Global Policy Forum

As Posted to the Internet List "unreform"

1. Gary Ostrower

It has often been said that the competing interests of the permanent members of the Security Council virtually guarantees that these countries will not permit the selection of a strong SG, and that the development of geopraphical blocs after the mid-sixties reinforces this development. Consequently, the UN is fated to have relatively unassertive SGs, like Lie and Thant. Hammarskjold? An abberation, and he paid for his strength by being almost totally shunned by the Soviets during his last days as Moscow proposed the Troika formula to guarantee that such power would not again be lodged in the office. Even some of the recent research about Waldheim is consistent with this notion of SG weakness. Reputable scholars suggest that the US and Soviets both knew about his Nazi past, and supported him precisely because they believed that this information virtually guaranteed that he could not exercise truly independent power; in other words, his knowledge that both countries knew about his past served to curb his independence.

Well, is this view correct? Are we fated to have SG's who are second-raters, who cannot exert the kind of independence that the UN, in a critical period of its history, desperately needs? And -- closely related to this -- might the fate of Boutros Ghali be tied to this question -- for he may be (as Abe Rosenthal recently argued in an op-ed in the New York Times) the most able SG in UN history with the exception of Hammarskjold. In this view, US opposition to his second term stems not so much from the visicitudes of campaign politics in the US, but rather from the fact that great powers will not tolerate a strong and independent force at the UN.

Gary Ostrover's views seem quite well-founded and supported by empirical evidence. I think the reluctance of the superpowers had its cold war rationale, because each block was afraid that a strong and assertive SG could be manipulated by the opposite block, while a weak and/or blackmailable SG would in any case pose less of a headache even if he was aligning with the opposite block. Probably Boutros-Ghali's election was also due to the particular historical moment, right at the end of the cold war and with great expectations about the "rebirth" of the UN, especially in the peace and security area.

I don't know whether Boutros Ghali has been the best SG after Hammarskjold (Being a UN staff member, I would hesitate to give candid comments on an open listserv...). Certainly he had to go through more than most of his predecessors (Somalia and Yugoslavia, for example, on top of other 10-odd peacekeeping operations) and (whatever the Americans say), he undertook more reforms of the Secretariat than probably all of his predecessors combined.

Childers and Urquhart recently published A World in Need of Leadership, which focuses on how to search for the best possible SG. It is a very thought-provoking contribution, but their very elaborate ideas are not very likely to be implemented any time soon.

The most promising development, in my opinion, would be an agreement among the P5 -- short of a Charter amendment -- not to use the veto when voting to recommend a candidate for SG. This might give a better chance to first-raters to emerge.

And anyway, the idea that the best candidate rarely gets elected, or even comes close to the finish line, is not an exclusivity of the UN.

What about the election of the SG? Art 97 says "The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." In 1950 the GA "extended" Trgyve Lie's term for 3 years over a Soviet veto. The GA could extend SG Boutras-Ghali's term in defiance of the US. Would probably mean the deadbeat would pay even less and the SG would be in an untenable position with a major power.

To follow up of Professor Stein's remarks, he's quite right about Lie. Technically, the Secretary Council must only recommend a candidate to the General Assembly. This they could not do in 1950. So the President of the Security Council (over the stringent objections of Ambassador Vishinsky of the USSR) sent a letter to the President of the GA indicating that, because of the deadlock, the Security Council could not therefore recommend a candidate and that the responsibility thus fell to the General Assembly. The GA reasoned that, because Trygve Lie had been recommended in 1946 for a five year term, that recommendation still stood, and that the GA would be within its constitutional right to simply "extend" Lie's term for three more years. Lie resigned, however, after only two years. Among several personal reasons, he stated that he felt that the interests of the United Nations body would be better served by a Secretary General that was universally recognized. The Soviet Union and its satellites refused to even recognize his existence - even so far as to register their credentials with a lower officer of the Secretariat.

Is this, then, what Boutros-Ghali faces if the GA were to do the same over a certain US objection? Perhaps not to the extent to which the Soviets reached. But President Clinton is - and has been - under a great deal of Republican pressure regarding the UN. If the GA were to elect Boutros-Ghali over US objection, I fear greatly for the extent of US support for any UN activity in the future. Does this mean we must settle for someone which only the US will support? Not necessarily. Remember, four other countries also have veto power. While the US seems adamant about its opposition to Boutros-Ghali, it stands in virtual diplomatic isolation. Is the US position ridiculous? Of course, no doubt about it. Is is illegal? No. Unfortunately, this is simply the way the game is - and has been - played. The most we can do is attempt to persuade the Clinton administration away from this bizzare stance.

RB: In choosing the Secretary General, the foremost concern must be for the poor and disenfranchised of the world. The UN must show, in dramatic and clear terms, that it is a people-oriented institution.

PP: Is this true, I could mention a dozen other criteria for electing the SG, including peace, development and simple representing the consensus. It is quite likely, now that the US elections have passed, that a bit more constructive approach of the US will lead to a package deal, which does include an extension of the term to seven years, as has been proposed by Urquhart and Childers in their book, page 87. Moreover, that will give some time to find a representative candidate, which could include for the first time a woman. I think this is a very important condition.

