Global Policy Forum

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Sanctions against UNITA have reduced Jonas Savimbi's capacity to wage an expensive conventional war against the Angolan state, but according to analysts and a detailed UN report, they have not reduced the rebel movement's ability to indefinitely embroil the battered country in a state of war.

The Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA - as part of what has become known as a "name-and-shame campaign" aimed at deterring illicit diamond and arms trading - submitted its third report to the UN Security Council in October, detailing progress regarding a UN embargo on UNITA diamond sales and arms purchases.

The mechanism's report paints a picture of a military force which has adapted well to its waning fortunes and of a leader who has become increasingly paranoid and firm in his belief that he can overthrow the Luanda government. It says UNITA is probably selling about US $250,000 dollars worth of diamonds illicitly each day and is still, for the most part, using its old routes and connections to do so. It also says that UNITA continues to buy the arms it needs to wage guerrilla warfare and that it is using new information technology, like the Internet, to spread its message more widely than ever before.

And, as Patrick Smith, editor of Africa Confidential, says, one can not write UNITA off because it has no - or very little - international support. "I guess if you judge a military threat on the amount of hardware and cash resources, then in terms of diamonds and access to fuel and transportation, there is no doubt that UNITA is weaker than it was in 1990," Smith says. However, he stresses that UNITA does not need conventional forces to continue being a serious threat. "They are a much more random and mobile threat. They still have recruiting mechanisms and there is still loyalty to UNITA's ideas. In my view UNITA is still a formidable force," he told IRIN.

The mechanism says in its report: "UNITA has increased its terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. It has attacked schools, buses and trains. It has shot at people fleeing to escape from the flames of a burning explosion. It has shot at World Food Programme (WFP) planes carrying not weapons but desperately needed food and humanitarian supplies. Sadly, such instances and far too numerous to cite here. During the last six-month period UNITA has pursued its military activities with attacks in several provinces...

"The activities of UNITA serve multiple purposes. Through its attacks, the organisation aims to show the world that it is to be reckoned with. The attacks are also aimed at forcing the Angolan armed forces to deploy more units in government-controlled areas, thus diverting attention away from what UNITA considers vital, such as protecting its leadership in the province of Moxico (eastern Angola), and important UNITA bases in other provinces. The attacks are also invaluable opportunities for obtaining supplies (from the FAA and from civilians)."

Wealth outweighs risk

The mechanism says it believes that arms deliveries to UNITA have been "drastically decreased", but adds: "The mechanism's monitoring of the arms embargo has also had a deterrent effect. Nevertheless, there are indications that some businessmen are still willing to take the risk if the payoff is sufficient. Cross-border supplies still reach UNITA from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mechanism also received repeated allegations that the country remains a major transit country for UNITA diamonds."

One of the businessmen named is Victor Bout, alleged to be the provider of forged end-user certificates and identified as the owner of air cargo company Air Cess, carrier of the bulk of the equipment suspected to be headed for UNITA. It says Bout has subcontracted his work to five companies since he was exposed in March 2000, in an attempt to confuse the trail, and that at least three of the companies he uses are registered in South Africa. South African intelligence sources told IRIN a local investigation into arms and diamond deals involving UNITA was under way, but would not divulge details.

The mechanism's investigations, however, established that KAS Engineering Gibraltar, a broker of exports from Bulgaria, acted as the sole contractor and initial buyer of the arms exported by suppliers based in Bulgaria. Its says KAS received payment in coverage of initial expenditures from Standard Chartered Bank and that the mechanism has asked the US authorities for cooperation in obtaining information on the account from which the payments were drawn - allegedly held at a New York branch of Standard Chartered Bank.

"This development," says the report, "has permitted the mechanism to reconstruct a particular modus operandi in the UNITA arms procurement methods. This method involved the use of forged end-user certificates, and the investigation demonstrated the key role played by Victor Bout as the alleged provider of the forged documents and formally identified as the latter's air cargo company, Air Cess, as the carrier of the bulk of the equipment."

The mechanism says the "financial trail relating to the arms purchase shows a fragmented pattern designed to break the link between the payment of funds and the supply of weapons". It says it is awaiting information from the authorities in the Bahamas on the East European Shipping Corporation, "the broker of arms deals between SN ROM ARM and, purportedly, Togo". It says it is also awaiting information from the British authorities on the dealings of Trade Investment International Limited, "said to be the European representative of the East European Shipping Corporation".

Legal requirements in the Bahamas impeded efforts to fully disclose the role the East European Shipping Corporation in purchasing weapons destined for UNITA. Another company named as having links to arms procurements for UNITA is the Panama City-based Armitech Company Inc - a broker of arms transactions between Arsenalul Armatei Romania and Burkina Faso.

In addition, in trying to trace the origin of UNITA equipment seized in Togo in 1997, the mechanism has uncovered flying routes involving airports in Togo, Khartoum, Nairobi, Johannesburg, and even Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. It has also traced some flights suspected of carrying arms to UNITA as having reportedly originated in the Republic of Moldova and from Uzbekistan. Ultimately, however, the mechanism has not managed to connect all the dots and to identify who is selling arms to UNITA.

In its own words: "The ongoing project on the profiling of arms dealers mentioned in the previous report (released in April), namely Imad Kebir, alias Piotr Godunov, and Victor Bout, has not recorded any major progress. The mechanism has not been able to collect information other than that already published, except in the case of Victor Bout." Neither has the mechanism managed to secure cooperation from all the states implicated, in its attempt to isolate UNITA.

