Mexican Mission to the UN
April 21, 1998
Unofficial Translation of the statement of the permanent representative of Mexico to the UN, Ambassador Manuel Tello, in the working group on the reform of the Security Council, during the consideration of the question of the veto
Mr. Chairman:
Our Working Group is considering once again the question of the veto in the Security Council. The position of Mexico is widely known and has not changed since the Conference of San Francisco. The existing balance of power in 1945 forced us to accept the voting procedure that the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the three participants at the Yalta Conference, had agreed upon in February of that year.
The prevailing political conditions at the end of the Second World War made it impossible to prevent that five members of the Organization that we were all committed to create bypass the principle of sovereign equality of States to acquire special powers and privileges.
On June 13, 1945, the delegation of Mexico in San Francisco did not support what became paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter. Its text reproduces the formula agreed upon in Yalta by the three victorious powers of World War II. It is worth recalling that this provision was adopted by a vote of 30 in favor, 2 against, 15 abstentions and 3 absent, which proves that even then, the idea of granting privileges to a few did not enjoy unanimous support. The record of this vote is contained in annex 1 to this intervention.
Notwithstanding his opposition to the very concept of the veto, the Representative of Mexico explained that he had abstained "taking into consideration the reasons set forth by the Delegates of the Four Sponsoring Powers and France to the effect that [the voting procedure agreed in Yalta] represents, for the time being, the maximum of common agreement possible among the five States in question, so that if it is not accepted it will be impossible, as they say, to adopt the Charter creating the General International Organization."
In other words, we were told in no uncertain terms in San Francisco that, if the veto was not granted, there would be no United Nations. We were driven by the strong desire to create an Organization to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind", to quote the Charter itself.
Mr. Chairman:
Even before the vote I referred to, many doubts had been voiced concerning the privilege that the victorious powers were considering giving to themselves. As a matter of fact, on June 7, 1945, the "Four Sponsoring Governments" —as China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States were known—, issued a Joint Statement on the voting procedure in the Security Council, as a reply to a questionnaire that the other participants addressed to them.
This Joint Statement of the Four, to which France associated herself, did not satisfy the rest of us, since the future permanent members failed to answer all the questions put to them and furthermore gave an excessively broad interpretation to the powers they were soon to acquire.
It is worth noting that, in view of its shortcomings, the Joint Statement could not be included in the Charter of the United Nations. Nor does it appear in any other legally binding instrument. It is not a document accepted by the members of the United Nations.
At the Conference of San Francisco, the delegation of Australia proposed an amendment to the Yalta voting formula. As is well known, the Australian suggestion amounted to limiting the scope of the veto to decisions taken under what is now Chapter VII of the Charter. This Australian initiative was put to the vote on June 12, 1945, with the following result: 10 in favor, including Mexico, 20 against and 15 abstentions. Five countries were absent. The record of the vote is included in Annex 2.
The votes cast in the two cases I just recalled total fifty, and not 51, which is the number of founding members of our Organization. This is because, as is known, Poland was not represented at San Francisco.
Mr. Chairman:
That is what happened in San Francisco. Allow me now to recall other events which might shed some light on certain positions.
On March 21, 1945, before the Conference of San Francisco, the new Government of France, which was installed once the allied armies liberated its territory from the German occupation, expressed the following with regard to the voting procedure in the Security Council:
"Without wishing to overlook the element of weakness which the rule of unanimity entails for an institution, the French Government admits that it is not possible, under existing conditions, to set in motion the full force of the International Organization against the will of one of the permanent members of the Security Council. It is therefore advisable, in its opinion, to make a distinction, from the standpoint of the voting procedure, between the recommendations of the Council and its decisions, inasmuch as the former do not involve recourse to force. The French Government suggests that the recommendations be passed by a two-thirds majority vote (without qualifications) of the members of the Council. The qualified two-thirds majority (a majority including unanimity of the permanent members) would, on the other hand, be required in the case of decisions...."2
It is therefore clear that in March 1945, the French Government shared the idea that the veto would be necessary only in actions entailing the use of force. In other words, France agreed that this privilege should be restricted to what is now Chapter VII of the Charter, as Australia would formally propose a few months later.
