By Brian Whitaker
Getting governments to take the problem seriously, though, was a different matter until Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab set his underpants on fire aboard Flight 253 last month. Suddenly, Yemen was on the map, al-Qaida hysteria swept through the American media and Gordon Brown summoned an international conference for the end of this month.
"Yemen is a much bigger problem than anyone ever believed before Christmas Day," Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North (of Iran-Contra infamy) informed readers of his Fox News column last week. "We now know that there are in fact many more al-Qaida-trained terrorists in Yemen preparing for attacks on Americans."
All this must be music to the ears of Yemen's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose position prior to 25 December had been looking increasingly precarious. But now deliverance may be at hand - thanks to al-Qaida and the likes of Ollie North.
There was further encouragement for the Yemeni president from an article in the Wall Street Journal. "Mr Salah [sic] is an unpalatable partner," it said. "But he is the only partner we have in Yemen." The article went on to suggest that Saleh should be supported, not only in combating al-Qaida, but also rewarded with American support for his pointless war with the Houthi rebels.
For a wily character like Saleh (and you don't rule a country like Yemen for 32 years without being extremely wily) this is exactly the wrong message to send. He now knows two things. First, that the international community's main reason for taking an interest in Yemen - and perhaps the only reason - is its fear of al-Qaida and, second, that if he is seen to be putting up a fight against al-Qaida the aid money will come rolling in.
But there's a snag here. An unscrupulous psychiatrist who charges patients for therapy by the hour can make more money by prolonging their treatment, and it's much the same with Saleh and al-Qaida. The longer it takes to defeat al-Qaida, the better the aid prospects.
As Marc Lynch put it recently in his Foreign Policy blog, "If you like working with Hamid Karzai, you're going to love Ali Abdullah Saleh."
The trick, as Saleh well knows, is to spin out the battle while appearing to make progress - and progress against al-Qaida in Yemen is very difficult for outsiders to judge.
Last week, for instance, the Yemeni government announced the killing of Abdullah al-Mehdar, who was posthumously described as one of the country's most wanted militants and the suspected leader of an al-Qaida cell. Maybe that's true, but it's hard to know for sure. The word in Yemen is that Mehdar was just a troublesome tribal figure who didn't join al-Qaida until he was dead.
On Friday, Yemen announced the killing of six al-Qaida suspects, including Qassim al-Raymi (described as the military leader of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula) in air strikes on two cars. Yesterday, amid reports that one of the dead men had been seen eating lunch with his family, al-Qaida issued a statement saying all six had survived the attack.
Asked about this during a visit to Ottawa, Yemen's foreign minister appeared to concede that no bodies had actually been found. The attack was in a remote part of Yemen, he said, and "in some cases al-Qaida will withdraw their killed operatives and will bury them before the armed forces get to that area" - which was what he believed had happened in this case.
This is familiar territory to anyone who has been following the Houthi war in northern Yemen, where the army has supposedly been just days away from victory ever since September. Officials announce success after success, rarely with any supporting evidence, while the total of military casualties has never been disclosed.
So what can be done about it?
For a start, Yemen should be pressed to publish a "most-wanted" list, as the Saudis did with al-Qaida and as the Americans did with the Ba'athists in Iraq. Then, at least, we'll be able to see if those rounded up or killed are genuine militants or not. The Yemeni authorities should also be discouraged from claiming successes that they can't prove.
More generally, though, everyone should tone down the al-Qaida hysteria. It should be made clear to Saleh that in return for aid he is expected to perform on a variety of fronts - not just with the militant Islamists. He needs to get serious about the country's political and economic mess, he needs to crack down on corruption and stop harassing the media. And he should be reminded that in September 2013 he must leave office as required by the Yemeni constitution.
