Security Council Reform by Amb. PARK Soo Gil, Permanent Representative
at the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council Reform
Mr. Chairman,
Although the focus of today's discussion was intended to be on the decision-making process, including the veto, I should like to touch upon several other important topics such as the expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership, permanent regional representation and periodic review because we think these are all more or less inter-related.
Mr. Chairman,
We have traveled a long way in our common quest for a new modernized Security Council. Unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be a golden road leading us to quick success in this important exercise.
While many travelers have left significant landmarks and milestones along the way, none of these may serve as a definitive guide. We clearly now find ourselves at a crucial stage in our endeavor. Some might even go so far as to call it a stalemate. But I am among those who choose to take a positive view of the half-filled glass of water.
We do agree that the expansion of Security Council membership should be pursued in such a manner as to enhance the basic principles of representativity, effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy, credibility, transparency and democracy.
However, understandably, not everyone has a like-minded interpretation of some of these basic principles. For example, some delegations see an increase in both current permanent and non-permanent categories as a prerequisite to the overall enhancement of the Security Council. On the other hand, there are those delegations who believe an increase in permanent membership in the Security Council will indeed undermine the foregoing basic principles.
Faced with such opposing views, some think the time is ripe for political compromise on the basis of realism, as pointed out by the Ambassador of Norway. Then again, this poses a crucial question. Just what is political compromise and what is realism? Different delegations obviously have varying ideas as to what each represents. In this context, we found the view expressed by the Ambassador of New Zealand, concerning how the issue of compromise should be approached, to be extremely interesting and useful.
Expansion of permanent membership
Let me first turn to the question of whether we need more permanent members. This strikes at the very core of the whole issue. We note that a number of delegations support an increase in the permanent category though they cannot as yet agree upon who that will be. Some further contend that without an increase in permanent membership, Security Council reform would be neither complete nor balanced.
My delegation is not yet convinced of that argument. Although we agree the current composition of the Security Council is in need of improvement, we are not sure that an increase in permanent membership is the best option.
One is continually reminded of the international reality at the time of the United Nations' inception some fifty years ago. World War II was a monumental event in the history of humankind. Dictated by the needs and reality of the time, a unique and privileged status was bestowed upon the five permanent members.
Today, as we attempt to modernize the Security Council in this new era of cooperation and ever-increasing inter-dependence, why must we emulate an outdated post-World War II model? Does simply continuing along the beaten path reflect a balanced and realistic approach? We hardly think so. Even though we accept the reality of the current P-5, we see no logic nor rationale compelling us to support such a course of action.
Some maintain that an increase in permanent members will also increase the representativity of the Security Council. But who can argue that the globe as a whole would be better represented by an increase in permanent members. I hardly see a spirit of balance or compromise in simply adding new permanent members.
Permanent regional representation
I turn now to the interesting idea of permanent regional rotational representation. We certainly appreciate its author's creative effort and believe it serves as a valuable reference towards a potential way out of the current situation. However, we regard this concept as not entirely appealing. Delegations including Singapore, Brazil, India, Italy, Indonesia and Mexico raised some serious questions and doubts on this idea.
As several delegations have already pointed out, the major problem with it is that while providing a possible way out for a certain regional group, it could hardly be an exit for others. In effect, this formula may further compound matters for some regions and require us to wait a very "long" time to get them on board.
This formula also gives the impression that those countries selected by region represent their regional constituency. We are particularly uneasy with this. Article 23 of the Charter of the UN states: "...due regard, specially paid to equitable geographical distribution." In that, we see a distinction between geographical "distribution" and geographical "representation". Nobody denies that Council members should be equitably distributed in geographical terms. However, I am sure the Charter never intended for geographical sectors to be represented by one or a group of countries. The five current regional groups were established in the United Nations for the practical purpose of elections to ensure equitable geographical "distribution".
Revision and possible extension of the veto
Concerning the subject of the veto, my delegation believes this system needs to be reconditioned and revised in such a way as to reduce its overuse or abuse. In this regard, we welcome wholeheartedly the consolidating trend of not resorting to the veto in the work of the Security Council since the collapse of the Cold War. But a trend is one thing and an entrenched right is another. We all know that the true power of veto also lies in the threat of its use.
