Global Policy Forum

By Paul J. Smith*

On 14 December 1999, US Customs inspector Diana Dean interviewed a man who had arrived on a ferry from Victoria, British Columbia. Dean asked the man - later identified as Ahmed Ressam - a series of routine questions regarding his citizenship, home of record, and travel intentions. Sensing that Ressam was reluctant and uncomfortable about answering her questions, Dean asked if she could search his vehicle. Ressam reluctantly agreed and agents subsequently discovered bomb-making materials in the trunk of his car, including four timing devices, 118 pounds of urea crystals, 14 pounds of sulfate powder and 48 ounces of nitroglycerin.

Information obtained from Ressam's arrest led to the detention of a number of ethnic Algerians in North America. Those arrested are alleged to be members of a wing of the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Arme - GIA), one of most radical and violent factions involved in the Algerian insurgency. Washington believed that the group intended to conduct a pre-millennial terror campaign throughout the USA, possibly at the behest of Osama bin Laden.

A major lesson learned in the Ressam interception is that customs and immigration inspectors play as important a role in averting transnational security threats as do frontline army or naval forces. Countries may spend billions of dollars to develop anti-missile defences, yet remain vulnerable to a nuclear attack from a suitcase nuclear bomb smuggled across a porous border. Similarly, nations may deploy military forces on foreign anti-narcotics missions, and yet neglect the penetration of their own borders by transnational criminal gangs intent on expanding their own illegal drug distribution networks.

As crime and terrorism become increasingly global, a premium is placed on rapid and clandestine mobility. Criminal leaders or gang representatives must travel abroad to forge links with their counterparts in other countries or to smuggle commodities, such as narcotics. Terrorists must also travel abroad to foster ties with potential allies, to conduct training exercises, to raise money and attract political support for their particular cause. Most importantly, they must travel to conduct their terrorist strikes. The premium on clandestine mobility is heightened when the terrorist act is directed within the target country's own borders.

Achieving clandestine mobility can occur in several ways. A terrorist or criminal gang member can travel in the normal international stream of passenger traffic. While this is convenient, it requires an emphasis on sophisticated identity alteration or deception, particularly in more developed countries that generally follow more rigorous immigration inspection procedures. Forged passports and fake identity papers become valued commodities, and individuals possessing the skills to manufacture or alter such documents are highly valued.

Alternatively, terrorists or criminals can travel by crossing international borders that may be unguarded. This may occur with the assistance of an organised human smuggling syndicate.

Fake passports, real terrorists

When customs inspectors searched Ressam's car, they found not only bomb-making materials but also a forged Canadian passport. Ressam had obtained the document (a legitimate Canadian passport) by using a false name. Subsequent evidence revealed that Ressam shared a Montreal apartment with Karim Said Atmani, a reputed document forger for the GIA. Thus, it is clear that the GIA understood the importance of - and was prepared to utilise - forged or fake passports or other identification documents as part of their operations.

Recent cases around the world reveal a similar reliance by terrorist and criminal groups on fake or forged passports, suggesting that these groups commonly use these documents during at least a part of their international travel. A high-ranking Australian immigration official recently told an international conference that "identity fraud underpins transnational crime and facilitates transnational crime".

- In January 2000, Indian police arrested more than six individuals and the owner of a travel agency in Mumbai who had arranged fake passports for the hijackers of an Indian Airlines flight. The hijacking resulted in a six-day hostage drama in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The passports enabled the Pakistani-born hijackers to disguise themselves as Indian nationals.

- In 1999, Kuwaiti border police arrested an Arab man after he was discovered carrying forged Kuwaiti citizenship papers to suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden. In a related incident, Pakistani police launched a search in May 2000 for a travel agent accused of providing fake passports to Bin Laden's organisation. Authorities launched the search after immigration inspectors discovered an Afghan national travelling to Pakistan with a passport previously reported stolen.

