Statement by Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations at the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council on 16 June 1999.
Mr. Chairman,
It is now six years since we started our work on the reform of the Security Council, and as time passes and the sun sets on this century and this millennium, the temptation is great to write something dramatic on the pages of history. Alas, matters are far more complicated than they appear, and we have to analyze them with cold caution if we are to prevent a repetition of the sad events which characterized this Working Group a couple of years ago.
Let us for a minute determine what has really happened over the past six years. All of us know, though few have the courage to admit it, and even fewer the strength to say so openly, that this Working Group came into being because of the desire of some to spread around the financial burden of the United Nations budget, a burden which in any case they were not shouldering. The easiest way to do this was then to get the "New Realities" of the world to chip in, something which the New Realities might have been willing to do provided they were duly compensated with permanent seats in the Security Council. In other words, auction the unpaid debt of the United Nations to the highest bidders.
Easier said than done. Any attempt to tinker with the permanent membership of the Security Council immediately brought forth all the inherent contradictions in this exercise. There were those who did not like permanent membership in the first place, because it was discriminatory, because it was anachronistic, and because it was totally undemocratic. There were those who objected to permanent membership because of its intrinsic link with the veto; as we all know, this unfortunate device was a self-serving invention of the victors of World War II, was not a consensus decision even at that time, and certainly commands almost universal disapproval today. There were those who could not understand how the European Union, which is a closely knit single entity, with aspirations to a common foreign policy and a common currency and God knows what else, could possibly justify its two existing permanent seats on the Security Council, and have one of its members claim a possible third. There were those who could not understand why the exceptional rights arrogated to themselves by the victors of World War II should not be adjusted to the new realities by subtraction rather than by addition; realities after all can move downwards as much as they can move upwards. There were those who continued to be deeply concerned at the marginalization of the vast majority of countries, that overwhelming majority which constitutes the Third World, in an increasingly inequitable environment in which their share of decision making in the Security Council was so amorphous and inconsequential.
In brief, if the question were to be asked today, as to whether the Member States of the United Nations would prefer to replace the existing system of permanent membership with an expanded Security Council in which all the members would be democratically and periodically elected, the vast majority, and possibly as many as 180, would come forward with a resounding "Yes". That is the sense of the house, that is the trend of the times, and we can test it out now or at any time.
Unfortunately, the objective of the exercise has always been what has been described as the Quick Fix, sugar-coated with some inducements to lull any opposition into silence. It was then hoped that developing countries would sell their souls for strings of beads and trinkets. It did not work. Developing countries may be poor and needy, but they have a sense of honour, and they do not, and will not, pawn or jeopardize their future. Only the fool-hardy could have believed that they would sell their votes for small change.
So, if we have not gone as far forward as we would have wished, it is not for want of trying, but because our divergences have remained wide and deep, and incapable of being papered over by wishful thinking, or procedural subterfuge. That is why our discussions have zig-zagged from substance into procedure, from comprehensive approaches to thematic approaches, from Cluster I to Cluster II, and back all over again. This does not mean that this Working Group has not made any progress at all over the past six years. On the contrary, it has established quite clearly that there are wide disagreements on the question of the expansion of the Security Council. There are some who believe that permanent membership should be done away altogether, and that pending that ultimate objective, this error of World War II should not be compounded any further by creating new permanent members. There are the self-chosen few, immortalised in a now infamous Para 69 of one of our numerous reports, who believe in the inevitability of the New Realities coming into their own, and who somehow think they can get a free lunch by hanging on to their coat tails, and somehow slide through the exalted portals of paradise leading to the ever-green pastures of permanent membership. There are still others who have convinced themselves that not only will permanent membership be expanded with the addition of member states from developing countries, but that these latter will also be given a free extra bonus of the veto. Finally, there is the vast, if not the overwhelming majority, which would like to see a expansion of the elected non-permanent component of the Security Council only, in order to inject greater balance into its working.
These are unbridgeable differences at present, and one of the greatest progresses made in this Working Group is the establishment of the fact that these divergences are as wide as they are. Only the wise know their own shortcomings.
The second major achievement of the Working Group is the establishment of wide consensus or general agreement about the importance of Cluster II issues. Reform is after all an ongoing process, and reform of the working procedures of the Security Council is necessary and eminently doable. Too much has changed in the Security Council over the past decade, in the increasing frequency of its informal consultations, which were always supposed to be the exception and not the rule, the total non-transparency of its working procedures, and the consequential devaluation of its relevance in the real world. That is why there was such a wide demand that the Security Council should conduct its business in normal public format, open to all member states of the United Nations, a proposal which was then obviously opposed by most permanent members themselves. Their strength lies after all in the veto and in non-transparency, so it is only natural that they should oppose any erosion of these two characteristics.
The third major achievement of the Working Group was the passage in the General Assembly of a procedural resolution by consensus, that no resolution or decision on the question of reform and expansion of the Security Council would be adopted "without the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the Members of the General Assembly". This was a highly significant development, which underscored the desire of all Member States to follow a consensus approach towards the fundamental issues before us, and we all congratulate you for having personally steered this happy result.
I come now to some of the procedural dangers which lurk in the wings as we continue to move forward. Of these the most pernicious is the idea of short-circuiting the open procedures of the Working Group, either by establishing non-transparent sub-groups, or by by-passing the Working Group altogether through the process normally described as "informal informals" of the Plenary. Need I recall that the General Assembly established this Working Group in 1993 to consider all aspects of the question of increase of the membership of the Security Council and all other matters related to the Security Council. Since then, this mandate of the Group has been renewed annually in the General Assembly. Accordingly, we will have to continue our discussions on all issues, including drafting, in a comprehensive, open, and transparent manner within this Group, and this Group only. We do not favour the establishment of sub-groups or of any other working procedures on which no consensus or general agreement exists. We will not be able to accept any ill-advised decisions from the Bureau, or from the Chair, which go against the established procedures of the Working Group, as clearly defined in the resolutions of the General Assembly. In fact, neither the Chair nor the Bureau is authorized to exceed the powers given to it under Rules 35 and 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, which we will defend in their integrity. So, no "informal informals" and no "confessionals" please. The second temptation might be to somehow convert the process of expansion and reform of the Security Council, into a step-by-step approach, with a Framework Resolution first, devoid of any real content beyond pious platitudes, leaving the rest of the exercise to the indeterminate future. This too was tried in the past, and much blood was spilt on the floor. It got nowhere, because the basic working hypothesis of the Working Group is "general agreement" on the proper and comprehensive reform of the Security Council for the benefit of all, and not the desire for trysts with history of any individuals, nor the repressed foreign policy objectives of a handful of countries seeking to buy or slide their way into permanent membership of the Security Council.
So much still remains to be discussed and decided, and we must not attempt to side-step the time that it will take to complete the exercise. The Security Council is one of the most important organs of the United Nations, and any mistake that we might make now in our eagerness to hurry forward will revist us and future generations, just as we ourselves are being constantly revisited by the faulty assumptions of World War II. This reform is too vital to be hastened by the deadlines of the end of an artificial Euro-invented century or millenium. Let us make haste, but let us do so slowly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
