Global Policy Forum

by Jed Greer and Kavaljit Singh

Transnational corporations are among the world's biggest economic institutions. A rough estimate suggests that the 300 largest TNCs own or control at least one-quarter of the entire world's productive assets, worth about US$5 trillion.1 TNCs' total annual sales are comparable to or greater than the yearly gross domestic product (GDP) of most countries (GDP is the total output of goods and services for final use by a nation's economy). Itochu Corporation's sales, for instance, exceed the gross domestic product of Austria, while those of Royal Dutch/Shell equal Iran's GDP. Together, the sales of Mitsui and General Motors are greater than the GDPs of Denmark, Portugal, and Turkey combined, and US$50 billion more than all the GDPs of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa.2

Partly as a result of their size, TNCs tend to dominate in industries where output and markets are oligopolistic, or concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of firms. The top five car and truck manufacturers are responsible for nearly 60 per cent of worldwide sales of motor vehicles. The five leading oil majors account for over 40 per cent of that industry's global market share. For the chemicals sector, the comparable percentage is 35 per cent, and for both electronics and steel it is over 50 per cent.3

Though based predominantly in Western Europe, North America, and Japan, TNCs' operations span the globe. The Swiss electrical engineering giant ABB has facilities in 140 nations, for example, while Royal Dutch/Shell explores for oil in 50 countries, refines in 34, and markets in 100. Offices of the US food processing firm H.J. Heinz cover six continents and Cargill, the US's largest grain company, operates in 54 countries. Britain's leading chemical company ICI has manufacturing operations in 40 nations and sales affiliates in 150.4

Technical definitions of TNCs vary, but for the purposes of this guide the term "transnational corporation" means a for-profit enterprise marked by two basic characteristics: 1) it engages in enough business activities -- including sales, distribution, extraction, manufacturing, and research and development -- outside the country of origin so that it is dependent financially on operations in two or more countries; 2) and its management decisions are made based on regional or global alternatives.5

A TNC can be a "public" corporation, which trades its shares of stock at stock exchanges or brokerage houses; the buyers from the public are "shareholders," and can include individuals as well as institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. DuPont and Enron are examples of publicly-traded corporations. Or a TNC can be "private," meaning that it does not have shares which are traded publicly; such firms are frequently family-controlled. Cargill is a private firm which until recently was controlled by two families.

A "parent" company, located in the TNC's country of origin, exercises an authoritative, controlling influence over a "subsidiary" in another country either directly if it is private or, if it is public, by owning some or all of the shares (parent corporations can exert controlling power even with relatively small share holdings in subsidiaries). United Carbide India Ltd., for example, was the Indian subsidiary of the US-based Union Carbide Corporation. Subsidiaries can have a different name than the parent company, and can of course also be located in the same country as the parent. The style of relationships between parent and subsidiary companies --that is, how control is exercised--differs among TNCs' main home regions. More formal, centralised control has typically been a hallmark of US, and to a lesser extent European, corporations than of Japanese TNCs.

Brief History of TNCs

From the Origins to the Second World War

The earliest historical origins of transnational corporations can be traced to the major colonising and imperialist ventures from Western Europe, notably England and Holland, which began in the 16th century and proceeded for the next several hundred years. During this period, firms such as the British East India Trading Company were formed to promote the trading activities or territorial acquisitions of their home countries in the Far East, Africa, and the Americas. The transnational corporation as it is known today, however, did not really appear until the 19th century, with the advent of industrial capitalism and its consequences: the development of the factory system; larger, more capital intensive manufacturing processes; better storage techniques; and faster means of transportation. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the search for resources including minerals, petroleum, and foodstuffs as well as pressure to protect or increase markets drove transnational expansion by companies almost exclusively from the United States and a handful of Western European nations. Sixty per cent of these corporations' investments went to Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Fuelled by numerous mergers and acquisitions, monopolistic and oligopolistic concentration of large transnationals in major sectors such as petrochemicals and food also had its roots in these years. The US agribusiness giant United Fruit Company, for example, controlled 90 per cent of US banana imports by 1899, while at the start of the First World War, Royal Dutch/Shell accounted for 20 per cent of Russia's total oil production.7

Demand for natural resources continued to provide an impetus for European and US corporate ventures between the First and Second World Wars. Although corporate investments from Europe declined somewhat, the activities of US TNCs expanded vigorously. In Japan, this period witnessed the growth of the zaibatsu (or "financial clique") including Mitsui and Mitsubishi. These giant corporations, which worked in alliance with the Japanese state, had oligopolistic control of the country's industrial, financial, and trade sectors.

