May 23, 1996
Statement by Ambassador Dr. Gerhard Henze Acting Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations to the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and other Matters related to the Security Council Decision-making Process in the Security Council, including the Veto
Mr. Chairman,
It is not the first time that we are discussing the decision-making process in the Security Council. Doc. A 49/965 of 18 September 1995 reflects the extensive discussion we have had in the past on voting procedures in the Security Council. The document lists the following sub- items of discussion:
VI. A. Limitation in the scope and use of the veto
B. Extension of the veto to possible new permanent members
C. De facto privileges
D. Voting majority
VII. Periodic reviews
The German position in regard to most of these points is known.
On the limitation in the scope and use of the veto, our position is clear: We understand the misgivings that many countries obviously have with regard to the right of veto. Egypt has presented a very accurate paper on behalf of the NAM on the question of the veto. So have Austria and many others. Japan has pointed out that some legitimate circumscription of the use of the veto would be appropriate and useful. The Philippines has recently made thoughtful comments on the veto in the context of permanent rotating seats. Even the Mexican proposal that proposes concrete Charter amendments but is probably too far reaching in a number of aspects deserves interest. We believe that these and other proposals can lead to a dialogue be tween the general membership and the permanent members. Germany, for its part, can accept any reasonable procedure with regard to decision-making processes in the Security Council.
Together with Japan and many others, we believe that the veto power should not be available to a permanent member, be it an existing member or a new one, for the pursuit of its parochial interests rather than for the maintenance of international peace and security. Ger many is open for proposals aiming at achieving this objective in a unilateral or multilateral way.
It has always been one of the fundamental opinions of my country in the current reform debate, that the reform must lead to both greater legitimacy and cohesion of the Security Council. We are deeply convinced that the introduction of new groupings will not lead to this end and is not in accordance with the general philosophy of the Security Council reform which as far as we can see most of us share. In other words: All permanent members should have the same rights and obligations. Obviously the same holds for all non-permanent members. At the same time, it should be obvious from what I have stated above that as far as Germany is con cerned the veto right per se is not an objective for us. We have very early in in the debate stated that we are ready to support a credible and workable compromise solution in the question of veto power. I welcome therefore the calls of many speakers to work towards that end.
Let me also repeat very clearly at this point, what we have outlined in our statement of 23 April 1996: Germany is not going to profit from a "cascade-effect" of permanent-member ship-rights. We are perfectly ready and we are stating this here clearly and openly, that we are willing to bear the consequences of this position.
Mr. Chairman,
The veto discussion, important as it is, should not obscure the fact of the Council's al most daily positive decision-making. Equally important as the question of how to prevent a decision is the question of how to arrive at a decision in the Security Council.
Art. 27 (3) of the Charter states that decisions of the Council on other than procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. With the actual size of 15 Security Council members, nine votes can only be achieved if at least one non-aligned member of regions from the South contributes to the majority vote of nine members. Asia, Africa and Latin-America and the Caribbean to gether dispose of 7 votes, i.e. of a blocking minority. If the future Council is to have a size of 24, as we have suggested in our statement of 10 May 1996, the number of votes needed for the Council to act could be fixed at 13 or 14 (one resp. two votes more than the half of 24 Council members). Given the fact that the Council would then consist of 4 permanent members from the South (China plus three) and 10 non- permanent members of the South (7 from Asia and Africa, 3 from Latin-America and the Car ibbean), these countries would dispose of 14 votes. These 14 votes are complemented by 10 votes from Council members from the North (4 present permanent members, 2 new permanent members and 4 non-permanent members). The weight of the South in Council decisions would thus be considerably increased (14:10 instead of 8:7). Without countries from the South, no decision could be taken in the Council.
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his lecture delivered at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Mexico-City, on 4 March 1996, has explicitely referred to proposals raising the number of affirmative votes needed for the Council to act. He has stated - I quote: "In this way, an effective "group veto" might be created for the developing world - without placing that veto into the hands of any single state. By greatly enhancing the strength and im portance of the new non-permanent members, raising the threshold for Council action is seen by some as a key element of a new framework balancing the possible addition of Germany and Japan as permanent members with the imperative of making the Council more representative by strengthening the voice of the developing world".
I have nothing to add to these words. One thing is for sure: There is no need at all to create special categories linked with new imbalances to obtain eventually a "sixth collective veto power". As I have shown, the "group veto" can easily be obtained by a reasonable and re sponsible increase in both traditional membership categories, the non-permanent and the per manent. It does not matter if there is rotation within the permanent category or if the increase finally results in an overall size of 25 new Council members. In all cases, a strong and effective group veto in favour of non-aligned countries and the regions from the South will be the result.
Mr. Chairman,
Security Council Reform is an immensely important and at the same time very complex issue, as we all know. Perfect solutions that satisfy all of us are indeed difficult to achieve. But a reform is possible now, based on the central requirements of better geographical representation and effectiveness. Such a reform would constitute a considerable improvement over the status quo. At the same time, a review clause would open up possibilities for further improvements. Germany, therefore, joins the many delegations which have argued in favour of periodic reviews. The review would of course have to adress all aspects of the reform pack age, including new permanent memberships. Therefore, by reforming the Security Council we will not create new "eternal" or only "momentaneous" members, but new permanent and non- permanent members. It is as simple as that. Those who claim the contrary ignore intentionally the possibilities which a review clause would offer us. The review clause should in our view be based on three elements:
- it would apply to the enlargement and the new composition and size of the Council, including new permanent and non-permanent members;
- it would be limited and not include other issues;
- it would provide for a review after a certain period. The period should be foreseeable and not to long. At the same time, it should be realistic and not destabilize the new Council and its members from the beginning.
The "review clause" can be a helpful and important element in the final reform package. As the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden - to quote only one speaker - has said in his inter vention in this Working Group on 22 April 1996 also on behalf of four more Scandinavian countries: It would keep the size and composition of the Security Council "up to date" with the realities of the world. This is what we all aim at with the reform of the Security Council.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
