A/AC.247/1997/CRP.8 29 May 1997
Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council
Conference Room Paper by the Bureau
1. The purpose of this conference room paper, prepared by the Bureau of the Open-ended Working Group, is to produce a distillation of discussions held during the two substantive sessions of the Working Group in 1997, recognizing that a comprehensive package needs to be formulated to begin negotiations to achieve general agreement on all aspects of the reform of the Security Council. The first part of this paper deals with the expansion and composition of the Council and the second part with the working methods of the Council, the transparency of its work as well as its decision-making process.
2. The size of the reformed Security Council, taking into account representivity and legitimacy and considerations of effectiveness and efficiency, should be from 24 to 26 through an expansion in permanent and non-permanent membership. The new permanent seats will be allocated to Member States representing both developing countries and industrialized countries.
3. The number of permanent members should be increased by 5 or 6. In the event of 5 being the decision, the permanent seats will be distributed according to the following pattern:
(a) One to the developing States of Africa;*
(b) One to the developing States of Asia;
(c) One to the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean;
(d) Two to industrialized States.
* OAU has made a case for two permanent seats for African States.
4. Given that permanent regional representation was discussed, it is not precluded that a region may determine its own selection taking into account regional considerations prior to the election by the General Assembly.
5. The number of non-permanent members should be increased by 4, 5 or 6. In the event of 4 being the decision, the seats will be distributed according to the following pattern:
(a) One to the African States;**
(b) One to the Asian States;
(c) One to the Eastern European States;
(d) One to the Latin America and the Caribbean States.
** In case additional five seats being the decision, the additional fifth seat should be allocated to the African States.
6. In the event that no general agreement is reached on expansion of the Security Council in both categories of permanent and non-permanent membership, an expansion in the non-permanent category only will be considered.
7. The General Assembly shall elect the new permanent members by a two-thirds majority upon endorsement of the respective region or in the lack thereof from the individual candidatures presented to it. Balloting shall continue until all allocated permanent seats have been filled by the required majority. This will take place subsequent to a decision to be taken by the General Assembly on the framework for the comprehensive reform of the Security Council.
8. The veto as a voting instrument relates primarily to the decision-making process in the Security Council and is dealt with as such in the section covering "Decision-making in the Security Council" in Part B of this paper.
9. The question of the veto is closely linked to an increase in the number of permanent members. The view held by an overwhelming majority is that the veto is anachronistic and undemocratic and should be eliminated in a modernized United Nations. The veto should not perpetuate differences and discrimination among members of the Security Council on the one hand or between present and proposed new permanent members on the other. This view has been strongly underlined by the membership. However, the permanent five have indicated that they will not accept or ratify any Charter amendments which aim at abolishing or limiting the veto.
10. Several approaches to solve this problem have been suggested:
· no extension of the veto
· full extension of the veto
· full extension of the veto in principle but linked to a formula which would suspend the application of the veto by new permanent members for a period to be determined
· unilateral (voluntary or binding) declaration by a new permanent member containing a commitment not to resort to the veto ( 100 percent or partially; could also be applied to present permanent five)
· provision to enable a new permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares (could also be applied to the permanent five)
· establishing a list - positive or negative - of matters which are not subject to the veto (applicable to both present and new permanent members)
· instituting some form of a collective veto for possible new permanent members (requiring 2, 3, 4 or 5 negative votes to constitute a veto in the sense now applicable to any of the permanent five)
· in addition to any of the above illustrations a recommendation by the General Assembly urging the permanent members (both present and new) to refrain from resorting to veto either generally or by the way of suggesting either a positive or negative list. Every effort should be made to avoid a veto and to promote consensus-building in the Council. Improvements in the working methods of the Council should help discourage a veto, especially in areas relating directly to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council's decision-making.