1945 to the Present

US TNCs heavily dominated foreign investment activity in the two decades after the Second World War, when European and Japanese corporations began to play ever greater roles. In the 1950s, banks in the US, Europe, and Japan started to invest vast sums of money in industrial stocks, encouraging corporate mergers and furthering capital concentration. Major technological advances in shipping, transport (especially by air), computerisation, and communications accelerated TNCs' increasing internationalisation of investment and trade, while new advertising capabilities helped TNCs expand market shares. All these trends meant that by the 1970s oligopolistic consolidation and TNCs' role in global commerce was of a far different scale than earlier in the century. Whereas in 1906 there were two or three leading firms with assets of US$500 million, in 1971 there were 333 such corporations, one-third of which had assets of US$1 billion or more. Additionally, TNCs had come to control 70-80 per cent of world trade outside the centrally planned economies.8

Over the past quarter century, there has been a virtual proliferation of transnat-ionals. In 1970, there were some 7,000 parent TNCs, while today that number has jumped to 38,000. 90 percent of them are based in the industrialised world, which control over 207,000 foreign subsidiaries. Since the early 1990s, these subsidiaries' global sales have surpassed worldwide trade exports as the principal vehicle to deliver goods and services to foreign markets.

The large number of TNCs can be somewhat misleading, however, because the wealth of transnationals is concentrated among the top 100 firms which in 1992 had US$3.4 trillion in global assets, of which approximately US$1.3 trillion was held outside their home countries. The top 100 TNCs also account for about one-third of the combined outward foreign direct investment (FDI) of their countries of origin. Since the mid-1980s, a large rise of TNC-led foreign direct investment has occurred. Between 1988 and 1993, worldwide FDI stock -- a measure of the productive capacity of TNCs outside their home countries -- grew from US$1.1 to US$2.1 trillion in estimated book value.

There has also been a great increase in TNC investment in the less-industrialized world since the mid-1980s; such investment, along with private bank loans, has grown far more dramatically than national development aid or multilateral bank lending. Burdened by debt, low commodity prices, structural adjustment, and unemployment, governments throughout the less-industrialised world today view TNCs, in the words of the British magazine The Economist, as "the embodiment of modernity and the prospect of wealth: full of technology, rich in capital, replete with skilled jobs." 9 As a result, The Economist notes further, these governments have been "queuing up to attract multinationals" and liberalising investment restrictions as well as privatising public sector industries.10 For TNCs, less-industrialised countries offer not just the potential for market expansion but also lower wages and fewer health and environmental regulations than in the North.

Thus, in 1992 foreign investment into less-industrialised nations was over US$50 billion; the figure had jumped to US$71 billion in 1993 and US$80 billion in 1994. In 1992-93, less-industrialised countries accounted for between one-third and two-fifths of global FDI inflows -- more than at any time since 1970. These flows have not been evenly distributed, however, with just ten host recipients_the majority in Asia_accounting for up to 80 percent of all FDI to the less-industrialised world.11

Problems Arising from TNCs

Intra-Company Trade and Manipulative Price Transfers

The post-Second World War period witnessed not merely a rise in TNCs' control of world trade, but also growth of trade within related enterprises of a given corporation, or "intra-company" trade. While intra-company trade in natural resource products has been a feature of TNCs since before 1914, such trade in intermediate products and services is mainly a phenomenon of recent decades. By the 1960s, an estimated one-third of world trade was intra-company in nature, a proportion which has remained steady to the present day. The absolute level and value of intra-company trade has increased considerably since that time, however. Moreover, 80 per cent of international payments for technology royalties and fees are made on an intra-company basis.12

Problems stemming from intra-company trade concern TNCs' ability to maximise profits by avoiding both market mechanisms and national laws with an instrument of internal costing and accounting known as "transfer pricing." This is a widespread technique whereby TNCs set prices for transfers of goods, services, technology, and loans between their worldwide affiliates which differ considerably from the prices which unrelated firms would have had to pay.

