The "Cascade Effect" of Permanent Membership
1. The present working paper is only a first and preliminary attempt to
examine, in both quantitative and comparative terms, the participation of
the permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations system
as a whole.
2. When analysed in contrast with United Nations institutional regulations, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, a statistical study of the actual participation of the permanent members of the Security Council in the various organs of the system makes possible the identification of a problem intrinsic to the Organization's representative mechanism, namely, the large representation ratio of certain countries to the detriment of others.
3. Such a de facto situation is somehow analogous to granting a different status to a number of Member States in the system as a whole. Given its vast repercussions, it reflects a reality of the United Nations beyond the stipulations of the Charter.
4. We will, therefore, consider both the Charter and the representation figures separately, and take as a basis for comparison the situation of the five permanent members of the Security Council - France, China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation -to try to assess their overall representational advantage, as the centrepiece of the paper.
I. Regulations of the Charter of the United Nations
5. On the basis of Charter regulations, the status of permanent member has special bearing on:
. (a) Voting prerogatives in the Security Council - veto right - (Art.
27);
. (b) Composition of the Military Staff Committee (Art. 47), which
consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members or their
representatives;
. (c) Composition of the Trusteeship Council (Art. 86, b), integrated by
the five permanent members. China joined the group in 1989.
6. As regards participation in the General Assembly, the Charter regulations postulate, inter alia, the following:
. (a) General Committee
. . (i)According to rule 31 of its rules of procedure, the General Assembly
elects 21 vice-presidents. By decision 1 of the Assembly (in reference to
resolution 33/138 of 19 December 1978), five of these vice-presidents are
representatives of the five permanent members;
. . (ii)The General Committee is highly significant, given its role in
assessing the provisional agenda and supplementary list of items, and
introducing recommendations as to their inclusion in agenda rule 40);
. . (iii)On the other hand, permanent members may not assume the chairmanship
of the General Assembly, or the chairmanships of the Main Committees. The
latter conforms to rule 31, which indirectly indicates that the
presidencies of the Assembly and chairmanships of the Main Committees
cannot correspond to the same countries;
. . (iv)Likewise, it is established practice that the permanent members do
not assume the posts of vice-chairman or rapporteur of the Main Committees;
. (b) Committee on Contributions. Established by General Assembly
resolution 14 (I) of 1946, this Committee advises the Assembly on matters
relating to the allocation of the organization's expenses and on the
application of Article 19 of the Charter in cases of arrears in the payment
of contributions. Its membership has been expanded several times, now
standing at 18. Members are selected by the General Assembly on the basis
of geographical distribution, personal qualifications and experience. They
serve for a period of three years, retire by rotation and are eligible for
re-appointment.
II. Statistical findings
A. General Assembly
1. Committee on Contributions
. 7. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members belonged to the Committee in any given year, showing a 70 per cent re-appointment rate; that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed - on average - 7 out of the 10 times they were eligible for re-appointment. On the other hand, non-permanent members have a 48 per cent re-appointment rate, that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed a little under 5 out of 10 times when they were eligible for re-appointment.
2. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
. 8. Established at the first session of the General Assembly, by resolution 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, this particular Committee examines and reports on regular and peace-keeping budgets and accounts of the Organization, as well as on the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies. It also advises the Assembly on other administrative and financial matters referred to it. Its membership has been expanded numerous times, now standing at a total of 16. Members are appointed by the Assembly on the basis of geographical distribution, personal qualifications and experience. They serve for three-year periods and retire by rotation, but are eligible for re-appointment.
. 9. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members served on the Committee in any given year. They presented a combined re- appointment rate of 70 per cent, with France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation each presenting a 100 per cent re-appointment rate. On the other hand, non- permanent members have a combined re-appointment rate of 41 per cent, re- entering the Committee only 4 out of 10 times when they are eligible to do so.
