Global Policy Forum

By Erich Marquardt

During the buildup to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003, numerous U.S. politicians -- from across the political spectrum -- agreed with the Bush administration's objective of increasing U.S. influence in the resource-rich region of the Middle East. What they did not agree with, however, was the foreign policy strategy drafted by the administration to achieve this end. Perhaps the most contentious issue dividing the administration and its domestic critics was the policy of U.S. unilateralism used in pursuing foreign policy objectives.

Rather than attempting to use its traditional allies -- such as France and Germany -- in a war with Iraq, and gaining international legitimacy through the United Nations, the Bush administration instead saw no reason why the U.S. need compromise its foreign policy objectives, compromises that would have eventually been made had the administration wanted broader support for its actions. Instead, the administration believed that the current, unprecedented level of U.S. power in the world would be sufficient to invade Iraq, bring stability to the country, and then form a new government that would have the support of the Iraqi people, while at the same time cooperating with U.S. interests.

Bush administration officials who were the most enthusiastic supporters of this plan -- such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and members of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board -- believed that the United States needed to review its relationship with its allies and alter its foreign policy to better reflect the U.S.' position as the sole superpower in the world, capable of fighting military conflicts without allies.

A foreign policy such as this one -- based on unilateralism rather than multilateralism -- was an attempt to prevent the U.S. from ever subordinating its interests to the needs and demands of its allies. Indeed, this explains why Washington's traditional allies in Paris and Berlin reacted coldly to the administration's plans in Iraq; they recognized the administration's antipathy to the interests of France and Germany. Fearing a loss of power and influence on the international scene, these two countries -- in addition to Russia, China and other states in an inferior power position -- had no choice but to reject the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

This foreign policy shift marked a divergence in U.S. policy. Certainly, since the fall of the Soviet Union, successive U.S. administrations have been more willing to disregard the interests and needs of their allies. They have recognized the preeminent power position of the United States. The difference now, however, is that previous U.S. administrations still worked with their traditional allies and compromised U.S. interests, albeit marginally, in order to gain support and international legitimacy.

In the case of the March invasion of Iraq, no real compromises were made. Instead, the administration abandoned attempts to gain support from traditional U.S. allies, ignored the decrees of the United Nations, and formed "coalitions of the willing" with poor states and isolated U.S. allies. The poor states that cooperated with the administration secured much needed financial support and political clout from the U.S. government -- offers that Washington could afford to give without having to let these states have any say in U.S. foreign policy and its strategy in Iraq.

This foreign policy shift worked well at the start; the U.S.-dominated invasion of Iraq was remarkably successful, showing off the military prowess of the Pentagon. The next two steps, however, are proving to be much more difficult. Washington is still struggling to bring stability to Iraq and is no where near forming a new government that has the support of the Iraqi people while at the same time willing to secure U.S. interests in the region. Ironically, this is very similar to the problem faced by the U.S. in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.

Now, the military capacity of the United States to launch unilateral wars that require an ensuing occupation is being seriously questioned. Attacks against U.S. troops in Iraq have been rapidly increasing to the point where soldiers are attacked 30-40 times per day. Casualties have also been steadily mounting, inflicted by what appears to be an evolving insurgency; at first subject to isolated sniper attacks, U.S. troops are now often the victim of roadside bombs and rocket propelled grenade attacks. In the last few weeks, guerrillas have been shooting down U.S. helicopters, causing the casualty rate to soar.

It is always difficult for a state actor to fight a guerrilla war. Both France and the United States failed in Vietnam; the Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan, and modern day Russia has been taking serious losses in Chechnya. In Iraq, the Bush administration thus far has failed to find an exception to this rule. Therefore, without massive international support, the U.S. may ultimately fall far short of their goals in Iraq. If the guerrilla war continues to intensify -- as seems to be the case from the mounting casualties sustained by U.S. troops -- the political will of the American people to "stay the course" in Iraq may become sapped. If by the U.S. presidential elections in 2004 attacks have continued to increase, the Bush administration may be voted out of office and replaced with an administration that promises to drastically alter U.S. strategy in Iraq.

Critics of the administration -- in both the Republican and Democratic parties -- are united in their conviction that the U.S. needs to mend ties with its traditional allies and the United Nations. This stance reflects the American concern for U.S. forces bearing the brunt of a conflict due to ineffectual foreign policy management. This stance will only strengthen the longer the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq results in escalating losses of U.S. troops and the failure to establish a viable government in Baghdad. And as long as news articles continue to be released by organizations such as Reuters, which recently released an investigation pointing to the fact that the U.S. death toll in Iraq has surpassed the number of U.S. troops killed during the first three years of the Vietnam War, the American people may very well support a foreign policy more aligned not with the Bush administration, but with its critics.

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