We must admit that this French position was expressed when France did not yet have a permanent seat in the future Security Council. As is well known, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals only mentioned the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China as permanent members, indicating that France would become one "in due course".
The situation changed in San Francisco when, on May 16, 1945, the Conference accepted the Canadian proposal to eliminate the expression "in due course", therefore ensuring that France would enjoy the same privileges as the Four Sponsoring Powers3. One day later, on May 17, France stated that, even though her Government had proposed amendments, it would accept the voting formula agreed to in Yalta by the three victorious powers. The French delegate stressed that he would have favored certain changes if this had not jeopardized the establishment of the Organization.4
Fifty years have elapsed and the situation remains unchanged. The veto, like a weed, spreads throughout the Charter. We find it for the first time in Article 4. It last appears in Article 109.
As we all know, the veto prevents action. The veto does not foster unity, nor does it promote the search of an understanding. More than a responsible act of power, exercising the veto reflects a position too weak to be sustained through reasoning. Blocking the will of others is the only way out when arguments fail to convince. He who wields the veto does not provide alternative solutions: he simply obstructs action. He prefers to impede any movement rather than to face a problem with a view to solving it. It is a paradox: the user of the veto does not impose a particular course of action. He merely stops one that he deems contrary to his interests.
Mr. Chairman:
In 1945, Mexico was elected to the Security Council with a one-year mandate. On October 24, 1946, exactly one year after the entry into force of the Charter and almost at the end of the Mexican tenure in the Security Council, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of my country participating in the general debate of the First Session of the General Assembly, had this to say on the first year of the functioning of the veto, a privilege which had already been used thirteen times, on an average of once a month:
"...In San Francisco we were told that the voting system in the Security Council, as it was finally included in the Charter, was intended to guarantee the unity of the great Powers. If the results of the application of this procedure had corresponded to what was foretold, we should have no objections to rise...Unfortunately, experience has shown that the veto, far from helping to achieve this unity is undermining it in a way which we cannot but regret...We do not think it would be rash to assume that the elimination of the veto would help to strengthen that unity which we all desire. While there exists the certainty that there can be no legal defeat, there is no need to compromise nor to go half-way to meet the opposing view. If, on the other hand there exists the latent danger of such a defeat, it is natural to seek a compromise and thus to achieve unanimity."
Those were his words before the emergence of the Cold War, before a fifty-year long rivalry between the powers led to recurring paralysis of the Security Council, sometimes, it must be said, on issues pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security, but frequently on matters that have little or nothing to do with the primary responsibility assigned to it by the Charter.
Mr. Chairman:
Almost two years ago, on May 13, 1996, the delegation of Mexico introduced in this Working Group document CRP.7, which contains proposals to amend seven articles of the Charter, with a view to limiting the use of the veto to the issues for which it was intended, that is, coercive measures taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Mexican proposal, included as annex 3, fully shares the position expressed by the Movement of Non Aligned Countries and contains the objectives of the initiative taken and defended by Australia in 1945 in San Francisco.
Allow me to make some detailed comments concerning the first proposal in the Mexican document, to amend Article 4 of the Charter on the admission of States to membership of the United Nations. We suggest the elimination of the last clause of paragraph 2, which reads "upon the recommendation of the Security Council".
The Soviet Union holds the doubtful honor of having been the first permanent member to exercise the veto power in the Security Council, on February 16, 1946. From that date on, and up to December 1955, the Soviet Union used the veto on 81 opportunities, 43 of which were to oppose the admission of States applying for membership. On a single day, on December 13, 1955, in the course of what can be labeled as a historic meeting of the Council, the Soviet Union blocked the admission of the following fifteen countries: Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Japan, Laos and Spain.
You may note, Mr. Chairman, that Finland appears on that infamous list. Her membership application was rejected on three opportunities. And today, we have a distinguished Finnish national as Co-Vicechairman of this Working Group established to reform and modernize the Security Council. The history of the use and abuse of the veto on admission of new members is long. The following 20 States suffered the opposition of one permanent member to their application: Vietnam, Italy, Ireland, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Portugal, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Jordan, Austria, Finland, Libya, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Spain, Angola, Mauritania, Bangladesh, Mongolia and Kuwait. The gold medal belongs to the Soviet Union, which used her veto fifty times. The United States holds a distant silver medal, having done it on six opportunities. China blocked a single admission, that of Mongolia. The last veto on this matter took place on November 15, 1976, when the United States prevented the admission of Vietnam. Credit where credit is due: France and the United Kingdom have never vetoed a membership application.