There are many benefits TNCs derive from transfer pricing. By lowering prices in countries where tax rates are high and raising them in countries with a lower tax rate, for example, TNCs can reduce their overall tax burden, thus boosting their overall profits. Virtually all intra-company relations including advisory services, insurance, and general management can be categorised as transactions and given a price; charges can as well be made for brand names, head office overheads, and research and development. Through their accounting systems TNCs can transfer these prices among their affiliates, shifting funds around the world to avoid taxation. Governments, which have no way to control TNCs' transfer pricing, are therefore under pressure to lower taxes as a means of attracting investment or keeping a company's operation in their country. Tax revenue which might be used for social programs or other domestic needs is thus lost.

Moreover, in countries where there are government controls preventing companies from setting product retail prices above a certain percentage of prices of imported goods or the cost of production, the firms can inflate import costs from their subsidiaries and then impose higher retail prices. Additionally, TNCs can use overpriced imports or underpriced exports to circumvent governmental ceilings on profit repatriation, causing nation-states to suffer large foreign exchange losses. For instance, if a parent company has a profitable subsidiary in a country where the parent does not wish to re-invest the profits, it can remit them by overpricing imports into that country. During the 1970s, investigations found that average overpricing by parent firms on imports by their Latin American subsidiaries in the pharmaceutical industry was 155 per cent, while imports of dyestuffs raw materials by Indian TNC affiliates were being overpriced between 124 and 147 percent.13

Influence in Nations' Political Affairs

TNCs' influence over countries, particularly those in the less-industrialised world, has not been manifest solely in sheer economic power or manipulative price transfers. Such influence has also been reflected in corporations' willingness and ability to exert leverage directly by employing government officials, participating on important national economic policy making committees, making financial contributions to political parties, and bribery. Furthermore, TNCs actively enlist the help of Northern governments to further or protect their interests in less-industrialised nations, assistance which has sometimes has involved military force. In 1954, for instance, the US launched an invasion of Guatemala to prevent the Guatemalan government from taking (with compensation plus interest) unused land of United Fruit Company for redistribution to peasants.14

Perhaps the most notorious example of TNCs' meddling in the political affairs of a sovereign state, however, occurred in the early 1970s, when International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) offered the US Central Intelligence Agency US$1 million to finance a campaign to defeat the candidacy of Salvador Allende in Chilean national elections. Though this offer was refused, and Allende democratically elected, ITT continued to lobby the US government and other US corporations to promote opposition to Allende through economic pressure including the cutoff of credit and aid and support of Allende's political rivals. After copper mines in Chile owned by the firms Kennecott and Anaconda were nationalised, the US government took a series of steps based largely on the recommendations of ITT to subvert Allende.15

Disclosure of ITT's efforts to overthrow Allende helped prompt initiatives in the United Nations to draft a TNC Code of Conduct to establish some guidelines for corporate behaviour. This move was part of more general concern about the extent of corporations' economic and political influence which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, and which led some less-industrialised countries to demand that TNCs divest from certain sectors or to require changes in the terms of a company's investment. Yet such developments have been minor and temporary obstacles to the augmentation of TNCs' economic power, and overall the past three decades have been characterised by increased regional economic integration, the liberalisation of many international markets, and the opening up of new are as such as Central and Eastern Europe.

TNCs and International Politics

Especially since the 1980s, TNCs' involvement at international political negotiations and fora has accompanied and encouraged the rise of global corporate economic power. In an effort to reduce barriers to trade and investment capital flows in the last decade, TNCs have lobbied vigorously to shape to their liking Europe's Single Market agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). For TNCs, so-called free trade lessens governmental restrictions on their movement and ability to maximise returns. "The deregulation of trade aims to erase national boundaries insofar as these affect economic life," economists Herman Daly and Robert Goodland have noted. "The policy-making strength of the nation is thereby weakened, and the relative power of TNCs is increased."16

For example, rules established in the GATT's recently concluded Uruguay Round regarding trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) will be of particular benefit to TNCs. The first gives corporations greater capacity to privatise and patent life forms, including plant and other genetic resources of less-industrialised nations and peoples. TRIMs render illegal certain measures which countries_ notably Southern nations_have employed to encourage TNCs to establish linkages with domestic firms. TRIPs, TRIMs, and other GATT rules fall under the authority of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a new supranational body which works with the World Bank and other financial institutions to manage global economic policy to serve transnational corporate interests.17