3. General Assembly ad hoc and subsidiary organs
. 10. Permanent members also take part in a number of important United
Nations bodies dependent on the General Assembly:
. . (a) Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal
Judgements. By its resolution 957 (X) of 8 November 1955, the General
Assembly established a committee, authorized by paragraph 2 of Article 96
of the Charter, to request consultative opinions from the International
Court of Justice on decisions of the Administrative Tribunal. The
Committee is constituted by the members of the current or most recent
General Committee, which includes permanent members;
. . (b) International Law Commission. Established by resolution 174 (II) of
21 November 1947, the Commission was established by the Assembly with the
function of encouraging the progressive development of International Law
and its codification. Its membership has been expanded a number of times,
now standing at a total of 34, and is elected on the basis of geographical
distribution. With the sole exception of the United Kingdom, who did not
participate for four years, the permanent members belonged to it
continuously during the period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were
retired, at a rate of 20 per cent;
. .(c) United Nations Conciliation Committee for Palestine. Established by
resolution 104 (III) of 11 December 1948, this Committee was, inter alia,
established by the General Assembly to help with the repatriation of
refugees and to assist Israel and the Arab States to achieve final
settlements on all questions outstanding between them. The Committee's
regular members are France, Turkey, and the United States of America -two
of them Security Council permanent members;
. . (d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Established by the General
Assembly by its resolution 351 A (IV) of 24 November 1949, the Tribunal
hears and passes judgement on applications alleging non-observance of
contracts of employment on the part of the United Nations Secretariat staff
members or of their terms of appointment. Members are appointed by the
Assembly on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee for a three-year
term. For the period 1984-1993, at least three of the seven positions of
the Tribunal corresponded, at any one time, to permanent members, with
their tenure averaging 45 per cent of the total;
. . (e) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 913 (X)
of 3 December 1955, the Committee reports on all major sources of exposure
to ionizing radiation in the human environment and submits annual progress
reports to the Assembly. Its membership has been expanded a number of
times, now standing at a total of 21. With the exception of three years,
in which only four of the five permanent members participated, the five
permanent members were included continuously in the Committee during 1984-
1993;
. . (f) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This Committee,
established in 1959, acquired permanent status through General Assembly
resolution 1721 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. Its membership has been
gradually expanded to a present total of 53 members, which includes the
five permanent members, on a continual basis;
. . (g) Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. Established by the
General Assembly by its resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, it
consists of 34 members, including the five permanent members on a continual
basis;
. . (h) Joint Inspection Unit. Established by the General Assembly by its
resolution 2150 (XXI) of 4 November 1966 and beginning its work in 1968,
the Unit ensures that the activities undertaken by organizations of the
United Nations system are carried out as economically as possible, with
optimum use being made of available resources. It consists of no more than
11 Inspectors elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution and
serving in their personal capacity for a term of five years, which can be
renewed only once. With the exception of China, permanent members averaged
3 Inspectors out of 11 at any one time;
. . (i) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Established
by the General Assembly by its resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966,
the Commission seeks to promote the progressive harmonization and
unification of the law of international trade. Its membership has been
expanded on several occasions, with a present total of 36 elected on the
basis of six-year terms. With the exception of 1985, when only four of the
five permanent members participated, all five served continuously durithe period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were retired at a rate of
15 per cent;
. . (j) Committee on Relations with the Host Country. Established by the
General Assembly by resolution 2819 of 15 December 1971, it consists of 15
members nominated by the President of the Assembly, which includes the five
permanent members on a continual basis;
. . k) Consultative Committee on Disarmament. Established in 1978 by the
General Assembly by resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, the Committee is
composed of 20 eminent personalities, all nominated by the Secretary-
General. It includes experts representing the five permanent members on a
continual basis;
. . (l) Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. By its resolution 3499 of
15 December 1975, the General Assembly re-established the former Special
Committee on the United Nations Charter under a new name. After a number
of successive expansions, the Committee today consists of 47 members
nominated by the President of the Assembly, including the five permanent
members on a continual basis;
. . (m) Committee on Information. Established by the General Assembly by
its resolution 33/115 C of 18 December 1978, it has undergone successive
expansions and currently consists of 83 members assigned by the President
of the Assembly, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;
. . (n) United Nations Environment Programme. Established in 1972 by
General Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, UNEP is
represented by a Governing Council whose functions are, among others, to
promote international cooperation in the environment field, recommend
policies to this end and provide general policy guidance for the
coordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations system.
