By Martin Chulov
The Observer
August 15, 2010
Bremer left claiming he had helped make Iraq sovereign and to establish the foundations of a functional state. His prophecy was in tatters long before George W Bush gave him America's highest civilian honour, for his role in running post-Saddam Iraq in the shambolic early days of the occupation.
Hill arrived in Iraq 16 months ago on a mission to turn things around. Sectarian chaos had ravaged the country in the interim. Bush's democratic project here looked stillborn, far from being central to the birth pangs of a new Middle East. And, more important for a US diplomat, America's standing both in the region and around the world had taken a pounding.
Like Bremer, Hill also claims to have made gains. But in mid-2010, it is difficult to find any trend or tangible evidence to support his optimism. Indeed, the country looks in worse shape than when Hill arrived.
Over the past month, US officials have been trying hard to push the incumbent prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, and Iyad Allawi, the man who edged him out in a general election five months ago, into a power-sharing arrangement that would end a dangerous political deadlock.
Like a pair of bull walruses fighting, neither man has given ground as the fragile security gains of the past two years threaten to unravel. At the same time, the mood on the street has palpably soured.
Throughout this most brutal of summers (where the daytime temperature in Baghdad has rarely been below 48C), Iraqis have been getting by with around four hours per day of electricity (usually too weak to run more than one air conditioner). Even more concerning is the creeping return of terror; almost daily assassinations, a spike in bombings and rocket fire. This was not the way it was supposed to be when the conquerors left town.
The US-sponsored deal would mean Maliki could hang on to the prime minister's chair, but with diluted powers, while Allawi would take a newly formed position as head of a national security council, which would give him an executive overlord role across the security forces.
All stakeholders here were thought to have been satisfied. In Allawi, the restive Sunni centre of the country would get a strongman who had their interests at heart. His return to real power would also likely win over Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iran, meanwhile, was believed to be appeased by the reinstallation of Maliki and his Shia Islamic backers.
Last week, however, the proposal somehow found itself back on the drawing board. Not for the first time had the machinations of power-sharing confounded those who come here to make sense of it all. All sides seem to have retreated to positions that are not far beyond the postures they struck shortly after the results of the 7 March poll, which gave Allawi a narrow 91 to 89 seat victory, but in need of a coalition to help him form a government in the 325-seat parliament.
After much post-poll jousting, the ballot was deemed to have been fair and transparent. Little since then has met the same standards. The intractable stalemate seems to point to far more than the stubborn wills of the two opponents. Neighbouring Iran is as much to blame; it wants to entrench Shia majority rule in the heartland of Arabia, and of Saudi Arabia, which remains horrified by such a prospect.
All of this, while Obama, his departed ambassador and a number of US generals continue to insist that their job in the land that the US has occupied for seven years is nearly done. There are many in Iraq who are far from convinced; the Sons of Iraq leadership, the chief of the Iraqi military and even Saddam Hussein's most loyal deputy, Tariq Aziz, who said Obama would leave Iraq to the wolves if he continued the pull-out.
In truth, the much-vaunted 31 August combat withdrawal deadline is largely about symbolism and emotional detachment from a war that Obama reluctantly inherited.
There will still be six US brigades and 94 bases. Their commanders may well be more wary about sending them into the fray, but if they stood by while Baghdad burned, America's standing would take a far bigger hit than it is enduring now. The war in Iraq is increasingly becoming Obama's problem after all.