In another demonstration of transnationals' growing political might, and perhaps the most striking example to date of organised corporate lobbying on the world stage, TNCs' efforts at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro undermined sections of the Summit's key documents. And well before the Summit took place, TNC pressure had led to the removal from UNCED materials proposals to regulate the practices of global corporations.19

This success in Rio underscores a broader issue: although TNCs are collectively the world's most powerful economic force, no intergovernmental organisation is charged with regulating their behaviour. United Nations efforts to monitor and to some extent address TNCs' impacts, notably through the UN's Centre on Transnational Corporations (CTC), have recently been decimated. Under a 1992 restructuring, the CTC lost its independent status, and in 1993 it was dismantled and a 17-year attempt to negotiate the aforementioned Code of Conduct on TNCs was abandoned. A new Division on Transnational Corporations and Investment emerged_with the aim of promoting foreign direct investment.

TNCs, Human Health, and the Environment

The unwillingness or inability of national governments to control TNCs in a period of deregulated global trade and investment does not bode well for people's health or the environment. TNC operations routinely expose workers and communities to an array of health and safety and ecological dangers. All too often these operations erupt into disasters such as the gas release at the Indian subsidiary of the US-based corporation Union Carbide in Bhopal.

To regard such tragedies only as "accidents," however, distracts attention from the larger, inherent harm to the planet and its inhabitants TNCs' industrial development strategies cause. For example, TNC activities generate more than half of the greenhouse gases emitted by the industrial sectors with the greatest impact on global warming. TNCs control 50 percent of all oil extraction and refining, and a similar proportion of the extraction, refining, and marketing of gas and coal. Additionally, TNCs have virtually exclusive control of the production and use of ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and related compounds.20

In destructive minerals extraction, TNCs still dominate key industries. In aluminum, for example, just six companies account for 63 per cent of the mine capacity, 66 per cent of the refining capacity, and 54 per cent of the smelting capacity. Four TNCs account for half the world's tin smelting capacity.22 With respect to their influence on global agriculture, TNCs control 80 per cent of land worldwide which is cultivated for export-oriented crops, often displacing local food crop production.23 Twenty TNCs account for about 90 per cent of the sales of hazardous pesticides.24Additionally, because TNCs control much of the world's genetic seed stocks as well as finance the bulk of biotechnology research worldwide, they are poised to reap large financial rewards from patenting life forms.

TNCs also manufacture most of the world's chlorine _ the basis for some of the most toxic, persistent, and bioaccumulative synthetic chemicals known such as PCBs, DDT, dioxins and furans, chlorinated solvents, and thousands of other organochlorine compounds. These chemicals' impacts on health include: immune suppression; birth defects; cancer; reproductive, developmental, and neurological harm; and damage to the liver and other organs. As a group, TNCs lead in the export and import of products and technologies that have been controlled or banned in some countries for health and safety reasons. For instance, 25 per cent of total pesticide exports by TNCs from the US in the late l980s were chemicals that were banned, unregistered, canceled, or withdrawn in the US itself.25 And a handful of Northern companies are responsible for the nuclear technology now found at plants in South America and Asia.

TNCs and their business associations claim that deregulated trade and investment will produce enough growth to end poverty and generate resources for environmental protection. The unrestricted free trade and investment-based growth beloved by TNCs, however, is the same kind of development which has led to overexploitation of land and natural resources, air, water, and soil pollution, ozone depletion, global warming, and toxic waste generation. As economists Herman Daly and Robert Goodland observe: "The dream that growth will raise world wages to the current rich country level, and that all can consume resources at the U.S. per capita rate, is in total conflict with ecological limits that are already stressed beyond sustainability."27