11. A periodic review should be conducted on the basis of automaticity every l 0 years, the first of which will be held 10 years after the entry into force of the adopted arrangements and amendments resulting from the present reform exercise. The scope of the review process should be comprehensive to evaluate the situation created by the present reform of the Security Council, including the status of new permanent members - whether their status should be terminated or reaffirmed by two-thirds majority - as well as the questions of the veto and accountability. The review process should also take into account the question of under-representation of any region and its continuing interest in enhanced representation on the Council in the permanent or nonpermanent category of membership, as well as the question of over-representation. The review process should not be subject to the veto.
(a) Established arrangements
12. Under Article 28 of the Charter the Security Council is expected to organize its work so as to be able to function continuously. This includes readiness to hold meetings at any time as necessity demands. The Charter also requires the Council to hold periodic meetings at which States Members of the Council may be represented by other than their current representatives. The Security Council thereafter committed itself to meet at intervals not exceeding 14 days (Provisional Rule of Procedure (PR) 1) and to hold periodic meetings twice a year (PR 4). These commitments have not always been observed. PR. 48 requires the Security Council to hold meetings in public, except when the Council itself decides otherwise, or when it is considering a recommendation to the General Assembly for the appointment of a Secretary-General. In such instance, the Council meets in private. A practice has evolved over the years, whereby the members of the Council meet together informally to exchange views on any matter under its purview. Such informal consultations of the whole are not meetings of the Security Council in the sense stipulated in the Charter and in the Council s Provisional Rules of Procedure. They are held in private.
(b) Improvement undertaken by the Security Council so far
13. By the Presidential Statement of 16 December 1994 (S/PRST/1994/81) the Council declared its intention to increase its recourse to open meetings in particular at an early stage in its consideration of a subject . The Council retained its prerogative to decide when to schedule such public meetings. (See full text of the Presidential Statement.)
(c) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
14. (i) The Security Council should, as a rule, meet in public.
(ii) The Security Council should hold open and substantive orientation debates at the beginning of the consideration by the Council of any substantive matter.
(iii) Open public meetings should also be held, as appropriate, when special envoys of the Secretary-General or representatives of UN agencies are reporting to the Council.
(iv) In certain cases, when it so decides, the Security Council may meet in private and/or conduct its business in informal consultations.
(d) Proposed form of institutionalization:
15. Amend rule 48 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Secunty Council.
(a)Established practice
16. Every in-coming President of the Security Council consults informally and individually with every other member of the Council on the tentative forecast of the programme of the work for the month. Nowadays such a programme is drawn up by the Security Council Secretariat for the President's approval and may thereafter be the basis of consideration by all the Council members during informal consultations of the whole. It is not an official document of the Council.
17. The Council does not issue annotated agenda for its prospective meetings. Only a provisional agenda covering the subject to be discussed is tabled at the meeting for the formal adoption of the Council. The content of the provisional agenda is normally agreed on beforehand by the members of the Council in informal consultations.
(b) Improvement by the Security Council so far
18. By a note issued by the President on 27 July 1993 (S/26176) the Security Council decided that the tentative forecast should be made available to all Member States for information under certain stipulated conditions; namely that it would not be binding on the Council and that the actual programme would continue to be determined by developments and the views of the members of the Council. (See full text of the Note by the President.)
19. As for the provisional agenda for formal meetings the Council has decided that the provisional agenda should be included in the Journal "provided that it has been approved in informal consultations". (See Note by the President dated 30 June 1993 (S/26015 paragraph 2(7).) Allowance is expected to be given for the exigency of meetings called on a day after the day 's Journal has already been issued.
(c)Suggested improvements to the present practice:
20. (i) In addition to the tentative forecast of the monthly programme of work of the Security Council, already distributed to the membership, the provisional schedule of the work of the Security Council for the month, and its updated versions, should also be circulated as soon as they are available.
(ii) The provisional agenda, including expected type of action (e.g. decision on draft resolution, reports, exchange of views, etc.) to be taken at Security Council meetings and an annotated agenda for informal consultations of the whole, should be included in the Journal of the United Nations.
