Statement by Ambassador Tono Eitel Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council at the United Nations:
Rotating Seats, Semi-Permanent Seats, Regional Seats: General Remarks
1. The discussion in our Working Group has led to several proposals of rotating, semi- permanent, quasi-permanent or regional seats. These proposals establish in general a new category of seats: Seats held by several countries, giving the shareholders the right to more frequent representation on the SC. This kind of seat is neither permanent nor non-permanent. It is not permanent because the seats do not belong to one single country. Neither is it non-permanent because the seats will belong to a selected small group of countries (three, four or five) which divide the seat temporarily among themselves. The rest of the general membership will have no access to that seat. For the sake of simplicity, we can call this entire new category "semi-permanent" or "special" seats. The Compendium of September 1995 (Doc A/49/965) contains some more or less concrete proposals for this kind of new seat. These proposals deserve very close and careful consideration.
2. The Turkish, Italian and Mexican proposals have in common that they exclude additional permanent seats. This basic feature is in contradiction to the views of a great number of Member States who have publicly stated that they support new permanent seats (among others for Germany). In the GA debate on agenda item 47 in November 1995, 94 Member States discussed the SC reform substantially. 22 states expressed their support in one way or another for "semi-permanent" seats. We must therefore seriously discuss their views. But, Mr. Chairman, out of these 22 states, only four states were in support of extreme and exclusive models, models which exclude an additional increase in permanent seats. Four Member States: That is just 2% of the general membership. A greater number of (- five -) Member States, however have ex pressed in that debate their complete objection to a new category of seats.
I therefore suggest, Mr. Chairman, that our discussion of semi-permanent seats be held in an open and unbiased manner, but also be based on the clear understanding that only a tiny minority of Member States links this new category of seats with a fundamental opposition to additional permanent seats.
3. "Semi-permanent" or "special" seats can not be considered to be fairer than other seats. Introducing a system of special seats means giving 20, 30 or 40 shareholders the privilege to sit more frequently on the Council than other countries:
a) This new category would simply institutionalize the advantages that larger countries have had in the past when they were more often represented on the SC than smaller countries. It would mean: Cementing de facto structures. From now on, larger countries would have an explicite right to more frequent election, to the disadvantage of the 79 Member States which have not served at all and of the 44 Member States which have served only once on the SC. All these coun tries would by definition become third class Members. We wonder if they are really interested in obtaining this status.
b) Access for smaller countries to non-permanent seats would not be "greatly facilitated" by eliminating rivalry of mid-size powers.
First: There will again be a similar and natural rivalry among the remaining candidates for non-permanent seats.
Secondly: If the SC is increased by 10 seats shared by 30 Member States, the remaining 150 Member States will compete for 10 regular non-permanent seats. This ratio of 15:1 means theoretically one seat on the SC every 30 years. Under the existing circumstances, 180 Member States compete for 10 non-permanent seats. The ratio of 18:1 leads theoretically to a seat every 36 years. Does a theo retical difference of 6 years (as an example: a country which has never served in the SC would join it in the year 2026 instead of 2032) mean a "great facilita tion" or "greater democracy"? Can this difference compensate a whole region and its Member States for not being permanently represented on the SC?
c) Special seats would downgrade non-permant members. So far, non-perma nent members are the majority in the SC (10:5). In a system of special seats, links between permanent members with semi-permanent members would be automatically closer than those with non-permanent members. Non permanent members would become a minority vis-a-vis combined permanent- and semi- permanent members (10:15).
d) Finally, it is hard to see which criteria could be established to entitle certain Member States to shared seats. There seems to be no fair or objective method which would allow an entire group of 20, 30 or 40 Member States to enjoy more privileges than the remaining 140 to 160 Member States.
4. Many questions remain unanswered regarding the contributions of semi-perma nent members to peace-keeping burdens:
- Will the semi-permanent countries, according to the principle of special fiancial responsibility, be assessed a surcharge for peace keeping operations ? Will this surcharge apply whether a semi-permanent Member State occupies the seat on the SC or not?
- Will the fiancial burden of the 20, 30 or 40 semi-permanent members correspond to the burden of the five permanent members?
- Will semi-permanent Member States be selected according to their capacity to pay increased contributions for peace keeping operations?
- Can the peace keeping contributions of semi-permanent members realistically equal the contributions of possible new permanent members?
5. Other questions arise regarding the election of semi-permanent members:
- What happens, if a semi-permanent state is not elected by the GA? Does one of the remaining shareholders take the seat or does the seat become vacant or non- permanent?
- What happens if more than one semi-permanent member is not elected? Does the remaining shareholder then become a "quasi-permanent" member?
- Can a non-elected Member State compete for a seat of the third category, i.e. a seat of those countries which do not participate in the special seat system ? - Are Member States allowed to refuse special seats and instead compete for the other seats?
6. After all, it seems that shared seats would be a new category of seats extremely dif ficult to handle in practice. Special seats are neither fairer nor more harmonic than increases in both the traditional categories. They raise more questions than they promise to solve.
This does not mean that ideas of special seat systems must not work at all. Some Mem ber States have suggested - without specifying details - an increase in permanent and non-permanent seats plus regional rotation systems. One example is the proposal of the Nordic Countries contained in the Compendium, which reads:
"Regional groups should be encouraged to establish equitable systems of rotation for non-permanent members."
This proposal would strengthen the regional influence on the composition of the Council which is an aspect that in my delegation's view deserves further considera tion. Regional, not exclusive rotation systems, could also serve as an option for those regions which are attributed a permanent seat, but prefer sharing it.