The Council reports to the Assembly through the Economic and Social Council
and is composed of 58 members elected by the Assembly on the basis of
geographic distribution and four-year terms. For the period 1984-1993, the
five permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation, thus
covering the entire period. The rest of the members combined - averaged
eight years of participation;
. . (o) Human Rights Committee. Based on available information for the
period 1986-1993, three permanent members participated in this Committee
continuously during the given period, while the rest of the membership was
subject to rotation or changes at a rate of 12 per cent;
. . (p) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, it consists of 18 experts elected by the Assembly on the basis of geographic distribution. For the period 1984-1993, two permanent members were added to two others (who had already been on the Committee) in 1986, after which all four served on a continual basis. On the other hand, other Committee members were rotated or retired at a rate of 21 per cent.
B. Economic and Social Council
11. The five permanent members are also part of the Economic and Social Council and various standing organs of limited membership, re-elected successively since the establishment of such organs.
. 1. Economic and Social Council (general membership)
12. Consisting originally of 18 members, it was successively expanded to include its present total of 53 members with three-year terms. Eighteen of these are nominated every year in General Assembly elections. With the exception of China, the five permanent members belonged to it almost continuously from its beginnings, until 1993 (combined default time: two years). Combined default time: total time of non-participation. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while all other members - combined - averaged 3.9 years of participation (39 per cent) in the same period. Figure 1 (sample graph) of the appendix shows this result. Figure 2 establishes the same comparison, but shows a breakdown of the component of the column "others" corresponding to figure 1 (on the basis of geographical distribution).
. 2. Subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council
13. Permanent members have also taken part in a number of other important United Nations bodies dependent on the Economic and Social Council:
(a) Statistical Commission. Established by Economic and Social Council
resolution 8 (I) of 1946, the Commission assists the Council in promoting
the development of national statistics, coordinating the statistical work
of certain specialized agencies and advising United Nations organs on
questions regarding statistical information. Its membership has been
expanded a number of times to a present total of 24, elected on the basis
of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the
permanent members served on the Commission almost continuously from its
inception until 1993 (combined default time: 3 years). For the period
1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent).
All other members combined averaged 3.2 years of participation (32 per
cent) in the same period;
(b) Population Commission. Established by Economic and Social Council
resolution 3 (III) of 1946, the Commission studies and advises the Council
on demographic questions and related social and economic matters. Its
membership has been expanded successively since 1946, now standing at a
total of 27. Members are elected by the Council for four-year terms on the
basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China,
the permanent members sat on the Committee continuously from its inception
until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of
participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.7
years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period;
(c) Commission for Social Development. Originally known as the Social
Commission, it was established by Economic and Social Council resolution 10
(II) of 1946 and renamed in 1966. It advises the Council on social
policies of a general character. Its membership, elected directly by the
Council for fouryear terms on the basis of geographic distribution, has
been expanded a number of times and now stands at 32. With the exception
of China, the permanent members served on the Commission almost
continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: 11
years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.8 years of participation
(88 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.9 years of
participation (29 per cent) in the same period;
(d) Commission on Human Rights. Established by Economic and Social
Council resolution 5 (I) of 1946, the Commission reports on questions
regarding the international bill of rights and other related declarations
on civil liberties and various forms of discrimination. Its membership has
been expanded numerous times, now standing at a total of 53. Members are
elected for threeyear terms on the basis of equitable geographic
distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members were
members of the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993
(combined default time: three years). For the period 1984-1993, they
averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). All other members
averaged 3.5 years of participation (35 per cent) in the same period;
(e) Commission on Transnational Corporations. Established by Economic
and Social Council resolution 1913 (LVII) of 1974, the Commission comprises
48 members elected directly by the Council for three-year terms on the
basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the
permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception
until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of
participation (100 per cent). The remaining members averaged 4.8 years of
participation (48 per cent) for the same period;
(f) Committee for Programme and Coordination. Established by Economic
and Social Council resolution 920 (XXXIV) of 1962, the Committee functions
as the main subsidiary organ of the Council and the Assembly for purposes