(d) Proposed form of institutionalization:
21. Include this arrangement in the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
(a)Established practice
22. Informal consultations of the members of the Security Council are held in private for the members only. There are no official records of the deliberations of the members during informal consultations.
23. In the course of informal consultations proposals may be introduced and many ideas floated towards eventual formulation into a draft resolution. Some of those proposals and idea may be withdrawn; those that are pursued may undergo changes and amendments virtually each time the members consider them. Eventually, a formulation of them is reached in the form of a draft resolution, which is then issued in a provisional form (i.e. in "blue") with an S/-symbol.
(b) Improvements by the Security Council so far
24. In recent years a practice has evolved, after agreement among all the members of the Council, whereby the President may brief non-members of the Council and the public at large on what transpired during informal consultations immediately after the consultations. The President normally apprises the members of the Council beforehand of the content of his proposed briefing.
25. By a note issued by the President on 28 February 1994 (S/1994/230), the Council decided that, effective 1 March 1994, draft resolutions in "blue " would be available for collection by non-members of the Council. (See full text of decision in paragraph 1 of the Note by the President.)
(c) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
26. (i) The practice followed by the Presidents to brief non-members of the Security Council should be continued on a regular basis. These briefings should be arranged promptly and they should provide more substantive and detailed information to non-members of the Council. Interpretation should be provided for these briefings. The President of the Security Council should decide whether the oral briefings should also be distributed to non-members of the Council in writing.
(ii)The President of the Security Council should make available draft resolutions as soon as the draft becomes the basis for informal consultations of the Council or even earlier if authorized by the author of the draft. In case they are not distributed, the President could inform members of the existence of the draft resolutions.
(iii) Information about the consultations with the troop-contributing countries, as well as briefings given to those countries, should be included in the briefings of the President of the Security Council to the general membership, which should be organized immediately after such consultations have been undertaken.
(iv) Briefings should be announced in the Journal of the United Nations.
(d) Proposed form of institutionalization:
27.Adopt a Presidential Statement on the matter and annex this to the Provisional Rules of Procedure and/or add an appropriate rule in the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
(a) Evolutionary Practice
28. Like the institution of peace-keeping operations itself, which evolved as a measure of expediency outside specific stipulation in the Charter, the practice has similarly evolved of consultations between the Secretariat, and subsequently the Security Council, and the governments providing troops for the peace-keeping operations. Originally the consultations were on a bilateral basis between representatives of the governments providing the troops and senior members of the Secretariat dealing with the subject. This evolved into a more formal format of briefings by the Secretariat to troop-contributors for each field mission by mutual consent as regards timing and frequence. With the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to Somalia with a somewhat enhanced mandate, requiring the use of force in certain circumstances (UNOSOMII), and the increase in the number and size of the field missions, requiring many traditional contributing countries to increase their outlay of troops in the field, many contributing countries have sought more formal and regular briefings not only by the Secretariat but also by the Security Council.
(b) Improvement bv the Securitv Council so far
29. In six statements issued so far the Security Council has responded in various ways to matters relating to peace-keeping operations and to its relations with troop-contributing countries. The Council has responded to various aspects of the question based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his "An Agenda for Peace " and its Supplement, including stand-by arrangements for peace-keeping operations, civil personnel, financial and administrative issues, and communication with non-members of the Security Council (including troop-contributors). In particular, the Security Council decided that with effect from 4 November 1994(S/PRST/1994/62), meetings were to be held between members of the Council and troop-contributing countries, to be chaired jointly by the Presidency and a representative of the Secretariat nominated by the Secretary-General; such meetings to be in addition to those chaired solely by the Secretariat for troop-contributors to meet with the Secretary-General 's representatives or force commanders, or to discuss operational matters. Subsequently, the Security Council decided that meetings would be held as a matter of course between the members of the Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat for the purpose of consultations and the exchange of information and views, such meetings to be chaired by the Presidency of the Council assisted by the Secretariat.(See the full texts of the Security Council statements issued by the Presidents of the Council on 28 May 1993 (S/25859), 3 May 1994 (S/PRST71994/22), 24 July 1994(S/PRST/l994/36), 4 November 1994 (5/PRST/1994/62), 19 December 1995 (S/PRST/1995/61) and 28 March 1996 (5/PRST/1996/13).
