By Francois Misser
May 1999
On 12 June 1998, a month after the resumption of the civil war in Angola, the UN security council passed resolution 1173, prohibiting the importation of Angolan diamonds not accompanied by a Certificate of Origin from the Luanda government. This was done in a bid to cut off the UNITA rebels main source of revenue and thus cripple its ability to purchased arms.
On 28 July 1998, the European Union adopted a resolution implementing the ban. The move was crucial since two EU states - the UK and Belgium - play a key role in the world's diamond trade. From the UK, the De Beers' owned Central Selling Organisation regulates the world market and 80% of transactions take place in Antwerp.
However, by December 1998, the war in Angola had escalated and UNITA continued to score significant military gains. Robert Fowler, chairman of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee urge UN member states to make violations of the sanctions a criminal offence and to obtain information from private companies and individuals on illicit diamond trade with UNITA. Fowler also wanted member states, the Angolan government and the diamond industry to work out methods of enforcing the sanctions.
He was reacting to a report from the UK-based NGO, Global Witness, which claimed that De Beers and CSO had been purchasing diamonds from UNITA since the early 1990s and thereby helping Savimbi's organisation to maintain its military strength.
The report also blamed the Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs experts who check the diamond parcels for failing to spot misleadingly labelled Angolan diamonds. Global Witness accused some Zambian Ministry of Mines officials of issuing false Certificates of Origin for Angolan diamonds smuggled out by UNITA.
The report provoked mixed reactions. On 2 March, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Erik Derycke called on the EU to investigate links between African diamond sales and the purchase of weapons. The Minister admitted that due to the importance of the diamond sector in Belgium, investigations should take place not only there but also in the UK and South Africa.
However, De Beers officials told African Business, "We do not purchase any Angolan diamonds which may be offered to us where their provenance is uncertain". Moreover, they said, "from the outset of sanctions, De Beers has been in contact with and offered assistance to the Angolan government and have also written to the UN Secretary General stating our position and offering assistance.
Jan De Kesel, the general director of the Antwerp-based Diamond High Council (DHC) which protects the interests of the industry, claimed on the 11 March, that the Belgian authorities were "rigorously" respecting the UN sanctions. But De Kesel claimed not to know whether other diamond trade centres, such as Tel Aviv, had adopted similar measures.
"I do not believe that the real problem is in Antwerp. It is in Angola and in the neighbouring states," he added. To some extent, De Kesel is right. Global Witness itself stressed "the Angolan government's failure to operate a rigorous system of controls". By the time the report was published, the Luanda government had not responded to requests from Belgium for a list of approved signatories to the Certificates.
Another difficulty is that export routes of unofficial diamonds from Angola have changed. Until early 1997, Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and Câ„¢te d'Ivoire were used as the main export routes of Angola's unofficial diamond exports to Antwerp, according to DHC statistics and a book, Les Gemmocraties. But the take-over of power by Angola's allies in Kinshasa and in Brazzaville during the same year forced UNITA to find alternative routes.
One of them is Zambia, claims Global Witness. Antwerp is not the main destination of these gems: only 14,593 carats worth $23,500 were exported from Zambia to Belgium in 1998. This represents a small fraction of the estimated $200m income generated by UNITA's sales in 1998.
The alternative destination, according to a former adviser to the ex-Congo Brazzaville President Pascal Lissouba, could be Isreal. He pointed out that Zambia maintains excellent relations with Israel, where President Frederick Chiluba paid a visit two years ago. The increasing influence in Zambia of Israeli companies linked with diamond interests, creates a favourable environment for such exports to Tel Aviv. However, old routes via Togo and Câ„¢te d'Ivoire may be still operational.
Another alternative route could be via Kisangani in the DRC, says London-based diamond trade expert, Chris Gordon. An intermediary of an Antwerp-based diamond trader reportedly opened a gems buying office in Kisangani at the end of 1998 to purchase UNITA's gems. There is speculation that these gems could be re-exported through Uganda or Rwanda.
Last year Uganda exported 11,303 carats worth $1.44m to Belgium. Interestingly most of the diamonds (8,500cts worth $1.1m) were exported in December. Likewise, Rwanda started exporting gems to Belgium last December - up to 166cts worth $16,606.
But again, these quantities are small, which suggests that most UNITA gems are no longer exported directly to Antwerp. But the new circuits are difficult to identify. Those who try, face problems: there are rumours of threats by a dealer against a journalist who was in Antwerp investigating violations of the UN embargo.
Dealers agree that it is almost impossible to identify stones as Angolan ones. In theory, parcels of stones coming from a single mine provide indications of its source. But, since dealers frequently mix gems from different sources, the exercise is difficult. Added to that, says Israeli diamond magazine Mazal U'Bracha, there is no way of distinguishing between gems exported before the embargo and stocked by dealers and the official production of the Angolan parastatal Endiama.
This, among other reasons, leads Israeli diamond industry circles to dismiss the sanctions weapon as "unrealistic". Activists believe that sanctions would only have an effect if there is unprecedented coordination by the international community and the diamond industry. Indeed, targeting Antwerp or Tel Aviv alone would just divert the trade to Hong Kong or elsewhere.
The question is whether the UN security council is prepared to fund the policing of the illegal diamond trade. Also debatable is whether the Angolan authorities themselves are prepared to establish transparency in their domestic diamond trade. A number of Forcas Armadas Angolanas generals, associated with foreign diamond companies might not be too keen.
