Global Policy Forum

With the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's 41-year dictatorship in Libya, the year of Arab revolutions has taken a game-changing turn, not just for the peoples of the region seeking systematic and large-scale political change - but for geopolitics at a global level.

Until now, this year's two successful removals of dictators in the Arab world, in Tunisia and then in Egypt, occurred as countrywide non-violent protests that, while decapitating the state, did not dismantle it. Ben Ali and Mubarak were forced out - along with their top lieutenants. Mubarak, his sons and other senior officials of the ancien regime, might spend the rest of their lives in jail.

But because the mass protests were largely non-violent on the peoples' end - although it's worth remembering, particularly in Egypt, that in the final days before Mubarak left, protesters did use significant violence against the state outside of Cairo - the "revolutions" did not, and, to this date, have not, radically changed the structure of power in either of the two countries.

Pivotal moments, fateful choices

The day after Mubarak left, I attended a meeting of around two dozen young activists who were at the core of the uprising - and the subject of how far to push the army was a primary topic of debate. "The army is scared sh**less of us," a friend exclaimed - a perception which led many in the group to advocate continuing to push hard, in order to achieve a quick transfer to a caretaker civilian government and the dismantling of the economic networks that had so enriched Egypt's military and civilian elites.

But people were exhausted from the protests and still had good will towards the army for refusing to use the kind of violence against protesters that subsequently occurred in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. The majority of the leaders at that meeting, and across the board, sought dialogue and a willingness to compromise to ensure a peaceful, if only partial, transition to democracy. It is clear that, in so doing, they missed an opportunity to initiate a radical transformation in the political economy of Egypt - which has allowed the Mubarak-era system of power and wealth to remain more or less undisturbed to this point.

Protesters have had to return to Tahrir numerous times to push the army - from a weaker position than demonstrators held on February 12 - to move towards democracy, to free military prisoners, to try Mubarak and his henchmen, and less successfully, to enable workers and "the people" to begin to share more fully in the country's wealth.

Tunisians are engaged in a similar struggle, and the mafia-like tentacles of the country's elite within society will be as hard, if not harder, to root out - regardless of the outcome of the elections scheduled for October.

Nevertheless, by making non-violence a centrepiece of the protests and transition to democracy, Egyptians and Tunisians have also set created a framework for resolving future political and social conflict in their countries that has little tolerance for political violence, even as debates over the country's future become more heated. Such a red line may well prove invaluable in the coming months and years as the emerging political systems struggle against the forces of the economic status quo.

As important, while the army and traditional economic elites will surely retain excessive power in the "new" Egypt and Tunisia, if the countries' young entrepreneurial and small business sectors can forge strong links with their counterparts in neighbouring African countries (including, now, a free Libya with tens of billions of dollars a year in disposable oil income), the balance of power - between the people and democratic government on the one side, and the army and its allies on the other - could shift in the next decade as it did in Turkey during the past ten years.

Can violence produce democracy?

On the other hand, from the Philippines to South Africa, "people power" movements have often compromised with economic or military elites to prevent greater violence, and in so doing allowed corrupt systems that arrogate wealth to the few to remain in power - thus ensuring continued and potentially violent social and economic disparities, and conflict, further down the road.

In stark contrast, Libya's freedom was won through large scale violence, and there is no telling how this reality, from the experience of ordinary civilians-turned-fighters to the NATO-backed transitional administration, will impact the short-term development of the country. It seems likely that the Libyan state - the "People's Republic" - along with the networks of power and wealth dominated by Gaddafi and regime allies will be dismantled. But what will replace it and how a new balance of power will be adjudicated without resort to violence is much harder to ascertain. Afghanistan and Iraq loom in the distance as morality tales of the folly of the violent (and externally initiated or supported) overthrow of repressive states.

One thing is for sure; laying down your AK is much harder than laying down your cartoon-festooned placard. A look at previous violent revolutions, from 18th century France to 20th century China, does not augur well for the development of a representative democracy and uncorrupted, more egalitarian distribution of wealth and resources. The shadowy role played in Libya by armed groups potentially linked to al-Qaeda could portend significant violence against the emerging system, if it doesn't develop towards their liking - while other social forces could also consider violence the natural route to secure rights or resources that might not be sufficiently recognised in the emerging new order.

Drawing up a scorecard

As of now, it seems the biggest "loser" in the Libyan revolution (aside from Gaddafi and his officials) will likely be the role of non-violence as the primary means of achieving political change in the Arab world's revolutionary wave. It's hard to know the long term impact of this shift, but the reality that dum butlab dum ["blood begets blood"] is not just an over-quoted Bedouin principle, it's a near universal fact of politics, and a path that is extremely hard to move from once started down.