Therefore, we support the idea of circumscribing the scope of veto to Security Council decisions under Chapter 7, which was endorsed by the NAM and elaborated by the Ambassador of Mexico.
Another primary issue with respect to the veto system is its extension to potential permanent members. We note that some delegations are pushing for equality among permanent members. I personally have always found "equality" to be an attractive goal. Yet this issue begs an important question. Is equality among a chosen few more important than equality among all members of the United Nations?
In this regard, I recall the Brazilian ambassador's interesting observation that increased competition among veto-holders would accentuate the exceptional nature of the veto, ultimately contributing to its neutralization. But who can predict the outcome of an untried experiment? Unfortunately, history can not be made an object of experimentation.
It is possible that the more veto holders there are, the more overuse or abuse of veto power there will be; effectively paralyzing the functioning of the Security Council mandated by the UN Charter. In particular, sensitive and important issues may rarely appear in the agenda of the Security Council wherein abundant veto power would await. This is a very important point we have to bear in mind.
We note that the argument in favor of granting veto power to new permanent members is presented mainly by those ambitious to assume permanent membership. This is yet another source of our concern over the expansion of permanent membership.
Periodic review
As to the subject of periodic review on the composition of the Security Council, my delegation supports that notion, simply because we believe that nothing is forever and that all things must be checked against time. The qualifications of Security Council members should be no exception in this regard.
The question of periodic review is a broad issue. But today I want to concentrate on the ways by which we can review the qualifications of Council members. In addressing the question of reviewing qualifications, one naturally thinks in terms of objective criteria.
Thus, the question becomes: What is "objective"? There are certainly quantifiable criteria such as population, national income and financial contributions to the United Nations. But there are also many unquantifiable criteria including spiritual or cultural contributions to the international community, leadership, moral stature and the willingness and capacity to uphold the fundamental principles of peace and justice. These are equally important elements to some delegations. There are also somegray areas that are theoretically quantifiable yet, in practice, less quantifiable.
In short, it is extremely hard to establish purely objective sets of criteria given the vast number of unquantifiable factors. Moreover, any attempt to precisely establish objective criteria would create serious political difficulties because it corresponds positively to some countries and negatively to others.
Therefore, as a credible process either complementing or superseding objective criteria, we emphasize the importance of democratic elections in the General Assembly in determining Council members. We may benefit from the wisdom and experience of the majority to identify those countries best suited to the responsibilities of the Council at a given point in time. We believe that "democratic" review in the form of elections should be considered an essential component of the entire system.
Expansion of non-permanent membership and longer tenure
Finally, regarding the subject of non-permanent membership, my delegation notes a substantial degree of convergence of opinion on the need for expansion. If we are unable to narrow the gap between opposing views on the expansion of permanent membership, one option would be an increase in the non-permanent category only, bringing the total size of the Security Council to the low or mid twenties.
In contemplating the appropriate expansion of non-permanent membership, we do not necessarily have to restrict our consideration to the original two-year term. We might as well explore the possibility of adding longer-tenure members to the current 10 two-year term membership, if such an idea serves as an important element in a compromising package.
Longer tenure could mean more credibility, consistency and additional responsibilities and obligations, perhaps including a greater financial contribution. Therefore, adding several members with a longer term may enhance the overall representativity, effectiveness and credibility of the Security Council.
It is our view that the introduction of longer term non-permanent members, with no discriminatory pre-selection process but the ban on immediate re-election still in place, warrants further consideration.
Mr. Chairman,
In this extensive process of Security Council reform, we should keep three things in mind: one, the fifty-year anniversary of the United Nations is now behind us; two, the new millennium is only four years away; and three, the United Nations is the glaring focus of international public attention.
Whether or not we break from the status quo of the Security Council to meet the demands of a burgeoning new era, depends upon the political will of each and every one of us. We must continue to search for a solution which we can all live with and that future generations can build upon.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