of planning, programming and coordination. Its membership has been
expanded a number of times to its present total of 34. Members are elected
by the Council for threeyear terms on the basis of equitable geographic
distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on
the Committee continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period
1984-1993, they averaged 9.4 years of participation (94 per cent), while
all others averaged 3.7 years of participation (37 per cent);
(g) Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Established by Economic and Social
Council resolution 9 (I) of 1946, the Commission comprises a total of 53
members elected by the Council for four-year terms at two-year intervals on
the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the
permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception
until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 9.6 years of
participation (96 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 5.2
years (52 per cent);
(h) Commission on Human Settlements (Habitat). Established by the
General Assembly by its resolution 32/162 of 19 December 1977, the
Commission comprises a total of 58 members elected for three to four-year
terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of
China, the permanent members sat on the Commission continuously from its
inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.4 years of
participation (84 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 5.5
years (55 per cent);
(i) Commission on the Status of Women. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 11 (II) of 1946, the Commission comprises a total of 45 members elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members participated in the Commission almost continuously from its beginnings until 1993 (combined default time: eight years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.6 years of participation (86 per cent), while the remaining members averaged a total of 3.7 years (37 per cent).
14. Appendix figure 3 (sample graph) shows average participation of permanent and non-permanent members in the Economic and Social Council subsidiary organs mentioned above. Figure 4 establishes the same comparison, but shows a breakdown of the component "others" corresponding to figure 3 (on the basis of geographic distribution).
C. International Court of Justice
15. Although the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not directly specify it, the five permanent members of the Security Council are de facto permanent members of the Court.
D. Related United Nations programmes and specialized agencies
. 1. International Atomic Energy Agency
16. Beginning its activities in 1957, the Agency seeks to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Its executive organ is the Board of Governors, members of which are designated on an annual basis by the Board itself and on a bi-annual basis by the Agency's General Conference, all by the principle of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Board continuously since 1957. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 years of participation (100 per cent); other members combined averaged 3.1 years of participation (31 per cent) in the same period.
. 2. International Civil Aviation Organization
17. Beginning its activities in 1947, ICAO fosters the planning and development of international air transport so as to ensure a safe growth of civil aviation throughout the world. Its executive body is the members' Council, composed of 33 contracting States. Permanent members participated in the Council for an average of 35.6 years (possible total: 46 years) between 1947 and 1993, that is, almost 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years of participation (18 per cent) in the same period.
. 3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
18. Established in 1945, FAO includes a main Council as its chief executive organ, composed of 49 member nations elected by the FAO Conference for threeyear terms. With the exception of the Russian Federation, which is not a member, the permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent) in the period 1984-1993; the rest of the membership averaged 2.7 years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period.
. 4. International Maritime Organization
19. Established in 1959, IMO regulates standards of maritime safety and facilitates cooperation among Governments on technical matters affecting international shipping. Its chief executive body is the IMO Council, composed of 32 members. With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Council continuously since 1959. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period.
. 5. International Telecommunication Union
20. The Union's chief executive organ is its Council, the members of which are elected by the ITU Conference and are eligible for re-election (total Union membership is 183). With the exception of the United Kingdom, the permanent members have been members of the Council continuously since 1947. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.9 years (19 per cent) in the same period.
. 6. World Meteorological Organization
21. WMO became a specialized agency in 1951, with the WMO Executive Council serving as its chief executive body. Permanent members sat on the Council for an average of 31 years (possible total: 42 years) between 1951 and 1993, that is, 75 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984- 1993, all five permanent members averaged 8.7 years (87 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period.
. 7. World Health Organization
22. WHO became a specialized agency in 1948, with the WHO Executive Board serving as its chief executive organ. Permanent members served on the Board for an average of 36 years (possible total: 45 years) between 1948 and 1993, that is, 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984- 1993, all five permanent members averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 2 years (20 per cent) of participation in the same period.