If a new state can emerge that quickly achieves hegemony across society and the monopoly of violence - without which it can't function - this could strengthen the argument of pro-democracy forces in Syria (in particular) who might be tempted to turn to violence to achieve democratic ends. Such a move will impact pro-democracy protests across the region, from Bahrain to occupied Palestine, producing yet more violence.

Who are some of the other big losers in the rebel victory in Libya? The United Nations and International Criminal Court have to be at the top of any list. However positive many people - and most Libyans - might consider NATO's wholesale support for the rebels, it was a clear violation of the UN resolution that authorised the military bloc's involvement in the conflict in the first place.

Specifically, UN Security Council Resolution 1973, passed in March, called for a ceasefire and imposed a "no fly zone" and arms embargo against Gaddafi's forces - as well as freezing regime assets. Most important, the resolution authorised member countries "to take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack".

NATO, of course, interpreted "all necessary means" to include active support for the rebels and the overthrow of the regime, arguing that Gaddafi's continued use of mass violence meant the only way to protect Libyan civilians was to remove him from power. This argument could well be true, but it doesn't change the fact that Resolution 1973 was not intended to allow foreign forces to take sides in the revolution and actively work toward the overthrow of a UN-member state.

What kind of credibility will future Security Council resolutions have if their terms can be so thoroughly exceeded or violated by those entrusted with the task of enforcing them? And if members of the Council understood NATO's true intentions when they passed the resolution, that damages the credibility of the Security Council - and of the UN as a trustworthy and impartial arbiter of international and civil conflicts.

Another big loser is the International Criminal Court, which put out arrest warrants for Gaddafi, his sons, and their senior aides. To be sure, no one will shed a tear at seeing them on trial in the Hague for crimes against humanity, and justice would be served if they spent the rest of their lives in prison. But it will surely be a "justice of the strong" nonetheless, reminding the world, yet again, that if you are an ally of - or otherwise useful to - a great power, and particularly of a permanent member of the Security Council (which must authorise any action by the ICC), there is little chance that you'll face justice at the ICC.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa will not soon be at the Hague unless it's for an official reception (neither will George W Bush for that matter), but President Assad will certainly take note if Gaddafi is behind bars in the near future. The prospect of ending up in the cell adjoining Gaddafi's might even push Assad towards leaving power - while he still can dictate terms. But again, there is far less chance of the ICC pursuing charges against him, precisely because he still has friends in Moscow who will not support a Security Council Resolution authorising an investigation.

As the Christian Science Monitor's Dan Murphy, who covered the early phases of the Libyan revolution from Benghazi, put it in a recent post: "The problem lies with the UN Security Council, where countries like Russia and China are generally nervous about an expanding international authority into matters that touch on national sovereignty. Despite mounting evidence of war crimes in Syria, there seems little appetite at the UN Security Council to take action against Assad or his main allies."

He might not be at the Hague soon, but Assad is undoubtedly another big loser of the Libyan revolution, particularly if NATO can engineer a quick transition in Libya, thus freeing itself up for potential aid to Syrian revolutionaries - should they take inspiration from their Libyan counterparts and move towards violence. Indeed, replacing the Iranian-allied Assad with someone who would turn Syria towards the West and disrupt the "Shia crescent" stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean would be a huge strategic victory for the United States, Israel and the Sunni Gulf states.

Considering that neither Russia nor China have vital interests at stake in Syria, we should not be surprised if behind the scenes negotiations leads them to acquiesce to a similar course of action in Syria as occurred in Libya - part of the price of which would surely be even less willingness of the West to press either government on their own occupations (Chechnya, Tibet), and their systematic human rights violations.

Palestinians and Bahrainis are also losers in the victory of the Libyan revolution, for it once again demonstrates that, without a major Western sponsor, people struggling for freedom are at the mercy of governments who can act with relative impunity - safe in the knowledge that they will never suffer the same fate as Gaddafi, Ben Ali or Mubarak - as long as they maintain a monopoly of force and the backing of key global powers to use it. At the same time, Western leaders will use the adulation and gratitude from jubilant Libyans to deflect criticisms for their support of the Israeli or Bahraini governments. We can also add the people of Kashmir, Myanmar and most of the Central Asian kleptocracies to the benighted list of oppressed peoples who will not see their suffering addressed any time soon for lack of a great power sponsor.

If these are the main losers from the victory of armed insurrection in Libya, who are the main winners?

