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European Union Enlargement: Opportunities and Challenges for Western and Eastern European NGOs

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By Barbara Brubacher

INTRAC
May, 2003

Introduction


While the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 allowed East to meet West, the 2000s will see parts of the East joining the West through the process of accession to the European Union (EU). In such a dynamic environment, Eastern and Western institutions, including NGDOs (non-governmental development organisations), will have to learn not only to co-habit but to co-ordinate and adapt to common policies such as the EU Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) policy. While this new marriage brings great opportunity for both sides, it will also pose significant challenges. How will such diverse Civil Societies, each with its unique history and outlook, relate to EU institutional culture and policy? Moreover, how will the relationship of Eastern NGDOs with their national governments change? And will the increase in development funding bring competition or co-operation between NGDOs?

The purpose of this article is to address these questions and assess the implications of the prospective EU enlargement in terms of development policy and its effects on current EU NGDOs and those in Accession Country (AC), as well as the relations between them. The article then highlights the challenges and opportunities facing EU and AC NGDOs and suggest ways forward.

1. The Contrasting History of EU and AC NGDOs

NGDOs, as products of Civil Society, are to a large extent defined by their socio-economic environment. As Europe was divided for more than 40 years, the historical contexts of the mostly Western EU and the mostly Eastern AC NGDOs are understandably different. While EU NGDOs have well over fifty years experience of democratic, capitalist systems wherein Civil Society and Government were to a greater or lesser extent separate, the modern history of Eastern AC NGDOs only began in the twilight of the USSR as previously the centralized socialist system had effectively stifled the activity of an autonomous Civil Society. Governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain to a greater or lesser extent utilised development policy as an extension of their respective foreign policies. However, Western governments used NGDOs as instruments of that development while in the East the role of NGDOs was almost non-existent, with state institutions dominating development.

(a) EU NGDOs in Profile

With over fifty years experience, EU NGOs have gone through many changes to their institutional culture and development strategies. In the post-War optimism, EU NGDOs initially embarked on relief-based aid in order to alleviate poverty while many, mostly in newlyindependent developing nation states, attempted to establish themselves as the primary service providers. However, while it was expected that this relief-based work would only be needed temporarily, by the 1960s the post-War optimism had faded and EU NGDOs began to understand that poverty was going to be a chronic, long-term problem that relief alone would not address. Thus instead of focusing on resource allocation, NGOs began to train local human and technological capacities in order to create more sustainable development.2

By the 1980s and ‘90s, sustainable development strategies had become increasingly sophisticated with emphasis now being placed on the empowerment of local NGOs and the formation of partnerships with the local community. This trend to complement instead of supplanting local NGOs has continued to the present. These ‘partnerships' between Northern and local Southern NGOs are becoming, albeit far from perfect, increasingly equal insofar as the earlier paternalistic approach is being replaced with respect for and solidarity with their local partners in the South.

EU NGDOs, such as OXFAM, Action Aid, and CARE now focus more on how they can best serve the interests of their partners politically rather than only financially. In its ideal form, a new relationship of solidarity built on mutual respect has caused NGDOs to acknowledge two fundamental aspects regarding development on a global level. Firstly, as the EU's aid is still closely linked to its foreign policy thereby benefiting the interests of its member states as much as those of its stated beneficiaries,3 many EU NGDOs set out to create a degree of financial and political autonomy in order to preserve their own independent policy options.