RB: The SG must be critically aware of the newest threats to civil societies,and be able to mobilize the member states in preventing these thrreats to world security. The current system can be characterized by the Golden Rule: He who has the gold, makes the rules.

PP: Most governments have difficulties understanding, let alone regulating or controling new technowlogy. Do you think an underresourced UN is able to do that? The golden rule, I think you mean the permenant seats in the Security Council, is a fact, here to stay. It would be dreaming to think that the status quo can easily be changed, however ther are some justifications for having the permanent members. I think the main problem is how to adjust the Security Council, extending the group who holds the gold. The most clever proposal I have seen was the double veto, You can enlarge the group of permenent members with Japan, India, Brazil, Germany and Nigeria (or South Africa), while you raise the treshold for the veto, e.g. you need at least 2 veto's for blocking something, which the US might be willing to accept because they are almost always guaranteed the vote or veto of the UK. This avoids the new permanent members blocking for regional interests. The SG can be a less political person then and even more a grey bureaucrat.

The Secretary-General's office is constructed around the concept of an impartial civil service, an idea which goes back to the League of Nations. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to be impartial with consistency, for real impartiality leads to friction with states who certainly do not want the SG to be impartial (think, for instance, of the USSR's condemnation of Lie during the Korean War and of Hammarskjold during the Congo crisis, or recall the way that the US government consigned U Thant to the diplomatic wilderness after Thant in 1965 criticized Washington's inaction regarding Vietnam peace efforts).

A number of people have made reference to the role of the General Assembly in extending Trygve Lie's term of office as UN Secretary-General on 1 Nov 1950 (G.A. Resolution 492 (V)). This is cited as a possible precedent if an impasse is reached following the expiry of the term of office of the current Secretary-General.

It should be noted that the original recommendation from the Security Council to the Assembly to appoint Lie from 1 January 1946 made no mention of the period of time for which it should be valid. Thus the objections of the USSR at the time that the Assembly had no legal right to extend his term of office held no legal basis. Subsequent recommendations from the Council to the Assembly on the election and re-election of subsequent Secretaries-General have all contained a specific time limit.

Thus while there have been some de facto changes to the relationship between the Council and Assembly over the years, such as through the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, the case for Assembly intervention in the case of an impasse from 1 January 1997 is considerably weaker (at least from a legal point of view) than the situation that arose in 1950.

Having worked with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee some years ago, I have had the opportunity to observe the Helms staff in action. Further, I have participated in several conferences over the last couple of years with congressional staffers, so I know the strength of objection to the UN and the current SG.

I do not give you this history to support the Clinton administration's handling of the current selection process. In fact, I have experienced first-hand and at close range the aggravation that several perm-reps expressed when word of the US veto-position on the SG was leaked last June 20. Whatever concerns the US may have about the SG, the handling of the current selection process raises a number of questions in my mind. Certainly, the early placing of political markers needlessly frustrates any thought of compromise on the matter.

I understand fully, the structural and historic limitations of the Charter, however, this current crisis provides us with a new opportunity for charter revision. The key complaint of the US is that UN will overtake US sovereignty via world governance and global opinion. Yet, the US wishes to continue in that mode itself. The contradiction is clear, and has unfortunately fallen on the head of the most representative SG the UN has ever seen. I propose a meeting between Boutros, Clinton, the Pope, and Mr. Helms, to jointly discuss a new paradigm for the UN. Perhaps Mother Theresa could moderate and Jimmy Carter could be a participant observer. How's that for thinking outside the box?

One of the most disturbing dimensions of this whole situation is the refusal of President Clinton to even talk to the Secretary General. Were they to have such a meeting, it would at least allow a potential for the administration to change its position on a second term. After such a discussion, it would always be possibility to change from the veto position "based on further consideration",

Boutros B-G is indeed in many ways an ideal person for realizing the interests of the US and the West in the UN -- an interest that includes having an effective UN, one that can mediate the global leadership of the West and smooth it over (which means also moderating it where necessary) while also helping in its smoother and more efficient implementation. He is a Christian from an Islamic country. He is a Third World citizen with deep cultural links to the First as well as Third World. He knows which way is up and has been for the most part willing to play along with the reality of a unipolar world. The Gulf War is a case in point.

B B-G showed some regrettable reluctance to cooperate with NATO on workable terms in Bosnia, but he also oversaw the rapprochement with NATO and the eventual cooperation in action. It wasn't so many years ago that the UN had nothing to do with NATO, regarding it with an equidistant attitude as a mere agency of the cold war, morally equivalent to the Warsaw Pact. Under B B-G, NATO has come to be named as one of the positive regional international organizations coordinate with the UN. In this sense, the concentric/unipolar reality of the world order -- the US and EU inside NATO inside the Bretton Woods institutions inside the UN -- has gained nearly full acceptance in the UN.

