Statement by Ambassador Tono Eitel Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council at the United Nations:
Observations concerning the Submissions by Belize, Italy, Mexico, the Nordic Countries and Turkey
Mr. Chairman,
I would like to add some remarks to yesterdays' discussions, which in my view were remarkably frank and useful. To my feeling, they have shown three things: 1) If you look closer to semi- permanent or frequent rotation models, they are less promising than at a first glance, 2) They offer neither to the regions nor to smaller countries accountable advantages. 3) They let basic questions unanswered.
As our discussion developed over the last days from frozen cakes to more philosophical items like Harakiri and the theology of seat categories, I would like to come back today to the diffe rent models of frequent rotation seats which we have before us.
My delegation firmly believes that this new category of special seats does not solve our pro blem. As far as the word "shareholder" is concerned, I don't understand the excitement about it. It describes exactly what is the gist of the creation of the new category of rotating or semi-per manent seats: As sovereign a member country may be, it would not have a seat of its own; it would have to share a seat. And that is what, mustering all my knowledge of the English lan guage, I shall continue to call "shareholding".
The Italian and the Turkish model do not differ very much in substance. I don't want to re peat my general remarks of yesterday, but I could sum up what are in my view the basic de faults of these special seats as follows:
- they exclude additional permanent seats, a feature which we and many others feel im portant
- would create new privileges (24-30 seat sharing countries)
- no substantial advantages for remaining 150 Member States; some Member States speak even of "marginalisation" of smaller states
- no convincing criteria for drawing the line between 30 privileged and 150 regular members
- A lot of unanswered questions linked with financial contributions and elections
The Turkish proposal to increase the number of members occupying special seats to 40 would make it even more difficult to justify their privileges compared to the remaining "ordinary" Member States. Let me mention in this context, that one delegation has submitted yesterday a tentative list of objective criteria which could be applied to semi-permanent seat-candidates. This list seems to be carefully elaborated and the intent deserves applause. However, it shows very clearly, how extremely difficult it would be to define which country would be included and who would not be. I do not see how this difficulty could ever be overcome.
Coming back to the Turkish idea of introducing new regional groups, this idea seems to be an interesting one, but it would certainly lead to new problems of distributing seats and balancing regional interests.
An analysis of the Mexican proposal shows, that this model does not change the number of permanent members. In this respect, it misses the chance - as do the Italian and Turkish propo sals - to increase the small number of permanent members and to adapt it to today's realities and a better representation of the regions.
- The proposal reflects better the weight and standing of my country than other seat-sha ring models. It is difficult to see, however, why a permanent seat for Germany is refu sed, but a seat every two years would be acceptable.
- An advantage of the Mexican proposal would be that it avoids to create a completely new category of 20-40 rotating Member States at the expense of the remaining smaller countries.
- However, the rotation between an Asian and a Western European Country is not cohe rent with the overall system of geographical distribution of seats in the SC.
- The proposal does not seem to be fair to Eastern European Countries, which deserve 2 non-permanent seats, and should not be obliged to share one of their seats with another regional group.
- An increase of 5 new seats does not seem to be enough to reflect the new realities and the increase in the membership since the last increase in 1963.
As to the model proposed by Belize, our main observations are:
- The proposal offers an interesting, rather unorthodox approach. The proposal in the Compendium has been amended by the proposal suggested by Belize in the last Meeting of the Working Group on February 1, 1996. The main disadvan tage of both proposals is probably their often technical and sometimes maybe unrealistic approach.
- It does not seem appropriate to speak of permanent or "indefinite" members, if these are only elected for a term of five years.
- The overall number of 33 seats is likely to harm the efficiency of the work of the SC.
Given the character of the UN as an intergovernmental body, SC seats should not be given to agencies but only to states.
- The model of Belize foresees permanent membership for countries which qualifiy on the basis of their contribution to the budget of the UN. This seems to be a realistic approach which should be seriously taken into account when discussing an increase of the traditional category of permanent seats in other proposals.
- The idea of linking the veto of a permanent member with the veto of a non-per manent member also deserves further consideration. In the long run, the veto, if maintained, must be qualified and newly defined in its scope.
An analysis of the model of the Nordic countries shows a lot of positive ideas, such as
- Balanced and appropriate increase in permanent membership.
- The ratio between non-permanent and permanent seats is fair.
- The idea of regions establishing their own regional seat system is a very in teresting one.
Mr. Chairman,
Let me conclude with a remark on the new realities, which, together with the anniversary, are the compelling reasons for our discussion: Since the last reform of the Security Council in 1963 some 70 countries joined. Their interests could not have been taken into consideration when the reform was decided upon. They today make up more than a third of the membership. And, let me remind you, it is as one of those 70 new members that are now asking for their role in the institution, that Germany is seeking her role, responsibilities and aspirations.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
