Global Policy Forum

By Colum Lynch

The U.N. Security Council quietly dissolved a high-profile independent U.N. panel last month that was established more than 21/2 years ago to prevent the al Qaeda terrorist network from financing its war against the United States and its allies, U.S. and U.N. officials said.

The move comes six weeks after the panel, headed by Michael Chandler of Britain, concluded in a stinging report that a number of Security Council sanctions against al Qaeda had failed to constrain the terrorist network. But Security Council members have denied the move was retribution for the panel's conclusions, saying that the quality of the group's work was uneven and that the group had outlived its usefulness.

The 15-nation council on Friday adopted a new resolution sponsored by the United States, Russia and Chile that would replace Chandler's panel with what they say will be a more professional body. The new panel is expected to keep monitoring the global war against terrorism but would be subject to closer Security Council coordination and oversight.

The dispute underscores the challenge of managing an international counterterrorism operation through an organization whose 191 members are frequently criticized for failing to cooperate. It also reflects growing frustration among members that sanctions have done little to interrupt the flow of money and arms to al Qaeda.

Chandler criticized the decision, saying it would undercut the United Nations' capacity to combat al Qaeda. He suggested that his panel's demise was a result of pressure from influential U.N. members who had been singled out in his reports for failing to take adequate measures to combat al Qaeda.

"A number of people were uncomfortable with our last report," Chandler said. He said that the Security Council was sending the wrong message and that one of the "key elements" of a successful counterterrorism strategy is "a strong independent monitoring group."

Chandler's five-member panel -- the monitoring group on al Qaeda -- was established in July 2001 to ensure compliance with an arms embargo against the Taliban and a freeze on its financial assets for harboring Osama bin Laden. The mission's mandate was expanded after the Taliban fell in January 2002, granting it broad powers to monitor international compliance with a U.N. financial, travel and arms ban.

Chandler's reports have provided periodic snapshots of the international campaign against terrorism, often highlighting failings in governments' responses to the al Qaeda threat. In August 2002, after a lull in al Qaeda activities, Chandler provided a prescient forecast of the network's resurgence. "Al Qaeda is by all accounts 'fit and well' and poised to strike," the report warned. It was followed by deadly strikes in Bali, Indonesia; Casablanca, Morroco; and Saudi Arabia.

"The group functioned very well, providing hard-hitting reports to the Security Council which painted a picture of what was really going on," said Victor Comras, a former State Department official who helped write the Dec. 2 report. "I am at a loss to understand why the United States is one of the main players in redrafting the new resolution and allowing the monitoring group to lapse," he added. "The United States was the greatest beneficiary of the monitoring group because it gave them a lever to name and shame" countries that failed to combat terrorists.

One U.S. official said the last thing the United States wants is to "muzzle" the United Nations. But he said that although Chandler's panel was effective "at getting headlines," his propensity for antagonizing member states could ultimately undermine U.S. efforts to harness the United Nations' support in its anti-terror campaign. Chandler's group "did a good job," said James B. Cunningham, the deputy U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. "But we are trying to make the committee more effective."

Some U.S. and U.N. diplomats said Chandler needlessly alienated potential allies and constituents at the United Nations, including some in the United States. Chandler's 2002 report irked Bush administration officials by casting doubt on the success of the U.S.-led effort to block al Qaeda financing. The Bush administration also challenged the veracity of Chandler's assertion in an earlier report that the Treasury Department had ignored warnings from SunTrust Banks that a key plotter in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had previously transferred large sums of money to an account at a Florida bank branch.

Chandler infuriated officials from Liechtenstein, Italy and Switzerland with the Dec. 2 report that illustrated how two U.N.-designated terrorist financiers, Youssef Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, lived, traveled and operated multimillion-dollar businesses in their countries in violation of U.N. sanctions.

Liechtenstein's U.N. ambassador, Christian Wenaweser, one of Chandler's sharpest critics, complained that the Chandler investigation was shoddy and that he failed to adequately acknowledge his government's role in helping build the case against two alleged terrorist financiers. "We don't question the usefulness of the monitoring group. Quite the contrary. But they have to have a clear mandate and guidelines on how they should and shouldn't do their work," Wenaweser said. "They didn't bother to verify basic facts; they got some things wrong. Travel dates. Spelling of names. Some of the stuff was silly."

Chile's U.N. ambassador, Heraldo Muñoz, the U.N. terrorism committee's chairman, said the new eight-member panel -- called the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team -- would give "more teeth" to U.N. anti-terror efforts by strengthening the committee's expertise in finance and border controls, and improving its capacity to analyze terrorist trends. "I would like a monitoring team that is efficient, that is independent and that can closely collaborate with the committee," Muñoz said.

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