(c) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
30. (i) Consultations between the members of the Security Council and troop-contributing countries, both current and potential, should be held promptly and on a regular basis during the decision-making process on the establishment, conduct and termination of peace-keeping operations.
(ii) Consideration should be given to inviting contributors of civilian components and other countries affected by and/or involved in multi-faceted operations.
(iii) Consultations between the members of the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries should be convened by the President of the Security Council upon a request from a troop-contributing country.
(iv) The Security Council should make fuller use of the proposals and/or information received in the consultations with the troop-contributing countries.
(d)Proposed form of institutionalization:
31. Security Council should adopt a new presidential statement on these measures which should be annexed to the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
(a) Established practice
(i) Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly
32. Under Article 24 (3) of the Charter, the Security Council is required to submit an annual report to the General Assembly. The report, which today contains a factual record of the activities of the Council and indexes of those of its subsidiary organs for a period of 12 months from 16 June through 15 June of the following year, is submitted to the General Assembly during the regular session of the Assembly starting in September every year. The draft of the report is prepared by the Security Council Secretariat and copies of it are given to the 15 current members of the Council for their consideration and eventual approval, as well as to the five previous members whose terms on the Council expired at the end of the previous calendar year, who may have some comments or suggestions on the items in the draft report relating to the period of their tenure on the Council. Since 1974 and 1983, the Security Council has abandoned the practice of submitting an annual report that includes a summary of the deliberations at formal, public meetings and of the communications received, respectively. Since then the annual report has become less substantive.
(ii) Article 50
33. Applications by states under Article 50 of the Charter are routinely referred by the Council to the Security Council Sanctions Committees concerned, where they are scrutinized, often including oral hearings and written representations from the applying countries. The applications are also issued as documents of the Security Council. The Committees send their findings in a report to the Council, which includes a recommendation in the form of a draft resolution. If the Council accepts the report, it issues the recommendation as a resolution. The resolution normally contains an appeal to all other states and international organizations within the international community for all assistance to the applying country.
(b) Improvements bv the Security Council so far
34 By a note issued by the President on 30 June 1993 (S/26015), the Security Council announced a number of measures dealing with its annual report, including the following: the report to include an index listing all the Presidential Statements issued during the period, indicating the date and subject matter of each statement; the draft report no longer to be issued as a confidential document to the Security Council members only, but as a document with a "limited distribution" designation, and the draft report to be adopted henceforth at a public meeting of the Council, at which it would be available to any interested delegation (See the full text of the Presidential Statement.)
(c) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
35. (i) Each President of the Security Council should give an analytical assessment of the work of the Council during the month under his/her Presidency to be attached to the report of the Council to the General Assembly. The analytical assessments should also be distributed to the non-members of the Council immediately after they are issued by the President of the Council;
(ii) The annual report of the Security Council should give a substantive and analytical account of the Council's work and it should be made available to the General Assembly before the beginning of its annual general debate;
(iii) The Security Council should, through an appropriate procedure or mechanism, update the General Assembly on a regular basis on the steps it has taken or is contemplating with respect to improving its reporting to the Assembly, including improvements in its working methods and transparency;
(iv) The Security Council should include in its report information on requests received under Article 50 of the Charter and actions taken by the Council thereon.
(v) The Security Council should submit special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration as stipulated in paragraph 24(3) of the Charter.
(vi) The Security Council should, in preparing its annual report to the General Assembly, take into account resolution 51/193.