. 8. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
23. The organization was established in 1945. Its chief executive organ, the Executive Board, is elected by the UNESCO General Conference and consists of 51 member States who appoint representatives for four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. For the period 1984-1993, China, the Russian Federation and France were members of the Board continuously (10 full years of participation), while the rest of the membership averaged 3 years (30 per cent) of participation in the same period.
. 9. United Nations Children's Fund
24. Originally established as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund in 1946, it became a full permanent organ by General Assembly resolution 802 (VII) of 15 September 1953. Its leading executive body is the Executive Board, comprising 36 members elected for three-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the remaining members averaged 3.6 years (36 per cent) of participation in the same period.
. 10. United Nations Development Programme
25. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2029 (XX) of 22 November 1965, UNDP includes a Governing Council as its chief executive organ. The Council's membership has been successively expanded - now standing at a total of 48 - and is elected on the basis of equitable distribution among "developed" and "developing" countries as two separate categories. With the exception of China, the permanent members participated in the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984- 1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while average participation for the remaining "developed" countries (excluding the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation) averaged 6.5 years (65 per cent).
. 11. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
26. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 319 (IV) of 3 December 1949, UNHCR includes an Executive Committee as its leading organ. The Committee's membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 46 regular members, which includes (and has always included) all Security Council permanent members except for the Russian Federation.
. 12. Universal Postal Union
27. UPU became a United Nations specialized agency in 1948, with an Executive Council as its leading organ. For the period 1984-1993, the five permanent members averaged 6 years (60 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 2.1 years (21 per cent).
28. The above data make it somehow clear that the effective rates of participation of the five Security Council permanent members seem to be not directly reflective of Charter stipulations. In effect, they may be producing a certain degree of disequilibrium in the United Nations structure.
29. Such an apparent disequilibrium may find its roots in a number of reasons, which cause what can be called the "cascade effect". The permanent members' relative weight and negotiational advantage when soliciting their admittance into organs outside of the Security Council may well be reverberating throughout the Organization. The ongoing review of the Security Council may well grant all members an opportunity to look also in depth into this particular matter.
A/AC.247/5 (b) / A/49/965
| Existing Arrangement | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Western Europe | Eastern Europe | Africa and Asia | Latin America and the Carribean | Total | |
| Permanent Members | 3 | 1 | 1 | - | 5 |
| Non Permanent Members | 2 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 10 |
| Total | 5 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 15 |
| Simple Model | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Western Europe | Eastern Europe | Africa | Asia | Latin America and the Caribbean | Total | |
| Permanent Members | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 10 |
| Non Permanent Members | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 10 |
| Total | 6 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 20 |
| Existing Groups | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Western Europe | Eastern Europe | Africa | Asia | Latin America and the Caribbean | Total | |
| Permanent Members | 3 | 1 | - | 1 | - | 5 |
| Quasi-Permanent Members | 1 | - | 3 | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| Non Permanent Members | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 10 |
| Total | 6 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 23 |
| New Groups | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Western Europe | Central and Eastern Europe | Middle East and Maghreb | Africa | Central Asia and Indian Ocean | East Asia and Oceania | Americas | Total | |
| Permanent Members | 2 | 1 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Quasi-Permanent Members | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| Non Permanent Members | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10 |
| Total | 4 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 23 |
A/AC.247/5 (c)
Discussion paper
1. The present discussion paper on the main issues under consideration in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council has been prepared by an informal group of small and medium-sized countries.
2. In drawing up the paper, the delegations concerned considered that a sufficient level of broad agreement existed between their positions on the principal issues under consideration for it to be worthwhile setting these down with a view to establishing a general framework within which further work could be undertaken.
3. In the view of the group, a stage has been reached in the deliberation of the Open-ended Working Group at which there would be merit in sharing its approach with other delegations. It is for this reason that the group has decided to circulate the present discussion paper now.
4. In doing so, the group wishes to stress that the positions reflected in the paper are flexible and evolving. The discussion paper should not be seen as cutting across the work of the Open-ended Working Group, nor should it be viewed as a package solution to all the outstanding issues. It is intended, rather, as a contribution to the ongoing work of the Working Group from a group of countries that share a similar approach to the problems being addressed.