- On 8 December 2000, Japanese police raided six houses near Tokyo belonging to supporters of Fusako Shigenobu, founder of the Japanese Red Army. The raid was launched after it was discovered that Shigenobu - who was arrested a month earlier on separate charges - had relied on forged passports to travel between Japan and China. In a related incident, Lebanese officials arrested Kozo Okamoto and four other members of the Japanese Red Army in 1997 when they were discovered travelling on forged passports.

Passport fraud can occur on two levels. First, passports or identity documents may be forged, physically altered in some way, or fabricated completely. The most basic form of passport fraud involves attempts to alter pre-existing biographical data, such as substituting a photograph. Passports containing photographs not covered by special lamination are preferred by forgers because of the ease in which they can be substituted. However, even more sophisticated passports are not immune to photograph-substitution, especially in light of the growing expertise that exists within criminal and terrorist syndicates.

Passports intended for fraud can be acquired through various means. These include the purchase of legitimate passports from individuals who subsequently report their passport as 'lost', theft from airports, hotel rooms or travel companies, or direct purchases from a corrupt government official or agency.

Another prized document is the blank passport with a legitimately inscribed number but no biographical data. These passports are highly sought after by smugglers or terrorist organisations because they can be altered without having to tamper with or erase pre- existing data, which in turn decreases the chances of discovery. Governments lose thousands of blank passports every year either because of corruption, theft or misplacement.

Some criminal organisations have perfected the art of completely fabricating a passport. A syndicate may provide a forged visa attached to a legitimate passport that could enable the bearer to gain entry. Criminal organisations also exploit the specialised visas for 'intra-company transfers' (or similar arrangements) provided by certain countries. A criminal or terrorist organisation could create a front company and then petition the host government to allow unfettered entry of that company's 'employees'.

Another avenue for passport and visa fraud involves 'visa-free' arrangements between countries. Governments have traditionally relied on the practice of issuing entry visas outside of their borders as a way of screening out criminals, terrorists or other socially or politically undesirable individuals. The pressures of globalisation and the increasing demands of international commerce have steadily eroded this practice, and have encouraged the growth of 'visa-free' arrangements throughout the world.

Such agreements are extremely popular, primarily because they are convenient for busy travellers who no longer must endure the time- delay and fees involved in applying for a business or tourist visa. Washington has visa-waiver agreements with 29 countries, which allows residents of those nations to stay in the USA for three months as long as they arrive with a round-trip ticket. In Western Europe, the 1985 Schengen agreement allows visa-free travel between certain of its signatories. The EU is expanding visa-free access to non-members, including Bulgaria and Hong Kong.

Notwithstanding the popularity of such visa-free agreements, some officials worry that they increase the likelihood of illegal migration and thus could promote the influx of criminals or terrorists. A report by the US Department of Justice discovered that the American Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) - which has now been made permanent - provided a conduit for criminals and terrorists attempting to enter the country. Moreover, terrorist or criminal groups often discover that passports of visa-waiver participating nations are more valuable because they receive less scrutiny during the immigration-screening phase. Chinese human smuggling syndicates have been known to rely on stolen Japanese passports - the bearers of which are entitled to visa-free entry into the USA - to smuggle Chinese nationals. Similarly, one of the co-conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993 was caught at New York City's JFK airport, attempting to enter the country with a photo-substituted Swedish passport. Sweden is among the 29 countries that enjoy visa- free access to the USA.

Not surprisingly, the most prized passports on the black market are those from those countries that are part of visa-waiver or visa-free arrangements. The US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates that more than 100,000 passports of countries in the Visa Waiver programme have been stolen and are in circulation. When Slovenia entered the programme, the value of its passport increased dramatically on the black market. Criminal and terrorist groups perceive that passports from visa-waiver participant countries receive less scrutiny at border checkpoints and are thus more useful. A passport goldmine would be blank passports from a country that enjoys visa-waiver rights with the target country.

A second type of passport or identity fraud involves the practice of acquiring legitimate travel documents through fraudulent means. Ressam was discovered carrying a legitimate Canadian passport, inscribed with an assumed name. He had acquired this document with a fake birth certificate, a forged student identification card and other fake documents. His choice of a Canadian passport was particularly astute as Canada enjoys visa-free access to numerous countries. Many immigration experts argue that the fraudulent acquisition of a legitimate passport is a key vulnerability in passport control regimes. "Absent some outside intelligence," said one US immigration official, "there is little we can do to detect this."

