February 8, 1999
Statement by the permanent representative of Italy to the open-ended working group on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council
Mr. President,
Your personal attention to the question of Security Council reform and to the work of our Group is greatly appreciated. On a procedural matter considered intractable, you proved to be a mover and a doer, and that a fair solution could be found. Allow me to also congratulate the new Co-Vice-Chairmen, Amb. Hans Dahlgren of Sweden and Amb. John de Saram of Sri Lanka. I am one of the many who are confident that under their capable leadership we can make good progress this year. And I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to thank also their predecessors, Amb. Breitenstein of Finland, Amb. Jayanama and Amb. Pibulsonggram of Thailand, and Amb. Tai Soo of Singapore for their efforts from the very beginning of this exercise.
1. The procedural question, the problem of the majority needed for decisions on Security Council reform, weighed heavily over the Working Group's activity in the past two years. Thanks to your timely and relentless action, Mr. President, on November 23, 1998, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 53/30. By eliminating once and for all the threat of a legal anomaly, this document cleared the field to a serious, in-depth exploration of questions of substance. We are all in debt to you, Mr. President, for the decisive role that you played.
Allow me now to give a brief sketch of Italy's views on the substantial issues facing the Working Group in the months to come.
2. Considerable progress has already been made in our discussion of how to improve the working methods and transparency of the Security Council—the so-called "Cluster Two" issues. An excellent basis for discussion is the latest Conference Room Paper, CRP. 4/Rev.2, produced by the Bureau last year to summarize previous discussions of the matter (annex V of last year's report). What we need now is to capitalize on the progress made, move forward in our discussions, and push for concrete improvements in those areas where we seem to be near a general agreement.
I realize that some delegations feel that Security Council reform should be handled as a single package. Allow me to submit a different approach. I believe we already have enough elements on Cluster II to start working on the text of a good draft resolution to submit to the General Assembly, without prejudice to our continued discussions of enlargement. Such a resolution would introduce and/or consolidate new practices aimed at increasing participation and transparency in the Council's work. This said, the Italian delegation will not stand in the way if the majority feels otherwise on the linkage of the two Clusters.
3. On the other hand, one issue inextricably linked to enlargement— particularly the possible creation of new permanent seats—is the veto. Without the veto, new permanent members would have little or no weight. This point was made ironically but vividly by the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe, Stan Mudenge, at the NAM meeting in Delhi, when he said: "It does not make sense to talk of permanent members of the Security Council who do not wield a veto. In the bovine kingdom, there are bulls and there are steers. A permanent member without the veto is, in Security Council terms, a steer and not a bull. Either they are all bulls or all steers."
Here, we are faced by a dilemma. Those who currently have the veto are unwilling to sacrifice it on the altar of democracy. Therefore, it is easy to understand why developing countries who aspire to permanent seats have also requested the veto. For our part, we Italians hope that the veto would eventually become obsolete through non-use, and recognize that in the last decade there has been recourse to it only in rare instances. Perhaps, in the meanwhile one could search for ways to restrict its use, for example by providing for its application only to issues falling under Chapter VII of the Charter.
4. Let me turn now to enlargement. Ever since my arrival at the UN six years ago, I have sensed that any attempt to increase permanent members would run into insurmountable difficulties. Consider this: three-quarters of General Assembly consists of developing countries. They can hardly be expected to rubber-stamp a reform that would "sic et simpliciter" add two more wealthy, industrialized countries from the North to the current five, all of whom already belong to the Northern hemisphere. Permanent seats therefore would have to be simultaneously assigned to the developing countries. But which ones? It would be most difficult, if not impossible, to select one developing country from Africa, one for Asia, and one for Latin America and the Caribbean to be seated at the summit of the UN's top decision-making body. Decolonization granted the developing countries a sovereignty and independence of which they are rightly proud. Why should they agree to replace the former hegemony of colonial powers with a new virtual predominance of a single country in their respective continents?
To overcome this obvious difficulty, someone suggested the so-called "2 fixed + 3 rotating" formula: two fixed, permanent seats for two industrialized countries, and three "permanent rotating seats" for three developing countries each from Africa, Asia and Latin American and the Caribbean. This plan would shelve consideration of the most intractable question --the veto-- by assigning it to another working group, i.e. to another round of endless, fruitless discussion. But this formula would introduce a new clear discrimination by giving fixed, genuine permanent seats to two industrialized countries, while developing countries would have to be satisfied with pseudo-permanent, rotating seats. Apart from that, another major difficulty emerged. In the selection of the developing countries to rotate: who should be included, and who should be excluded?
Moreover, as we have often said, this formula would establish four distinct categories of membership:
a.The five current permanent members, with veto power;
b.Two additional industrialized countries, Germany and Japan, with fixed seats but no veto power;
c.Nine countries (three from each continent in the Third World) destined to rotate on the so-called "regional rotating permanent seats," also without the veto;
d.Finally, all the other UN Member States, approximately 170 countries, in the fourth and last category.
As Italian Foreign Minister Dini once said, this would amount to a caste division, reminiscent of ancient empires. No Member State, large or small, will ever accept being relegated to a third or fourth-class status; and none of us will ever allow this to happen by our own vote. Furthermore, this solution would violate a founding principle of the United Nations, solemnly inscribed in the preamble of the Charter: the sovereign equality of States. It would also carve in stone concepts that are not mentioned anywhere in the Charter: namely, a contraposition between industrialized and developing countries. After decades of fighting to eliminate discrimination between the Northern and the Southern hemispheres, we must not let the reform process become an alibi for moving backward.