It is difficult to understand on what grounds can the admission of a State that fills the requirements provided for in the Charter become an issue relevant to international peace and security. The veto was used whimsically against States that are now distinguished members of our Organization.
As in many other cases, the exercise of the veto on this issue did not promote unity between the permanent members. On the contrary, it exacerbated their rivalry.
In 1947, at the initiative of the United States, the General Assembly established an organ called the Interim Committee, to examine issues relevant to the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes between the closing of one session of the General Assembly and the opening of the next. In the course of its deliberations, the Committee examined the question of voting in the Security Council. Many proposals were advanced, among which I will single out the suggestion that the admission of new members should be considered among the categories of decisions that should be taken "by an affirmative vote of seven members, whether or not such categories are regarded as procedural or non-procedural".6
This proposal eliminates the veto with regard to the membership application of a State. One could believe that its proponent was the delegation of Mexico. Not at all. What I just read comes from document A/AC.18/41, proposed to the Interim Committee on March 10, 1948 by none other than the delegation of the United States of America. The admission of new members is the first item on the list of the 31 categories of decisions that Washington considered should not be subjected to the veto. This gives an idea of the importance attached by the United States to limiting the abuses inflicted to countries with which we all maintain cordial relations.
Mr. Chairman:
Besides this interesting initiative by the United States on admission of new members, two more permanent members, China and the United Kingdom, also submitted proposals to the Interim Committee on the exercise of the veto.
On January 14, 1948, China proposed that the five permanent members amplify the Joint Statement they issued in San Francisco in 1945 "by adding to it a declaration that the five permanent members, one and all, waive the right of invoking the application of Article 27 (3) in all proceedings arising under Chapter VI of the Charter on pacific settlement of disputes."7
It should be noted that this Chinese suggestion is surprisingly similar to the Australian initiative that was defeated in San Francisco.
On February 10, 1948, the United Kingdom proposed, among other things, that the permanent members, "mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of all the United Nations, would only exercise the 'veto' where they consider the question of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole, and they would explain on what grounds they consider this condition to be present."8
Mr. Chairman:
It should be stressed that these proposals were advanced in 1948, at a particularly difficult time in the history of power rivalry. It is the year of the Berlin Blockade, when tension in Europe reached dangerous levels. In spite of these unstable and insecure conditions, three permanent members made suggestions to limit the scope of the veto.
As we just saw, one of them —the United States— did not consider the admission of new members as an issue that warranted the use of the veto. Another one —China— went even further and indicated that the veto should not be used in questions pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The third one —the United Kingdom— stated that this privilege should be restricted to exceptional cases, fully justified.
If this is what happened in 1948, why would it be far-fetched to expect now a more mature attitude of the permanent five, especially when the Cold War has fallen into oblivion?
Mr. Chairman:
We are perfectly aware that, although we have the support of the overwhelming majority, or if you prefer "general agreement", we cannot impose our will. To make progress in this crucial issue, we need the understanding and cooperation of the five permanent members.
It would therefore be interesting to ascertain whether they are ready to submit to our Working Group concrete ideas to limit the application of the veto privilege.
They could take as a starting point the questionnaire that they received in San Francisco, to which their very broad Joint Statement failed to provide adequate reply. They could also examine the proposals that, as I just recalled, three of them advanced in 1948 to restrict the excesses, as well as the suggestions made by the overwhelming majority of members of our Organization during the past four years.
If they heed the call we are now making on behalf of reason, the permanent members would give tangible proof of their political will to reform the Security Council; of their desire to adapt it to present-day realities, and of their willingness to limit its competence to the primary responsibility for which it was conceived: the maintenance of international peace and security.
At the same time, they would clearly demonstrate that they can accept that the General Assembly, the most representative organ of the international community, has finally come of age fifty-plus years after its birth, and is thus able to responsibly take certain decisions without prior authorization of the Security Council.
- We are convinced that the General Assembly is perfectly capable to decide whether a State is peace-loving and can fulfill the obligations of the Charter.
- We are convinced that the General Assembly should be solely responsible for the very serious decision to suspend or expel a Member State.
