Global Policy Forum

By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

With the election on May 2 of Chile's former interior minister Jose Miguel Insulza to the post of secretary general of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), that alliance will, for the first time since its founding in 1948, have a chief executive who is not the preferred choice of the United States.

The O.A.S., which groups all of the independent states in the western hemisphere -- except Cuba -- into a loose strategic and economic bloc, has since its inception and until recently functioned as an instrument of Washington's global geostrategies under the general principles of the Monroe Doctrine that exclude extra-hemispheric attempts to control the political systems of states in the region. As the Monroe Doctrine has evolved in response to changing global power configurations, it has come to include the aims of establishing regimes favorable to Washington -- preferably, market democracies -- throughout the hemisphere and isolating regimes that do not conform to that requisite.

Washington's control of the O.A.S. is most starkly illustrated by the ease with which it got the alliance to expel Fidel Castro's Communist regime in Cuba in 1962 and its ability to foreclose the possibility of sanctioning right-wing dictatorships favorable to Washington's perceived interests in Argentina, Brazil and Chile during the 1970s and 1980s. Although the installation of market democracies is Washington's best-case scenario, it has been willing to embrace authoritarian regimes when it perceives that they are fending off political forces that would establish alternatives to capitalism and cultivate the support of powers outside the hemisphere for their experiments. Even recently, after the adoption in 2001 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which commits O.A.S. members to honoring democratic processes, Washington briefly backed an unsuccessful coup attempt in 2002 against Venezuela's quasi-socialist regime led by President Hugo Chavez.

Washington's hold on the O.A.S. began to falter after its support of the anti-Chavez coup. In 2003, the alliance's General Assembly refused to seat Washington's candidate Rafael E. Martinez on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, leaving the Commission without a member from the United States for the first time in its history. Even more severe resistance to Washington's desires came in 2004 when an O.A.S. observer mission refused to condemn the vote in a referendum to recall Chavez, which he won by a comfortable margin.

Washington's losses in the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and in its efforts to eliminate the Chavez regime were preludes to its loss of control of the O.A.S. in the election for secretary general. Opposition to Washington in the alliance was triggered by the Chavez affair, but it reflects far deeper shifts in the balance of power in the hemisphere that spell declining influence for the U.S. over the long term, signaled at present by the rise of Brazil as a regional power center in South America and the bid by Venezuela to become a "small major power" committed to building a mixed cooperativist-capitalist economy and diminishing Washington's power in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Power Struggle and Deadlock

In the summer of 2004, Washington seemed set to continue its dominance in the O.A.S. when its choice, former president of Costa Rica Miguel Angel Rodriguez, was elected secretary general of the alliance, after Insulza reluctantly withdrew his candidacy. Tensions deepened and confrontation broke out in October, when Rodriguez resigned his position after he was indicted on corruption charges dating from his presidency and was placed under house arrest in Costa Rica.

With U.S. diplomat Luigi R. Einaudi taking over as acting secretary general, a power struggle began over the leadership of the alliance, reflecting the underlying regional and ideological divides within it. In quick succession, three candidates came forward: Mexico's foreign minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, Insulza and former president of El Salvador Francisco Flores.

Washington's firm choice was the conservative Flores, who had been the only Latin American leader to join it in backing the 2002 coup attempt against Chavez and who supported the El Salvadoran military contribution to the U.S. coalition in Iraq. By backing Flores, Washington signaled its intentions to reward its friends and bring the O.A.S. to heel. It was able to muster the support of the Central American sates, which have right or center-right governments, look forward to the ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (C.A.F.T.A.) and believed that it was their turn to have a secretary general from their region.

The complex of interests that bound the Central American states to Washington's choice did not extend beyond that region. Insulza, a member of Chile's market-oriented Socialist government, who had opposed the U.S. intervention in Iraq, found an unwavering base of support in the left-center governments of the southern cone -- Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay -- and in Venezuela's Chavez, setting up a north-south confrontation with ideological overtones.

The Derbez candidacy was Mexico City's attempt to mediate the poles represented by Flores and Insulza, and become a bridge between north and south, which would strengthen its hemispheric influence. Derbez gained the backing of states seeking to balance the emerging power center in the southern cone, particularly Bolivia and Peru, which have persisting disputes with Chile.

Mexico City's move to put Derbez forward was ill received by Santiago, which claimed that Mexico's government had promised to consult with it before presenting a candidate and had failed to do so. Although they had been increasing ties prior to the O.A.S. election, Santiago's and Mexico City's respective interests in bridging north and south with an ideology of "capitalism with a human face" and maintaining a receptivity to the policies of both sides placed them on a collision course, with Santiago positioning itself as mediator from the southern left and Mexico City as mediator from the northern right.

