1. In his statement to this Working Group on 28 April 1997, President Razali had indicated his preference that we deal specifically with the issues. Respecting his wishes, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to discuss the issue of expansion in some detail. Almost all of us would agree that this is central to any meaningful reform of the Security Council.
2. Singapore's positions on expansion and other aspects of Security Council reform were placed on the record in my Foreign Minister's address to the General Assembly on 26 September 1996. Our principled position stands and need not be repeated. We will therefore only focus on what we consider the real obstacle to progress. This is the position of the five current Permanent Members of the Security Council.
3. The policies that will allow this Working Group to move forward, or which will stall its progress indefinitely, will not be worked out in Bonn, Oslo or Rome. They will not be made in Brussels, Islamabad, Helsinki or New Delhi. Nor in Tokyo, Canberra, Mexico City, Tunis or Cairo; not in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta.
4. We all know that the really crucial decisions—those that will make or break this process—will be made in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris and London.
5. Four of the five Permanent Members have pronounced themselves, with apparent exactitude, on the central question of expansion. We take what they say seriously and have studied their written statements in the General Assembly and this Working Group very carefully.
6. The texts we have studied are not careless comments, thrown out off-the-cuff over drinks, or casual corridor talk. They are not secret conversations of which nobody but the participants has any record or which can be subsequently denied. They are sober official public pronouncements, made in official UN bodies, presumable the fruit of much thought, crafted with precision for the record. Colleagues may find the results of our study useful.
7. The US has been the most specific. So we will deal with its position first. Our texts are the statement made by Ambassador Edward Gnehm in the General Assembly on 30 October 1996, the statement made by Permanent Representative Bill Richardson in this Working Group on 11 March 1997 and the statement by Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, again in this Working Group, on 29 April 1997. We have also carefully studied the US non-paper that was distributed in some capitals in March 1997.
8. The following appear to us to be the main elements of the US position on expansion:
· First, the US has clearly professed itself in favor of Japan and Germany as new Permanent Members. Ambassadors Gnehm and Richardson referred to Permanent Membership for Germany and Japan as a "sine qua non" of Security Council reform, while the non-paper described US support for Germany and Japan as ‘enthusiastic'.
· Second, the US is resolutely opposed to any increase only in the non-permanent category. Ambassador Inderfurth described this US position as ‘firm'.
· Third, the US has been equally clear that the Security Council should consist of only 20 to 21 members. The US non-paper called a Security Council of 20 to 21 " the largest we can accept".
· Fourth, US representatives, on various occasions, although with somewhat less clarity than on the first three points, referred to the need for what they have variously called "broadening participation in the Council by developing countries", or "balanced international representation" or "balanced international representation" or ‘fair' representation for "the world's regions".
9. The comments by UK, France and Russia on expansion have been somewhat less specific, consistent or comprehensive. Nevertheless, some elements of their positions appear generally congruent with those of the US.
10. Speaking in the General Assembly on 30 October 1996, a representative of the United Kingdom said that any enlargement, and I quote, "must be kept modest to, say, 20 or 21 seats". However, speaking to this Working Group on 20 March 1997, Sir John Weston refrained from naming any specific number, although he criticized President Razali's proposal for a Security Council of 24 as "too large".
11. Speaking to the General Assembly on 29 October 1996, the Permanent Representative of France, Alain Dejammet, referred to a Council of "a little more than 20 members" as constituting the "maximum". He did not say how many constituted "a little". And as far as we know, France has not since named any particular number.
12. Speaking in the General Assembly on 29 October 1996, the Representative of the Russian Federation referred to "a limited increase" to make up a Council "of around 20 members". How far around, he did not say.
13. The United Kingdom, although apparently somewhat less enthusiastically than the US, also appears to have supported Germany and Japan as new Permanent Members.
14. On 20 October 1996, the UK representative said that certain countries deserved to be offered Permanent membership by virtue of their political, economic and diplomatic weight. This is an unexceptional general statement. He followed up by welcoming what he described as "the wide support' for Germany and Japan. The UK representative stopped short of explicitly saying that the UK itself supported Germany and Japan.
15. Lest this be thought a quibble, let me hastily point out that Sir John Weston was even more circumlocutous in this Working Group on 20 March 1997. He began by welcoming President Razali's presence and in this context characterized President Razali's proposal as, among other things, reflecting the "wide support" that, and I quote, "has justifiably been given to the candidatures of Japan and Germany for permanent membership". End of quotation.
16. ‘Justifiably' only means that the position so described could be demonstrated to be correct. It does not in itself mean that the person so describing the position necessarily shares the view.
