establishment of new permanent seats. Today I will focus my statement on the increase in non-permanent seats. On this subject there is a much greater convergence of views, and hence a more concrete possibility of reaching an agreement.
At this point let me give some precise answers to the list of questions as it appears in the program of work drafted by the bureau:
a) Principles governing the possible expansion of non-permanent membership, including the ratio to permanent membership: We have repeatedly indicated that one of the principles that should guide the expansion of non-permanent membership is the need to reconcile democracy and sovereign equality of states with the proper realism. This can be done by providing for democratic election for all members of the Council, with the sole exception of the five permanent members indicated in paragraph 23 of the Charter, and by allowing the countries that bear a larger burden for the life and activity of the United Nations to rotate more frequently in the Security Council. To be frank, Mr. Chairman, some countries are already able to rotate more easily than others, as you can see in the diagram attached to the Italian proposal.
While fully maintaining the principle of democratic election by secret ballot, our formula intends to rationalize the present system, thereby preventing major rivalries and acrimonious situations, such as some we are currently experiencing.
This is the ideological root of our proposal.
As for the ratio of non-permanent to permanent members, it should be increased in favor of non-permanent members. The five permanent members should remain five. A very clear trend in this direction emerged with the reform of 1963, when there was an increase only in non-permanent members. And this for the sake of reinforcing the democratic and egalitarian character of our organization. One major principle of the Italian proposal is that non-permanent members should see their weight increased in the decision-making process of the Council. Furthermore, as we have explained in the past, if the Italian formula is adopted, developing countries would acquire what they are striving for: a "sixth collective veto";
b) Criteria for new non-permanent members: May I recall that the latest version of the Italian proposal simply indicates--as criteria for selecting new non-permanent members--the provisions of Article 23, paragraph 1 of the Charter: i.e., contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization, and equitable geographic representation. Other more precise criteria can be logically deduced from these, such as the capacity and willingness of states to make specific contributions (with military personnel and financial resources) to peace-keeping operations, as well as to voluntary funds for humanitarian operations and political and economic rehabilitation.
In our opinion, it is important that the criteria agreed on be applicable to all continents and countries. Any geographic differentiation in the choice of criteria could, in our view, introduce dissimilarities that would ultimately impair the functioning of the Security Council.
c) Number of new non-permanent members: We continue to believe that an increase of 10 would make it possible to reconcile the need for more equitable geographic representation with that of maintaining, or possibly increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Council. In our opinion, this should be the ceiling if we are to have a viable Council.
d) Modalities for the selection of new non-permanent members: According to our proposal, ten new non-permanent seats would be created in addition to the present ten. Three states would rotate on each of these new seats, making a total of 30 states. Each state would serve one two-year term in the Council every six years (i.e., one out of three terms). None of these 30 states could compete for the ten current non-permanent seats, which would be left exclusively to small to mid-sized countries. This solution would provide such countries with greater opportunities to be elected, since they would not have to compete any longer with larger countries within their respective regional groups. Each state designated by the General Assembly for more frequent rotation would in any case have to submit to elections on a clean slate, and obtain a two-thirds majority by secret ballot. Should the candidates not obtain a majority by the third ballot, the second country from the same sub-group of three states could then run, according to the same procedure. If this second country also fails to obtain the required majority, this seat would become open to election to all members of the same geographic group, according to current practices.
Needless to say, the Italian model does not a priori exclude forms of preselecting candidates on the part of the geographic groups (as some groups, like the African one, already do), so long as these choices are later ratified by the General Assembly as the expression of the UN general membership.
e) Rotational arrangements for new permanent members: I have already dealt with this aspect under point c). Let me add that the list of countries designated to rotate more frequently should be subject to periodic review (every 12 or 15 years): a requirement which Italy holds in the highest importance, since it would allow the Council to adapt to changing conditions and prevent the formation of situations of eternal, irreversible privilege, which would instead be the case with new permanent members.
The Italian proposal provides for the application of the principle of more frequent rotation to all geographic groups, and not just to some. As the debates in recent weeks have shown, any exception or exclusion would inevitably be perceived as an unacceptable discrimination, in an organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states. f) Terms of office and possible immediate re-election for non-permanent members :It is implicit in what I have already said that the terms in office for non-permanent member should remain two years, as provided for in Article 23, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Italy is firmly opposed to removing the ban on immediate reeligibility set in Article 23 of the Charter. Lifting this ban would result in further limiting the space left for rotation of the entire membership, to the benefit of a handful of countries. A change in this rule would also risk introducing a new category of countries: permanent non-permanent members. The precedent of the League of Nations is, in this regard, a warning we must not ignore.
g) Size and composition of non-permanent membership: According to the Italian project there should be a total of 20 non-permanent seats, with the 10 new seats distributed in such a way as to assure a geographic rebalancing of the composition of the Council: 5 to Asia and Africa combined; 2 to Latin America; 2 to WEOG; and 1 to Eastern Europe. In such a way, the continents that are currently under-represented would receive 70% of the new non-permanent seats, which would considerably increase their overall weight in the Council.
h) Amendments to the Charter: The Italian project has the great advantage of requiring only a very limited number of modifications to the UN Charter: namely, the Amendment of Article 23 (to increase the number of non-permanent seats from 10 to 20) and of Article 27 (to review the quorum of votes needed for the adoption of Security Council decisions). Nothing more than what was already done in 1965.
Mr. Chairman,
Allow me in concluding to make an appeal to the non-aligned countries to clarify and further elaborate their common position. For example, they could specify the circumstances and conditions that would make them opt for the alternative contained in their proposal, namely an increase, for the moment, only in non-permanent seats. I hardly need to recall that the membership of the non-aligned movement is roughly equivalent to two-thirds of the General Assembly. Its choices could be decisive indeed to a fair outcome of this exercise: Fair for all, and not only for a handful of countries who are asking to perpetuate a situation of eternal privilege, which would transform the rest of the general membership into mere spectators to their activities and decisions.