Secondly, if development is to be truly sustainable and built on ensuring people's political as well as socio-economic rights, then governments, not NGOs, must ultimately become the primary service providers. In other words, NGOs should not solely attempt to fill in the gaps left government but to strengthen the capacities of those governments and lobby for a more equitable distribution of services and resource. To this end, EU NGDOs embarked on initiatives to lobby both domestic and European governments, especially on trade, debt and human rights.4

(b) Eastern European NGDOs in Profile

This institutional and strategic evolution of EU NGDOs has not been shared in Eastern Europe, where the Communist state system largely overshadowed and stifled the development of Civil Society. There was not a total Civil Society vacuum in countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, which maintained a degree of their traditions in voluntary and charity in faith-based organisations such as CARITAS. However, state-controlled bodies held an almost total monopoly on international development. In such an environment, NGOs were not able to emerge until the dissolution of the Soviet Union.5

With the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the rapid and difficult transition to liberal democracies, an economic crisis emerged and Eastern Europe became a net recipient of aid. It was in this dynamic context that two categories of modern NGDOs were formed. The first was formed out of the long-standing tradition of social and religious charity networks that had previously been repressed. With freedom of religion restored, faith-based organizations were able to revive their linkages, connections and networks. The international faith-based networks in particular were able quickly to re-build old contacts and the tradition of charity and volunteer work, especially in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia.6 These organisations focused on alleviating the poverty and economic needs of their constituencies and became secondary service providers as the new post-Communist governments took shape.

The second category of NGDOs lacked such traditional networks NGDOs and therefore grew not out of constituency support but as products of Western donor funding. Western donors channeled funding to the East under the New Policy Agenda 7 which had the aim of promoting Civil Society as an essential ingredient to forming truly representative democratic systems. These new NGDOs were intended to become intermediary organisations capable of connecting the interests of the household with that of government (Wedel, 1991).

One unfortunate result of this attempt to push former Eastern European societies to create a civil culture and transform into liberal democracy based on the free market economy was that foreign aid in the former Communist countries has a record of ‘picking winners.' (Edwards, 2001, p. 6). Particularly in Russia and the Balkans, donors pre-selected those organisations that were thought to be the most effective in fulfilling the aim of Western liberal ‘democratisation.' Thus, Western state-sponsored aid programmes often selected urban-based advocacy NGOs and networks that were composed of the local civic elite as their aid recipients (Edwards, 2001). This sudden influx of targeted aid created elite advocacy NGDOs with little capacity or orientation to providing services. Instead a highly competitive NGDO culture took shape in the transition countries. While these new elite eastern NGDOs were successful in forming a dynamic Civil Society that was capable of promoting civic and political rights, they lacked roots in a local constituency.

Much of the Eastern NGDO work remained focused on civic and political rights during the transition period, and what little aid was sent abroad went primarily to neighbouring Eastern countries (Baginski, 2002, p. 15). For instance, in keeping with its domestic and foreign interests, Hungary's aid policy was directed towards countries such as Romania with its large Hungarian population in the border region. Similarly, 95 percent of Slovenia's ODA goes to the FRY Serbia and Montenegro and to five percent to Albania (Trialog 2002; Press, 2003). This neighbourly orientation stems not only from the foreign and domestic interests of the AC states but also from the fact that AC NGDOs have the most experience and historically grown concerns in this region.

2. Enter the EU Enlargement and a Common ODA Policy

Within the new EU system, the new member states will be expected massively to increase their ODA contributions from the current 0.03 percent of GDP to 0.39 percent by 2006 (Press, 2003). This huge increase will require a major shift from recipient to donor (DFID, 2002). Accompanying this shift is a pressure from the EU to re-orient the Eastern focus of AC NGDOs toward more involvement in the South. Such coercion to re-orient southward is positive insofar as it will encourage a more expansive development policy in the East, however it presents several problems. Firstly, the economic and political hardship faced by the people of Eastern Europe during the transition is still fresh, making it difficult for AC NGDOs to foster a constituency for overseas development. Secondly, large parts of the population in future EU candidate countries such as Bulgaria and Romania and their neighbouring countries Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia are living in poverty. With these conditions present, it may be wise to avoid too coercive a policy in encouraging AC NGDOs to expand their regional focus.