5. In this context, the views of other delegations are welcome, particularly those delegations which felt that they would wish to join with the group in developing the ideas further.
General comments
6. The reform of the Security Council should be in accordance with the following principles:
. (a) The reform of the Security Council must not put in danger its effectiveness, on the contrary it should strengthen it;
. (b) Enlargement of the Security Council should enhance its representativity, taking into account the emergence of new economic and political powers as well as the increase of United Nations membership;
. (c) Enlargement of the Security Council should enhance equitable geographic representation;
. (d) The possibility for smaller Member States to serve on the Security Council should not be diminished;
. (e) Enlargement should take place in both categories of permanent and non-permanent members.
Cluster 1
1. Permanent membership
7. There is a need to increase the number of permanent seats (two to five additional permanent seats). Global influence, capacity and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in particular through peace-keeping operations and through the assumption of an additional financial burden (peace-keeping operations budget) should be taken into account for selecting new permanent members. Fixing objective criteria for selecting new permanent members would, however, be difficult to achieve and might threaten the whole process of reform. In addition to Germany and Japan, already perceived by many as candidates for permanent seats, Africa, Asia and Latin America should also be given permanent seats.
2. Non-permanent membership
8. The increase in permanent seats should be accompanied by an appropriate increase in non-permanent membership in order to preserve as much as possible a balanced configuration of the Security Council. The current criteria for selecting non-permanent members (Article 23.1 of the Charter) should be maintained.
3. Other categories of membership
9. An increase in membership should take place within the framework of the current distinction between permanent and non-permanent; special privileged rotation arrangements for medium-sized countries should not be established.
4. Veto
10. There would be value in limiting the use of veto and the suggestions already made in this regard should be considered.
5. Size
11. Twenty to 25 should be the size of an enlarged Security Council.
6. Other matters
12. Review of the composition of the Security Council should remain possible in order to adapt it to the changing configuration of international relations.
Cluster 2
13. Measures already taken to enhance the relationship between the Council and the general membership as well as to improve the working methods and procedures of the Council, constitute a positive development. These measures should be maintained and improved, and, when appropriate and if possible, should receive a certain degree of formalization. Other new measures should be developed along the same lines. An amendment of Article 24 of the Charter might recognize the principle of information and consultation of all Member States by the Security Council to the largest possible extent.
14. The following should receive particular attention:
. (a) Briefings on the work of the Council by the President of the
Council;
. (b) Open orientation debates of the Council;
. (c) Consultations between Security Council and troop-contributing
countries;
. (d) Transparency of the work of sanctions committees.
A/AC.247/5 (d)
I. Summary of answers to Cluster 1 questions
1. Indefinite (permanent) membership
. (a) The number should be increased by between five and eight;
. (b) There should be established the principle of at least two members
from each of the five regions;
. (c) Subject to what is said in section VII below, in each of the five
regions any State would have the right to contest a seat in elections
conducted within the United Nations for each regional group. Tenure would
not exceed a renewable period to be prescribed. In addition, the States
contributing a specified minimum percentage of the Organization's budget
would be members;
. (d) Deferred, except for 4 below.
2. Regular (non-permanent) membership
. (a) The number should be increased by approximately 10;
. (b) The Article 23 criteria would be essentially the same as at present,
with the emphasis on equitable geographical distribution;
. (c) The ratio between the two categories should be approximately 2:1.
3. Other categories of membership
. (a) There is no need for additional substantial categories of
membership. As stated in 1 (c), regional representation should be the main
criterion of indefinite (permanent) membership. It should also be the main
criterion for regular membership. In both membership categories, pairs of
prospective members should also have the purely voluntary option of forming
composite or constituency groups;
. (b) The basis for self-selection through this modality would be
geographical, including trans-aquatic, adjacency or common membership of a
Chapter VIII agency;
. (c) The right to vote, exercise the veto (if any) and participate in
debates and in closed sessions would be rotated monthly. However, at all
times, the delegation would be comprised of representatives from both
participants in the composite or constituency group.