Results are disappointing

Andrea Lari, an independent consultant on Angola to the international lobby group, Human Rights Watch, says the monitoring mechanism report is "disappointing". "If you read between the lines, very little has been achieved in terms of tightening of controls and the effectiveness of sanctions," he notes. Acknowledging the difficulty of tracing the origin of arms and diamonds sellers and buyers, Lari says more pressure must be brought to bear on sanctions busters by sovereign states.

Like other observers and analysts, he says there is a need to re-evaluate the sanctions regime to give it teeth. Global Witness campaigner Alex Yearsley points to the absence of a proper mechanism to investigate and prosecute diamond and arms sanctions busters as a major loophole - a point the monitoring mechanism itself seems to acknowledge. In its report, it recommends the creation of a permanent structure with increased powers, but says that the form of such a body needs to be debated.

In the meantime, though, UNITA has secured itself a global audience via the Internet, which it is using effectively to spread its message and to facilitate communications between Jonas Savimbi and his army, and the internal and external wings of UNITA. "Electronic technology is becoming an increasingly important asset for UNITA in its propaganda campaign. Use and abuse of Internet web sites and e-mail by UNITA enables the rebels to maintain an even higher profile than the group had prior to the prohibition of its representational activities pursuant to Security Council resolution 1127 (1997)," the report states.

The mechanism says the "most important UNITA representatives are found in Belgium, Burkina Faso, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, Togo and the US" - with Portugal being the most important UNITA base in Europe. It lists two Ireland-based websites run by Colm Croasdell and Leon Dias as UNITA sites. It says that Joffre Justino, a vocal UNITA representative in Portugal, as well as Jonas Savimbi and other senior UNITA officials use e-mail addresses administered in Portugal. "Although these facts have been brought to the attention of the Irish and Portuguese authorities, neither government has succeeded in closing the sites," the mechanism writes.

Many ways to sell a diamond

Turning its attention to UNITA's diamond trading, the mechanism says UNITA probably sells between 25 and 30 percent of the illegal diamonds leaving Angola, excluding sales from stockpiles. It is estimated that about US $1 million worth of illicit diamonds leave Angola each day. While the mechanism has not been able to accurately detail UNITA's diamond stockpile, it says it has information that Savimbi himself holds a stockpile of coloured diamonds. The only coloured stones found in Angola are pink and yellow.

While saying that information on UNITA's diamond trading systems are incredibly patchy because it is one of the secrets UNITA guards most tightly, the mechanism says: - It has heard repeated reports that UNITA has been selling diamonds from its stockpile during 2001 - that UNITA is selling diamonds to dealers by tender using third countries, selling directly to friendly dealers, engaging in small opportunistic sales to raise money for food and medicines and is bartering diamonds for anything from arms to food and medicines. - it is possible, based on information provided by a UNITA defector, that Malange and the Angolan interior remain important mining areas for UNITA - it holds the view that UNITA is still in possession of some diamond mines in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Uige and Bie, among others.

In spite of various attempts, the mechanism has not been able to track end-buyers, even though it has identified various South African-linked dealers as possible middle-men, saying only that Savimbi himself seems to be controlling mined diamonds and that Zambia and the DRC remain important conduits. Quoting the defector, the mechanism says: "He described seeing six sealed opaque plastic sacks, about 16"X10", filled with diamonds, arrive through this route in March 2001."

If the Kimberley Process, aimed at keeping UNITA and other rebel forces from selling diamonds to fund their wars, ends its last meeting successfully in Botswana in November, then the sale of such diamonds could be severely curtailed. However, there is still, among others, disagreement over the certification system being proposed. And analysts and diamond experts alike agrees that criminal syndicates will always find a way of doing business.

It's war - business as usual

So, while the mechanism reports cooperation from some individual states, it seems that a lack of intelligence sharing among governments, sophisticated smuggling modus operandi, the secrecy of the diamond and arms trades and the mechanism's lack of capacity conspire to ensure that Savimbi can operate with a degree of impunity.

In the last six months the mechanism, through a wide range of interviews and its own investigations, has determined that UNITA is now built along a classical guerrilla cell structure, with operatives knowing only what they have to in order to carry out operations. It has also discovered that the rebel movement no longer has the civilian/administrative structure it used to have and that many civilians in its areas of control starve - unless they have senior connections.

It says there is ample evidence that UNITA's leadership is concentrated in the province of Moxico, where the government recently launched a major offensive, sending civilians and UNITA cells fleeing.

"For security reasons and because of the military offensive of the government troops, the various organisational units are not kept together. Jonas Savimbi is said to move with 14 or 15 highly trained military guards and a male nurse," the mechanism says, adding that several other senior UNITA members on the UN list of officials who are subject to sanctions, seem to be based in Moxico.

In addition, Savimbi, via a satellite communications system, continues to be able to reach any of the UNITA representatives abroad. More importantly though, his firm hold on the rebel movement (which has seen many of his detractors, defectors and powerful military leaders killed) keeps Savimbi in constant contact with his military commanders throughout the country via a good radio network. This has enabled them to plan and execute attacks throughout the country in the past six months, in defence of UNITA's smuggling routes and in search of food, medicines and arms.

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