Furthermore AC NGDOs do not yet have the capacity to finance and implement projects further abroad (Trialog, 2002, p.12). The learning curve of these new NGDOs remains steep and AC NGDOs are in need of capacity building. However, until now their has been little help in this area from EU NGDOs or the EU itself. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is funding a programme called Official Development Assistance in Central Europe Program (ODACE)8 that is designed to foster partnership between the four Visegrad-countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and third countries, both Eastern and Southern. This collaboration between CIDA and the Visegrad-countries has been relatively successful with AC NGDOs bringing their knowledge of the region and expertise in the democratic/economic transition process while CIDA provides logistical know-how in project planning and implementation.9

Another aspect of the new AC NGDO culture that has not yet had time to develop is the networking of NGDOs both to increase development capacity and to lobby local and regional governments. With their relatively long history, EU NGDOs have had time to create numerous local and regional networks capable of lobbying for more progressive development policies. In 1975 the Liaison Committee of European NGOs (CLONG) was formed in Brussels in order to co-ordinate unified NGDO lobby initiatives, targeting the EU to ensure optimal quality of development assistance and the stated commitment to poverty eradication. However, while such NGDO networks 10 have proliferated 11 , their actual impact is not always effective due to co- ordination problems and the difficulty of reaching united positions on specific issues. In such a context it is understandable that AC NGDOs seem to be somewhat reluctant to join such networks.12

Although the impact of regional networks has not always been optimal, their potential and purpose are important and should be encouraged. To this extent CLONG has helped to organize an Eastern regional organisation through its TRIALOG programme 13 . This has helped to facilitate the process of co-ordination between NGDOs regionally and the national NGDO platforms, in order to influence nation governments and the EU. However, these regional networks are still young and their constituency underdeveloped. Younger still are the national platforms which, with the exception of Slovakia, have had very little impact on government policy (Kricheswky, 2002a). Furthermore, as Western aid is fading and the more elitist NGDOs are becoming more dependent on local government funding, there is a disincentive to create progressive national NGDO platforms. Thus, countries such as Poland have preferred to try to influence the EU directly and have established a Polish NGDOs Office in Brussels.14

3. NGDOs in the Expanded EU

Challenges

  • As newcomers to a 25 member Union, AC states and NGDOs will find it difficult to influence EU policy which is often dominated by the senior and economically more powerful member states such as France, the United Kingdom and Germany.15 To communicate their concerns and interests, AC NGDOs will have to greatly improve their lobbying capacities at both the national and EU levels. To lobby decision-makers effectively, AC NGDOs will need to form lobbying groups both nationally and regionally.

  • The increasing financial contributions of AC governments to ODA will open AC NGDOs access to government funding. As experienced by EU NGDOs, however, too great a dependence on government funding can affect the independence of NGDO policy. Governments tend to exert control over NGDOs by defining focal areas and making NGDOs accountable to them through donor-led evaluations.16 The availability of additional funding can have the effect of skewing NGDOs' accountability towards governments alone instead of to their beneficiaries.

  • In order to counter dependence on government funding, AC NGDOs will need to secure multiple donor sources, preferably including local constituency support. The ability of AC NGDOs to foster local constituency support may, however, be hampered if EU policy forces them to focus resources on Southern countries instead of on their Eastern neighbouring states where AC NGDOs have established historical and cultural ties. ‘Going South' with development policy may also create resentment due to the fact that the local population still encounter many economic hardships themselves.

  • While the AC NGDOs have flourished with the collapse of the USSR and have matured rapidly, they are still relatively smaller and less developed than their Western counterparts. As development aid within the EU will more than likely operate on a level playing field, wherein any preference for NGDOs based on nationality will be considered contrary to the principles of the EU, there will be little opportunity on the national level to protect the weaker AC NGDOs. In such an environment, EU NGDOs will inevitably have an unfair advantage in securing a disproportionate amount of the development aid. If EU NGDOs pursue the funds of AC states in a manner that is unrestrained, they will not only limit the programmes of AC NGDOs but stifle their institutional development.