4. Veto
Ideally, the veto power should not be retained. If this is not feasible, it should be thus modified: a minimum of 3 States (if the Council is enlarged to over 25) or 2 States should jointly cast vetoes.
II. Introduction
1. At various times this delegation has presented its ideas both in this Working Group and in the plenary, as it did on 13 October 1994. Given the diversity of cultures, regions and economic and social realities, and the complexity of our proto-twenty-first century world, we stand by the proposals elaborated on that occasion. Nevertheless, in our endeavour to move forward, this delegation is today offering some additional thoughts. Some of these are based on ideas that have been expressed by several distinguished delegations. At the same time, our present formulation includes several elements from our previous proposals. Chief of these is the composite or constituency modality of membership.
2. Central to our notions is the importance of ensuring democracy in the United Nations. If this Organization's moral authority is to be preserved in an increasingly democratized world, it is inescapable that its own processes must be made more democratic. The essential ingredients of such democracy must be the introduction of equality and even-handedness. The first notable area in which this must be accomplished is that of membership categories and terminology. Surely the very notion of permanent membership contradicts the fundamental principle of democracy for which we have waged at least one major war in this century. It was a cardinal principle in the Atlantic Charter of the Second World War and the Charter of this Organization, which was spawned by that war. I would insult the intelligence of my listeners if I were to say any more on the history of this subject than that an entire large branch of international law and United Nations law is based on a veritable forest of weighty resolutions of this Assembly, notably resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples. In view of the vital importance of democracy, this delegation therefore proposes that the category of permanent membership should be relabelled "indefinite membership" and that the incidents of that category should reflect the basic notions of democracy, without posing any threat whatsoever to the peace and security of the world.
3. Similarly, overall democracy within the Organization and internal democracy within the Council itself must be made to apply to the incidents of voting, particularly the veto, which this delegation has previously recommended should be the foundation of reform. Logic would suggest that the veto should be abolished. But, in the realm of peace and security, logic is an abominable master. Therefore we repeat our suggestion that the veto should be reformed.
4. Democracy obviously requires that there should be essential equality between the weak and the strong, between the poor and the rich, and between the small and the large. It requires the widest possible participation in representative bodies. No United Nations organ, especially the Council, must become so complex as to preclude a category of State from participation. Wisdom, like democratic rights, should be widely shared. There must be full access to the distilled experiences of the weak, the poor and the small. Thus, ideas on Council reform should squarely reflect this concern.
5. In addition to democracy, we must acknowledge that, like States, international organizations are dynamic organisms. Their structures must therefore be flexible. That is an additional reason why modification of the veto and of permanent membership is required. Membership criteria and other structures must therefore reflect the reality that, throughout history, the dimensions, composition, boundaries and very existence of States have often been in flux. When these changes have taken place through democratic and peaceful means, this Organization has generally made the necessary accommodations. The very notions of permanent membership and the veto, as they presently exist, preclude such accommodation in cases of State succession. We must ensure that this is now rectified.
6. The final introductory point is that, in view of the dynamism to which reference has been made, an institution as vital as the Security Council must be provided with a mechanism for orderly change. This includes the Council's membership criteria. At the same time, reform should not be so idealistic and radical as to deprive the international system of the continued benefit of those States which have furnished yeoman service in the sensitive and dangerous fields of peace and security.
III. Indefinite membership
7. Indefinite membership would replace the present category of permanent membership. This delegation envisages that there might be two such members from each of the Organization's [five] regions. It might be argued that there are disparities between the existing regions in size and population numbers. However, that argument does not detract from the imperative of giving equal and democratic representation to each region. The solution to this perceived problem might be to reform the Organization's regional system.
8. Tenure would be indefinite in the sense that it would be of longer duration than the two years for regular members. The period could conceivably be five years, if indefinite membership included such responsibilities and obligations as justify an extended period for the amortization of necessary investments. Clearly, one of the incidents of such a status as indefinite membership should be indefinite renewability.
