Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations
Statement to the General Assembly Working Group on the Security Council
New York
20 May 1996
Mr. Chairman
We are now virtually at the end of another year's work on reform of the Security Council. We have gone around in the same circle. As in previous years, we have at times been seduced into exploring various deviations. But as in the past, these have all proved to be dead ends. The circle comes back to the same place -- and we are no closer to a solution.
The Ambassador of Norway, at our last meeting, eloquently urged all delegations to abandon their maximalist positions and to look for common ground -- look for compromise.
In response to this appeal I would like to offer a few thoughts on the search for compromise on the key issues.
In our judgement there are really only three issues which require serious political compromises. They are:
We are strongly of the view that if there is to be any eventual package solution there must be genuine compromises on all three of these issues. There are of course other points to be resolved. But these do not require such difficult political choices. For instance there is broad agreement on increasing the number of regularly elected members of the Council. There is also broad agreement within relatively close parameters on the desirable size of the Council.
These issues will largely resolve themselves if and when there is political will to compromise on the key issues. I see no point in entering into a negotiating process on these issues, particularly a question such as the size of the Council, since the outcome is clearly contingent on the resolution of the bigger issues.
So what is the situation with respect to the key issues?
Let me start with the question of states who might enjoy privileged membership of the Council. I use this term rather than the term Permanent Member for a number of reasons.
First, it is a fact that despite the principle of "sovereign equality of all its members" set out in article 2(i) of the Charter, Article 25 of the Charter named five states specifically. For reasons which were compelling at the time, the Charter gave these five named states a privileged status in respect of membership of the Council which is a derogation from the basic principle of sovereign equality.
The second point is that the privilege is not limited to membership. Article 27 confers a special power on the five named states -- the power of the veto. A further derogation from Article 2(1).
The third reason can be found in Article 108. The named states enjoy their privilege and power in perpetuity. They can, indefinitely and unilaterally, resist any amendment to the Charter.
The term "Permanent Member" is used in several places. But in reality it is only a drafting device, a shorthand reference -- a convenient way of referring to the five named states without naming them over and over.
Mr. Chairman, the characteristics of the group of states whose position in the Security Council constitutes a derogation from the principle of sovereign equality are as follows:
These are the Permanent Members.
It is no wonder that they're so often called the "P"s.
It is clear beyond any shadow of a doubt that there is no consensus -- nor any prospect of one emerging -- to simply expand this group by adding a small number of names to the list in Article 25.
No-one, any longer, is credibly able to argue for the "quick fix". Even Japan and Germany in their recent statements on 26 April and 10 May have rejected this and accepted that the "quick fix" would not be an equitable outcome.
Similarly the concept of "quick fix" for developed countries but regional rotation for developing countries has also been comprehensively rejected.
Does this mean that the possibilities for compromise are exhausted? Frankly I do not know. But I think the Ambassador of Norway was undoubtedly correct when he said that if there ever is to be compromise then everyone will have to accept less than their maximalist positions.
The basic question remains. Are we at the end of the 20th Century prepared to expand the number of special states enjoying a derogation from the principle of sovereign equality? And, if so, should the derogation apply to all the characteristics of privilege, power and perpetuity? Or should a different formula be found.
The Ambassador of Brazil on 10 May addressed the distinction between discrimination and differentiation. He said that discrimination was based on prejudices whereas differentiation took into account legitimate distinctions. He pointed out that both domestic and international society employ appropriate differentiation for various purposes.
Let us examine this point a little more deeply. Ambassador Amorim is right. We do in the United Nations, despite Article 2(1) and the principle of sovereign equality already differentiate with respect to membership in the Security Council. Five countries have been specifically named. But there are a group of others who are elected who also quite clearly benefit from a process of differentiation. It is not an institutionalized differentiation. It is not legalised. But it happens. Some countries are elected to the Council quite often. They serve much more often than a process of rotation based on equality would permit.
The real question facing this Working Group -- the question on which real political compromise is required -- is whether we are willing to shift from a system in which this differentiation is expressed through political mechanisms, i.e., the outcome of a secret ballot following an electoral campaign or through a codified legal process which to a greater or lesser extent predetermines the outcome.
Mr. Chairman, this is a very big question. And as I have said before it is not a good time, given the health of this Organization, to be addressing such a big issue.
The maximalist position on one side is to insist that five derogations from Article 2(1) are five too many and that only elections from a basis of legal equality amongst the membership are acceptable. There are clearly many in this room who hold very strongly to that view.
On the other side the maximalist position is the addition of further names to the list of five in Article 25.
If we are to have a compromise clearly both sides will need to move. We will need to explore possibilities which exist to modulate the 3 Ps -- privilege, power and perpetuity -- to a degree that will meet the bottom line requirements of those who strongly prefer election on the basis of sovereign equality of all states.
Mr. Chairman, if we frankly assess the proposals on the table, everyone would have to acknowledge that there is a common thread among all of them. From the Italian proposals at one end of the spectrum to the positions of Germany and Japan at the other, there is a recognition that, if there is ever to be an outcome to this debate -- and I repeat I still doubt it -- the outcome may have to involve either de jure or de facto a further group of countries whose position in the Security Council is privileged.
If the objective is to find a genuine compromise then the debate must turn, therefore, not to whether there will be such a group, but to the 3 Ps; the kind of privilege, the extent of their power and the issue of perpetuity.
Unfortunately if some of the aspirants who wish to be in such a group continue to insist on legal equality with the existing five named states, then the debate goes right back to square one. Frankly that is not negotiable. It is the maximalist position. It is not a step towards consensus. It is a slap in the face to those like the Ambassador of Norway who have appealed for genuine compromise.
And of course, one of the consequences of insisting on legal equality with the five named states, is that those very many states who prefer only elections to the Security Council based on sovereign equality of all states naturally feel justified in reverting to their own perfectly reasonable view of what is the appropriate benchmark for equality.
Simply invoking the concept of equality does not take the argument forward. To the contrary, it is a step back from genuine compromise.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the vast majority of the membership of this Organisation is ready to modernise the Security Council but in order to make that happen there will need to be a genuine package of compromises on all of the three key issues which I have described.
I will come back to the veto again when we next discuss it in detail. I simply recall that it is the subject of a NAM position paper which New Zealand fully supports. But if we are talking about essential ingredients for a package solution, I underline to the five named states that we should all forget this exercise completely if they are not ready to negotiate on this question.
With respect to the working practices and procedures of the Council, this again is a critical issue on which genuine movement is required by the five named states. New Zealand and Argentina have submitted to the Bureau concrete recommendations for consideration at our next session.
In conclusion, I will return to the question of the composition of the Council for a few words.
Mr. Chairman, why is it that the circle keeps coming back to the same place? Why is it that this Working Group is so fundamentally deadlocked? I believe the answer is very simple. The maximalists on one side -- those who prefer no new privileged states -- have shown an openness to consider various forms of privileged status. The Mexican proposal is one example. The problem is that there are still maximalists on the other side who insist that there must be equality with the five named states. So my answer to the Ambassador of Norway is this. When there is movement, when there is a willingness to reach a compromise on the questions of privilege, power and perpetuity -- then and only then will there be progress towards compromise on composition of the Council. But that will not be enough. Such movement will have to be matched by equally genuine steps towards middle ground by the five named states on the veto and on the working methods and practices of the Council.