NATO's fortunes have certainly been transformed dramatically with the rebel victory. Only weeks ago commentators were writing the Alliance's obituary thanks to the difficulties rebels faced in defeating Gaddafi, despite thousands of NATO sorties bombing his forces - and even his tent - since March. Some even called for ground troops to be sent in. But NATO commanders clearly had a well-conceived plan, correctly ascertained the balance of forces and where to apply pressure without exposing their troops to significant casualties or establishing a major bootprint on the ground.

Their strategy has, as of now, been vindicated. And given Libya's huge wealth, it's not far fetched to imagine the "new" Libya hosting a permanent NATO presence and even becoming part of the alliance. At the very least, Libya is an optimal staging ground for NATO forces across the continent as the resource/terror wars penetrate ever deeper into Africa.

President Obama is another big winner, at least in the short term. His steady hand, measured language and coy discourse about letting other countries take the lead in Libya (which is manifestly not true, as US drones, satellites and special operations forces played a crucial role in helping the rebels turn the tide against government forces and move on Tripoli), will have been shown to have succeeded in achieving the designated strategic goal at a time when the situation in Afghanistan looks increasingly grim.

Indeed, an American "victory" in Libya offers a stark contrast with the US-led invasion of Iraq, where the Bush administration pursued a policy of managed or sponsored chaos to encourage a level of violence and instability that ultimately left both Sunni and Shia leaders too scared to tell the US to leave, for fear of even greater violence and chaos enveloping the country. In Libya, however, the Obama administration is being very careful to pursue an agenda of protecting civilians, fostering reconciliation, and pushing, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey D. Feltman, "an inclusive transition that would bring together all the segments of Libyan society".

Not Kosovo, but Norway?

Many commentators have compared NATO's involvement in Libya to its bombing of Serbia ostensibly on behalf of Kosovar civilians in 1999, which ultimately led to the establishment of a huge NATO base, Camp Bondsteel, in Kosovo and a more or less permanent UN/NATO trusteeship over the still disputed territory. In particular, much was made at the time of the NATO bombing of Serbia of the potential route of the Trans-Balkan pipeline through Kosovo as the main reason behind NATO's willingness to "protect" Kosovar civilians.

Whether or not a pipeline passes directly through Kosovo, it's clear that the US and Europe had a vested interest in securing control over any transit routes for Caspian oil to the Mediterranean. But Libya is not Kosovo, which is still considered part of Serbia by the Serbian government and has not been recognised by the majority of the world community as an independent state. Equally important, Kosovo is literally a basket case of the international community - it recently suffered the ignominy of having its IMF sponsored economic plan declared "off track," and suffers from perpetual unemployment, poverty and corruption - with a predatory elite that is free from accountability while being tied closely to various mafia groups.

For its part, Libya has huge petroleum reserves (reportedly the ninth largest in the world and perhaps the largest in Africa), a large surface area and a relatively small population. If its wealth was managed correctly - something Gaddafi did not do, whatever his "socialist" pretensions - it is possible that the country could follow a path similar to Norway, whose population is not that much smaller than Libya's and whose oil production and revenues are fairly similar.

The enthusiasm for Saif Gaddafi's faux-program of civil society development of recent years shows that Libyans are as thirsty for creating a well-functioning, representational political system as the world is for the country's oil.

Indeed, the biggest winner of the revolution, at least potentially, are the Libyan people. Even as someone committed to non-violence, having met Libyan refugees in Tunisia and Egypt during the last few months and heard the horror stories of brutality, torture and large scale murder by Gaddafi's forces, I cannot but empathise with the joy being expressed across Libya at ridding the country of a particularly nasty dictator

There is certainly a long road ahead, and the long-term consequences of violence could well make it harder to construct the kind of society most Libyans say they want. Now that the first phase of the revolution is over, it is up to the international community, and particularly Libya's neighbours, to ensure that the revolution is not hijacked, either by Western interests, corrupt local elites, or militants of various ideologies or agendas.

Rebuilding Libya, which is blessed with such a wealth of resources, will take massive efforts on the part of Arab, African and international civil societies, to ensure that the Libyan people aren't sacrificed at the altar of oil profits and special ops bases for deepening US involvement in Africa; that as has happened in so many other countries, the "oil curse" doesn't doom the country to another four decades of corrupt and kleptocratic rule.

With most every country in the region caught up in its own troubled transition, this will be no easy task. What is clear, however, is that the post-conflict transition in Libya presents the most important test yet of the much-celebrated return of pan-Arab solidarity among the youth generation in the Arab world.