- We are convinced that it is high time for the General Assembly to be entrusted with the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- We are convinced that eventual amendments to the Charter should be adopted by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and enter into force when they are ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations.
Mr. Chairman:
We will never accept that, without giving anything up, some of them pretend that their immense powers and privileges be extended to other countries. We will never accept that the result of the reform amount merely to duplicate or highlight differences. We will never accept that the decision arrived at after hard work only multiply centers of power and privilege.
How can anyone in their right mind conceive that the General Assembly at the end of the century, a General Assembly in which 185 sovereign States participate, will accept to establish new centers of absolute power?
Mr. Chairman:
Let me be perfectly clear. It is not our intention to have the five permanent members relinquish all the privileges they currently enjoy. We acknowledge that the Charter, a legal instrument that we have all accepted, grants them special rights and prerrogatives which, being realistic, we will not ask them to abandon.
What we wish is for them to undertake a careful reflection on the role they are called to play in the United Nations of the 21st century, an Organization that can no longer live in the nostalgia of 1945. Merely two years away from the new century, we are in the presence of five absolute monarchs by virtue of the Charter. We would like them to accept becoming constitutional monarchs. We feel that at the turn of this century the permanent members should be willing to share some of their responsibilities with the rest of us, that is the General Assembly.
Mr. Chairman:
The principle of constitutional monarchy was born in England in 1215, almost 800 years ago, when a group of noblemen forced King John Lackland to accept limits to his power and to sign the historic document known as the Magna Carta. In 1787, the United States enshrined in their Constitution a mechanism of control of the Executive Power by the representatives of the people. In 1789, the abuse of power by the absolute king led to revolution in France and the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity were included in the legal system of the Republic. Finally, in this century, the peoples of Russia and China fought against the excessive power of their autocratic rulers.
Nowadays, it would be ironic for the same countries that were able to establish limits to absolute power in their internal regimes, to resist applying to international life the principles in which their very own national institutions are based.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, what we are aiming at is to enable our Working Group to submit to the General Assembly at the end of this exercise, a formula to reform and modernize the Security Council, ensuring that it be more DEMOCRATIC. We desire a more DEMOCRATIC, not a more elitist Security Council. We must build a more DEMOCRATIC Security Council, not one that would stress inequity. We need a Security Council that genuinely reflects the collective aspirations of all Members of the United Nations.
30 VOTES IN FAVOUR: - Brazil - Greece - South Africa - Byelorussia - Honduras - Syrian Arab Republic - Canada - India - Turkey - China - Iraq - Ukraine Costa Rica - Lebanon - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Czechoslovakia - Liberia - United Kingdom - Denmark - Luxemburg - United States - Dominican Republic - Nicaragua - Uruguay - Ethiopia - Norway - Venezuela - France - Philipines - Yugoslavia
2 VOTES AGAINST: Colombia and Cuba
15 ABSTENTIONS: - Argentina - Egypt -Netherlands - Australia - El Salvador - New Zealand - Belgium - Guatemala - Panama - Bolivia - Iran - Paraguay - Chile - Mexico - Peru
3 ABSENT: Ecuador, Haiti and Saudi Arabia
Source: Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945 (UNCIO) United Nations Information Organizations. London and New York. Vol. XI, p. 518
(San Francisco, June 12, 1945 )
10 VOTES IN FAVOUR: - Australia - Iran - Brazil - Mexico - Chile - Netherlands - Colombia - New Zealand - Cuba - Panama
20 VOTES AGAINST: - Byelorrusia - Nicaragua - China - Norway - Costa Rica - Philippines - Czechoslovakia - South Africa - Denmark - Soviet Union - Dominican Republic - Ukraine - France - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Honduras - United Kingdom - Lebanon - Uruguay - Liberia - Yugoslavia
15 ABSTENTIONS: - Argentina - Greece - Peru - Belgium - Guatemala - Saudi Arabia - Bolivia - India - Syrian Arab Republic - Canada - Iraq - Turkey - Ethiopia - Luxemburg - Venezuela
5 ABSENT: - Ecuador - Egypt - El Salvador - Haiti - Paraguay
Source: Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945 (UNCIO) United Nations Information Organizations. London and New York. Vol. XI, p. 495
