Global Policy Forum

I would like to congratulate the organizers for having convened this seminar to discuss an interesting and important issue that has been a focus of attention at the United Nations in recent months. I intend to concentrate on the main issues, setting out the specific Colombian proposals on the subject.

We attach great importance to the Security Council reform process. It is a crucial and important issue under consideration at the United Nations. Enlargement of the Security Council and reforms in its functioning and working methods are indeed inseparable aspects of the same process.

Nowadays, the United Nations--and in particular the Security Council--need to be prudent, cautious and responsible in decision- making. The Council is currently formulating policy as regards international peace and security and setting very complex precedents that could prove counterproductive for the United Nations and jeopardize its credibility. We must not be associated now or in the future with loss of prestige, irresponsibility, incompetence or even belligerence. On the contrary, we must be identified with the peaceful political settlement of disputes, as was the original desire at San Francisco.

The Need for Accountability

The activity of the Council is of such permanent nature, that all members of the Organization ought to be well-informed. We are at a crossroads in the history of international relations in which the Security Council is one of the major players. The council has in the last few years, contributed to shaping new power relations, and this is the reason why, its increasing role and influence should imply accountability towards the General Assembly which is the sole universal legislative forum in the Organization. To the end, the interaction between the Security Council and the General Assembly becomes of paramount importance; and transparency in its work becomes a fundamental instrument for the effective exercise of such accountability.

Since the General Assembly is an integral part of the collective security system, we are convinced that full and complete information and transparency in the deliberations of the council would benefit the entire system, including the Council, since it would ensure the legitimacy of its actions and confidence in its members.

In this context, we have proposed the creation, according to Article 22 of the Charter, of a subsidiary body of the General Assembly that would maintain permanent communication to support the decisions of the Council and would receive, before adoption of decisions by the Council, comprehensive information in a systematic manner of the substantive debate and relevant considerations concerning the evolution of any given situation.

In return, the General Assembly would contribute with pertinent observations on the situations according to the Charter and especially in relation to the provisions of article 11.

This subsidiary body would entitle its chairman--possibly the Presi-dent of the General Assembly or one of its Vice-Presidents-- to be spokes-man of the general membership. The spokesman could be invited to formal meetings and informal consultations of the Council. We have suggested that formal and regular consultations should be established during the decision-making process. Through these, the Security Council could consider the views of interested Member States or groups of states, regional organizations and/or the experts on specific problems.

Similarly, verbal and direct summaries presented by the President of the Council or a spokesman acting on his/her behalf, with the possibility of exchanging views with Member States and the publication of the records prepared by the Secretariat, would contribute to the flow of information and enhance transparency. It is totally unacceptable for Member States to obtain important information through hasty personal favors from the participants to the "secret" meetings.

We have also called to the attention of the general membership the importance of the revision of the "eternal" Provisional Rules of Procedure by the council. The revision should reflect the different proposals express-ed by Member States aimed at enhancing the representative character, transparency and legitimacy of the Security Council. Special attention should be given to rules 51 and 57 because they tend to block the diffu-sion of information. If rule 51 has lesser scope because it refers to an ongoing process, in rule 57 the Security Council grants itself the right to censor and withhold information from member states. This irregularity should be considered in detail and should be certainly modified.

Power at Stake

The role of the United Nations in the field of international peace and security has been expanding significantly, both in quantity and in quality. The Council has increasingly enlarged its responsibilities, to the point of infringement on other organs' jurisdictions. That is to say, the overstepping of its competencies is contrary to the constitutional mandate as provided for in the Charter for this organ.

We are particularly concerned with the progressive abuse of the concept of threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. We have to be careful in protecting the credibility of the Council by ensuring the legitimacy of its decisions. We are also extremely concerned at the abuse of the Council's discretionary powers. It may be true that the Security Council needs a certain degree of discretion and interpretation for its practical functioning. However, it is also true that the Council is not above the law and cannot act with absolute sovereignty.

We have argued that political control of the actions of the Security Council, emanating from the General Assembly, is necessary to prevent the consolidation of absolute powers. These, by their nature, foster corruption and are inadmissible. They induce arbitrary decisions and corruption at the national level. Likewise, they are a source of abuses of authority, arbitrary rulings and finally, corruption at the multilateral and international level.

In this context, we have suggested on several occasions the importance of adopting a mechanism of judicial review by which the legality of the acts of the Security Council could be determined. This judicial review would embrace the legitimacy required for the Council's decisions and would entail greater sense of responsibility to its members in the performance of their functions in conformity with the Charter.