TNCs and Occupational Safety

There have been many instances of TNCs failing to control industrial hazards at their facilities in less-industrialised nations as thoroughly as in their home countries. The situation in Bhopal, where comparison of operations of Union Carbide's Indian subsidiary and a similar plant in the US has revealed many double standards, is only the most infamous example of what the Industrial Labour Organisation acknowledges is a prevailing trend: "In comparing the health and safety performance of home-based [TNCs] with that of the subsidiaries, it could generally be said that the home country operations were better than those of subsidiaries in the developing countries."28 The case of the German TNC Bayer's chromate production factory in South Africa is illustrative. Chromate is a corrosive compound which can cause respiratory illness including lung cancer. Bayer has owned the facility, Chrome Chemicals, since 1968. In 1976, a South African government report noted health problems in nearly half the plant's employees which were related to their work and which, it said, "are extremely disturbing and would appear to indicate a lack of concern regarding the physical welfare of the workers."29

In 1990, a trade union learned that several workers had developed lung cancer, although none had been informed that the disease might be related to their employment. Chrome Chemicals management refused the union's request to review the plant's industrial hygiene records, and in 1991 the firm shut down much of its operation and laid off most of its workers. In South Africa, lung cancer was not added to the list of compensable occupational diseases until 1994, and Bayer has so far refused to provide compensation to a growing number of former employees at Chrome Chemicals who have developed lung cancer. Bayer could not get away with this in Germany, where as early as 1936 lung cancer was considered a compensable occupational disease for chromate workers. Indeed, German compensation authorities consider any labourer with more than three months of chromate work eligible for compensation if lung cancer develops subsequently.30

TNCs and Employment

In an era of declining constraints on their mobility and the attraction of cheaper wages in less-industrialised nations eager to draw foreign investment, TNCs are eliminating jobs in their home countries and shifting production abroad. Although overall TNCs' employment in their home countries has changed little in the last decade, among the 300 largest corporations employment in 1989 was lower than it had been in 1980. US-based TNCs have eliminated jobs especially vigorously. Between 1982 and 1993, for example, US TNCs cut over three-quarters of a million jobs at home but added 345,000 jobs outside the United States.31 For workers in the US and other industrialised countries, TNCs' increased willingness to move operations to lower wage areas along with their greater use of automation, subcontractors, and part-time labour have rendered the strike relatively ineffective and undermined trade unions' collective bargaining power. In the US, there were one-tenth the number of strikes in 1993 as in 1970, and only 12 per cent of the US workforce is currently unionised, a lower proportion than in 1936.32

In less-industrialised regions, the lure for TNCs of fewer costs and regulations offers little promise to workers of decent working conditions, sufficient pay, or job security. Tax breaks and subsidies governments use as incentives are no guarantee that the TNCs will not move on after the benefits have expired, and as cost advantages now found in Singapore appear in, say, Bangladesh, the countries currently experiencing an influx of investment may eventually find themselves in the same position as that of the US and other industrialised nations today.

More fundamentally, as Richard Barnet has emphasised, the transnational corporate order cannot begin to solve the chronically severe unemployment problems in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, where an estimated 38 million new job seekers enter the labor market annually.35 A comparison of the growth in TNCs' outward foreign investment stock worldwide and their estimated global direct employment in recent decades lays this fact bare. Between 1975 and 1992, outward FDI stock increased almost seven times, whereas TNCs' employment did not even double. In less-industrialised countries, TNCs added only five million employees between 1985 and 1992.36