    Opportunities

  • There is a great opportunity to increase European NGDO capacity both in terms of the increased resources for programming and in terms of development strategy and experience. With EU accession, hundreds of new NGOs will enter the Union, each with their unique capacities and histories. The experience of AC NGDOs as intermediary organisations in transition societies and their work with refugees in Eastern Europe may be extremely valuable for current EU NGDOs. Through networking and co-ordination, these new capacities can be capitalised upon in a manner that is mutually beneficial to both NGDOs and to their designated beneficiaries.

  • The geographical location and historical relationship of AC NGDOs to their Eastern neighbours may also greatly facilitate the creation of new relationships for EU NGDOs. As stated by Rochelle Koos, Director General of DG in the European Commission, the integration of Portugal and Spain in the past enlargement helped to form important linkages to Latin America. Such a process can already be seen with accession states like Slovenia who will inevitably contribute to the facilitation of aid to states within the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania.

  • The accession of the ten new member states will also inject a large amount of new funding into the development community. With a scheduled increase of almost three times their current aid contributions, AC states will soon become important donors and aid in stimulating the development sector generally.

    Conclusion

    Having recently emerged from years of repression under Communism, Eastern European NGDOs are now facing another radical transformation with their imminent inclusion into the EU. This accession will inevitably be accompanied by significant challenges and opportunities as AC NGDOs and EU NGDOs search for a mutually complementary modus vivendi. The EU common ODA policy will require new member states to increase national contributions to development and thus increase the cumulative amount of funding available for NGDOs, and this increase will be accompanied by a parallel increase in the number of NGDOs seeking funds. In such a situation, competitive tendencies will almost certainly increase with the better established EU NGDOs harbouring the competitive advantage. To counter such trends it is vital to pursue two policies. Firstly, the capacity and knowledge of AC NGDOs to obtain EU funding must be increased in order to level the playing field. Secondly, pan-European NGDO networks must be expanded in order to ensure that competitive tendencies do not result in damaged relationships but foster trust within a division of labour.

    Another potential benefit from the EU expansion will be that AC NGDOs will bring a wealth of experience and relationships from their experience in Eastern states such as Albania and the Former Yugoslavia. Public support for such initiatives in neighbour countries is strong, although the focus on this region among AC NGDOs could be considered disproportionate in the face of needs in the South. However, shifting their focus from the East to the South must be accompanied by support among their constituencies. Without that support, AC NGDOs will be in danger of losing their independence and become increasingly dependent on state aid and risk becoming instruments of state foreign policy.

    In these circumstances it is vital that greater government funding is accompanied by initiatives to build constituency support within accession countries. These processes will be slow and will require not only public education but efforts to address the concerns of the population who are still adjusting to the new liberal democratic system. As long as people in the accession countries still face a high level of socio-economic inequality and economic insecurity, grass-roots support for Southern orientated programmes may not emerge. If the EU and EU NGDOs prematurely encourage a re-orientation of AC NGDO to the South without time for constituency mobilisation, AC NGDOs could find themselves damaged in the long term. EU NGDOs must therefore listen carefully to the history and outlook of AC NGDOs and formulate co-ordinated policies in a manner that is co-operative and with an appreciation of the others' historical context and outlook.