9. Elections of the permanent members from each region would be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, with participation of all the members of each respective regional group.
10. In addition to this modality of selection based on regional considerations, this delegation proposes that two or three additional permanent members would so qualify on the basis of their contribution to the budget of the Organization. It is submitted that, in view of the size of the Organization's budget for international security, it is unrealistic to deny the nexus between financial contributions and peace and security. One State that would obviously qualify under such criteria is the United States of America. This delegation further suggests that such States would not be counted among those which are qualified as contestants and electors in the regional elections described in the preceding paragraph.
11. To either type of indefinite membership could be applied the optional selection modality of composite or constituency membership. In the case of the budget-contribution criterion, the contributions of both States in a composite/ constituency group would be aggregated in order to determine whether they satisfied the required threshold. The adjacency criterion would be applied as described in section V below.
IV. Regular membership
12. Because of the imperatives of democracy (from the perspective of both equality and even-handedness), the label "non-permanent membership" conveys a sense of second-class citizenship. It is therefore proposed that it be relabelled "regular membership" or simply "membership". For reasons that have been canvassed in this statement, the number of regular members should be increased so that the proportion of regular to indefinite members would be approximately 2:1. In that event, the total number of members of the Council would be approximately 33, which would be consistent with efficiency, particularly if the Council ensures that its procedures are consistent with the effective use of time. As long as there is continued emphasis on equitable geographical distribution and the composite or constituency modality is utilized, it is perceived that the criteria presently in Article 23 (1) would suffice.
V. Composite or constituency membership
13. Regionalism is at the core of the proposals discussed so far. The expression has been used mainly in the sense of the existing United Nations regional groups. Consistently with the Council's role in peace and security, it has also been used in the sense of the functional security regions, which are the subject of Chapter VIII of the Organization's Charter. As noted in the Secretary-General's recent update to (A/50/60- S/1995/1) and the Council's recent debate on the Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111), the Organization has been relying increasingly on regional mechanisms. Since it appears likely that this trend will continue, it is rational to relate the composition of the Council to this reality, which bears a broad relationship to collective self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter). This is the essence of the composite or constituency modality, which follows a development in agencies that provide specific benefits or have certain defined or tangible functions.
14. This modality of membership would facilitate the effective participation in the work of the Council of the scores of States that have never been able to afford to participate, while providing the breadth of experience and nuanced views prevailing in the various functional regions.
15. It is most important to stress that this modality of membership would be available for both categories of membership. It would be purely optional for pairs of adjacent States. The concept of adjacency would include trans-aquatic adjacency and non-adjacent States that are members of a regional agency certified by the Security Council.
16. The vote and veto, if any, would rotate monthly between the parties to the composite/constituency arrangement. So would be the right to speak in debates, in both open and closed sessions. At all times, however, the delegations of composite members would include delegates from each component, who would be seated accordingly and would participate fully in committee work without regard to rotation.
VI. The veto
17. As this delegation has previously recommended, the exercise of the veto would be limited to cases in which more than one indefinite member coincided in its exercise. It is recommended that if the total size of the Council is increased beyond 25, the minimum number of coinciding members should be 3. Otherwise, it should be two.
VII. The alternative criteria for indefinite membership
18. As an alternative to today's proposal on the criteria for indefinite membership, this delegation wishes to reiterate the proposals it last summarized on 13 October 1994. It will be recalled that the most important elements in those proposals are population size (with a threshold of 100 million) and contribution to the Organization's budget. They also include a criterion based entirely on extraordinarily large population size. In addition, concepts are included for compensating for marginal non- satisfaction of the population and contribution criteria and for "grandfathering" existing members. Those concepts on grandfathering should be included in the new proposals outlined in the present statement. To that extent, the regional concept could not be fully applied in at least one of the five regional United Nations groups.
19. Nevertheless, I understand that at least one other delegation, fully cognizant of the changeability of international life, suggests that the Assembly should revisit this matter at regular prescribed intervals, in the first instance not later than 10 years from the date of effectiveness of the forthcoming set of reforms. This delegation endorses that suggestion.