As the scheduled vote for secretary general on April 11 neared, it became clear that the balance of power would fall to the 14 small states comprising the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Although one might expect those states to follow Washington's lead, Chavez had been supplying them with cheap oil, and, on April 1, Chile's foreign ministry reported that at least ten CARICOM states would vote for Insulza. The CARICOM votes plus the sure votes from the four southern cone states and Venezuela put Insulza within three votes of the majority of 18 that he needed to win the election. He had emerged as far and away the strongest contender in the three-way race.

With opposition to Insulza divided between Flores and Derbez, Washington faced an embarrassing scenario of divisiveness and nearly certain failure if it continued to back Flores. President Ricardo Maduro of Honduras assured the collapse of the Flores candidacy when he withdrew his country's support of it. After Flores resigned from the contest on April 8, Washington shifted its support to Derbez, carrying the Central American states with it.

Meeting in Washington on April 11 at O.A.S. headquarters, voting delegates held five separate ballots, all of which resulted in a 17-17 deadlock between Insulza and Derbez. Although the vote was secret, many states declared their preferences publicly, indicating that the regional and ideological blocs had held fast, with the exception in South America of Bolivia's announced support for Derbez and Peru's and Colombia's probable backing of him. A re-run of the election was scheduled for May 2, with Washington continuing to stand behind Derbez and both sides intent on winning over fence sitters such as Paraguay and Haiti.

In the aftermath of the deadlocked vote, Washington confronted an unpleasant set of possibilities. Even if Derbez won a revote by a narrow margin, Washington would face a divided O.A.S. that would be structured by a hardened regional and ideological conflict. Yet, if it conceded victory to Insulza by ceasing to oppose him strongly, it would lose its previously unquestioned domination of the alliance. Washington's best hope was for a new "consensus" candidate, but, although names were floated by Lima and Ottawa, no serious alternative emerged. Washington would have to try to make the best of a bad situation. Meanwhile, Brasilia and Caracas had shown their power to contest control of the alliance effectively.

Condoleezza Rice Engineers a Retreat

During the two weeks following the April 11 vote, the press reported persistent diplomatic efforts by both sides to sway possibly susceptible states to support them. Santiago and Caracas attempted to secure and expand their gains in the Caribbean, reportedly offering economic aid and greater representation in O.A.S. institutions. Washington and Mexico City were reported to have done the same. Yet by April 25, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice embarked on her five-day "goodwill" tour of Latin America with stops in Brazil, Colombia, Chile and El Salvador, the deadlock was still unbroken and a divisiveness loomed that could have hobbled the O.A.S. by tearing it into contending northern and southern blocs.

Rice's trip had several goals, all of which revolved around the overriding aim of preserving and, if possible, restoring Washington's influence in the hemisphere. At the top of her agenda was the interest in persuading Venezuela's neighbors to isolate Chavez, who the week before had canceled Caracas's 35-year military cooperation agreement with Washington, the latest round in the intensifying conflict between the two capitals. A second goal was to revive Washington's plan for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (F.T.A.A.) that would place the economic future of the hemisphere under U.S. leadership. The third aim was to convince the southern cone states that Washington would no longer try to impose its policies in the region, but would "partner" with the emerging southern power bloc and seek consensus on hemispheric issues. Finally, Rice would show support for its most loyal allies in the region -- Colombia and El Salvador.

The key to the success of Rice's agenda was Brazil, the emerging power center of the southern cone, which, under the administration of President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, had made the geostrategic assessment and decision that it was strong enough to bid for leadership in South America and speak for the region in international organizations. Before Rice arrived, Brasilia announced that the F.T.A.A. was not on its agenda.

In her public statements in Brazil, Rice was unequivocally positive, acknowledging that "Brazil is a regional power and, in fact, Brazil is a growing global presence, and we think that's a good thing." The "charm offensive" could not cover up the fact that by the end of her visit, Rice had failed to get Lula to commit to restraining Chavez, much less isolating him. In a joint press conference with Rice, Brazil's foreign minister Celso Amorim made it clear that any solution to problems in Venezuela "must respect Venezuelan sovereignty." Rice's position was that Washington was pursuing a "positive agenda" and had no quarrels with any O.A.S. member, only concerns about the integrity of democratic processes in general.

Whether or not Rice convinced Brasilia that Washington wanted to "partner" rather than impose, she was unable to fulfill the top two items on her agenda, retreating at the end to acquiescence in Brasilia's independent stance, while withholding from it what it most desired -- Washington's support for its bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Analysts agree that Brasilia holds the well-founded belief that Washington's influence is waning in South America and that Brasilia is free to act independently of Washington -- Rice was simply forced to accept the fact of multipolarity.

Chile presented more favorable ground for Rice's appeals. Santiago had led the way toward the F.T.A.A. and already had a model working free-trade agreement with Washington, which was not in jeopardy. In addition, Santiago's geostrategy is to play the role of a bridge between the Brazilian power center and Washington, maintaining cordial relations with both and, in the best case scenario, mediating between them. The only problem was that having its candidate for O.A.S. secretary general elected was integral to Santiago's strategy.