(d) Proposed form of institutionalization:
36. Annex these provisions to the Provisional Rules of Procedure or add a new rule.
(a) Current practice
37. In recent years a practice has developed (the so-called "Arria formula") by which members of the Security Council are invited to have a frank exchange of views with prominent personalities or eminent international figures on matters of great import to the Council. The request to the members of the Council by, or on behalf such personalities must be sponsored by a member of the Council. The resulting meeting is not regarded as a meeting of the members of the Council in informal consultations; it is not held in the Security Council consultation room, it is not convened or presided over by the President of the Council, and is not even attended by members of the Secretariat (except interpreters). A variation of that practice would have been the so-called "Somavia formula ", under which interested members of the Council would have met similarly to hear depositions by international or non-governmental organizations. The meeting would have been organized by a member of the Security Council for the benefit of all members of the Council. However, the meeting envisaged under that format did not take place; the "Somavia formula" has therefore not been realized yet. Instead, one meeting for the same purpose so far has been convened by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, to which members of the Council were invited, as well as representatives of the other organs interested in humanitarian affairs, such as members of the bureaux of the Economic and Social Council, and the General Assembly Second and Third Committees. Since that meeting was not held under the auspices of the Security Council, it cannot be taken to constitute an endeavor by the Security Council under the proposed "Somavia formula" or any other arrangement.
(b) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
38. (i) Meetings of the Security Council and informal consultations of the whole:
-The Security Council should more often conduct consultations with countries most affected by the decision of the Council.
-The Security Council should invite non-members of the Security Council to participate in the informal consultations of the Council under similar arrangement as stipulated in Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter;
(ii) Informal meetings of the members of the Security Council:
-The members of the Security Council should have more frequent recourse to "Arria formula" where members of the Security Council on the initiative of a Council member can hear views of other Member States.
(c) Proposed form of institutionalization:
39. As far as meetings of the Security Council and informal consultations of the whole are concerned amend rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure to allow participation of non- members in informal consultations as well as to allow fuller participation of non-members in open meetings; other meetings of the members of the Security Council will be left to the discretion of the members because they are not governed by the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure.
(a) Establishment arrangements
40. Under Article 35 (1) of the Charter any member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. In actual practice states often include in their notice a request for a meeting (or an urgent meeting) of the Security Council to consider the subject matter of the notice. The letter from the requesting state is always issued as a document of the Security Council. It is for the Council to determine whether and when to hold a meeting, which if held, need not be devoted to hearing the requesting member per se. By Security Council PR37 any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Council, may be invited by the Council, under the relevant provisions of the Charter, to participate, without vote, in the Council 's deliberations. In practice, again, all non-members of the Council requesting so to participate are routinely invited by the Council to do so.
(b) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
41. The rules of procedure of the Security Council should allow any Member of the United Nations to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The President of the Council should circulate such requests promptly as documents of the Council. The rules of procedure should require that the President convenes a meeting of the Council to hear the Member in question.
(c) Proposed form of institutionalization:
42. Amend rule 3 of the Provisional Rules of the Procedure of the Security Council.
(a) Suggested improvements:
43. (i) The rules of procedure of the Security Council should include a provision or a decision by the Council operationalizing the right contained in Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations for Member States to consult the Council with regard to a solution of problems arising from their implementation of preventive or enforcement measures imposed by the Council taking into consideration also Article 49 of the Charter.
(ii) The Security Council should establish a mechanism to provide relief to affected states under Article 50 of the Charter on the basis of automaticity of application.
(b) Proposed form of institutionalization:
44. Add an appropriate rule to the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council
(a) Suggested improvements:
45. The Secretariat should establish a voice-recording or another appropriate mechanism of alerting non-members of the Security Council of unscheduled or emergency meetings of the Council during nights, weekends or holidays.
(b) Proposed form of institutionalization:
46. The Secretariat to implement as soon as possible.
(a) Established practice
47. Currently, the President of the Security Council and the General Assembly meet for informal consultations and exchange of views
(b) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
48. The Presidents of the Security Council and of the General Assembly should have regular exchanges of views and consultations at least every month and in the event of international crises or urgent developments more frequently. Other interested parties could be invited by both Presidents.