17. Singapore was, of course, taught the nuances of the English language by our former colonial masters, the British. For this we are profoundly grateful. Whether these particular nuances will prove significant, time will tell. But countries with ambitions should perhaps beware their friends as well as their enemies. Or am I being too cynical?
18. Ambassador Dejammet's statement of 29 October 1996 was more direct in France's support for Germany and Japan. French is not one of Singapore's official languages. I apologize if we have mistranslated the French text and so misrepresented him.
19. As far as we are aware, Russia has not placed on written public record support for Germany and Japan as potential Permanent Members.
20. China has been the least specific of all the Permanent Members in that it has not mentioned any specific number or country. On 20 October 1996 in the General Assembly China said that it was, I quote, "in favor of an appropriate expansion of the Security Council". On 28 April 1997 in this Working Group China said that its view was that, I quote again, the ‘key to the enlargement of the Security Council lies in redressing the long-standing anomaly in geographical representation and in representation between the developed and developing countries in the composition of the Security Council." End of quotation.
21. How do these written, declared, official positions of the Permanent Members accord with the views of the majority of the UN membership?
22. Here, I am aware that we are perhaps treading on delicate ground. The very concept of a majority has been subject to some discussion and debate. Nevertheless, without entering into the debate or prejudging its outcome, we believe that the concept is generally clear enough to be used as a benchmark against which to test the positions of the Permanent Members.
23. Reporting to the Working Group on 10 March 1997 on the results of the Vice-Chairmen's consultations with some 165 delegations, Ambassador Asda Jayanama, said that, and I quote him, "the majority of those who addressed the size of the Council supported an overall expansion of the membership up to 26, while some others preferred the low 20s". End of quotation. Speaking to this Working Group on 28 April 1997, President Razali described the insistence on a Security Council of only 20 members as, and I quote him, "a minority position".
24. We know that the Vice-Chairmen's findings and President Razali's proposal have been highly controversial. But since the Non-Aligned Movement, consisting of 113 states, has endorsed an enlargement of the Security Council to 26 members, we are emboldened to suggest that at least the Vice-Chairmen's and President Razali's conclusion that expansion of the Security Council to only 20 or 21 is only a minority view is obvious. In fact, we would venture to say it is held only by a very small minority of four or, at most, five countries.
25. A minority view, but nevertheless the view of a powerful, sophisticated and experienced minority. Assume for purposes of analysis that by diplomatic sleight of hand or the application of brute force; because of our inattention or by intimidation, the views of the vast majority of UN members are brushed aside and a Security Council of 21 is imposed upon us. What would this Security Council look like?
26. The first assumption of our analysis is that the US, UK and France mean what they say and Russia and China go along. It will then be clear that two of the six additional seats will be occupied by Germany and Japan as new Permanent Members. How will the remaining four extra seats be allocated?
27. All the Permanent Members have spoken generally and variously of the need for representation of the developing world or of all regional groups. Beyond this, their positions fade into the mists. Although the US position still appears to be the most specifically enunciated, it nevertheless contains serious ambiguities. The US has not said clearly whether the additional four seats will be permanent seats or non-permanent seats. The US has only been clear that it will not accept an expansion in only the non-permanent category, a position echoed by the UK.
28. In his statement of 20 October 1996, Ambassador Gnehm indicated that the US would accept "a modest expansion of the Council beyond permanent seats for Germany and Japan". He acknowledged that "beyond Germany and Japan, additional membership remains a substantial question". But what was this ‘substantial question'? Was it to give the developing world permanent seats? He did not say. He only mentioned that "we take no position on how other seats might be apportioned".
29. In the same speech, Ambassador Gnehm described the concept of permanent regional rotational seats as "both positive and constructive" and deserving "careful consideration". But he did not say that the US itself endorsed permanent regional rotational seats.
30. He was perhaps wise in leaving the matter vague since the impracticalities of the concept have already been thoroughly exposed in this Working Group by many delegations including my own. At best, permanent regional rotational seats may work for Africa whose position is that it should have two new permanent seats with the veto. Africa already has an established system for rotation of candidatures. We do not see how it can work for any other region where it will only lead to permanent stress and conflict.
31. In this respect, I am grateful to my friend, Ambassador Ka of Senegal, for making clear in his intervention in this Working Group on 28 April 1997 that the concept of permanent regional rotational seats was not for export from Africa. For all other regions it is only a rhetorical device, not a real solution.
32. In any case, the US seems to have since retreated from even the already vague position of 30 October 1996. The March US non-paper does not mention permanent regional rotational seats. Nor does the paper explicitly say that the additional seats envisaged in its proposal for developing countries should be permanent seats. It only says that the views of Asia, Latin America and Africa should be solicited as regards the allocation of the additional seats beyond Germany and Japan.