Notes
1. "Everybody's Favourite Monsters," The Economist, Survey of Multinationals, 27 March 1993.Back
2. The GDP and sales figures are taken, respectively, from the Human Development Report 1994, United Nations Development Programme, Delhi 1994, and the World Investment Report 1994 -- Transnational Corporations, Employment and the Workplace, UNCTAD Division on Transnational Corporations and Investment, Geneva, 1994, chapter 1.Back
3. "Everybody's Favourite Monsters," op cit.Back
4. Hoover's Handbook of World Business 1993, The Reference Press, Inc., Austin, Texas, 1993.Back
5. Yitzahak Hadari, "The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise," Michigan Law Review, 71, March 1973, pp. 731-806.Back
6. C. Aldana-Benitez & C.L. Posadas, TNCs In the Thick of Everything, ed. Ernest Valencia, IBON Philippines Databank and Research Center, Manila 1994, pp. 1-9.
7. John Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, Massachusetts, 1993, pp. 112 & 114.Back
8. Frederick Clairmonte & John Cavanagh, The World in Their Web The Dynamics of Textile Multinationals, Zed Press, London, 1981, pp. 5-6.Back
9. "Everybody's Favourite Monsters," op cit.Back
10. Ibid.Back
11. For the facts and figures on TNCs and FDI in this section, see: "Trends on Foreign Direct Investment -- Report by the UNCED secretariat," Commission on Transnational Corporations, 20th session, E/C.10/1994/2, 11 March 1994; World Investment Report 1994 -- Transnational Corporations, Employment and the Workplace, UNCTAD Division on Transnational Corporations and Investment, Geneva, 1994, chapter 1; "Ongoing and Future Research: Transnational Corporations and Issues Relating to the Environment," United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 5-14 April 1989, p. 5; and "Activities of the Transnational Corporations and Management Division and Its Joint Units," E/C.10/1993/7, Commission on Transnational Corporations, 19th session, 5-15 April 1993, p. 12.Back
12. World Investment Report 1994, ibid, pp. xxi-xxii & 141-143.Back
13. Som Deo, Multinational Corporations and the Third World, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 75-76; Dalip S. Swamy, Multinational Corporations and the World Economy, Alps Publishers, New Delhi, 1980, pp. 118-119. See also The World in Their Web, op cit, pp. 148-149.Back
14. Multinational Corporations and the World Economy, ibid, p. 130.Back
15. R. J. Barnet & R.M. Muller, Global Reach The Power of the Multinational Corporations, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975, pp.81-83.Back
16. H. Daly & R. Goodland, "An Ecological-Economic Assessment of Deregulation of International Commerce under GATT," World Bank Environment Department, Spring 1993 draft, p. 45.Back
17. Noam Chomsky, "Notes on NAFTA," The Nation, 29 March 1993.Back
18. "Bio/Technology/Diversity Week," vol. 3, no. 7, 25 March 1994, produced by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy.
19. The Greenpeace Book on Greenwash, Greenpeace International, Amsterdam, 1992.Back
20. Dr. Arjun Makhijani, and Dr. A. van Buren, A. Bickel, S. Saleska, Climate Change and Transnational Corporations Analysis and Trends, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Environment Series No. 2, United Nations, New York, 1992, pp. 47.Back
21. Mukul, "Shell's Mess," Frontline, 11 August 1995.
22. Climate Change, op cit p. 77, and Transnational Corporations in World Development Third Survey, UNCTC, London, 1985, p. 150.Back
23. Steven Shrybman, "The Environmental Costs of Free Trade," in the Multinational Monitor, March 1990, p. 20.Back
24. "Transnational Corporations and Issues Relating to the Environment: The Contribution of the Commission and UNCTC to the Work of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development," UNCTC, 28 February 1991; and "Activities of the Transnational Corporations and Management Division and Its Joint Units," E/C.10/1993/7, Commission on Transnational Corporations, 19th session, 5-15 April 1993, p. 12.Back
25. From "Pesticides: Export of Unregistered Pesticides is not Adequately Monitored by the EPA," General Accounting Office of the US Congress, April 1989. Cited in "Unregistered Pesticides Rejected Toxics Escape Export Controls," Greenpeace International and Pesticide Action Network-FRG, October 1990, p. 2.Back
26. See: Barbara Dinham, The Pesticide Hazard: A Global Health and Environmental Audit,, Zed Books, London 1993; Citizens -- Pesticides -- Hoechst: The Story of Endosulfan and Triphenyltin, R. Macfarlane, Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific, Malaysia, 1994; and "International Citizens' Campaign Targets Hoechst Pesticides," Global Pesticides Campaigner, September 1994.
27. Daly & Goodland, op cit, p. 14.Back
28. Barry Castleman, "The Migration of Industrial Hazards," Third World Resurgence, August 1995.Back
29. Ibid.Back
30. Ibid.Back
31. The Labor Institute, Corporate Power and the American Dream, April 1995, p. 11.Back
32. Richard J. Barnet, "Lords of the Global Economy," The Nation, 19 December 1994.Back
33. John Borsos, "The Judge Who Stood Up to GM," The Nation, 12 April 1993.
34. Aaron Freeman, "GM Abandons Ypsilanti," Multinational Monitor, Sept. 1993.
35. Richard J. Barnet, "The End of Jobs," Harper's, Sept. 1993.Back
36. World Investment Report 1994, op cit, p. 175Back