By opposing him, the US is seriously damaging its own best interests. It is undermining its credibility and damaging some of the better arrangements for extending its power and influence around the world. So why in the world is the US doing this? The suggestions from some other countries -- that the US, in its unipolar moment, is jealous of anyone else showing any independence of initiative or wielding any power or influence -- unfortunately have some merit. It's infantile, but such jealousy is real. However, most Americans probably are't so mindlessly jealous. On the far anarcho-libertarian fringe -- Left as well as Right -- jealousy of a competitor is probably less important than opposition to any kind of global leadership: i.e., it is resented when international organizations help the US manage the global leadership act, not because this is misunderstood as a competition for the role, but because it is felt in these circles that both the US and the international organizations ought to get out of the global leadership business.

Clinton is at the moment not expressing his own views so much as yielding to the Helmses and the anti-government extremists, who carried a lot of weight in the last Congress. Gingrich has long differed on many matters with the isolationists in his own party who did so much damage in the last two years, and has recently shown some evidence of thinking better on the UN as well. I still hold out hope that, as the domestic politics shift in the coming months and as the costs in terms of international isolation become clearer, the Administration will change its line and come around to the side of B B-G. It would help meanwhile if Americans were to recognize how good B B-G has been for them.

On October 24, UN day, Ambassador Albright spoke at Columbia University and said, among other things, something that speaks volumes about the US's attitude towards Boutros-Ghali and the ideal profile of the next SG. She said, in a nutshell, that the next SG should concentrate on the reform of the Secretariat, be a good administrator and not aspire to be a world leader or a prominent diplomat like Boutros-Ghali. It is unclear to me whether this is really the thinking of the Clinton administration or rather a tactical position to avoid further frictions with the Republican hawks on Capitol Hill. What is clear is that the US, for the uses that it wants to make of the UN in the foreseeable future, does not need and does not want a strong or assertive SG. The US has ironically replaced the Soviet Union in taking this kind of position.

So, for those who foresee a Secretary-General able to implement a progressive vision of the need of the international community, to empower the disenfranchised and build a bridge to the 21st century... dream on!

The position outlined by Albright accords exactly with the policy of the major powers ever since the first years of the UN. The only difference is that in the past (certainly since Hammarskjold), the State Department offered lip service regarding a strong SG. Today, even lip service has disappeared.

I would be interested to know more about the merits (and weaknesses) of those men who have served as SG's. As with Supreme Court justices, the UN does not always get what it bargains for (Hammarskjold being the best example of this). As a case in point, my own research suggests that Perez de Cuellar, of whom the State Department knew very little back in 1981, was a much more impressive SG than conventional wisdom seems to allow. His efforts to promote informal mediation among the permenent SC powers during the Iran-Iraq War led to what some scholars have called a long-lasting revitalization of the SC; the result was not just the settlement of that war in 1988, but a settlement to the conflict in El Salvador as well (and the beefing up of the peacekeeping function generally).

What about other SG's? Do their reputations speak to their real accomplishments (or lack of accomplishments)?

I am anxious, not being an "insider" - to hear someone tell us the specific complaints that the US has against Boutros Ghali's performance. In the absence of that information, I am unable to evaluate whether there is any substance supporting the US position, or whether this is just another example of a Clinton/Christopher foreign policy screwup, incomprehensible to the rest of the world, incomprehensible to the media, incomprehensible to the Republican opposition, incomprehensible to his own State Department, incomprehensible to anyone but Clinton's pollsters.

That said, occasional problems with personnel and personality often reflect systemic political flaws, and I would prefer to focus on the systemic issues, rather than whether Boutros is getting a raw deal, or whether the execution of US foreign policy is competent at the present moment.

In response to discussion about the records of the various Secretaries-General, I second the idea that the U.S. (and other countries for that matter) often do not get what they are looking for. It is an interesting question, therefore, to look at what they got.

As far as your comments on Perez de Cuellar, much of what I've read points to his "successes" relying on the change in the international environment; i.e. if he was such an effective SG, why did we not see results earlier? I am interested to hear what others have to say about the relative importance of the person vs. the situation. For example, I would argue that for Hammarskjold, one of the reasons that he had success was his ability to take advantage of opportunities when they were presented as well as pushing to find ways around constraints. Along similar lines, could Thant have been more effective if he had found ways to have more of an impact, or especially in the case of Vietnam, did it not matter who was Secretary-General?

As far as the other Secretaries-General, I have already debated how good a job Lie did -- I would argue that if he did such a bad job, why were the states looking for someone so different and more bureaucratic when they hired Hammarskjold -- but I'm interested in others' opinions. With Waldheim, I think his poor reputation is well deserved -- which is interesting since he would have served a third term if it was not for the Chinese insistence (and use of veto) to get a Third World candidate. Finally, for Boutros-Ghali, more hindsight would be appropriate, but, as others have suggested, he has worked hard on behalf of the UN and may fall closest to attempting to fill Hammarskjold's shoes. I am open to hearing more, as others have also suggested, specifics about BBGs failings to try and change my mind.

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