33. In his statement to this Working Group on 11 March 1997, Ambassador Richardson was again silent on what the additional seats beyond permanent seats for Germany and Japan should be. Last week Ambassador Inderfurth, after advocating a Council of not more than 21, merely claimed that this, and I quote, "would well allow balanced international representation. We believe the regions could decide on the appropriate allocation of additional seats". End of quotation.
34. It is a little difficult to understand what Ambassador Inderfurth precisely meant when he said that the US believed that the regions could decide on the appropriate allocation of additional seats. If by regions he was referring to Asia, Africa and Latin America, it seems clear that most of the countries in these regions, if not the majority, believe that Asia, Africa and Latin America should be given new permanent seats with full powers in any expansion of the Security Council.
35. As Ambassador Asda Jayanama said on 10 March 1997, and I quote, "the majority of supporters of an increase in both categories of membership supported an increase of five non-Permanent Members and five Permanent Members. Most of these supporters wanted the new five Permanent Members to come from both developing and industrialized countries and many stressed that there should be no discrimination between present and new Permanent Members". End of quotation.
36. Of course, the Vice-Chairmen's conclusions have been controversial. But one need not necessarily agree with all their conclusions to note that it is precisely this kind of clarity in the type, status and allocation of seats that the US has avoided. Ambassador Inderfurth did not mention the concept of permanence in relation to developing countries. To our knowledge, and based on available texts, no US representative ever has done so on public record.
37. Other Permanent Members have also waffled on this key question. While the UK has acknowledged the need for enhanced representation in the Security Council for the developing world, it has not specified whether this representation should be in the permanent or non-permanent category.
38. On 29 October 1996, France called for an increase in Security Council membership which would allow the "best representation of developing countries" and where "no regional group should be left out". Again, there was no specific mention of permanence in relation to developing countries.
39. On the same day, Russia said that, and I quote, "the improvement in Security Council representatives should be carried out on a balanced basis, taking into account the interests of regional groups, including a specific task of expanding representativeness of the developing countries." End of quotation.
40. There was no clear mention of permanent seats for developing countries. However, developing countries may be a little comforted by the fact that in the same statement, the Russian representative expressed satisfaction that the Working Group had rejected the "quick fix". But, of course, this is not exactly the same thing as clearly supporting permanent seats for developing countries.
41. Of all the Permanent Members, China has been the most explicit in its support for developing countries. In his statement of 30 October 1996 to the General Assembly, Ambassador Wang Xuexian, stressed that the reform of the Security Council must, and I quote, "focus on redressing imbalanced regional representation, particularly serious inadequacy in the representation of developing countries. It must in no way further aggravate such imbalance. Without attaining this objective, the enlargement of the Council cannot be regarded as reform in the real sense, but rather a failure of the reform. Therefore, no reform plan that excludes or discriminates against developing countries will ever be accepted by the general membership of the UN, including China". End of quotation.
42. The implication is that China supports permanent seats for developing countries. But this is still only an inference not a direct statement.
43. To be sure, the US has on a number of occasions claimed that it would be flexible. Thus, for example, Ambassador Richardson on 11 March 1997 after repeating the familiar US position that the expansion should be to no more than 21 and describing permanent seats for Japan and Germany as a "sine qua non", said that "within those parameters, we are willing to be flexible". Ambassador Inderfurth last week repeated that "within those parameters, we haven't ruled anything out".
44. The problem with this ostensibly open-minded position is that in the absence of clarity as to whether the US would be prepared to see developing countries being given permanent seats, the declared parameters are so narrow as not to leave very much room for developing countries between them. Certainly, there does not appear to be any room for the ambitions of the large developing countries.
45. Even the current Permanent Members who have, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, supported Germany and Japan's aspirations have been silent on whether Germany and Japan should have the veto. The US non-paper lamely says that the US has taken no position on this crucial question. If the US is reluctant to commit itself to two Treaty allies; allies with whom and for whom it is prepared to go to war, it makes it even more difficult to believe that the US, and the other developed Permanent Members, would ever allow any developing country to attain permanent status, even the conscribed kind envisaged in President Razali's proposal.
46. We could go on to further dissect and analyse the positions of the Permanent Members. But I think we have already said enough to make two things clear:
· First, at least four out of the five Permanent Members are at odds with the majority of UN members in what they consider to be an appropriate overall size of a reformed Security Council.
· Second, at least four out of the five Permanent Members are at odds with the majority of UN members over what would be appropriate allocation of seats between the permanent and non-permanent category and between the industrialised and developing countries in a reformed Security Council.
47. Where then does this leave us? We submit it leaves us exactly where this Working Group is at this precise moment: at an impasse.