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Therefore, it is a suitable body to monitor the actions of the Security Council when they affect the international community. Thus, we recommend the creation of a "Chamber of the Charter" in accordance with the Court statute, to regulate the compliance of the actions of the Security Council with the Charter.

Efficiency of the Security Council is a political and power- related problem. We should bear in mind that for 45 years, the Council was practically paralyzed, partly due to the political confrontation of the superpowers and due to the use of the veto by life-time members. Therefore, there is no direct relation between the efficiency of the Security Council and the number of its members, as it is argued by some. The Security council was inefficient with 10 members, it was inefficient with 15 members and it will continue to be inefficient with no matter how many members, if the political conditions predominating then would prevail again.

The Veto: Question of Power

The veto was the result of a particular situation at the end of the Second World War, in which the superpower confrontation dominated the system. The veto had to be accepted despite the privileges that it entailed and despite the fact that it is an outrage against the will of the majority. Moreover, some countries that were granted the veto were not at that time and are not today, superpowers. Specific and well-known and historic and political factors determined the events of 1945.

Another highly questionable aspect of this problem is the presence of life-time ("permanent") members in the Security Council. The General Assembly should periodically ratify the service of all the members of the Security Council. Only then, would we guarantee a Security Council comprised of members widely supported by the community. States that interpret the general will could be reelected but they could never be life-time (permanent) members as a granted right.

In this regard we have suggested a number of steps to limit and eventually eliminate the veto, such as:

• the submission by the majority of the members present and voting to the General Assembly, for its review, of a given decision in which a veto was used. The modification of the Security Council decisions could, as an alternative, be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

• the limitation of the use of the veto exclusively to the decisions adopted under Chapter Seven of the Charter. Various possibilities could arise, because the Charter only referred to the "concurring votes of the permanent members" on non-procedural matters. We could hardly conceive conciliatory efforts of Chapter Six or similar diplomatic actions to be blocked with a veto. This provision could be the first transitional period toward dismantling the veto, and it could last for about five years.

• the next step, prior to the complete elimination of the veto, could incorporate a multiple veto. In this respect, it would be necessary that several countries coincide in their determination to veto a decision. This would progressively prevent one State's position from having priority over others. We are seeking to render increasingly difficult the exercise of the veto, inducing therefore the Security Council to work with the concurrence of the majority and not by the will of one of its members.

Expansion of the Security Council

We support an expansion of the Council based on the principle of geographical distribution in which life-time (permanent) members should be included for the geographical balance within the Security Council. A new composition of the Council cannot be the product of criteria designed to accommodate certain preselected countries. A flexible and long-lasting reform should avoid explicit reference to any particular state. Therefore, we are convinced that flexible, democratic, open, long-term and adjusting mechanisms benefit all member states.

In this process of revision and considering our previous discussion, we believe that the life-time (permanent) member category should be frozen and gradually eliminated. Similarly, the veto power should not be extended to more states. On the contrary, its exercise by life-time members should be limited according to the provisions of the Charter. Therefore, all increase in the composition of the Security Council should be confined to non- permanent seats.

It could be useful to study the possibility of introducing a system of reelection of some non-permanent seats. Reelection should be decided by the General Assembly. That is to say, that the entire membership would ratify those states that could serve the international community for additional periods. The remaining non-permanent seats would follow the current procedure of election in order to ensure equal access to the Security Council by all members, especially small and medium-sized states.

International Order

Today's international system is different. We no longer identify with the world wars described n the Charter. The 1945 colonial powers with political control over others no longer exist. The problem now is not to decide how to prevent generalized wars but rather how to consolidate political, economic and social processes for sustainable and autonomous development. Instead of repression, violence and the use of force, the world needs economic development and technological cooperation. Since the world has changed, the structure of the United Nations should also change.

Therefore, we deal here with a substantive reform and not just with mere cosmetics to perpetuate non-existent conceptions of the world, that prevent us from reaching appropriate solutions to present problems.

The concept of security of the Cold War no longer defines the conflicts. The crises nowadays express a search to reaffirm national and cultural identity and to enhance economic conditions in all societies. The Organization of the United Nations cannot ignore cultural richness and specificities of each and every society. In this context, solutions oriented to impose the world conception of some states and that of some of the main actors of the international system are inadmissible.

Stubbornness to arm the system and to confer exclusive responsibility to the Security Council when assessing the nature of conflicts, constitutes an action of major irresponsibility on the part of all member states. It is necessary to adapt the method of functioning and to integrate the Security council to the international system and its new realities. Only then, this very important body of the United Nations would discharge with the full confidence of member states, its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security.