Global Policy Forum

By Christopher Deliso

In the past weeks, The Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has shown renewed interest in alleged Serbian war criminals. On October 20, four ranking officers -- Army Chief of Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic, former Pristina Corps Commander Vladimir Lazarevic, current Chief of Public Security Sreten Lukic and his predecessor, Vlastimir Djordjevic -- have all been indicted over the Kosovo war in 1999. Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic criticized the new indictments as "a blow to reform in Serbia" and posed the following intriguing question: "Why [the indictments] today -- seven days after the meeting in Vienna with the Kosovo Albanians and the international community, during a campaign for presidential elections in Serbia and when we are just about to start a debate on confidence in the government?" Western pro-intervention forces are growing increasingly frustrated with The Hague, which they consider to be a weak tribunal. Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte's failure to win a total victory over Slobodan Milosevic -- the inquisition's big prize -- remains a sore spot. Del Ponte has never won a big case in her career and is said to be increasingly obsessed with defeating Milosevic in addition to netting other desirable undesirables like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. These men continue to elude captivity and are thought to be hiding in the Republika Srpska or in Serbia proper. Over the past two years, NATO has mounted several high-profile operations against them, though these have been mostly for show. The two former commanders may never be caught.

There are two major reasons for The Hague's renewed interest in Serbia. First of all, it comes just as Belgrade and Pristina are sitting down for the first round of talks since NATO's bombing campaign of 1999 made the Serbian province of Kosovo into a protectorate. Resolving Kosovo's final status is a process with immense ramifications for the entire Balkan region, but also for the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which has been running the province since 1999. After originally boycotting the Vienna-based talks, Kosovo Serb leaders are participating due to frantic shuttle diplomacy from the West. Above all, UNMIK and Western governments are trying to avoid a perceived failure in Kosovo. The widely criticized mission has overlooked the elimination of non- Albanian minorities by vengeful militias, the destruction of priceless cultural relics (for example, over 110 Serbian Orthodox churches), and the explosive increase in the drug, weapon and cigarette business, as well as in human trafficking and prostitution. With Iraq and Afghanistan now draining Western budgets, Kosovo is perceived as an old nuisance to be cast aside as soon as possible.

Serbia is perceived as the obstacle to a deal. In trying to be sensitive to the wishes of both Serbs and Albanians, it is clear that the West can please neither. The former believe Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia, and argue that the few remaining Serbs will be driven out or killed once the province becomes independent, making a farce out of whatever power-sharing agreement the West might try to broker. For the Serbs, the return of Serbian police forces is the dream whereas partition of the province is the pragmatic solution. Neither of these options is acceptable to the Albanian side, which is confident it can eventually take everything in the negotiations. The Albanians believe (as the Serbs do) that Kosovo is historically theirs. The Albanians are becoming increasingly frustrated with what they consider to be a simulated government in which UNMIK always has the final say. Vital issues like property ownership, privatization and investment laws remain unresolved. Several times the decisions of President Bajram Rexhepi and the Kosovo Parliament have been overturned by UNMIK. While the Albanians are always quick to thank the West for releasing them from Serb rule, they increasingly believe that the U.N. is part of the problem. Now, the unthinkable is occurring -- open street protests in Pristina. Albanians young and old alike recently gathered and demanded that UNMIK "go home" and hand over full power. Now, the West fears Kosovo could become like Iraq -- albeit much more slowly. UNMIK, much beloved at first, is starting to get a bad reputation. Western officials drive sleek new cars, work in air-conditioned modern offices and enjoy conspicuous consumption with their bloated Western salaries while more than 45 percent of Kosovars remain unemployed. Rexhepi last week blamed Western officials for directly stealing money from his budget, while also accusing the internationals of fueling the growth in prostitution, and therefore strengthening mafia rule. U.N. civil and police officials have often bemoaned the powerful effect that militant mafia clans have over Kosovo.

For both of these reasons -- the urgency of finding a solution and avoiding recrimination -- the West is once again using The Hague Tribunal as a way of taking the pressure off. It hopes to use it both to direct attention elsewhere and to pressure the Serbs into quicker concessions. It is no secret that UNMIK is extremely apprehensive over the Kosovar Albanians. When Slovenia this week arrested notorious Kosovar warlord (and commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps police force) Agim Ceku, on an Interpol warrant issued by Serbia, he was almost immediately released and brought back to Kosovo. UNMIK announced that it was "working with" Slovenia to make sure such a situation would not occur again. The message was clear -- UNMIK will continue to protect Kosovo's own. Extraditing Ceku to Serbia would have caused an immediate and violent backlash against UNMIK. The position of the interim government, precarious enough as it is, cannot be allowed to be endangered by Serbian extradition desires. This is also why The Hague has not indicted Albanians for atrocities carried out against Serbs -- only those against other Albanians. By any standards of parity, The Hague has proven itself powerless, acting only to protect the UNMIK forces on the ground from Albanian reprisals. It is these factors of urgency that have led to The Hague Tribunal's revived interest in prosecuting Serbs. By hanging indictments over the heads of Serbia's government, Western negotiators hope they can extract more concessions from Belgrade with regards to Kosovo. Additionally, NATO officials -- already having trouble with Communist-era holdovers in incoming countries like Bulgaria and Romania -- would like to "cleanse" Serbia's security forces of any holdovers from the Milosevic administration as a pre- condition for Serbia someday joining the alliance.

On the other hand, Serbia has gone to great lengths this year to build good relations with the Americans. Troops were offered for Iraq and Afghanistan, and Prime Minister Zoran Zifkovic even visited Washington this summer. Serbia still faces tough economic times; however, recent high-profile takeovers of steel and tobacco interests by American companies, and German acquisitions of Serbian newspapers, indicate a significant resurgence of interest in Serbia as a Foreign Direct Investment destination. This is telling. It proves that The Hague is being used to exert pressure primarily to shield the U.N.'s reputation in Kosovo from mounting Albanian protests and the urgency of changing an untenable status quo. UNMIK is praying for a painless solution in Kosovo, but this simply will not happen. The fallout is likely to be far-reaching. Macedonia's civil war of 2001 was sustained and led by Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) veterans in Kosovo. Kosovo-based extremists from the Albanian National Army (ANA) have committed several deadly attacks this year, and have explicitly announced their desire to cleanse northern and western Macedonia of its "Slav colonizers," as they call Macedonians. In the end, while granting Kosovo independence might cause future regional upheaval and mafia rule in an economically unviable territory, the West views this as the least dangerous outcome.

This is not the result of some grand and sagacious strategy. Rather, UNMIK is primarily looking out for its own safety. While Serbian and Macedonian concerns can be and have been ignored safely, the Albanians are different. Only the unexpected can be expected from them. Their long memories and long history of militancy are clearly intimidating the Western interim government. Appeasing them is thus essential for the safety of the current local administration -- but also for those Western leaders who believed that the NATO bombing campaign was a wise enterprise. Satisfying everyone in Kosovo is impossible. Realizing this, the West has chosen to appease those whom it believes would cause the most problems if left unsatisfied -- the Albanians. Independence will happen, but not overnight. The Western gamble now is how long it can continue to keep the negotiating process going -- thereby maintaining the greatest simulation of fair treatment of all parties -- while also avoiding protests and violence against the UNMIK staff. This balancing act will likely prove awkward, dangerous and, in the long run, unsustainable.

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