5. In my opinion, six years of talk about enlargement of the Security Council have shown that, apart from the idea of the "quick fix" --rejected by all, including its potential beneficiaries--two main solutions have emerged: one based on rotation, and the other on the increase for the time being only in non-permanent, elective seats. Allow me, Mr. President, to dwell briefly on both.
Let me start with rotation. The word rotation can be interpreted in many ways. In fact, over the past 50 years, some States have been elected to non-permanent seats more frequently than others. In the Italian proposal we sought to formalize this practice by putting forward the idea of "more frequently rotating non-permanent seats." The rotation scheme that we envisioned was meant to bring order and fairness to the system, by formalizing a "de facto" situation. At the same time it would have freed up non-permanent seats for countries that have been traditionally shut out of Security Council by larger countries within their regional groups. Our formula was criticized for trying to introduce a third category of Security Council membership. I am afraid that we can anticipate the same kind of resistance to any other attempt at devising alternatives to the current system of permanent and non-permanent seats.
But, what Italy called "more frequently rotating seats" could, in fact, be termed also "permanent rotating seats." It's six of one, half a dozen of the other. The basic concept is the same. Some countries would seat in the Council more often, or longer, that others. What is critical, however, is that all countries, including those with special rotation, must undergo the genuine test of democracy: elections by secret ballot in the General Assembly.
The position of the African countries is also based on the concept of rotation. Africa, in fact, has requested at least two permanent rotating seats, with the veto. Let me reiterate our appreciation for Africa's request and for its reaffirmation of the democratic concept of rotation. We also understand the insistence of our African friends on obtaining the veto as a necessary component of permanent rotating seats. A permanent rotating seat, without the veto, would be little different from an ordinary non-permanent seat, except perhaps in the duration of the mandate.
6. The second main option is simply to increase, for the time being, non-permanent, elective seats only, leaving open the discussion of other categories. This approach would be consistent with the well-known "fall-back position" of the 113 NAM countries. To assure equitable representation, the vast majority of these new elective seats should go to the regions that are currently underrepresented in the Council, notably the developing countries. This is certainly the most democratic solution. Perhaps it is also the most doable one. By increasing the number of elective seats, it would facilitate the access of all Member States, big and small, to the Security Council. Africa for instance, could have five, instead of its three current elective seats: one for each of the five African sub-regions.
By contrast, adding a handful of permanent members would make the Council more elitist than it is now, and this at a time when, instead, the world is moving to expand democracy. As the President of the Republic of Italy, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, reminded the General Assembly, a simple enlargement of the current Olympus could diminish the interest of the excluded, giving them the dangerous feeling of being marginalized, of being transformed into mere spectators.
7. As for the size of the reformed Council, like some, we also believe that enlargement for the time being should not exceed 5-6 seats. Not long ago, when Italy was on the Security Council, and exercising its Presidency twice, I personally could see how difficult it would become to manage a Council of more than 20-21 members. Mind you, I am not arguing at all that we should keep the status quo: that would be the worst possible solution. But we must guard against an excessive enlargement of the Council that would risk making it unwieldy, inefficient, and therefore ineffective.
8. To sum up Italy's position, we are no less interested in enlargement than others. Italy strongly favors and urges an expansion of the Council, even if only to reflect the significant increase in general membership of the United Nations as a whole. Foreign Minister Dini has repeatedly stated that, while the Italian proposal remains on the table, we are open to other formulas. This, needless to say, on the condition that the formula finally adopted does not increase the number of countries "more equal" than others, does not distance Italy from the other principal industrial countries, and does not prejudice the possibility of a future common European presence on the Council.
Mr. President,
My delegation will return in detail to all of these issues when the Working Group tackles them in the weeks to come. Which brings me to the Program of Work for this year. I believe that last year's Program could provide us with a useful blueprint also for this year. I would suggest only two minor changes:
a) Point 3 of Item 3 reads: "Increase of non-permanent membership (including the possibility of an increase only in this category of membership)." This should be amended to read: "including the possibility of an increase for the time being only in this category of membership."
b) Item 5, "Majority required for taking decisions on Security Council reform," should, of course, be dropped, since a fair settlement was reached on this issue in resolution 53/30, through your good offices.
By following this agenda, we could begin our discussions with consideration of Cluster II. It would also be most useful, Mr. President, if you could kindly circulate a tentative schedule of the sessions of the Open-Ended Working Group between now and July, and indicate the approximate time when we can expect to discuss in the Group the report to the General Assembly. This to avoid the delays, uncertainties, and difficulties of last year, which led to the unprecedented situation of our having to sit here well into the month of August just to finalize a merely procedural report.
Mr. President,
Once again, let me assure you and all my colleagues that Italy remains fully committed to an active, constructive contribution to the Working Group. As in the past, the Italian delegation can be counted on for any and all efforts to make the Council more democratic, more transparent, and more inclusive: inclusive of all, and exclusive of none. In the end, our success or failure depends on our collective efforts, good will and mutual respect. Allow me to conclude with a phrase that I read with delight every time I enter the Indonesian Lounge. In the words of the great Mexican statesman, Benito Juarez, "El respeto al derecho ajeno es la paz." (The respect of the rights of the others is peace).
