Mr. Kim Won-soo, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations at the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council
Thank you, Mr. President,
My delegation is also pleased to see you back in the chair of this Working Group. I asked for the floor mainly to comment on agenda item 4, namely the periodic review.
Before doing so, please allow me to make some brief comments on the two specific issues raised in the course of our discussion, over the last two days, on the agenda item 2. My first comment concerns the issue of whether the veto power should be extended to possible new permanent members. Although this issue is not directly under the rubric of agenda item 2, we have heard some interesting arguments aimed at justifying the expansion of the veto. However, we cannot subscribe to such views. As my delegation has repeatedly expressed our firm opposition to the veto expansion, I will not go through the detailed arguments again. Today, I simply wish to emphasize my delegation's firm conviction that we are here to discuss how to reform the working methods, including the decision-making procedure of the Security Council, not to complicate them.
We respect the position of the African Group on this issue and duly take note of what has been said by the distinguished representative of South Africa yesterday. Unfortunately, however, we still have difficulty in going along with the veto expansion, even as a last resort, from a conceptual perspective. Given the fundamental nature of the current international system, it would be extremely difficult to conceive of an institutional innovation that would guarantee the enlightened use of the expanded veto serving the collective interests of the international community rather than national interests. Unless we have such an institutional guarantee, the increase in the number of veto holders is very likely to increase the use of the veto, or at least the threat of such use. Therefore, we believe that the veto power, as an exception to the principle of sovereign equality, should not be expanded, but rather rationalized.
Secondly, I would like to touch on the issue of whether we should establish a separate working group to discuss problems related to the veto. We would like to add our voice of support to the point eloquently made by a number of delegations yesterday, in particular the distinguished representative of Pakistan and the Australian Ambassador.
We share the belief that the question with regard to the veto, including that of veto extension to possible new permanent members, is too important to the whole question of Security Council reform to be separated from our discussion here in this working group. We cannot ask the general membership of the UN to make an appropriate judgment about the Council's expansion, without giving them a clear idea on the kind of privileges and responsibilities that the new members of the expanded Council will enjoy, in particular its possible new permanent members. If we try to do otherwise, it will be a case of putting the cart before the horse, as I have pointed out several times before.
Mr. President,
Having said that, let me now move to agenda item 4. We believe that the Working Group has a good basis of discussion as contained in the Annex 15 and 16 of the last year's report. We have gone through two rounds of discussions last year, on the basis of the conference room paper prepared by the Bureau. The paper was revised by the Bureau, reflecting all the proposals and comments. We would like to remind the Working Group of the proposal we made last year, which you can find in the Annex 17 of last year's report. I will not repeat the rationale behind our proposal, because we went through that stage last year and it is well-elaborated in paragraphs 2 to 4 of our proposal. You can find it in page 68 of last year's report.
I would like to take this opportunity to echo the point eloquently made by the Australian Ambassador yesterday on the need to design the periodic review as a true test for accountability. It requires us to put all the appropriate procedural arrangements in place. The first thing we should do, in our view, is to make the threshold for a decision at the time of the review adhere as closely as possible to the threshold of a decision at the initial election or selection of new Council members under a new package. This means the affirmative support of at least the two-thirds majority of all members of the UN.
We are grateful to the Bureau of last year and the Secretariat for being so quick in reflecting the gist of our proposal in paragraph 7 of the Annex 16 of last year's report. Actually, the revised version of the CRP came out exactly the same day as our proposal. We were truly amazed by the Bureau's speedy and efficient action.
But my delegation would like to see three more concepts of our proposal reflected in the next version of CRP, which we expect to be updated by the Bureau in due course. My first point concerns the need to have independent and specific provisions for the periodic review mechanism in the future reform package and to reflect them, as appropriate, in the Charter provisions. This point can be included in paragraph 1 of the Annex 16.
My second comment regards the time frame of the periodic review. We believe that the interval for such a review should be as reasonably brief as possible, as just pointed out by the distinguished colleague from South Africa while referring to the OAU position. Although we do not have a magic formula at hand, we think that we can make an educated judgment about the timeframe, taking into account other examples of review timeframe on the issues of comparable importance.
One other issue related to the time frame is the duration of the review process. Paragraph 5 of the Annex 16 suggests that the review process be concluded within two years. My delegation does not fully know the rationale behind this suggestion, and, therefore, we stand ready to be enlightened or corrected on it. In my delegation's view, a two-year period for a review decision is a little too long. The delay in a review process may cause the unnecessary uncertainty in the future of the enlarged Security Council. Therefore, we would like to suggest the shortening of the two-year interim period to one year, unless we have compelling reasons to maintain it.
Thank you, Mr. President.