Officials in some countries have also reported cases in which terrorists arrive in a host country as asylum seekers and subsequently obtain refugee status. Such status may allow them to acquire travel documents, which then allow onward travel to third countries.

A New Zealand official described one particular case prior to the 2000 Sydney Olympics. As part of an investigation into alleged human smuggling operations, police in Auckland raided an apartment, which was later described as a 'virtual command centre' for possible terrorist attacks in nearby Australia. Police discovered detailed maps and other evidence suggesting that the group intended to attack a small nuclear facility located in Sydney. Some members of the group had apparently acquired New Zealand passports, which could then be used for easy entry into numerous countries, including Australia. Police speculated that the New Zealand passports were preferred because they tend not to arouse suspicion.

Human smuggling

Human smugglers understand that international borders are defined legally but not necessarily geographically. For example, many countries - such as the Philippines - possess thousands of miles of unguarded coastline that constitute their 'border'. Many syndicates take advantage of these features, either to smuggle people, narcotics, or other valuable commodities.

During the past decade, Western nations have confronted a rising tide of human smuggling from developing countries. Major source countries include Mexico, India and China, among many others. The smuggling organisations facilitating this migration range from fairly simple, unsophisticated networks to complex transnational criminal syndicates.

Human smuggling syndicates, such as the Chinese 'snakeheads', have developed reliable networks of transit stations and safe houses. Chinese organisations often have access to a sophisticated array of forged passport and visa services, offered either within their own organisation or sub-contracted to other related groups. In theory, terrorist groups could rely on such organisations to provide these fake identity document services, instead of relying on their own in- house specialists. This may be a trend that will grow over time. Currently, some police officials believe that criminal groups are reluctant to provide such services given the increased law enforcement scrutiny that would probably be directed toward their own organisations.

The next level of convergence between human smuggling and international terrorism/crime involves the actual sub-contracting of human smuggling services. As terrorist or criminal groups seek to minimise their chances of being detected through border crossings, they may turn to organisations that specialise in illegal migration. These organisations - such as Albanian syndicates that facilitate trans-migration from Albania to Italy - only focus on one stage of the journey. They demand payment in advance and are not particularly fussy about the identity or nationality of the individuals being smuggled. In some cases, larger criminal syndicates that maintain control over the departure and destination phases of clandestine migration, will sub-contract for the services of these particular single-segment smugglers. This is particularly the case when migrants pass through an area where these smaller gangs have influence and power.

In the case of Chinese snakeheads, the terms of transportation are often delineated in sophisticated contracts between the smugglers and the migrants' families. They often draw a distinction between their activities and what they perceive as the far more sinister motivations characterising terrorist groups or narcotics gangs. Larger transnational organisations may be reluctant to smuggle members of terrorist organisations for various reasons: cultural mistrust, fear of heightened law enforcement scrutiny, or lack of any guarantee that transportation fees will be paid. Nevertheless, as terrorist or criminal organisations offer to pay substantial sums of money - the 'clandestine travel premium' - they will probably find syndicates willing to oblige.

The burgeoning trade in international identity fraud and human smuggling is more than a law enforcement or labour migration challenge. Indeed, it may have far-reaching national and international security implications.

Many smuggled aliens and members of international crime syndicates manage to pass through border checks every month with little difficulty. US immigration and customs inspectors interview and screen hundreds of thousands of international travellers every day. Under increasing pressure, inspectors generally have only a few seconds or minutes to make a decision that could ultimately have a detrimental impact on their country's security.

Immigration and customs inspectors are the frontline soldiers in this futuristic and unfolding struggle between the state and perpetrators of transnational violence. Governments are realising that the day they give up caring about border security will be the day they issue a carte blanche invitation to international terrorists and criminals, and it is very unlikely that the invitation will be ignored.

*Paul J Smith is a research fellow with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii. The views expressed in this article are the author's own, and do not represent the views or position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense or the US government.