(c) Proposed form of institutionalization:
49. Include in the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
(a) Established practice
50. There are at present six Sanctions Committees established by the Security Council. All the Sanctions Committees to date have issued guidelines for the conduct of their business and for the guidance of States and international organizations in the discharge of their responsibilities under the sanctions regimes. The Committees have all decided to conduct their business behind closed doors. This means that their documents, including the summary records of their meetings, are treated on a confidential basis, restricted to the Committee members only. From time to time Committees submit reports to the Security Council. The Committees often invite, or grant requests by, representatives of interested non-Member States of the Security Council to present their case orally or in writing . Currently, every Sanction Committee comprises all members of the Security Council. The Committees solicit and often receive information from States and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, and individuals on various aspects of implementation of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council.
51. In addition to the Sanctions Committees the following other subsidiary organs of the Security Council are in existence: The Committee on the Admission of New Members, the Committee of Experts, the Committee on Meetings Away from Headquarters, the UN Compensations Commission (based in Geneva), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. A number of other subsidiary bodies have been established by the Security Council from time to time mostly on an ad hoc basis. Those that have not been specifically dissolved upon completion of their mandate must be considered as either dormant or defunct.
(b) Improvements bv the Securitv Council so far
52. In three notes issued by the President on 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234), 31 May 1995 (S/1995/438) and 24 January 1996 (S/1996/54) the Security Council announced improvements that should be introduced to make the procedures of the Sanctions Committees more transparent. They included the following: the use of press releases after Committee meetings to be increased availability to non-Members of status of communication lists under the "no objection" procedure (for decisions on humanitarian supplies) and other decisions by the Committees; each Committee to issue an annual report to the Security Council to continue the practice of hearing comments by States and organizations concerned during the Committees closed meetings and the Chairman of each Committee to give an oral briefing to interested Members of the United Nations after each meeting. (See the full texts of the notes by the President.)
(c) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
53. (i) Sanctions Committees:
-Decisions and/or those parts of the summaries of the proceedings of the Sanctions Committees which do not compromise the confidentiality of the work of the committees should be made available also to non-members of the Security Council;
-[The results of the work of the subgroup on sanctions of the Working Group on An Agenda for Peace, provisionally adopted by the subgroup, should be included in this part when adopted by the General Assembly and the measures adopted should be fully taken into account/implemented by the Council.]
(ii) Other subsidiary organs:
-Subsidiary organs of the Council established in pursuance of Article 29 of the Charter should be more transparent in their proceedings (i.e. announcements of the meetings in the Journal, briefings to non-members, etc.).
(d) Proposed form of institutionalisation:
54. Insert an appropriate rule in the provisional rule of procedure in Chapter IX "Publicity of meetings, records".
(a) Established arrangements
55. The role to be played by the Security Council vis-í -vis the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the realm of the Council's activities in relation to that organ are clearly set out both in the Charter and the Statue of the ICJ. The [General Assembly or the] Security Council may request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal question (Article 96 of the Charter).
(b) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
56. The Security Council, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, should make more frequent recourse to the International Court of Justice, in particular by seeking its advisory opinions.
(a) Established and evolutionary practices
57. Chapter VII of the Charter sets out the mode of relations between the Security Council and regional arrangements or agencies with regard to local or regional disputes or enforcement action under the Council's authority for dealing with them.
(b) Improvements by the Security Council so far
58. In the course of its consideration of the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace" and its Supplement the Security Council has given further elaboration of the desired nature of its relations with regional arrangements and agencies. The Security Council has reaffirmed the importance it attaches to the role of regional arrangements and organizations and to coordination between their efforts and those of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security; it has also expressed its readiness to support and facilitate peace-keeping efforts undertaken within the framework of regional organizations and arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. (See in particular the full text of the note by the President issued on 28 May 1993 (S/25859).)