By the time Rice arrived in Chile to rejuvenate ties with its Socialist president Ricardo Lagos, who had been moving away from neo-liberal economic policies to the more welfarist positions of his southern cone neighbors, the O.A.S. crisis was imminent.

Continuing her charm offensive, Rice praised Chile as a "symbol" of what Latin America could and should become -- committed to market democracy and enjoying its yield. She was not able to move Lagos into opposition to Chavez. At a joint press conference with Lagos, Rice reiterated Washington's "concerns about the policies of the Venezuelan government in terms of its internal policies and in terms of its neighbors," but stressed that Washington had a "positive agenda" for the hemisphere. In response, Lagos took a nuanced line, walking a tightrope between Washington and Brasilia, and pointing out that Chavez was "legitimately elected," that the anti-Chavez opposition "has to meet its challenges so as to fulfill the role of an appropriate opposition," and that "there are a series of elements raised by the opposition party that warrant more in-depth conversation of what is happening there." Rice had failed in her mission to gain support for isolating Chavez -- Santiago remained in its role of would-be bridge.

It remained for Rice to try to do something about the O.A.S. conflict. In an effort to head off another deadlock at the May 2 election or a divisive close vote, Rice engaged in intense diplomacy with the parties to the contest, and on April 29, Derbez withdrew from the race for secretary general, leaving Insulza unopposed as the "consensus" candidate of 31 states, with only Bolivia, Peru and Mexico reserving support. Mexico City was particularly angered, claiming that it had an understanding with Santiago that both Derbez and Insulza would drop out of the race to make way for a "unity candidate."

In return for Washington's retreat, Insulza released a statement in which he said, "I believe it is essential that governments that are elected democratically govern in a democratic way." Those words, reportedly insisted upon by Rice, were seen by Washington as affirming support for its position that Chavez should be held "accountable" for violations of the O.A.S. Democratic Charter and were used by Washington as evidence that it had not retreated.

When Insulza delivered his acceptance speech on May 2, he called for "forging a consensus that allows us to overcome the erroneous consensus of irrelevance that damages our hemispheric effort" -- a clear reference to the alliance's Washington-dominated past -- and failed to mention the need to hold states accountable to the Democratic Charter. Washington had lost control of the O.A.S., the southern cone and its outrider ally Venezuela had asserted their independence successfully, and the multipolarity of the hemisphere was confirmed.

Aftermath

Having lost the battle over the secretary general, Washington is now faced with how it will orient itself to the O.A.S., which is no longer a sure instrument of its policies. Providing 60 percent of the O.A.S. budget, which is currently running a shortfall, with ten states in arrears, Washington could asphyxiate the organization by failing to provide adequate financial support, if it decided that the alliance was not worth salvaging in a multipolar form.

The alternative for Washington is to acknowledge and embrace multipolarity, and try to strengthen the O.A.S. as a forum in which disputes can be mediated and common policies forged, and Washington remains a major player across the hemisphere.

Rice responded to Washington's loss by proclaiming its commitment to a strengthened O.A.S., suggesting that it is considering increasing its funding of the alliance. She will attempt to persuade the major South American powers to do the same, making good on the notion of a "partnership" in which all powers are players. Rice also continued to promote Washington's anti-Chavez agenda, which Washington has no interest in or grounds for abandoning. Strengthening the O.A.S. by making it a multipolar forum means that Washington would continue to push its agenda, but would have to compromise if it was to win some acceptance of its preferred policies. That is the best that Washington can get in the current situation, and Rice seems to understand that.

A strengthened O.A.S., in which the U.S. is not the only major financial contributor and issues of north and south, and of social and political economy are thrashed out, is a practicable vision, although it is far from clear that either side has the commitment to make it materialize. Hemispheric partnership would demand major concessions from the United States, not only in its neo-liberal economic agenda, but in its control of hemispheric foreign policy and its control over the definition of pariah states. The Brazil-led power center would have to decide whether it is more advantageous to enter a partnership or to increase the independence of its power bloc, with the expectation that the compromises involved in partnership need not be made.

The O.A.S. is at a crossroads. Either it will become a veil covering an effective and more-or-less amicable divorce, or a marriage of distinct power centers, able to act in pursuit of interests that the partners determine that they have in common through strong consultative institutions. Partnership seems to be in Washington's interest; it remains to be seen whether it will make an effective commitment. Brasilia has a genuine choice to make between cohabitation and living single. Much will depend on whether Brasilia trusts Washington, and on what Washington is willing to offer. Meanwhile, Chavez will do everything he can to sabotage partnership. Odds are that the O.A.S. will subside into separation.