48. To break the impasse, the Permanent Members must be willing to simultaneously change their positions on both issues: the overall size of a reformed Security Council and permanent seats with full powers for developing countries. Compromise on one aspect without compromise on the other would still leave us at an impasse.
49. Assume, for instance, that a miracle occurs and all the Permanent Members clearly agree that there should be three additional permanent seats for the developing countries, but only in a Security Council of 21. That would leave only two additional non-permanent seats for the 175 other members of the UN. This is certainly unacceptable. But neither will the large developing countries easily give up their ambitions, no more than will Japan or Germany. Further, Africa has been clear that it wants two permanent seats. The NAM position of a Security Council of 26 seems to be the only way to accommodate the interests of all.
50. Unless all the Permanent Members simultaneously change both their basic positions we will remain in a state of paralysis. As things currently stand, what will command the support of the five Permanent Members will not command the support of the two-thirds membership that is necessary to amend the Charter in order to give effect to any reform of the Security Council, or at least will not command voluntary support. A coerced two-thirds majority to impose a so-called reform that does not comply with the wishes of the majority will merely undermine the legitimacy of the entire institution.
51. Four out of the five Permanent Members have virtually echoed the US in insisting that there should be no change in the "status and prerogatives" of the current Permanent Members. I suspect the fifth has remained silent only because there has really been no need for it to add its voice to this overwhelming chorus. Most of us have assumed that this ritualistic phrase refers only to Cluster II or the veto. I regret to say that the analysis that my delegation has shared with you is leading us to suspect that it applies to Cluster I as well; that the Permanent Members really do not want any change to the status quo because they believe that any change will diminish their status.
52. In his statement on 28 April 1997, President Razali appealed to members of this Working Group "not to seek recourse in filibustering". We entirely agree. But let us all be clear about the most serious filibuster: the inflexibility of the Permanent Members.
53. Of course, given the complexity of the issues involved in Security Council reform, we cannot expect an early resolution. There is a near and growing consensus that there cannot be an artificial deadline.
54. The Non-Aligned Movement's rejection of an imposed time frame was explicit and much discussed. But so also, in different ways, have several Permanent Members indicated that they do not intend to be hurried into hasty decisions; among them Russia and China in their statements to this Working Group of 11 March 1997 and 28 April 1997 respectively.
55. Less noticed because much more subtly expressed, the US and the UK also seem to have taken analogous positions. Ambassador Inderfuth said on 29 April 1997, and I quote, "the complexity and importance of Council reform require that decisions be made after careful deliberations. Obviously, we will need to consult intensively." Of course, Ambassador Inderfurth went on to express his support for what he called a "rigorous decision making schedule". But unlike President Razali's proposal, he named no specific dates. Similarly, on 28 April 1997, Sir John Weston, spoke of "an early decision by the Assembly". But he placed equal emphasis on ‘examining the proposals carefully', before ‘moving to negotiations'. Again no specific dates were mentioned.
56. Both were responding to President Razali's proposals. The interpretation we have given to their remarks is therefore borne out by our analysis of their substantive positions on expansion which has revealed that, notwithstanding their professed support for President Razali, there are serious contradictions between key aspects of their positions and President Razali's Proposal.
57. In fact, the central elements of the declared US and UK positions, like those of some other Permanent Members, makes it extremely unlikely that progress can be made, except on the basis of the complete submission of all other UN members to their wishes.
58. My delegation hopes that our analysis of the positions of the Permanent Five will soon be overtaken by events. We appeal to the Permanent Five to show flexibility.
59. We make this appeal in all sincerity, but, frankly, without much hope that it will be heeded. Our discussions on Cluster II and, in particular, on the veto were most discouraging. If the Permanent Members persist in their stubborn defense of the status quo, the Security Council reform process will be only a charade.
60. Let me conclude by reminding colleagues of a final complexity. Most of our discussions in the Working Group so far, and my delegation's own analysis, have dealt only with the positions of the governments of the Permanent Members; that is their executive authorities. As colleagues are aware, this is a necessary but insufficient condition for any Security Council reform to be given effect. Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter are clear that ratification by all five Permanent Members is also necessary. The positions of the legislatures of the five Permanent Members is therefore also critical.
61. We do not yet know the positions of the legislatures of four out of the five Permanent Members on Security Council reform. Or indeed on any aspect of UN reform. The legislature of the fifth member, the US Congress, has not pronounced itself clearly on Security Council reform. But it is abundantly clear that it is obsessed with institutional restructuring of the UN and financial reform, in particular, on the lowering of the ceiling of the US scales of assessment. These are also the clear priorities of the US administration. This Working Group should ponder the implications of this fact. Thank you.