(c) Suggested improvements to present practice:
59. (i) In its relations with regional arrangements organizations and agencies the Security Council should fully take into account/implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 49/57 of 9 December 1994 and the eventual results of the Agenda for Peace subgroup on co-ordination related to this matter.
(ii) Regional organizations, agencies and arrangements, should be consulted, at appropriate levels, on matters affecting the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter and the relevant mandates of regional organizations concerned.
(a) The question of procedural or substantive matters
60. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 267(III) of 14 April 1949, the Security Council on several occasions engaged in deliberations without definite resolution as to what constitutes a procedural or substantive matter. The matter remains open as to whether a subject matter under discussion or to come under discussion before the Council is procedural or substantive. To date the status quo has been maintained to the effect that a decision to that end is itself subject to the veto.
(b) The question of voluntary exercise of the veto
61. It is now a settled practice that the requirement for an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members on a substantive matter (Art. 27(3) of the Charter) does not necessarily entail affirmative votes by all permanent members of the Council; only that none of them casts a negative vote. There have been instances where a permanent member of the Council has either abstained or not participated in the vote or been absent from the pertinent meeting on a substantive matter and the resulting vote has been held to be valid and binding. Members of the Council must abstain from voting on decisions under Chapter VI and under Article 52(3) of the Charter relating to disputes to which they are a party - the so-called obligatory abstention.
(c) Suggested improvements to the present practice:
62. The Charter should be amended so that:
-as a first step, the veto should apply only to action taken under Chapter VII;
-a single veto will not prevent action on a proposal which has achieved the required majority;
-the right of veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions, as defined by a prescribed qualified majority of the General Assembly;
-the Articles 4(2), 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 are changed with a view to limiting or abolishing the application of the veto.
OR
63. The Security Council OR the General Assembly should:
-update the annex of General Assembly resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949, containing a list of decisions deemed procedural;
-provide a legal definition of what constitutes a procedural matter or clear criteria as to what is of a procedural nature (Art. 27.2 of the Charter);
64. The Security Council should:
-explore further the proposal for a provision enabling a permanent member to cast a negative vote without that vote constituting a veto if the member so declares;
-explore further the possibility for unilateral declarations by the permanent members containing a commitment not to resort to the veto.
(d) Proposed form of institutionalization:
65. Amend the Charter and/or to be included in Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council.
66. If the present action threshold is maintained at the approximately present level (60 percent), the number of affirmative votes required for a decision would be: in a Council of 24: 14, in a Council of 25: 15 and in a Council of 26: 16. Proposals for changing the present action threshold have been made.
(d) Proposed form of institutionalization;
67. Amend the Charter accordingly.
68. The Security Council should finalize its Provisional Rules of Procedure. Towards this end the following steps should be taken by the Council:
(i) The arrangements regarding various measures which the Security Council has already adopted to enhance its working methods and transparency, as well as the new measures discussed above, should be institutionalized as proposed in sections VII-X.
(ii) After institutionalization of the measures described in sub-paragraph (i) above and subsequent to an overall review of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, the word "Provisional" should be deleted.
1 See the following Presidential Statements and Notes of the President of the Council referred earlier
(listed here in chronological order):
- Note by the President of the Security Council dated 28 May 1993 (S/25859);
- Note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 June 1993 (S/26015);
- Note by the President of the Security Council dated 27 July 1993 (Sl26176);
- Note by the President of the Security Council dated 28 February 1994 (S/1994/230);
- Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 3 May 1994 (S/PRSTll 994/22);
- Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 24 July 1994 (SlPRSTl 1994136);
- Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 4 November 1994 (SIPRST/1994/62);
- Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 16 December 1994 (S/PRST/1994/81);
-Note by the President of the Security Council dated 29 March 1995 (S/ 1995/234);
- Note by the President of the Security Council dated 31 May 1995 (Sll 995/438);
- Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 19 December 1995 (S/PRST/1995/61);
- Note by the President of the Security Council dated 24 January 1996 (S/1996154); - Statement by the President of the Security Council dated 28 March 1996 (S/PRST/1996/13).