    1 For the link between development policy and state foreign policy see Dauderstaedt, 2002, pp.5-6
    2 For the various different ‘generations' of Western NGOs, see Korten, D. (1989), Getting to the 21 st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda.
    3 See van Reisen, 1999.
    4 For example, in March 2003, the UK based charity OXFAM announced that it is going to refuse to accept government funds to finance its humanitarian work in Iraq if the U.K. goes to war, reported the Guardian. Oxfam spokeswoman Barbara Stocking says that Oxfam wants to avoid being used as "an instrument of foreign policy" in the event of military action in Iraq, and has agreed an internal statement that commits it to preserving its impartiality. OXFAM GB's decision exemplify trends among EU NGOs that state funding will bind them to governments' military and political agendas and compromise their ability to operate freely in the countries, such as Iraq. Private donations from their constituency within the UK allow OXFAM to act independently from government donations.
    5 Kriwzechwsky, TRIALOG, 2002.
    6 In these countries, the Church remained informal and underground links throughout the Communist era, and the 1990s these were the most successful groups to rebuild national links and networks. Pre 1945 missionary and chruch-based connections to the South have been renewed. See Giffen, J. and Press, M. (2002 ), , unpublished, INTRAC, p. 19; also Novak, A. ‘Summary of Findings and Recommendations, Re-enforcing NGDO Participation in ODA', unpublished, CIDA .
    7 For a profound critique on the New Policy Agenda see Williams, D. ‘Good Governance and the Ideology of Transformation' in Hale, W. and Kienle, E. fter the Cold War: Security and Democracy in Africa and Asia. London: Tauris.
    8 Official Development Assistance in Central Europe Program, for more information go to www.acdi-cida.gc.ca
    9 Meeting with Adam Novak, ODACE Programme Manager, in Vienna at the TRIALOG Office on 11 th February 2003.
    10 For more information on EU NGO networks and their characteristics, see van Reisen, Mirjam (1999), ‘EU – Global Player', pp. 72-77. Also Randel, J. and German, T. (1999) ‘European Union' in Stakeholders: Government-NGO – Partnership for International Development by Henny Helmich, Ian Smillie, Tony German and Judith Randel (eds.), London: Earthscan.
    11 Other network organizatons include VOICE, APRODEV, WIDE, EURO-CIDSE, EUROSTEP, EURODAD and the TRADE union based SOLIDAR.
    12 Interview with John Beauclerk, INTRAC Central and Eastern Europe Programme Manager, held on 19 th March 2003, Oxford.
    13 For more information go to www.clong-trialog.at
    14 The Polish NGO office in Brussels aims to improve communication between Poland's NGO community, NGOs in the EU member states, European network NGOs, as well as EU officials and parliamentarians. It also aims to fill the current gap caused by a lack of national network NGOs that usually are members of existing European networks.
    15 For information on NGDO lobbying in the EU see Dauderstaedt, 2002, p. 9.
    16 For more information on the ability of governments to exert control of NGOs through funding see Helmich and Smillie, 1999, especially pp. 60-61.

    References

    Bagiñski, Pawel (2002) ‘Poland'. In Dauderstädt, M. (ed.) EU Eastern Enlargement and Development Cooperation, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung: Bonn.

    Dauderstädt, M. (2002) EU Eastern Enlargement and Development Cooperation. Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung: Bonn.

    DIFD(2002) From Recipient to Donor: Opportunities for Development Policy in an Enlarged Europe. DFID conference held in Warsaw on 9th October 2002.

    Gusenbauer, A. (1999) ‘Die EU Erweiterung im Nord-Sued-Kontext und die Rolle der NGOs' in conference paper for The Enlargement of the EU and the role of NGDOs in Vienna 18th –20th November 1998 organised by í•FSE, Vienna.

    Edwards, M. (2001) ‘The Rise and Rise of Civil Society. In Developments Magazine, 2nd Quarter.

    Helmich, H. and Smilie, I. (1999) ‘Development NGOs, Information, Evaluation and Learning', conference paper for The Enlargement of the EU and the role of NGDOs published by í•FSE, Vienna.

    Jankowitsch, P. (1999) ‘Die Erweiterung der EU: Implikationen fuer die internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und ihre Konsequenzen fuer die NGOs, conference paper for The Enlargement of the EU and the role of NGDOs in Vienna 18th –20th November 1998 organised by í•FSE.


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    FAIR USE NOTICE: This page contains copyrighted material the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Global Policy Forum distributes this material without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. We believe this constitutes a fair use of any such copyrighted material as provided for in 17 U.S.C § 107. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond fair use, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.